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OFFICIAL    HISTORY 

)PERATI0N8   IN  80MALILAND. 
1901-04, 


•VOXj.       I. 


General  Staff,    War  Office. 


LONDON : 

PBINTED  FOR  HIS  MAJESTY'S   8TATI0NEEY  OFriCE, 
Br  HARRISON  AND  SONS,  ST.  MARTIN'3  LANE, 


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PREFATORY   NOTE 

Tffls  History  of  the  Operations  in  Somaliknd,  1001  -04,  has 
been  compiled  in  the  Department  of  the  Chief  of  the  General 
StafE  from  information  obtained  from  all  ava,ilabl6  official 
despatches  and  reports,  and  from  unofficial  diaries  and  de- 
scriptions of  various  incidents  furnished  by  officers  who  took 
part  in  the  several  expeditions. 

The  first  and  second  expeditions  during  1901-02,  were 
under  the  command  of  Lieut. -Colonel  E.  J.  E.  Swayne,  Indian 
Army,  and  were  controlled  by  the  Foreign  Office ;  the  third 
and  fourth  expeditions  during  1902-04,  were  under  the  com- 
mand of  Brig.-General  Sit  W.  H.  Manning,  Inspector-General, 
King's  African  Rifles,  and  Lieut, -General  Sir  C.  C.  Egerton, 
K.C.B.,  Indian  Army,  respectively,  and  were  controlled  by  the 
War  Office.  The  forces  under  Lieut. -Colonel  Swayne  consisted 
almost  entirely  of  locally  raised  levies,  while  those  engaged 
in  the  third  and  fourth  expeditions  were  principally  drawn 
from  the  native  army  in  India,  and  from  East,  Central  and 
South  Africa. 

With  respect  to  the  two  latter  expeditions,  the  compilation 
of  the  work  has  been  rendered  easy  by  the  many  excellent  and 
clear  reports  and  diaries  which  were  kept  and  furnished  by 
officers  ;  but,  aa  regards  the  former  expeditions,  considerable 
difficulty  has  been  met  with  owing  to  the  general  lack  of 
official  records. 

While  endeavouring  to  confine  the  contents  of  the  work  to 
reasonable  dimensions,  the  aim  has  been  to  produce  a  military 
history  which  may  not  only  be  a  reliable  record  of  events,  but 
abo  an  interesting  and  instructive  study  tor  all  ranks  of  all 
the  important  work  undertaken  by  units,  services  and  de- 
partments, in  connection  with  the  conduct,  organization,  and 
administration  of  one  of  the  so-called  "  small "  but  difficult 
and  harassing  wars  in  an  uncivilised  and  comparatively 
unknown  coimtry,  which  the  Army  (sometimes,  as  in  this  case, 
in  co-operation  with  the  Navy),  is  so  often  caUed  upon  to 
undertake. 


fOFFJClAl  HISTOKY  OF  THE  OPEKATIONS  IN 
SOMAITLAM),  1901-1904. 


CHAPTER   I.- 

General  DESCBiPnos  of  the  Coontiiy. — Peinoipal 
Harbours  and  Ports.— Native  Settlements. —Over- 
sea AND  Inland  Communications. — Land  and  Water 
Transport. — Climate.^Trade  in  Arms. — ^Food  Sup- 
plies,— Fuel. — ^Water. — British  Trihes. — ^Disposition 
OF  THE  Tribes  during  the  Operations. — Internal 
Administration  of  the  Country. 

SoMALiLAND  occupies  that  portion  of  North-East  Africa,  Area  and 
known  as  the  "  Horn  of  Africa,"  wliicili  liea  betvreen  the 
Equator  and  the  1 1th  degree  of  north  latitude,  and  is  bounded 
on  the  north  by  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Aden,  on  the  east 
by  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  on  the  west  and  south-west  by 
I  Abyssinia  and  the  British  East  Africa  Protectorate, 

The  whole  of  the  above  area  covers  some  320,000  square 
miles,  and  is  partitioned  into  spheres  of  influence  amongst 
France,  Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Abyssinia. 

The  British  Protectorate  occupies  the  north -central  Britirii 
portion  of  the  "  Horn  of  Africa,"  and  its  area,  with  aji  average  ^'^^^•■'^' 
length  of  some  300  miles,  and  a  depth  inland  of  70  miles  in 
the  west,  150  to  200  in  the  centre,  and  150  in  the  east,  is  esti- 
mated to  contain  58,000  square  miles,  and  to  have  a  popula- 
tion of  246,000  (1899),  comprising  the  following  Somali 
tribes  ;— Isa,  Gadabursi,  Habr  Awal,  Habr  Qerhajis,  Habr 
Toljaala,  Dolbabanta  and  Warsangh. 


•  See  Map  I. 


As  regards  its  physical  geograpliy  Somaliland  may  be 
divided  into  three  distinct  tracts  of  country  ; — 

1.  The  fringe  of  maritime  plain  between  the  mountains  and 
the  sea. 

2.  The  maritime  mountains  running  paiallel  almost  to  the 
coast,  and  often  intersected  by  ioland  plains. 

3.  The  raised  plateaux  to  the  south,  with  8ubsi<Mary  hills 
linuig  the  water  drainage. 

The  maritime  plain,  a  strip  of  arid  coast,  extends  from 
Obok  in  French  Somaliland  through  British  SomaUland, 
where  it  attains  its  maximum  width  of  60  nules,  to  Gape 
Gardafui,  near  which  it  narrows  to  some  200  yards.  Thence 
it  widens  as  it  goes  south,  until  it  merges  in  the  Mogdishu 
Plain.  Close  to  the  sea  it  forms  sand-dunes,  which  bed  up 
the  drainage. 

The  mountainous  region  consists  of  a  mass  of  mountains 
forming  parallel  ridgea  and  isolated  peaks,  connected  by 
raised  plateaux  and  low-lying  interior  valleys,  all  intersected 
by  ti'igs  or  dry  watercourses. 

The  raised  plateaux  are  separated  by  a  lofty  seaward 
scarp,  some  6,000  feet  high,  from  the  lower  mountains  of  the 
maritime  range,  and  form  inland  a  series  of  gently  sloping 
terraj^es  which  fall  abruptly  to  the  main  line  of  drauiage, 
[  the  Webi  Shebeli,  and  then  rise  and  fall  to  the  Juba, 

b'ttiimgu.  There  are,  in  Somahland,  three  main  lines  of  drainage 

t 


(!)  That  of  the  maritime  ranges  and  seaward  slope  of  the 
main  plateau. 

(2)  That  of  the  inner  slope  of  the  latter. 

(3)  That  of  the  Harrar  Highlands. 

1.  From  Zeila  to  Cape  Gardafui  a  succession  of  tugs  or 
watercourses  drains  the  raised  plains  of  the  western,  and  the 
mountainous  regions  of  the  central  and  easteru  jjortiona. 

Their  general  direction  is  from  south  to  north,  and  conse- 
qaently  their  courses  are  so  limited  that  all  are  of  a  torrential 


nature.  Rising  generally  in  the  main  plateau,  tUey  fluw 
after  rain,  in  bioad  sandy  beds  with  alluvial  banks  through 
the  inland  plains,  and  in  narrow  boulder-atrewn  channels 
through  the  maritime  ranges  into  the  maritime  plain,  where 
their  waters  are  absorbed  in  the  sand-dunes  that  line  the 
coast. 

Of  these  tiigs  the  most  important  is  the  Issi'itugan  in  the 
west,  which  rises  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Hargeisa.  Running 
northwards  down  to  Jalelo,  it  forces  a  way  through  the  sub- 
hills  with  a  detour  eastward  beyond  Aleyalale  to  Hedi- 
gale,  and  gradually  widening  beyond  So  Midgan,  where  it 
drops  sheer  down  40  feet,  enters  the  maritime  plain  near 
Grerigoan  Hill,  losing  itself  eventually  in  various  beds  east  of 
Bulhar.  When  rain  falls  it  is  a  roaring  torrent ;  at  other 
times  there  is  in  places  a  tiny  rivulet  in  the  centre^  sinking 
out  of  sight  and  reappearing  at  intervals.  The  sand  of  the 
bed  is  saturated  with  water  forming  awkward  quicksands. 

The  maritime  range  of  the  east  coast  is  drained  in  the  same 
way  by  a  number  of  tugs  or  watercourses,  which  occur  at 
increasing  intervals  from  north  to  south,  as  the  hills  ^minlsh 
in  height. 

2.  The  drunage  from  the  inner  slope  of  the  main  plateau 
either  finds  its  way  into  the  plains — where  it  is  dispersed  and 
is  then  evaporated  or  sinks  underground — or  else  is  canied  off 
in  a  south-easterly  direction  by  the  tug  Darror  and  the 
tiig  Der.  The  latter  in  its  upper  course  receives  a 
few  insignificant  af&uents,  and  afterwards  little  water 
from  the  northern  slopes  and  still  less  from  the  Hand  on 
the  south,  while  the  Darror  has  apparently  no  tributaries 
beyond  those  which,  coming  from  the  Warsangli  and  El 
Maekad  Mountains,  join  it  near  its  source. 

3.  It  is,  however,  only  from  the  Harrar  Highlands  that 
rivers  of  any  importance  rise.  The  most  northern  of  these 
is  the  Fafan,  which,  Uke  its  tributary  the  Jerer,  forms  stagnant 
poob  in  the  dry  season,  but  in  the  rains  it  causes  extensive 
floods,  especially  about  Faf. 


10 


Both  it  and  the  Webi  Shebeli,  which  always  has  running 
water,  lose  themselvea  in  extensive  marshes  before  reaching  the 
sea,  the  former  south-east  of  Faf,  the  latter  not  far  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Juba. 

The  latter  river  ia  the  only  navigable  one  in  Somaliland,  but 
I  navigation  ceases  at  Bardera  ;  its  source  is  in  the  Abyssinian 
Mountains. 

British  Somaliland  consists  of  the  following  areas,  each  of 
which  has  distinctive  physical  features  : — 

(a)  A  semi-desert  country — valuable  only  for  its  ports 
and  the  grazing  which  it  afEords  to  sheep  and  goats — comprises, 
under  the  collective  name  of  Guban,  in  the  west,  the  maritime 
plain  and  ridges,  and  extends  inland  for  an  average  of  35  miles 
in  the  west  and  under  2  miles  in  the  east ; 

(6)  Qolis,  the  wooded  northern  crest,  some  6  miles  broad,  of 
the  western  and  central  portion  of  the  interior  plateau, 
amalgamates  east  of  Berbera  with  the  maritime  mountains, 
but  in  the  WarsangH  country  again  separates  from  them ; 

(e)  Ogo-Gvban,  the  country  from  Hargeisa  westwards 
which  intervenes  between  Guban  and  the  crest,  and  partakes 
in  its  nature  of  both  Ogo  and  Guban  ; 

(d)  Ogo,  the  southern  slope  of  the  northern  crest  behind 
Guban,  consists  of  a  strip  from  10  to  30  miles  in  width 
of  grassy  downs  or  thorn-covered  wilderness  ;  its  counterpart 
in  the  east  is  the  Waraangh  Plateau  ; 

(e)  The  Darror  Valley,  somewhat  similar  to  the  central 
I  portion  of  the  Nogal ; 

(/)  The  Nogal,  with  good  pasturages  in  its  upper  and 
,  and  sandy  or  stony  plains,  as  a  rule,  in  its  central  portion  ; 
.  and 

{g)  The  Haud,  a  belt  of  thorn  wildernesses  and  pasturages 
(waterless  in  Jilal),  runs,  with  a  breadth  of  150  to  250  miles, 
from  the  neighbourhood  of  Jig-Jiga  in  a  direction  somewhat 
south  of  east  to  the  maritime  ridges  of  Italian  Somaliland, 
and  separates  Ogaden  and  the  Harrar  Highlands  from  Ogo, 
Guban  and  the  Noga!  Plateau  on  the  north. 


11 

The  following  aection  on  the  line  Berbera-Bihendula-GoUs 
shows  most  of  the  above  sub-divisions,  as  well  as  the  general 
geological  structure  of  British  Somaliland. 


JVAritimePlAin  /fAritime  Ranges      Jnland Plain.         Sont&ti  PtAtcau 
■"■■:  JllluyUim       :::^limestone(^DubKT      VV  BathanctJi  limssZona 
lllll  C/Ufrfs <^nd limestones  orthsQoLia  ^ 

%?,o /fecit  f^r/Ue 3&nci:-lcnES      'iW  Arcfteecx-n.  Hot-Ks. 

(  rAjBdeited  line  from  Mirsolxithe  HAudia  th£  Level  oftheS/teiKh  Pass 

»e,  Decoda  IV., 

(a)  Gabon. — (i)  The  Marithne  Plain.  The  maritime  plain 
stretches  inhind  from  Zeila  for  a  distance  of  60  miles,  but  soon 
narrows  to  30  miles  south  of  Harag  Jid,  and  to  but  3  miles  at  a 
distance  of  8  miles  east  of  Bulhai.  Behind  that  town  it  again 
opens  out  into  a  semi-circle  of  some  14  miles  radius,  hut  again 
narrows  to  some  7  miles  behind  Berbera,  whence  it  gradually 
diminishes  to  1  nule  at  a  point  20  miles  east  of  Berbera. 
Thence  to  the  Italian  frontier  It  varies  in  breadth  from  200 
yards  to  2  miles. 

The  Zeila  Plain  consists  of  a  desert  of  smooth  saud,  stretch- 
ing inland  for  1  or  2  miles,  where  a  strip  of  evergreen  bushes 
separates  it  from  a  great  open  grass  plain  which  stretches 
to  the  foot  of  the  Bur  Ad  Range, 

At  Bulhar  the  plain  is  covered  with  a  dense  bush,  and 
between  that  town  and  Zeila  is  studded  with  holeSj  of  brackish 
but  drinkable  water,  which  renders  travelling  on  horseback 
somewhat  dangerous. 

At  Beibeia  the  plain  is  a  bushless  strip  of  white  pebbles 
for  1  or  2  miles  inland,  when  it  becomes  sandy,  and  is  clad  with 


I tb 

^^^    CO 


12 

kkansa  3  £eet  high,  and  witli  scattered  thora  bushes  9  feet 
higher,  It  slopes  gradually  to  a  height  of  300  to  400  feet  at 
7  to  10  miles  from  the  coast,  where  the  maritime  range  rises 
suddenly  from  it. 

East  of  Berbera  it  is  generally  level  and  sandy,  and  is 
occasionally  intersected  by  ravines,  in  whose  sandy  beds  water 
can  be  found  throughout  the  year,  either  in  pools  or  by  digging. 
In  the  Warsangli  country,  however,  it  is  diversified  by  low 
Band  Tiillw  and  rocky  pointe,  and  more  rarely  by  rocky  plateaux. 
The  vegetation  is  scanty,  and  consists  of  salsolacious  plants, 
stunted  arman,  acacia  and  other  thorn  bushes. 

(ii)  The  Maritime  Ranges.  The  north-western  frontier  of 
British  SomaHland  is  marked  by  a  ridge  of  hills,  running  in  a 
S,8.W.  direction.  The  maritime  mountains  proper  rise  in  the 
south-eastern  corner  of  the  Zeila  Plain,  and  at  first  form  a 
confused  mass  of  table-topped  plateaux  of  black  trap  rock  with 
precipices  30  feet  deep,  continued  by  steep  slopes  of  dihris  for 
some  300  feet  down  to  the  river  beds,  which  intersect  them. 
Strewn  with  boulders  or  jagged  and  rounded  rocks,  with  tufts  of 
feathery  grass  in  the  crevices,  and  covered  with  an  open  jungle 
of  khanaa  bush,  these  plateaux  are  very  trying  to  camels,  and 
still  more  so  to  horses.  They  stretch  from  Ogo  almost  down 
to  the  sea  at  Bulbar,  increase  in  height  east  of  that  town, 
and  break  up  into  a  number  of  parallel  limestone  ranges, 
which  vary  in  height  from  1,500  feet  in  the  outer  to  4,500  feet 
in  the  inner  mountains.  The  aspect  of  these  maritime  ranges 
is  very  forbidding  ;  bare  precipices,  flanking  deep  and  narrow 
river  gorges,  alternate  with  rounded  shoulders,  on  whose  gravel 
surface  only  a  low  scrub  can  thrive.  Within  the  ranges,  and 
between  them  and  the  Golis,  are  undulating  interior  plains, 
intersected  by  broad  sand-rivers,  winding  through  alluvial 
banks  and  thick  jungle  of  guda-thorntreeB,or  by  torrent  beds, 
choked  with  boulders  and  dense  undergrowth  of  reeds  and 
thorns.  Between  the  rivers  are  occasional  stretches  of 
coarse  grass,  but,  as  a  rule,  the  intervening  watersheds  are 
stony  and  gravelly,  and  are  studded  with  low  mimosa. 


J 


Eastward  of  Berhora  the  maritime  ranges  mergt  into  one 
another,  and  then  combine  with  the  northern  crest  of  the 
interior  plateau  to  form  an  irreguhir  range  of  Umestone  liilla, 
145  milea  long,  which  limits  the  plain  to  a  breadth  varying 
from  200  yards  to  2  milea. 

Near  the  sea  these  hills  are  but  400  to  1,000  feet  high,  but 
at  10  to  15  miles  inland  culminate  in  a  broken  crest  3,000  to 
4,000  feet  high,  which  forma  the  northern  edge  of  the  Northern 
Hand.  Prom  the  western  frontier  of  the  Warsangli  country 
the  formation  again  changes,  and  the  three  distinct  levels  of  the 
plain,  maritime  ranges  and  Golis  again  appear.  The  maritime 
hills,  brown  and  sterile,  sometimes  of  basalt  or  volcanic 
formation,  form  low  broken  ranges  from  700  to  1,500  feet  in 
height,  cut  by  mmieroua  rocky  ravines. 

(6)  and  (c)  Golis  and  Ogo-Qviban. — The  northern  crest  of  the 
interior  plateau  runs  first  in  a  south-south-easterly  and  then 
I  an  easterly  direction  to  HargcLsa,  whence  it  strikes  in  a 
torth -easterly  direction,  under  the  names  of  the  Assa  and 
lolis  ranges.  It  is  then  broken  by  the  Huguf  Plain  and 
afterwards  runs  slightly  north  of  east  to  the  Italian  frontier. 

From  the  N.W.  comer  of  the  interior  plat-eau,  2,000  feet, 
the  crest  rises  rapidly  to  4,S00  feet,  and  to  fl,500  feet  some 
~B0  miles  further  south.     It  runs  generally  within  500  feet  of 

i  level  to  the  Dubburo  Mountain,  west  of  Hargeisa.  To 
^e  north  it  descends  in  terraces  to  the  plateaux  that  form  the 
western  portion  of  the  maritime  mountains,  and  it  falls 
similarly  from  Dubburo  to  Hargeisa,  and  to  the  country  north 
mI  that  town.  These  terraces  form  the  tracts  known  as  Ogo- 
t,  where  precipices  of  200  to  300  feet  separate  cedar-clad 
lateaux  from  narrow  valleys  of  jungle,  caves  and  mosa-grown 
Here  luxuriant  pasturages  have  sprung  up  in  the 
rich  soil,  a  black  vegetable  mould. 

From  the  Ogo-Guban  of  Hargeisa  the  crest  rises  gradually 
through  the  Aasa,  3,000  to  4,500  feet,  to  the  Gohs  range,  5,900 
to  6,900  feet.  To  the  north  these  ranges  descend  abruptly, 
forming,  as  it  were,  a  gigantic  step,  up  which  lead  the  Jirato 


and  Sheikh  passes,  steep    and    toilsome,  though  improved 
in  recent  years. 

A  remarkable  feature  in  the  northern  slope  of  Gohs  ia  a 
ledge  of  broken  ground,  a  mile  or  two  wide,  known  as  Mirso 
or  the  "  Haven."  This  ledge  runs  some  1,000  feet  below  the 
crest  of  Qolis  for  20  to  30  miles  east  of  the  Jirato  Pass  ; 
although  covered  with  jungle,  and  having  a  shallow  and  stony 
soil,  it  is  a  favourite  pasture  of  the  Habr  Awal  and  Habr 
Gerhajia. 

At  about  45°  40'  E.  the  Golis  range  descends  in  broken 
terraces  to  the  narrow  Huguf  Plain,  beyond  which  the  northern 
crest  of  the  interior  plateau  merges  into  the  maritime  range 
already  described.  But  eastwards  of  the  latter  Golia  reappears 
in  the  lofty  Warsangh  Mountains,  which,  rising  in  precipitous 
steps  of  800  to  1,000  feet  from  the  west,  north  and  east,  run 
for  some  170  miles,  parallel  to,  and  at  a  distance  of  10  to  20  miles 
from,  the  coaat,  tlirough  the  whole  of  the  Warsangli  country. 
At  Pyramid  Peak,  in  the  extreme  west,  this  range  ia  5,170  feet 
high,  then  in  the  next  11  miles  rises  to  7,150  feet  at  Jebel 
Sarut,  and  thence  for  over  half  its  length  forms  a  uniform 
ridge  6,000  to  7,000  feet  above  the  sea,  and  finally  descends 
into  the  Dagan  Valley. 

Dense  jungle,  vegetation,  and  a  little  grass  distinguish  the 
slopes  of  these  ranges  from  the  sterile  maritime  hiUs  below, 
while  higher  up  gum,  myrrh  and  frankincense  trees,  and  a 
variety  of  the  aloe,  abound.  They  are  said  to  have  an  in- 
vigorating climate,  and  water  is  plentiful  in  rocky  pools. 

{d)  Ogo. — Ogo  b  the  resort  of  the  Gadabursi,  Habr  Awal, 
and  Habr  Gerhajis  during  Jilal,  or  the  dry  season,  when  water 
and  grass  fail  in  the  Haud  and  Guban  below.  The  com- 
parative equability  of  the  climate  and  the  presence  of  water  at 
all  times  have,  also,  led  to  the  establishment  of  some  permanent 
settlements  around  which  jowari  cultivation  has  sprung  up. 
The  vegetation  is  more  varied  than  elsewhere,  for  with  the 
thorn  jungles  and  grasses  of  the  Haud  are  nungled  the  cedars  of 
Golis,  and  the  giant  euphorbia  or  hassadan.     The  most  impor- 


tant  of  the  plains  of  Ogo  are  :  the  Daba-Debba  Valley  in  the 

west ;  the  Seyla  Baa  south-east  of  Hargeisa,  where  grass  and 
thorn  jungle  intermingle  ;  the  Shilmale  and  Daldawan  plains 
and  Khansa  Bush,  south  of  Silt,  with  water  in  pools  at  moat 
seasons,  and  excellent  pasturage  of  short  dihe  grass ;  the 
Gralgudan,  Sanak  and  Arori  Plains,  south  of  Sheikh,  all  with 
excellent  pasture,  and  the  first  two  watered  by  the  tiig  Der  ; 
the  Harakatis  and  Negegr  plateaux,  the  latter  somewhat 
deficient  in  water,  and  both  combining  thorn  jungle  with 
pasturage  ;  and  the  green  forest  which  surrounds  all  but  the 
northern  sides  of  Habrji  Peak  to  a  depth  of  7  to  8  miles.  Hero 
^ife  may  be  noted  water  could  probably  be  accumulated  by 
jamming  the  river  which  loses  itself  in  the  plains. 

Behind  the  Warsangli  Mountains  is  a  somewhat  similar 
mtry,  the  Warsangli  Plateau,  which  descends  from  the  main 
rest,  a  height  of  fi.OOO  to  7,000  feet,  by  successive  terraces 
"with  gentle  slopes,  for  some  3,000  feet,  to  the  Nogal  Plateau 
on  the  west  and  the  Darror  Valley  on  the  east.  Luxuriant 
pasturages,  the  resorts  of  the  nomad  Warsangli,  and  dense 
jungle  are  found  mingled  with  thorn  wildernesses  on  the 
plateaux  just  as  in  Ogo. 

(e)  The  Darror  Valley.  (Including  portion  in  Italian  Somali- 
Bid). — The  Darror  Valley  extends,  for  a  distance  of  some 
)  miles  from  the  foot  of  Mount  Hadaftimo,  almost  due  east 
I  the  south  Bay  of  Hafun.  It  is  broad  and  well  defined, 
ing  bounded  by  the  Kurkar  Range  on  the  south,  which  rises 
me  500  feet  and  separates  it  from  the  Northern  Hand,  and  by 
e  Warsangh  Range  on  the  north.  The  width  of  the  valley 
ries  from  50  miles  at  49°  E.  to  10  miles  about  50°  E. 
1  marked  dry  torrent,  the  ti'ig  Darror,  into  which  a 
mber  of  dry,  rocky  ravines  run,  traverses  the  valley.  Al- 
1  after  rains  a  volume  of  turbid  water  rushes  down  the 
i  and  floocU  the  surrounding  country,  yet  at  ordinary  times 
is  no  water  except  in  the  last  50  miles.  In  this  portion 
e  tiig  long  shallow  pools  or  reaches  are  to  be  found  in 
laces  throughout  the  year;  some  10  miles  from  the  mouth 


L 


(here  is  raiuiing  water,  whioli  then  disappears  in  a  mangrove*; 
covered  mud  flat.  The  valley  and  surrounding  range 
generally  very  arid,  but  amongst  and  around  the  clay  and 
gypsum  hills,  some  3,000  feet  above  aea  ievel,  which  vary  tha 
upper  portion,  extensive  pasturages  are  found.  The  bed  of. 
the  stream  from  50  to  10  miles  from  it«  mouth,  which  is 
never  less  than  700  yards  wide,  and  is  shut  in  by  precipitouft 
banks,  50  to  200  feet  high,  is  covered  with  a  vivid  greea 
vegetation  of  tall  trees,  date  and  doum  palms,  and  presents 
striking  contrast  to  the  brown,  sterile,  undulating  plains  and 
hills  above.  But  no  effort  is  made  to  cultivate  anything  but' 
the  date  palm ;  even  the  alluvial  hanks  at  the  mouth  of  the' 
stream  bear  only  palms,  acacias  and  salvodora. 

(/)  The  Nogal  Piam.— The  Nogal  Plain  is  formed  by  th* 
junction  of  two  main  affluents,  the  northernmost  rising' 
from  the  Gohs  Range,  and  the  southernmost  from  tJ 
southern  slopes  of  the  Bur  Dab  and  similar  short  limestoi 
ranges,  which  separate  the  two  streams.  These  ranges  a 
comparatively  well  watered,  but  produce  httle  except  gaxi 
bushes  and  pasturage ;  cut  up  by  rocky  passes  and  nullahfl 
they  render  marching  difficult  even  for  camels ;  otherwiBO 
being  easily  turned,  they  present  no  tactical  difficulties. 

The  pasturage  is  good  in  the  rains,  but  in  the  dry  seasoi^ 
the  grass  dries  up,  and  camel  grazing  can  he  obtained  only  on; 
the  airman  bush  of  the  neighbouring  Haud. 

The  first  affluent,  the  tug  Der,  has  water  running  in  it  on^ 
after  rain  and  as  far  as  Burao,  and  flows  through  a  levdl 
plain,  grassy  on  the  left  bank,  and  with  open  desert  and 
jungle  on  the  right  bank.  Below  Burao  the  Der  spread) 
over  an  open  level  plain  of  excellent  pasturage,  and  is  lost» 
Below  Ber  the  plain  is  open,  intersected  by  numerous  nullahe, 
and  generally  covered  with  good  grazing.  The  latter  continues 
to  47°  E.,  where  the  plain  becomes  arid  and  so  continues 
beyond  Jidbah.  North  and  south  of  both  affluents  and  of 
the  main  stream  an  abrupt  range  of  hills  rises  at  distances  of 
8  to  10  miles  to  the  level  of  the  Haud,  some   500  to   1,00Q| 


17 


These  hilla  ara  aocesBible  to  camels  only  by  the  rocky 
passes,  whicli  occur  to  the  south  at  intervals  oE  4  to  5  miles. 
Numerous  nullahs  intersect  the  Nogiil  Plain,  and  are  full, 
during  the  rains,  of  excellent  water,  which  can  be  found  in 
many  shady  pools  for  some  months  of  the  dry  season,  as  well 
as  in  the  permanent  wella  of  Wadamago,  Odergoeh,  Las 
Elberdali,  Beretabli,  Kallis  and  of  other  places.  The  trees 
and  bushes  found  in  the  Nogal  Plain  are  never  very  thick  ; 
east  of  the  Shilemadu  Hills  are  groves  of  figs  and  dates. 

At  30  miles  east  of  Jidbali,  the  plain,  under  the  name  of 
Dudi,  affords  excellent  pasturage  and  is  more  populous,  but 
at  48°  E.  it  is  again  arid,  stony  and  sandy.  At  49°  E.  it  is 
narrowed  to  a  width  of  about  a  mile  by  the  northern  range 
closing  on  the  southern  ;  here  green  jungles  extend  from  the 
sandy  river  bed  up  the  sides  of  the  hiUs.  At  Garserio  (49° 
E.),  where  the  name  is  changed  to  the  Dun,  the  river  appears 
to  bold  running  water  at  all  seasons.  Curving  then  in  a 
southerly  direction,  the  Dun  below  Daga  Dalola  receives  its 
first  tributary.  After  this  it  turns  west  and  south-west  and 
flows  in  a  narrow  gorge  towards  the  Indian  Ocean,  until  at 
some  1.5  miles  from  the  sea,  it  breaks  up  into  two  or  throe 
channels,  which,  too,  nin  through  narrow  gorges.  The 
northernmost,  the  Uabbe,  is  sand-barred,  as  too  is  the  main 
central  channel,  the  Ail  or  Eildun,  during  the  dry  season,  but 
the  latter  occasionally  flows  through  or  over  the  bar  after 
heavy  rains.  Six  and  a  half  miles  further  south,  and  4^ 
miles  north  of  lUig,  is  the  Gallule,  which,  according  to  native 
report,  is  the  southernmost  channel  of  the  Dun.  Fresh, 
but  brackish,  water  of  doubtful  quality  can  be  found  even  in 
the  dry  season  within  the  bars  of  the  Gabbe  and  Eildun. 

The  Northern  Hand,  which  forms  the  northern  hmit  of  tlie 
Nogal  Plain  retains  a  uniform  level  of  about  3,000  feet. 

(3)  The.   Haud.     (British,    Abyssinian   and   Itahan.) — The 
Hand — a  Somah  word  to  describe  a  country  of  thick,  some- 
times impenetrable  thorn  jungle  with  an  unden^rowth  of  hig 
or  (for  aloes,  and  broken  up  by  shallow  watercourses — is  the 
(8927)  B 


IS 


name  applied  to  a  great  elevated  undulating  plateau,  water- 
less in  the  dry  seaaon,  which  includes  large  strips  of  open, 
rolling,  grass  plains  or  bans,  or,  to  the  south-east,  semi-desert 
country  called  aror.  It  is  probably  the  most  valuable  part 
ot  Somaliland,  for  on  its  pasturages  the  surrounding  tribes 
ato  dependent  for  the  summer  grasdug  of  their  flocks,  the 
source  of  their  food  and  their  wealth.  Its  importance  is  recog- 
nised in  the  Anglo -Abyssinian  Treaty,  which  maintains, 
without  distinction  of  tribes,  freedom  of  access  to  all  the 
portions  in  which  the  two  nations  are  concerned. 

The  Haud  runs  at  first  in  a  direction  south  of  east,  between 
British  Somaliland  and  Ogaden,  aa  far  as  46°  E.  ;  it  then 
appears  to  widen  out  and  to  embrace  all  the  country,  except 
the  Nogal  Plain,  as  far  as  the  eastern  maritime  ranges  and 
between  the  Kurkar  HiUs  on  the  north,  and  a  line  running 
from  Galkayu  to  the  sand  hills  behind  Obbia  on  the  south. 

The  Eastern  Haud  is  divided  by  the  Nogal  Plain  into  a 
northern  and  southern  portion.  The  following  are  the 
limits  of  the  red  clay  or  red  sandy  soil  which  is  characteriatie 
of  the  Western  and  Southern  Haud  : — 

1.  Northern  :  The  mountain  range  west  of  Hargeisa  ; 
thence  a  line  south  of  the  Khansa  Plain  via  Berato  to  Kirrit ; 
and  from  that  point  the  western  and  southern  edge  of  the 
GraUai  and  Shiloleh  Ranges  as  far  aa  the  blufEs,  which,  running 
eastwards,  border  the  southern  edge  of  the  Northern  Haud. 

2.  Western  and  south-western  :  The  blufEa  which  run 
parallel  to  and  above  the  left  bank  of  the  Jerer  and  Fafan  to 
Hahi. 

3.  Southern :  An  east  and  west  line  from  Hahi  via 
Gerlogubi,  Wardair  and  Gfaladi  Wells,  and  the  Dudub  district 
to  Galkayu. 

4.  Eastern  :  A  line  curving  from  the  last-named  wells  east 
and  north  to  the  bluffs  on  the  southern  edge  of  the  Northern 
Haud. 

AooesB  to  the  Haud  up  the  bluffs  from  the  Nogal,  Fafan  and 
Jerer  is,  in  the  case  of  camels,  limited  to  fairly  numerous,  but 


steep  and  atony  passes  ;  eJsewhere  the  outer  edge  of  the  Haud 
has  a  gentle  slope.  The  Haud  itself  falU  gradually  from  N.W. 
to  S.E.,  the  north-western  portion  being  in  pWes  over  6,000 
feet,  while  in  the  south-east  the  elevation  falls  to  2,000  feet. 
Water  is  plentiful  all  over  it  in  the  rains,  which  are  heavy 
as  compared  with  Guban.  But  after  the  first  month  of 
the  dry  season  all  the  pans  and  the  numerous  nullahs  dry 
up  owing  to  the  porous  nature  of  the  soil,  through  which 
much  of  the  rainfall  is  lost.  Then  water  is  to  be  found  only  in  a 
few  permanent  wells  at  intervals  of  three  to  four  days'  march  ; 
of  these  wells  in  the  Southern  Haud,  the  moat  important  are  at 
Bohotle  on  the  northern  edge  and  at  Mudug  {Galkayu)  on  the 
southern,  at  both  of  which  the  supply  is  more  orlesa  permanent,* 
Possibly  the  deficiency  elsewhere  may  be  remedied  by  sinking 
new  wells  to  the  level  at  which  water  is  found  north  and  south 
of  this  portion  of  the  Haud,  viz,,  at  50  to  60  feet  from  the  sur- 
face, as  at  Burao,  where  the  wells  have  been  dug  through  sand, 
or  at  Gerlogubi,  where  they  have  been  hewn  through  rock- 
Or,  again,  tanks  might  be  formed  where  the  clay  is  hard  enough 
to  retain  the  water,  and  much  of  the  rainfall  be  thereby  saved. 

In  the  wooded  portions  of  the  Haud  dense  thorn  jungles 
and  scattered  trees  alternate  with  small  glades  of  durr  grass  ; 
while  ant-hills,  often  rising  to  25  feet,  appear  at  every  100  yards 
in  the  more  open  portions.  The  Southern  Haud  is,  as  a  rule, 
covered  with  thorn  bush,  more  or  less  thick,  and,  apparently,  the 
whole  of  the  Haud  was  at  one  time  so  covered.  But,  especially 
in  the  "Western  Haud,  floods  and  fires  destroyed  the  bush, 
which  was  then  overwhelmed  by  white  ants.  These  erected 
their  mounds  around  the  withered  trees  and  after  a  time 
abandoned  them,  when  wind  and  rain  distributed  the  vegetable 
mould  thus  formed,  and  laid  the  foundation  of  the  bans  or 
grassy  plains. 

Green  grass  is  plentiful  in  the  raina,  but  in  the  dry  season 
practically  none  is  obtainable  ;  camel  grazing  can,  however, 
be  always  obtained  throughout  the  year. 


so 


Mvdtig  oasis. — The  Mudnig  oams — in  tte  shape  of  a  horse- 
shoe with  the  Doho  district,  where  there  is  good  grazing  for 
ponies,  in  the  centre — lies  in  the  Bouth-eastern  corner  of  the 
Haud.  It  extends  from  Badwein  to  the  Dagarir  tank,  and 
ifl  from  60  to  80  miles  from  east  to  west.  It  affords 
excellent  pasturage  to  large  herds  of  camels  and  cattle 
and  flocks  of  sheep  and  goats,  and  has  numerous  permanent 
wells,  important  amongst  which  is  Galkayu,  where  a  fort 
erected  hy  Tuauf  Ali  of  Obhia,  was  once  taken  by  the 
Mullah.  The  country  of  the  latter'a  tribe,  the  Bagari,  and 
of  the  Rer  Ibrahim  and  Ker  Ali  appears  to  lie  partly  in  and 
partly  to  the  west  of  the  oasis,  and  to  be  in  places  covered 
with  dense  bush.  Sub-tribea  of  the  Marehan,  Ogaden, 
Dolbahanta,  Mijjarten  and  Hawiya  frequent  the  oasis, 

Abyssinian  Somaliland  embraces  -. — 

The  Harrar  Highlands. 

The  Ogaden  country,  comprising — 

(i)  The  southern  portion  of  the  Western  and  Central 
Haud  {vide  Britit^h  Somaliland). 

(ii)  The  mountainous  and  billy  country  watered  by  the 
Webi  ShebeU,  the  Fafan  and  their  tributaries,  and 
continued  across  the  former  river  to  the  Juba. 

(iii)  The  high  stony  plateau  eastward  of  the  last  sub- 
division and  north  of  the  alluvial  plain  of  the 
Webi  Shebeli. 

The  Earrar  Highlands. — The  Harrar  Highlands  consist 
of  lofty  peaks,  8,000  to  10,000  feet  above  sea  level,  and  elevated 
plateaux,  which  are  highly  cultivated  by  the  Gallas,  and  more 
to  the  east  afford  excellent  pasturage  for  the  cattle  of  the 
Somalia.  An  eastern  spur  connects  this  mountainous  tract 
with  the  Sau  Range  in  British  SomaUland,  and  thus  forms 
the  north-western  boundary  of  the  Ha\id.  Between  this  spur 
and  the  range  to  the  north-west  lies  an  extensive  plain  or 
high  ban  known  as  the  Harawa  Valley  and  the  Banki  Ellis, 
where  rich  pasturage  similar  to  that  of  the  Haud  is  found. 


'Ogadmi. — The  moutUai?tous  eastern  portion  is  formed  by 
foot    hills    of    the   AbysainiEin   Moimtalns   and  of  the 
Harrai  Highlands,  and  is  roughly  bounded  as  followa  ■ — 

1  a.  On  the  north  by  the  eastern  range  of  the  Uarrar  High- 

^^^H  lands. 

^^^^K  b.  On  the  west  by  the  Errer  and  Webi  Shebeli  as  far  as  Imj, 
^^^^B  and  by  a  line  thence  to  the  Juba  at  Dolo. 

^^^H  c.  On  the  south-east  by  a  line  from  Dolo  to  Bari ;   and 
^^^^K  d.  On  the  east  by  a  tine  from  Bari  to  the  Fafan  and  Jerer, 
^^^^   The  northern  portion  of  this  area  is  a  series  of  ranges  and 
I  broad  plateaux  of  limestone,  or,  in  places,  of  granite,  covered 

with  open  jungle  of  thorn  trees  and  with  high  grass.     The  sides 
I  of  the  hi  Ik  and  plateaux  are  generally  bare,  but  in  the  valleys 

thorn  bush  and  jungle  grass  are  diversified  by  stretches  of 
!  cultivation,  open  sandy  plains,  and  abandoned  tracts  of  jowari 

}  cultivation.     Water  is  found  after  rains  in  the  tiigs,  but  in  the 

dry  season  is  obtainable  only  in  wells  often  40  to  50  miles 
apart.  South  of  the  latitude  of  Milmil  the  ranges  break  up 
into  isolated  hills  some  3,000  feet  high,  while  the  tugs  in 
the  west,  which  generally  have  water  at  all  seasons,  and  often 
are  flowing  streams,  niii  through  gorges,  sometimes  1,000  feet 
deep,  between  alluvial  banks  covered  with  excellent  grass, 
creepers,  undergrowth  aud  tall  trees.  The  plateaux  and  valleys 
become  broader  and  are  often  bare  and  sandy  or  stony,  but 
are  still  interspersed  with  tracts  of  graring  for  camels.  Water 
on  the  plateaux  east  of  the  Webi  Shebeli  appears  to  be  com- 
paratively abundant,  but  many  wells  have  been  destroyed,  for 
the  country  is  thinly  inhabited  owing  to  the  attacks  by  the 
Ogaden  on  the  Gallas,  and  the  counter  raids  by  the  Antharas. 
The  mountainous  country  south  of  the  Webi  ShebeH  is  unex- 
plored,  but  it  appears  to  be  somewhat  similar  to  the  country 
to  the  north,  with  more  jungle  and  extensive  pasturages  for 
cattle  and  camels. 

The  Marehan  Plateau   courdry    of  the  eaat   lies  south  of 
Haud  and  north  of  the  Webi  ShcbeU,  and  is  bounded 


on  the  west  by  the  Fa£an  and  on  the  east  by  a  line 
which  nms  from,  approximately,  the  junction  of  the  Bldairi 
with  the  Shebeli  to  the  Galkayu  Wells, 

Except  along  its  outer  edges  it  is  a  barren  elevated  plateau 
o£  rocky  and  disintegrated  limestone,  generally  open,  but 
occasionally  interspersed  with  thorn  jungle. 

The  eastern  edge  is  a  mixture  of  stony  plain,  khansa  bush, 
jungle  and  pasturage ;  it  is  the  meeting  line  of  the  Marehan 
and  of  the  Hawiya  from  the  south.  Water  is  found  only  at 
wide  intervals,  some  three  to  five  days  march,  both  within  the 
plateau  and  along  its  northern  edge.  But  along  its  other  sides 
a  fair  quantity  of  water  is  found  either  in  welk  on  the  west, 
in  the  Shebeli  and  its  affluents  on  the  south,  or  in  wells  or 
pans  on  the  east. 

Italian  Somaliland  may  be  divided  into : 

(a)  A   maritime   plain,    which   runs   eastwards   to   Cape 

Gardafui,  and  thence  southwards  to  the  Juba  River. 

(b)  An  elevated  interior  plateau,   the  seaward  crest   of 

which  forms  a  broken  series  of  maritime  ranges  and 
which  descends  gradually  southwards  to, 

(c)  An   alluvial   plain   that   stretches   inland   from    the 

maritime  plain  along  the  lower  Webi  Shebeh. 
{d)  The  plateau  country  between  the  latter  and  the  Juba 
Rivers, 

(o)  The  marititne  plain  extends  from  the  Anglo-Itahan 
frontier  eastwards  to  Cape  Gardafui  in  a  low  sandy  belt, 
varying  from  200  yards  to  5  miles  in  width,  and  scantily  covered 
with  a  stunted  vegetation  of  marine  plants,  acacias  and  other 
thorn  bushes.  In  places  it  is  interrupted  by  scarped  rocks 
and  rocky  points  and  hills,  especially  east  of  Bandar  Alula,  and 
between  Las  Khorai  and  Bandar  Maraya  is  but  a  narrow  beach 
backed  by  a  steep  limestone  range.  In  the  broader  portions 
it  forma  low  sandy  bilk  or  plateaux,  and  south  of  Bandar 
Alula  becomes  swampy  and  broken  by  lagoons.  A  few  water- 
courses intersect  it,  but  these  are  generally  dry ;    water  is, 


S3 

wever,  plentiful,  as  too  are  sheep  and  firewood,  at  all  but 
I  few  of  the  coast  villages. 

From  Cape  Gardafui  southwards  the  maritime  plain  cou- 
tinues  a  narrow  strip  of  sand,  scantily  covered  with  bush, 
and  rising  gradually  to  the  foot  of  the  maritime  range.  Aa 
Ear  as  Ras  Ali  Bash  Kit  it  ia  often  broken  by  rocky  bluffs  and 
ranges;  south  of  that  place,  as  far  as  the  Darror,  it  is  con- 
tinuous and  increases  gradually  in  width  from  1  to  5  miles. 
Prom  the  Darrot  to  the  Nogal  it  ia  a  narrow,  broken, 
rocky  coralline  stretch,  200  to  400  feet  in  height,  with 
occasional  patches  of  drift  sand,  and  fairly  well  aupphed  with 
water. 

From  Illig  southwards  to  7°  N.  the  plain  continues  the  rocky 
coralline  formation,  but  around  Cai>e  Garad  are  extensive 
pasturages  which,  mingled  with  occasional  patches  of  vegeta- 
tion, then  extend  as  far  aa  Obbia  between  the  rocky  foot  hills 
of  the  maritime  range  and  the  low  sandy  strip,  interspersed 
by  sand  dunes,  that  borders  the  coast. 

Numerous  herds  of  camels  and  flocks  of  sheep  and  goats  are 
seen  on  these  pasturages,  of  which  the  most  extenaive  are 
near  Obbia. 

A  few  miles  south  of  Obbia  the  maritime  plain,  a  succession 
of  sandy  hills  and  plains,  with  occasional  pasturage  and 
cultivation  of  durra  and  beans,  rises  to  an  interior  sandy 
undulating  plain  of  similar  vegetation,  but  with  also  wide 
belts  of  dense  jungle.  This  interior  plain  stretches  apparently 
from  the  Marehan  Desert  on  the  north  to  the  alluvial  plain 
of  the  Webi  Shebeli  on  the  south-west,  and  behind  Mogdishu 
is  continued  southwards  by  the  maritime  plain  which,  gradually 
changing  from  white  to  reddish  sand,  is  at  first  bare,  but  from 
Brava  to  the  Juba  becomes  covered  with  a  stunted  bush.  The 
whole  of  the  maritime  plain  south  of  Obbia  is  well  populated, 
i  cameb,  sheep  and  goats  abound. 
I  {b)  The  wUerioT  ■plateau. — The  northern  crest  of  the  interior 
sau,  consisting  of  a  series  of  flat-topped  Umestone  moun- 
i,  covered  with  frankincense  trees,  runs  from  the  Dagau 


Valley  parallel  to,  and  as  a  rule  not  more  than  5  miles  fioni, 
the  coast. 

Along  the  IncUan  Ocean  from  G.  Gaidatui  to  Bargal  the 
seaward  crest,  3,000  feet  high,  is  rarely  more  than  i  miles 
inland,  and  descends  in  a  series  of  deep  precipices  to  the 
maritime  plain,  or  sometimes  to  the  sea  itself.  From  Bargal 
the  Gor  Ali  Range  mna  westwards  to  Las  Khorai,  and  forms  the 
southern  edge  of  the  plateau  of  Osman  Mahmud'a  tribe. 
Close  to  Bargal  this  range  turns  southwards  to  the  Gengado 
Peaks,  a  spur  which  sheds  the  water  on  one  side  to  the 
Gulf  of  Aden  and  on  the  other  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  and 
which  also  connects  with  the  plateau  of  the  Isa  Mahmud 
to  the  south.  From  Bargal  southwards  the  main  crest 
diverges  south-westwards  under  the  name  of  the  Suleiman 
Mouutaiua,  2,700  feet,  which,  uniting  with  the  Waraangh 
forms  the  northern  boimdary  of  the  Darror  Valley. 

South  of  the  Darror  Valley  the  continuous  line  of 
the  Kurlcar  Hills  rises  rapidly  to  a  second  limestone 
plateau,  which,  bounded  on  the  west  and  south  by  the 
Nogal  Plain,  falla  eastwards,  at  a  few  miles  from  the  sea, 
to  the  coralline  maritime  plain  by  broken  chains  of  steep, 
rocky,  flat-topped  bills,  1,500  to  2,000  feet,  from  which 
numerous  deeply  ravined  and,  as  a  rule,  dry  watercouraes 
find,  their  way  to  the  sea.  This  stretch  of  maritime  hills, 
beginning  in  detached  or  continuous  conical  hillocks  of  friable 
sandstone,  rises  to  arid,  stony  plains  of  limestone  and  un- 
dulating plateaux  with  thickets  of  acacias,  aloes  and  the  like 
then  follow  in  succession  large  tracks  of  pasture  in  a  chalky 
clay,  rich  vegetation  and  stouy  hills  as  far  as  the  Wadi  Darimo. 
Prom  tiiis  place  stony,  cheerless,  boldly  undulating  plateaux 
with  wide  zones  of  forest  extend  to  the  Agdaldansho  Moun- 
tains, south  of  which  an  arid  and  rugged  country  of  basalt 
outcrop  and  scanty  water  supply — except  for  the  luxuiiant 
valley  of  the  Wadi  Dugaloho — stretches  to  the  Nogal. 
South  of  the  latter  the  billR  gradually  lose  the  boldness  of 
outline  which  characterises  them  further  north.     The  rock 


J 


35 


still  outcrops,  but  is  frequently  interspersed  with  sand  ot 
sand  and  clay.  The  interior  plateau  becomes  more  diversified 
and  undulating ;  good  paatorage  alteraatea  with  sandy  tracts 
now  open  and  again  covered  with  sinnan  bush  or  jungle, 
while  locky  patches  are  less  frequent ;  water  becomes  more 
plentiful,  but  still  is  often  only  to  be  found  at  intervals  of  25  to 
30  miles.  Approaching  Obbia  from  the  north  a  succession 
of  sandy  hills  extends  inland  for  some  20  to  30  miles,  while 
inland  beyond  them  lies  an  elevated  diversified  plain  of  white 
sand,  which  at  50  miles  is  varied  by  a  red  clay.  Some  few 
mdes  south  of  Obbia  the  sand  hills  fall  away  gradually  to  the 
interior  plain,  already  described,  in  which  the  maritime  plain 
mergea. 

(c)  The  Alluvial  Ivienor  Plain. — The  alluvial  plain  extends 
for  some  3  to  10  miles  along  each  bank  of  the  Webi  Shebeli  from 
the  place  where  the  river  leaves  the  plateau  country,  to  the 
swamp,  north  ot  the  mouth  of  the  Juba,  in  which  the  river  la 
lost.  The  plain  is  densely  populated,  more  particularly  about 
Shidli,  Geledi,  Galwin,  and  behind  Brava,  and  is  exceptionally 
fertile. 

GJeledi,  10  hours  by  camel  from  Mogdishu,  is  especially 
worthy  of  mention,  for  not  only  does  the  latter  port  draw  all 
its  supplies  from  the  Geledi  district,  but  also  the  town  of  Geledi 
stands  at  the  main  crossing  over  the  ShebeU  of  the  caravan 
routes  between  Lugh,  Bardera  and  Mogdishu. 

{d)  The  Jvba-Shebeli  Plateau. — This  plateau,  a  rough 
square  of  sides  160  miles  long,  extends  from  the  Abyssinian 
foothills  in  the  north-west  to  the  alluvial  plain  of  Italian 
Somaliland  on  the  south-east,  and  descends  somewhat  abruptly 
in  an  easterly  and  westerly  direction  to  the  Shebeli  and  Juba 
respectively. 

The  principal  harbours,  porta  and  anchorages  in  Somaliland  prinoipal 
which  had  an  important  bearing  on  the  operations  are  :—         potta'ftnd 

JibiUi  (French),  a  small  but  growing  town  with  several  auolioroges. 
well-built  houses,  stores  and  shops,  clean  streets  and  a  healthy 
reputation,  is  situated  IJ  miles  south  of  the  low,  rooky  point 


of  Ras  Jibuti.  It  has  a  considerable  aud  growing  trade  with 
Abysainia  and  Harrar ;  eheep  and  cattle  are  cheap  and 
plentiftd,  and  gootl  water  is  obtained  in  abundance  about 
IJ  miles  from  the  town,  and  is  to  be  conveyed  to  it  by  pipes. 
4,000  to  5,000  tons  of  coal  are  kept  in  stock,  and  are  partly 
stored  in  lighters  which  supply  vessels. 

The  anchorage  space  for  ships,  1  mile  long  and  J  a  mile 
broad,  is  enclosed  by  reefs  and  well  sheltered,  and  afiorda  good 
holding  ground  of  mud  in  4  to  7  fathoms.  The  harbour  has 
two  piers  and  two  fixed  lights,  one  white,  105  feet  above  high- 
water  and  visible  at  15  miles,  one  red,  84  feet  high  and  visible 
at  9  miles,  while  in  the  town  are  two  other  white  lighte,  atill 
more  powerful.  A  third  substantial  pier  is  also  under  conatruc- 
tion. 

Jibuti  ia  the  headquarters  of  French  Somaliland,  and  has  a 
population  of  15,000,  including  2,000  Europeans, 

Zeiia, the  onlyport  (and  that  a  poor  one)  exceptJibuti  in 
the  laa  Somali  country,  is  a  town  of  about  50  stone  houses, 
600  huta  and  narrow  and  tortuous  streets,  built  on  a  narrow 
spit  which  is  nearly  level  with  the  sea,  and  becomes  an  island 
at  high  tide. 

In  the  south-west  monsoon  the  heat  is  excessive,  and  more 
than  half  the  natives  migrate  to  the  iuterior  highlands,  but  in 
the  trading  aeaaon  the  population  ia  15,000. 

The  roadstead,  1  mile  from  north  to  south  and  3  from  east 
to  west,  affords  anchorage  in  at  least  3  J  fathoms  over  mud  and 
sand,  about  IJ  miles  off  shore,  but  the  best  is  in  4  fathoms, 
2  miles  north  of  the  town.  In  the  north-east  monsoon  a 
moderate  swell  aeta  in  and  increaaea  towards  afternoon. 

Bjilhar. — The  town,  standing  on  the  beach  and  surrounded 
by  a  dilapidated  stockade  almost  entirely  washed  away, 
consists  of  the  Kesidency — a  double-storied  building  of  coral — 
the  quarters  of  the  native  troops  and  pohce,  a  defensible  jail, 
and  aome  atone  houaes  all  along  the  beach  and  native  cutcha 
houses  in  regular  blocks  and  streets,  separated  from  the  stone 
portion   by   a  clear   space   of   100  yards.     The   permanent 


^ 


'^A 


T;/ulloH'  I'laie  i.) 


'^ 


I  an 


27 

popolatioii,  Ayal  Yusuf  clan  of  the  Habr  Awal,  niunbera 
3,000,  increased  in  tlie  trading  season  to  10,000.  There  are  a 
number  of  brackist  wells  along  the  beach,  but  no  good  water 
supply  except  when,  after  very  heavy  rwn,  the  Tesutugan 
cuts  its  way  to  the  sea. 

Bulhar  has  an  open  roadstead  where  the  surf  is  so  heavy 
during  the  monsoons,  especially  the  south-west,  as  to  render 
landing  very  difficult  and  sometimes  impossible,  but  at  other 
times  au  anchorage  can  be  found  in  6  to  7  fathoms,  J  B  mUe 
from  shore.  Native  reports  say  that  the  wind  blows  for  seven 
days  on  end  during  which  landing  is  impossible,  as  it  is  often 
in  March  until  evening.  A  surf-beaten  spit,  which  small 
vesaels  can  cross  at  high  tide,  afiords  an  inner  anchorage  for 
them.  There  is  a  fixed  white  light  19  feet  above  the  sea, 
visible  8  miles. 

Berbera. — The  town  of  Berbera,  occupied  by  the  Egyptians 

1875  and  by  Great  Britain  in  1884,  is  built  in  two  portions, 
of  a  mile  apart.    To  the  east,  at  the  inner  end  of  the  harbour, 

the  native  town,  rebuilt  since  a  great  fire  in  June,  1888, 
and  consisting  now  of  mat  huts,  an  increasing  number  of  stone 
buildings  almost  all  along  the  sea,  a  few  mosques,  a  pier, 
customs-house,  and  its  own  drinking  tank,  all  laid  out  in  broad 
streets.  It  is  low -lying  and  was  exposed,  until  the  construction 
of  a  large  circular  embankment,  to  floods  during  the  burst 
of  the  rains  of  the  north-east  monsoon.  The  official  town, 
Shaab,  conabts  of  a  number  of  stone  buildings,  including 
court  house,  treasury,  jail,  Residency,  and  officials'  quartera, 
and  is  situated  on  high  gromid  which  drops  steeply  20  to 
30  feet  to  the  mud  and  coral  beach,  on  which,  just  below  the 
Shaab,  is  a  large  stone  water  tank.  Between  the  native  and 
official  town  are  the  pohee  quarters,  and  west  of  the  latter  a 
detached  fort,  from  which,  now,  to  the  Shaab  pier,  runs  a 
trolley  line.  The  surrounding  tribe  is  the  Isa  Musa  Habr 
Awal ;  the  population,  5,000  in  the  hot  weather,  is  increased 
to  25,000  to  30,000  in  the  trading  season.  Water,  some- 
what  brackish,  is    brought  by  pipe   from  Dubar,    8  miles, 


i 


laid  Oil  to  the  pier,  where  it  gives  237  gallons  pet  hour, 
and  to  tanks  in  the  town,  having  in  1893  a  cubic  capacity 
of  19,350  feet,  of  which  the  Shaab  tank  contained  10,500. 
The  heat  is  iatensein  the  south-west  monsoon,  but  the  climate 
ia  not  unhealthy,  except  during  the  Khareef  wind,  and  in  the 
north-east  monsoon  it  is  comparatively  cool.  A  little  of  the 
trade  is  with  the  Red  Sea  and  Persian  Gulf,  but  the  bulk  is 
with  Aden,  150  miles,  which  obtains  from  Berbera  almost  all  its 
supply  of  cattle  and  sheep,  which,  like  fiah,  aie  plentiful. 

The  harbour  ia  the  only  one  along  the  SomaU  coast  where 
vessels  can  he  in  all  weathers,  and  where  cargo  can  be  easily 
loaded  or  unloaded.  It  hes  E.N.E.  and  W.S.W.,  and  is  formed 
by  a  low  curving  sandy  coral  spit,  which  extends  1 J  miles  west- 
ward, and  terminates  in  the  steep  Tamar  Point,  It  is  1  mile 
wide  at  the  entrance,  which  is  free  of  all  dangers,  and  has  a 
depth  of  11  to  13  fathoms,  which  decreases  gradually  to  5 
fathoms  at  400  yards  from  the  shore.  It  afiorda  good 
anchorage  and  complete  shelter  from  all  but  westerly  winds 
in  a  apace  1 J  miles  long,  3CM)  to  1,000  yards  broad  and  4  fathoms 
deep.  Steamers  can  enter  andleave  at  all  times,  but  buggalows* 
have  been  occasionally  driven  on  shore,  and  in  the  south-west 
monsoon  cannot  leave  till  the  evening,  i.e.,  till  the  Khareef 
^^^         abates. 

^^H  Off  the  official  town  is  a  screw  pile  pier  of  wood  and  iron 

^^H  with  1?^  feet  of  water  at  high  and  10  feet  at  low  tide  at  the  head 
^^*  of  the  pier.  The  Aden  mail  boats  and  buggalows  come  aiong- 
r  side,  and  ships  of  2,000  to  3,000  tons  can  approach  within 

L  .      250  yards  in  30  feet  of  water.     An  extension  of  the  pier  by 

^^^^  100  yards  would  give  a  depth  of  18  feet  at  low  water.  A 
^^H  pier  of  coral  stone,  used  by  buggalows  at  high  but  unap- 
^^f  proachable  at  low  tide,  runs  from  the  customs-house  in  the 
I  native  town  into  the  harbour  at  its  head,  which  ia  shallow 

I  and  apparently  silting  up. 

^^^^  Two  and  three-quarters  miles  west  of  the  official  town  is 

^^^L     a  disused  lighthouse,  70  feet  high,  but  a  tight  ia  hoisted  on  a 

^^^K  •  Nftt 


ij- 


pole  at  its  foot.  There  are  three  fixed  hghtn,  viz.,  one  white 
49  feet  high  and  visible  8  miles  in  clear  weather,  the  other 
two  red,  visible  6  miles  ;  Tamar  Point  is  marked  by  a  beacon- 
Hots  is  fronted  by  a  reef  which  afltords  protection  to 
dhows.  North  of  it  is  Hais  Island,  between  which  and 
the  mainland  is  a  reef  which  aflorda  fair  shelter  in  the  north- 
east monsoon  in  5  fathoms. 

Bandar  Gori,  or  Las  Khorai,  is  the  principal  town  of  the 
Warsangli,  and  the  chief  residence  of  the  Gerad.  It  is  occupied 
by  the  Ogais  Lebbay  and  Ayal  Fateh  sub-tribes.  It  consists  of 
two  villages,  600  yards  apart,  three  large  and  six  small  pise 
forte,  all  very  dilapidated.  Each  village  consists  of  20  to  30 
long,  flat-roofed  and  very  lai^e  matted  constructions,  par- 
titioned off  to  contain  half  a  dozen  families,  and  unlike  any- 
thing else  on  the  coasts. 

Good  and  abundant  water  is  obtainable  at  a  depth  of  12  feet 
from  an  old  and  well-built  well.  The  sea  abounds  in  fish ; 
cattle,  sheep  and  firewood  are  procnrable.  Sheep  and  gums 
are  exported  to  Aden  and  Bombay,  and  guano  also  to  Macalla. 
There  is  a  considetable  caravan  trade  to  the  interior  to  the 
Dolbahanta  and  Mijjarten  tribes  ;  donkeys  are  the  best  means 
of  transport  across  the  high  mountains.  The  roadstead  is 
open  and  suitable  for  native  craft  only ;  the  anchorage  is 
rocky,  and  the  best  is  probably  in  7  to  10  fathoms,  J  of  a  mile 
off  shore.  For  three  months  of  the  monsoon,  June  especially, 
the  anrt  ia  so  bad  that  buggalows  are  taken  to  Berbera  for 
safety. 

Bosaso,  or  Bandar  Kasim  (Italian),  the  most  important 
market  of  the  Mijiarten,  is  a  town  of  four  forts,  washed  by  the 
sea  at  high  tide,  and  100  huts,  which  form  two  quarters,  viz., 
one  for  the  Harti,  i.e.,  Deshishi  and  Osman  Mahmud,  and  one 
for  the  half-caste  Arabs.  The  permanent  population  numbers 
500  to  600,  increased  to  1,000  during  the  trading  season. 
Caravans  resort  to  it  from  Kurkar,  as  well  as  from  the  War- 
sangli and  Dolbahanta,  and  a  considerable  export  trade  ia 
conducted  with  Aden  in  gums,  frankincense,  ostrich  feathers, 
iheep  and  gbi.     It  stands  in  an  arid  plain,  backed  by  a  distant 


sir' 


mountain  range,  cut  up  by  several  torreot-Deds,  and  studded 
with  a  few  bushoa.  A  track  connecting  Bandar  Ziada  with  it, 
continues  east  for  1^  miles  and  then  strikes  inland  past  the 
hot  springs  of  Bio  Kolola.  Anchorage  in  an  unprotected 
roadstead  is  available  at  ^  a  mile  off  shore,  outside  a  coral 
bank,  in  6  to  8  fathoms  over  sand.  Good  water  is  obtainable 
in  wells  in  all  the  forts  ;  firewood  can  also  bo  had. 

lUig  (ItaUan),  one  of  the  most  important  porta  of  the 
Isa  Mahmud  is  a  disorderly  collection  of  40  huts  inhabited 
by  some  200  of  the  Isa  Darud  clan  of  that  sub-tribe,  and 
governed  by  Farah  Sementar,  who  is  under  Yusuf  Ali.  It 
owes  its  importance  to  its  exports  of  sheep  and  goats  (totalling 
15,000  to  20,000  annually),  of  gbi  (50  tons  annually),  and  of 
dried  or  salted  meat  to  the  Benadir  coast,  Zanzibar  and 


Obbia  (Italian),  a  town  of  120  huts  and  3  large  square  stone 
buildings,  is  situated,  some  50  yards  from  the  sea  at  high  tide, 
on  a  large  open  and  grassy  imdulating  plain  of  firm  sandy  soil. 
It  was  the  chief  residence  of  Pusuf  Ali,  who  captured  it  in  1884 
from  the  Habr  Ghidir,  a  pastoral  sub-tribe  of  the  Hawiya  which 
extends  inland  for  some  25  miles.  There  is  plentiful  grazing, 
which,  however,  begins  to  dry  up  after  January.  Fair  and 
drinkable  water  is  found  in  numerous  small  wella  around  the 
town,  at  2  feet  below  the  surface  ;  better  water  is  obtainable 
at  a  depth  of  4  feet  in  two  wells  2  miles  from  the  town  where 
fresh  wells  could  be  dug  in  half  an  hour.  Important  trade 
routes  lead  inland  to  Mudug  oasis,  76  miles,  and  Jeribau 
amongst  other  places.  The  climate  is  moderate,  and,  though  the 
heat  is  great  at  times,  it  is  free  from  malaria. 

It  is  the  chief  outlet  of  Hawiya  trade,  but  in  the 
height  of  the  monsoons  is  cut  off  from  communication  sea- 
wards. Dhows  anchor  in  2  fathoms  in  a  shallow  bight  formed 
by  Diga  Point,  10  feet  high,  projecting  north-east  for  400  yards 
and  prolonged  by  two  rocky  islets  for  a  further  1,600  yards, 
which  ^ve  shelter  from  south-west  winds. 

Large  ships  can  anchor  in    7   fathoms   in  good   holding 


I 


ground  at  1,400  yards  trom  the  point,  but  this  anchorage  v! 
quite  unsheltered ;  there  are,  however,  no  outlying  dangers. 
The  point  forms  a  natural  breakwater  (with  a  depth  of  4J  to 
5  feet  of  water),  inaide  which  dhows  can  be  beached,  and 
landing  can  be  effected  by  surf-boats  at  all  states  of  the  tide 
and  weather,  and  by  ahips'  pulhng-boats  in  ordinary  weather. 
There  are  six  surf-boats  ;  these  carry  a  crew  of  seven,  and 
aeven  to  eight  passengers,  and  are  very  crank  ;  their  number 
could  probably  be  considerably  increased. 

Except  Harrar  and  Qildessa  and  along  the  valleys  of  the  Towna. 
Shebeli  and  Juba,  there  are  no  towns  other  than  those  on  the 
coast. 

In  British  Somaliland  (excluding  the  Warsangli  country) 
the  coastal  towns  consist  of  a  few  stone  buildings,  the  property 
of  the  Government  or  of  Indian  or  Arab  merchants,  and  of  native 
huts  similar  to,  but  on  a  larger  scale  and  more  substantially 
constructed  than  the  gurgis*  of  the  nomads  ;  in  some  cases  the 
mat  coverings  are  replaced  by  mud.  In  the  Warsangli  and 
Mijjarten  country,  the  coastal  towns  are  a  collection  of  mud 
or  pis^  huts,  with  a  mosque  occasionally  whitewashed,  a  few 
pise  or  stone  forts,  in  the  latter  case  of  two  to  three  storeys, 
and  one  to  six  large  buildings  of  the  same  materials  for  the 
storage  of  gum.  The  towns  and  villages  of  the  middle 
Shebeh  consist  of  a  cluster  of  palisaded  huts  of  durra  stalk, 
and  the  whole  surrounded  by  a  stockade  of  light  timber. 

Permanent  settlements  {Tarigas]  of  priests  are  scattered  Permanent 
throughout  the  country.  These  so-called  Tarigas  are  of  settlement*. 
importance,  not  only  because  of  the  influence  exercised  by  their 
educated  and,  as  a  rule,  travelled  occupants,  but  also  because 
they  form  the  nuclei  around  which  a  portion  of  the  nomads 
may  be  induced  to  settle,  and  from  which  cultivation  and  the 
establishment  of  a  permanent  water  supply  may  radiate. 
Jowari  cultivation  always,  and  wells  as  a  rule,  are  to  be  found 
in  the  neighbourhood.     The  most  important  are  :— 


*  Ctam(<I  cloths  used  us  tents. 


7«  British  Somaliland. — Hargeisa,  under  Sheikli  Madar, 
a  town  of  1,000  inhabitants,  mainly  Habr  Awal,  with  plentiful 
and  permanent  water  supply,  J  square  mile  of  jowari  cultiva- 
tion, mat  huta,  one  stone  building  and  a  breastwork,  situated 
on  the  caravan  routes  to  Milmil,  Imi,  Harrar,  Gildesaa,  Zeila, 
Bulhar  and  Berbeca. 

Upper  Sheikh,  at  the  summit  of  the  pass  of  the  same  name  ; 
Hahi,  to  the  south  of  Sheikh,  with  a  population  of  250  under 
Haji  Mui^a. 

In  Abyssinian  SomcdiUmd. — Seyid  Mahomed's  tariga  of 
4O0  huts,  about  the  size  of  Hargeisa,  situated  on  the  tiig 
Fafan,  and  surrounded  with  patches  of  jowari;  the  head  of 
this  tariga  had,  in  1895,  much  influence  with  the  two  Mahom- 
medan  chiefs  of  Karanle ;  Faf  {6°  27'  N.  and  44°  17'  E.), 
an  important  centie  under  Haji  Mahomed  Nur,  with  extensive 
cultivation,  herds  of  camels,  flocks  of  sheep  and  good  grazing, 
and  one  of  the  reported  sources  of  the  Mullah's  supplies  ;  En, 
west  of  Seyid  Mahomed's  tariga. 

On  the  Webi  Shebeli. — Kulmis  aud  other  small  towns  in  the 
alluvial  plain  of  Italian  Somahland. 

The  nomad  Somalia  wander  annually  in  fixed  orbits  in 
search  of  water  and  pasturage.  These  orbits  are  generally 
marked  by  the  zaribas  of  thorn  bushes,  called  rer,  in  which 
the  clan  or  sub-tribe  establishes  itself  for  a  period  not 
exceeding  two  months  at  a  time.  These  zaribas  are  formed 
by  a  double  ring  of  thorn-fence,  of  which  the  outer  is  often 
12  feet  high,  to  keep  out  lions.  Inside  the  zariba  pens  are 
made  for  cattle,  camels,  sheep  and  goats,  and  the  gurgis  or 
huts,  which  consist  of  a  portable  frame  of  galol-wood,  covered 
with  grass  mats,  hides  and  akins,  ate  erected  on  arrival.  As  a 
further  protection  against  wild  animals  fires  are  lighted  at 
night. 

The  construction  of  the  zaribas  devolves  on  the  male  portion 
of  the  tribe,  but  that  of  the  gurgis,  as  most  of  the  manual 
labour,  is  the  duty  of  the  women.  Caravans  form  single 
zaribas  of  a  similar  but  more  temporary  nature,  while  neat 
the  coast  a  low  single  fence  as  a  rUle  suffices. 


l<J-./«w,.,,32.) 


A  regular  weeUy  mail  service  by  Bteamers  plies  between  Orer. 
Aden  and  the  principal  Protectorate  ports.  The  usual  ^<'"""™"*" 
course  is  Aden  to  Berbera,  Berbera  to  Zeila,  Zeila  to  BuUiar, 
Bulbar  to  Berbera,  and  thence  back  to  Aden,  the  whole 
voyage  occupying  five  days.  Steamers  also  run  two  to  three 
times  a  week  between  Aden  and  Berbera  and  other  Somali  coast 
ports  during  the  trading  season,  October  to  April,  and 
occasionally  also  between  Berbera  and  Suez  1,400  sea  miles. 

There  is  very  considerable  trade  by  buggalows  between  the 
coast  ports  and  Aden,  and  there  is  occasional  communication 
by  small  sailing  vessels  between  the  Warsangli  ports,  the 
Persian  Gult  and  Bombay,  All  this  trade  is,  however,  con- 
fined  as  a  rule  to  the  trading  season,  i.e.  the  period  of  the  north- 
east monsoon,  November  to  April,  when  the  sea  is  open, 
"  Bat-Furan."  During  the  south-west  monsoon,  "  Bat- 
Hiddan,"  the  connection  between  Aden  and  the  ports  to  the 
north-east  of  Berbera  ceases,  but  there  is  no  interruption  to 
the  country  craft  interportal  traffic,  which  indirectly  main- 
tains the  communication. 

'he  nearest   cable  sta( 
miles,  or  Jibuti,  the  same  distance. 

Telegraph  lines  now  (190G)  run  between  Berbera -Sheikh  Wi^d 
Eurao  and  Berbera-Sheikh-Adadleh-Hargeisa.  At  the  time  and 
of  the  operations  there  were  no  telegraphs  but  those  con- 
structed at  the  time  (see  Chap.  XIV).  Communication  across 
the  maritime  plain  is  frequently  interrupted  during  the 
period  of  the  south-west  monaoonby  the  violent  sand  storms, 
and  during  Jilal  the  want  of  water  makes  the  crossing  of 
the  Hand  a  matter  of  great  difficulty  and  risk.  In  the  rainy 
season  the  Fafan  and  Shebeli  flood  the  neighbouring  valleys 
while  south  of  the  latter  river  the  routes  are  so  heavy  and 
greasy  that  travelling  is  brought  to  a  standstill. 

There  are  no  roads  in  the  European  sense  of  the  word,  i.e., 
none  fit  for  wheeled  transport.  Certain  roads  were  con- 
structed during  the  operations  (see  Chap.  XIV}  and  some  of 
^lese,  such  as  the  Berbera-Sheikh  road,  could  be  rendered 
(8927)  0 


fit  for  wheeled  transport.  In  the  hard  red  clay  of  the 
WoBtern  Haud,  and  in  the  open  portions  further  east,  roads 
could  be  easily  made,  but,  owing  to  the  greasinesa  and 
heavineaa  of  the  soil  in  wet  weather,  could  probably  be  used 
only  after  the  rains  had  run  ofE.  It  may  be  noted  that  in 
the  Haud  there  are  no  marked  routes  over  the  open  spaces, 
which  are  everywhere  fit  for  marching,  but  through  the 
thorn-covered  portions  the  traclts,  often  narrow  and  easily 
lost  in  the  dark,  must  be  followed.  These  tracks,  though 
wider  than  those  of  Ogo  and  Guban,  which  average  about 
2  feet,  are  not  so  well  kept,  and  are  often  flanked  by  wait-a-bit 
or  fish-hook  thorn  bushes,  which  catch  in  the  camels'  loads 
and  lessen  the  rate  of  marching. 

Some  of  the  passes,  in  order  from  east  to  west,  which 
give  access  from  the  maritime  plain  to  the  interior  plateau 
are  given  in  ihe  following  table  : — 


Name  of  Pubs  or  Defile. 

From- 

Through— 

T^^- 

Midgid  Pass 

Kamni 

Marilimn  Killa  . . 

Habr           Toljaala 
hX"'^    Toljaalo 

Oaha  Puss 

Karora 

Maritime  Hilk  . . 

/JJMSPUSS 

Bptbcra 

Dolbahauta  country 

Blambidol  Pons    .. 

Berbera 

Diibiiri 

Bar  bora 

Mfxiyo  PoFis 

Bcrbera 

ItaKnr  Pnas 

Berbers 

fiolia  Range       . . 

Habr"          Uorliajis 

Shtikh  Pa>4s 

Berbcra 

Hahr           Gorhajis 

oimtry 
Habr           Gerhajia 

J  into  P»SB 

Berbora 

rounlrv 

MiifBO  Posa 

Berbcra 

Habr            Gerhajia 
country 

Kil-Annd-MiM'uK           via 

Buihar 

Mariliftie  Hilb  . . 

HargPia\ 

I>iiiiituK>tn  Kivoi'  DeHln 

Ihwri  Piiisa 

Uulhar 

Miii-uaij.'h 

Bulbar 

Maritime  Hills  . . 

Cuban 

The  Bils  Ringe 

lap.   nod   Godabursi 

country 

NOTB.— Tlie  nniiM 


The  Bubjoinrtd  table  shows  the  prindpal  routes  throngh 

Guban,  in  order,  from  east  to  west  : — 


Prom— 

Via— 

To  {Distances  in  Miles)— 

Borbera 

1 

Siyari     

Gaha  Pass 

Magab      and      Meriye 

Pass  (Sonag  ntate) 
Raaor  Pass 
Sheikh  Pass       .. 

lAfarug  and  Jirat«  Pass 
Malgoi  and  Morgo  Pass 
Halgoi  and  Argon 
CoBBt 

Karara  and  Eastern  Porta 

Habr  Toljaala 

Habr  Toljaalfl  ;   Bcr.  103 

Ber,  163;  Garrero,  210 

Bnrao,   80;    Btr,   93;     Garrero,    141; 

Bohotle,  238 
AdadlPh.  53 ;  Ber.  Bl :  Mayo,  Wt 
Adadleh,  72 

Jalelo.  741 :  Hargeisa,  105 ;  Harrar.  39a 
Bulhar,  41 

Billhar 

Hatgeisa.  105  ;  Harrar.  302 

Zeiift    .. 

Hiimboa 

Two  other  rout^w  to     , . 

Cildcssa.  156  ;  Hairitr.  185 
GildoBsa 

Caravans,  as  a  rule,  make  each  day's  march  in  two  portions  Marclips 
in  order  to  escape  the  midday  heat  and  to  give  the  camels 
time  to  graze,  in  addition  to  the  half- hour  which  these  animals 
have  before  sunset.  An  ordinary  match  lasts  for  some  eight 
hours,  during  which  20  miles  would  be  covered,  and  an  easy  one 
'  is  15  to  17  miles.  Marches  of  25  miles,  continued  from  day 
to  day,  are  exceptional,  unless  loads  do  not  exceed  250  lbs. 
and  the  weather  is  favourable  ;  on  such  marches  a  halt  every 
five  or  six  days  is  advisable. 

According  to  the  lengtih  of  the  march,  dependent  often  on 
the  intervals  between  the  sources  of  water  supply,  the  morning 
and  afternoon  hours  of  march  would  vary  as  follows  : — From 
4  or  5  to  8  or  9  a.m.  ;   and  from  about  3  to  6  p.m. 

In  Guban,  caravans  avoid  the  heat  of  the  day  by  marching 
at  night,  when  they  can  cover  30  miles  without  a  rest,  as  the 
roads  arc  good. 

The  eastern  tribes  generally  make  longer  and  quicker 
marches  than  the  Isa  and  Gadabursi,  whose  country,  being  of 
trap  rock,  is  difficult,  and  whose  camels  are  generallv  inferior 
to  those  of  the  former. 

(8927)  o  2 


I 


Camels  are  used  throughout  Somaliland  for  '  purposes 
of  transport.  In  certain  localities  mules  and  donkeys 
are  also  employed,  and  most  of  the  tribes  north  of  the  Shebeli 
Lave  ponies,  which  are  never  used  for  transport  pntposea,  but 
for  fighting  and  raiding.  Ponies  are  also  largely  used  for 
riding  in  the  east  and  south-east  of  the  Protoctorate, 

Along  the  coast  the  bullc  of  the  trade  is  carried  in  the  north 
by  buggalows,  and  in  the  south  by  dhowa.  An  average  sized 
buggalow,  i.e.,  60  by  15  feet,  can  carry  270  sheep  and  15 
buUocka. 

Surf  boats  are  used  along  the  coast  from  Illig  to  Obbia,  and 
native  canoes  further  south.  The  former  are  propelled  by  a 
crew  of  seven  paddlers  and  can  carry  seven  to  eight  armed 
soldiers. 

Inland  boats  are  few  in  number  and  are  found  only  at  the 
ferries,  which  consist  of  ricketty  rafts,  a  dug-out  canoe 
occasionally,  or  boata  of  planking  fastened  by  vegetable  cord. 

Seasons. — The  year  in  Somaliland  may  be  divided  into 
four  main  seasons  :  JilaJ,  the  dry ;  Gu,  the  fertile  rainy  season; 
Haga,  the  hot  season,  ending  with  the  second  interior  rains; 
and  Dair,  the  cold  season,  extending  into  January,  the  first 
month  of  Jilal.  A  fifth  season,  sultry  and  calm,  viz.,  Kalil, 
is  said  to  occur  at  the  end  of  Jilal.  The  determining  causes 
o!  the  seasons  in  SomalUand  are  the  two  monsoons,  the  north- 
east from  November  to  March,  and  the  south-west  from  May 
to  September.  Aoril  and  October,  the  two  months  intervening 
between  the  monsoons,  are  periods  of  variable  aira  and  calms. 
The  south-west  monsoon  is  ushered  in  by  rain,  which  is 
spread  over  one  or  two  months,  and  its  departure  is  marked 
by  still  heavier  tains  in  the  interior,  while  on  the  coast  the 
second  and  more  regular  rains  do  not  occur  until  November 
or  December. 

As  regards  climate  Northern  Somaliland  may  be  divided 
into  four  main  zones,  dependent  mainly  on  elevation,  viz. : — 

Maritime  region. — Temperature  hot,  79°  to  105°  in  the 
shade  ;  rainfall  slight,  2  or  3  inches  annually  ;  wind,  constant 


(T.JI,r,„-XI.) 


and  cool  in   the   north-east   monsoon,  November  to  March 
squally  and  hot  in  the  aouth-weat  monsoon,  May  to  September. 

Ogo,  Golis,  Ogo-Guban. — Comparatively  equable  climate  ; 
temperature,  40°  to  91°  in  Western  and  as  low  as  25" 
in  Eastern  Somaliland,  with  great  variation  between  day 
and  night ;  rainfall,  ranging  from  10  to  20  inches  annually, 
accompanied  by  mists,  and  spread  mainly  over  April  to 
September ;  wind  uncertain  ia  the  same  period,  otherwise 
as  in  maritime  region. 

Higher  interior  plateau. — Greater  variations  than  in  Ogo 
of  temperature  between  day  and  night ;  extremes,  56°  to  108°, 
dependent  on  nature  of  vegetation,  i.e.,  wood  or  grass,  or  on 
its  absence,  e.g.,  bare  open  alluvial  or  sandy  tracts ;  lainfall 
similar  to  but  less  than  in  Ogo,  varied  in  some  years  by 
droughts,  which  are  more  common  in  the  arid  country  south  of 
the  Eastern  Haud ;  wind,  strong  to  a  gale  in  the  northern 
plateaux  from  June  to  September. 

Valley  of  the  Webi  Shebeli. — Damp,  trying  and  sultry 
from  March  to  September  ;  rainfall  apparently  heavier  than 
elsewhere ;  wind  slight  throughout  the  year,  except  in  the 
lower  portion. 

During  the  last  decade  a  very  large  impottatioa  of  arma  '^^^ " 
has  taken  place  through  Obok  and  Jibuti  to  Harrar  and      ^_ 
Abyssinia.     It  is  possible  that  some  of  these  arms  have  found    ^^| 
their  way  from  Harrar  into  the  Ogaden  country  to  the  south-    ^^M 
west  and  the  Galla  country  to  the  south.     But  the  number 
which  has  reached  Somahland  by  these  directions  is  trifling 
in  comparison  with  the  active  trade  which  sprmig  up  during 
the  four  years  preceding  the  operations  through  the  Mijjarten 
and  partly  through   the  WarsangU  country.      These  arras, 
mostly  of  the  Gras  pattern,  were  brought  from  Jibuti,  either 
direct  or  through  Arabian  ports  to  Las  Khorai  and  other  potts. 
They  fomid  their  way  thence   through  the  NaUya  Ahmed 
and  Nur  Ahmed,   Dolbahanta,    across    the   Nogal    to   the 
Mullah's  headquarters.     The  close  of  the  south-west  monsoou  I 
starts  the  period  of  activity  in  this  trade,  and  at  that  time  1 


Food 

f 

Fsel. 


an  average  of  one  buggalow  a  day  ia  said  to  leave  Jibuti 
with  arms  for  the  Arabian  coast.  Anns  are  also  said  to  be 
landed  oucaBionally  at  the  mouth  of  the  Nogal  and  on  the 
Beuadir  coast,  and  to  be  broi^ht  thence  to  the  Mullah.  The 
latter'a  anxiety  to  posseaa  lumseif  of  rifles  ia  shown  by  the  price 
which  he  is  said  to  have  offered  in  1900,  viz.,  five  camels  per 
rifle  and  one  per  15  rounds  of  ammunition.  Arms  of  patterns 
which  are  said  to  be  British,  French  and  Russian,  are  also 
brought  overland  through  Persia  and  across  Arabia,  and  are 
exported  to  Somaliland  from  Muscat  and  other  Persian  Gulf 
porta. 

The  staple  foods  of  Northern  Somaliiand  are  camels'  milk 
and  the  flesh  of  sheep  and  goats  ;  ghi,  obtained  from  the  in- 
land tribes,  is  largely  used  by  the  rice-eating  coast  tribes ; 
camels'  flesh  ia  somewhat  of  a  luxury ;  cattle  owning  tribes 
also  Uve  largely  on  cows'  milk,  but  apparently  are  not  great 
beef  eaters.  Along  and  south  of  the  Shebeli,  cattle  and  durra 
furnish  the  staple  food,  but  poultry,  eggs,  sheep  and  goats 
are  plentiful  along  the  river. 

The  denudation  of  the  plain  around  Berbera  by  the  tribes 
that  resort  to  it  during  the  trading  season  is  steadily  reducing 
the  available  supply  of  fuel  in  its  neighbourhood,  while  in  the 
inamediate  neighbourhood  of  the  sea  on  the  Eastern  Mijjarten 
coast  it  is  not  plentiful.  In  the  interior,  however,  it  is  generally 
obtainable  in  ample  quantities.  The  nomads  obtain  fire  by  the 
friction  of  two  small  pieces  of  wood — one  soft  and  the  other 
hard — called  madag,  which  each  one  of  them  carries. 

With  the  exception  of  the  Juba  and  Webi  ShebeU  rivers 
with  their  tributary  streams,  all  of  which  Ue  in  the  west  and 
south  within  the  Abyssinian  and  Italian  spheres,  there  are  no 
permanent  rivers  or  streams  in  Somaliland.  The  whole  of 
the  northern,  north-eastern  and  eastern  portions  of  the 
country  is  dependent  for  water,  in  the  dry  season,  on  the 
permanent  wells  only,  which,  however,  are,  in  the  rainy 
-^easons,  supplemented  by  rain  pools.  The  permanent  wells, 
or  groups  of  wells  (for  they  are  often  found  in  groups),  lie  at 


39 


'^mtervals  from  each  other,  which  intervals  vary  from  10  to 
100  miles,   and  occaaonaUy  :eveii   more,   as    for    instance, 
between   Bohotle  and   the   Mudug   wbUb,   which    ia    about 
1 130  miles. 

■  In  these  wells,  called  "  Eil "  or  "  El,"  water,  as  a  rule, 
MB  some  50  to  80  feet  from  the  surface  of  the  ground ;  the 
greatest  depths  occur  in  the  Dolbahanta  and  Ogaden  country. 
Narrow  circular  funnels  are  dug  through  alluvial  soil  or  hewn 
through  rock  to  the  water  level,  and  are  provided  with  slots 
on  which  men  stand  and  pass  up  the  water  from  one  t,<) 
another  by  hand  in  sldn  buckets.  About  half  the  water  is 
lost  in  handhng,  and  the  remainder  is  turned  into  rough  hide  or 
wooden  troughs,  at  which  the  animals  drink.  Separate  wells, 
and,  if  necessary,  separate  watering  hours,  are  allotted  to  the 
difierent  tribes  or  sub-tribes.  Some  of  the  more  important 
permanent  wells  indicate  the  head-quarters  of  certain  sub- 
tribes  during  the  dry  season. 

The  other,  less  important,  wells  contain,  as  a  rule,  only 
sufficient  water  for  passing  caravans. 

In  addition  to  the  wells,  water  is  found  during  the  rains  not 
only  in  pools  formed  in  nullahs  and  watercourses,  but  abo  in 
ballisor  depressions  which  contain  pans,  or  shallowpits  or  broad 
tanks  of  clay,  called  las.  These  pools  and  pans  are  frequented 
by  the  tribes  as  soon  as  the  rains  begin,  until  they  run  dry  and 
the  surrounding  grass  is  withered.  In  the  case  of  the  largest 
pools  and  pans,  the  supply  of  water  will  sometimes  last  as 
ftilong  as  two  months.  Even  after  this  period  water  can 
metames  be  obtained  by  digging  in  the  river  beds  or 
a  the  pans,  but  in  the  latter  case  care  must  be  taken  not  to 
ftpenetrate  beyond  the  clay  layer,  2  to  4  feet  thick. 

The  quality  of  the  water  in  pans  and  wells  varies  con- 
siderably.    In  the  gypsum  rock  of  the  Nogal  district  it  is, 
I  rule,  strongly  impregnated  with  sulphuretted  hydrogen, 
i  ia  considered  better  than  untainted  water  for  all  animals 
Ut  not  for  man ;  in  the  pans  of  Ogaden  the  water  is  fouled  by 
» flocks  driven  into  the  pools  to  water,  whereas  the  tribes 


40 


Isliak. 


furthei  north  water  by  hand  and  trough  ;  at  the  beginning  of 
the  raina  the  surface  scum,  fouled  by  the  flocks  and  herds 
some  months  before,  is  washed  into  the  wella,  and  the  water 
is,  therefore,  at  first,  bad  for  drinking.  In  the  maritime 
plain  water  is  always  brackish. 
'       The  principal  tribes  in  the  British  Protectorate  are : — 

The  Isa 

The  Gadabursi 

The  Habr  Awal 

The  Habr  Gerhajis 

The  Habr  Toljaala 

The  Dolbabanta       t 

The  Warsangli  J 
All  the  above  are  distinct  tribes  and  there  is  no  cohesion 
amongst  them,  with  perhaps  the  exception  of  the  Habr  tribes. 
The  importance  occupied  by  the  family  in  a  patriarchal 
system  of  government  has  led  to  the  disintegration  of  the 
original  tribes  into  sub-tribes,  clans,  and  even  families,  which 
rarely  act  in  unison,  unless  threatened  by  a  common  danger. 
Further,  the  scarcity  of  water  makes  the  possession  of  wells 
a  frequent  cause  of  dispute,  and  the  besetting  sin  of  the 
Somahs,  avarice,  leads  to  raids  and  counter-raids  for  the 
capture  of  camels,  which  form  the  usual  measure  of  wealth. 

The  population  of  the  British  tribes  was  estimated  in  1902 
at  about  315,000,  and  the  number  of  fighting  men  at  about 
90,000 ;  but  it  is  very  difficult  to  make  even  an  approximate 
estimate  of  the  population  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  people 
are  nomads. 

The  fighting  qualities  and  method  of  warfare  of  the  Somalis 
are  described  in  Chapter  VITI. 
if  In  British  Somaliland  the  Isa  and  Gadabursi,  in  whom 
the  feeling  of  race  ia  stronger  than  the  other  tribes,  had, 
apparently,  no  intercourse  with  the  Mullah.  The  WarsangU, 
who  were  ill-disposed  to  the  Dolbabanta,  assisted  him  only 
by  selling  arms,  probably  with  a  view  to  commercial  profit 
rather  than  from  any  sympathy  with  hia  movement.     In  the 


41 


spring  of  1904,  tlie  Warsangli  failed  to  co-operate  with  ua,  in 
accordance  with  an  undertaking  previously  given  by  their 
Sultan.  The  Habr  Awal  and  Habr  Gerhajis,  except  the  Musa 
lamail,  always  rejected  hia  advances,  while  the  Habt  Toljaala, 
always  a  turbulent  tribe,  and  the  Dolbahanta  were  his  only 
active  supporters  in  British  territory.  Of  the  former  the  Adan 
Madoba  were  not  only  responsible  for  suppljdng  him  with 
arms,  but  alao  assisted  bim  on  all  his  raids.  The  Eer- 
Yusuf  and  Ahmed  Farah,  like  the  Musa  lamail,  were 
with  the  Mullah  in  1900,  but  do  not  appear  to  have  acted 
with  him  during  the  subsequent  operations.  The  Dolba- 
hanta, all  except  the  south-eastern  portions,  made  sub- 
mission to  the  British  force  in  1901  ;  but,  exposed  by  their 
situation  to  the  Mullah's  influence  and  unable  to  offer  any 
resistance  but  that  of  spears  to  his  fanatical  following,  armed 
with  rifles,  they  were  forced  to  rejoin  him,  when,  at  the  end  of 
1901,  he  raided  the  Habr  Toljaala  from  Laasadcr.  The  Ali 
Gheri  and  Jama  Siad  were  probably  willing  followers  of  the 
MuUah. 

Since  the  conclusion  of  the  operations  in  1904,  a  number 
of  Ali  Gheri  and  Kayat  refugees  from  the  Mullah  have 
sought  our  protection, and  have  been  provided  with  live-stock 
and  arms  and  located  in  posts  on  the  frontier,  the  Ah  Gheri 
al  Bohotle  and  the  Kayat  at  Eil  Dab. 

In  Abyssinian  Somahland  the  Mukabil  Ogaden  originally 
supported  the  Mullah,  especially  the  Ibrahim  anbtribe 
which  made  submission  to  the  Britbh  force  at  Bohotle 
and  Kurmis  in  1901.  The  Miyirwalal  or  Western  Ogaden 
embittered  against  the  Abyssiniana  owing  to  frequent  raids, 
accepted  the  Mullah  in  1900,  but  apparently  did  not  actively 
support  him.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Abbasgul  and  Harrari 
tribes  assisted  the  Muikh  in  1900.  The  Adonis  in  the  south 
are  numerous,  but  are  said  to  be  unwarlike.  They  have, 
however,  on  more  than  one  occasion  fought  in  the  Dervish 
ranks  and  are  well  disposed  towards  the  Mullah. 

In  Ilalian  Somaliland,   during  Swayne's  operations,   the 


'  [l-aliun 
L'flDinalilaDd. 


Mijjarten,  except  Yuauf  Ati's  following,  supported  the  Mullah 
and  many  Mijjarten  fell  in  his  ranks  at  Samala  and 
Ferdiddiu,  but  in  1903-4  they  were  at  least  proEesaedly 
opposed  to  him.  The  Hawiya  and  Marehan,  who  are  under 
YuBuf  Ali,  sufiered  heavily  from  the  Mullah's  raids  and  were 
forced  to  join  him.  These  last  are  not  warlike,  though  com- 
paratively numerous,  (generally  it  is  difficult  to  say  exactly 
what  tribes  supported  the  Mullah,  since  the  ntunber  of  his 
followers  increased  or  decreased  in  accordance  with  the  rise 
or  fall  of  his  prestige. 

The  British  Protectorate  of  the  Somaliland  coast,  since  its 
transfer  from  the  Government  of  India  to  the  Foreign  Office  in 
1898,  and  fromtheForeignOffice  to  the  Colonial  Office  in  1905, 
has  been  administered  by  a  Commisaioner  and  Commander- 
in-Chief,  who  is  assisted  by  a  stafE  of  civil,  political,  and 
military  officers,  consisting  in  March,  1906,  of  about  30 
individuals.  The  coast  towns  of  Berbera,  Bulbar  and 
Zeila  are  in  charge  of  civil  officers,  while  east  of  Berbera  our 
authority  is  represented  by  two  small  police  and  customs 
posts  at  Karam  and  Hais,  the  headmen  of  Ankor,  Raguda 
Shullah,  Mait  and  Hashau  being  in  receipt  of  a  small  monthly 
subsidy  for  flying  the  British  flag.  Berbera  is  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Administration,  but  the  Commissioner  moves 
into  the  interior  during  the  hot  weather,  April  to  September. 

By  decree,  dated  7th  March,  1899,  the  French  Protectorate 
of  the  Somali  coast  was  placed  under  a  Governor,  with  head- 
quarters at  Jibuti,  who  is  assisted  by  an  executive  council  of 
three  official  and  thiee  non-official  members.  The  branches  of 
administration  include  a  Secretariat  and  Departments  for 
native  affairs,  police,  judicial,  prisons,  treasury,  health,  public 
works,  post  and  telegraphs,  and  customfl. 

Abyssinian  Somaliland  forma  part  of  the  Harrar  Province. 
The  Governor  of  this  province  lives  at  or  near  Harrar. 

The  relations  of  the  Italian  Government  with  the  Mijjarten 
Sultan,  Osman  Mahmud,  and  the  Obbia  Sultan,  Ali  Yusuf, 
are  limited  to  the  payment  of  an  annual  subsidy.     The  usual 


43 


channel  of  communication  is  the  Italian  Consul  at  Aden,  but 
at  the  present  time  (1906)  Commendatore  Pestalozza,  C.M.G., 
who  has  his  headquarters  at  the  same  place,  has  special 
charge  of  the  conduct  of  affairs  on  the  Mijjarten  coast. 

Benadir  coast  and  hinterland. — The  government  of  the  coast 
line  from  Elhur  to  the  Juba  and  of  its  hinterland  was  vested 
in  the  Benadir  Company,  which  held  a  charter  from  the 
Italian  Government.  But  by  a  convention  of  January  24, 
1905,  a  new  Benadir  Company  was  formed,  which  has  various 
commercial  and  agricultural  concessions,  but  no  adminis- 
trative functions  of  any  sort.  The  Governor's  headquarters 
are  at  Mogdishu  and  the  Company  has  established  trading 
stations  at  various  places. 


CHAPTER  II. 
Past  History  of  British  connection  with  Somalilahd, 

AND  OF  THE  LaND  FoRCES  IN  THK  EmTISH  PRO- 
TECTORATE.— History  op  the  Mullah,  and  Events 
which  led  up  to  the  first  expedition  against  the 
Mullah  in  1901. 

Before  describing  the  aeries  of  operations  against  the  Mullah, 
which  began  in  1901  and  were  carried  on  partly  within  the 
limits  of  the  British  Prot43ctorate,  and  partly,  in  the  later 
stages,  in  the  Northern  Hand,  in  the  Nogal  Plain  and 
in  the  Italian  sphere  of  influence  from  Obbia  on  the  Eastern 
Somali  coast  to  the  Mudug  oasis,  it  is  desirable  to  give  a  brief 
account  of  the  past  history  of  our  connection  with  Somaliland 
and  of  the  land  forces  in  the  British  Protectorate,  also  a  short 
history  of  the  Mullah,  and  the  events  which  led  up  to  the  first 
expedition  in  1901,  and  ended  in  the  fourth  expedition  in 
1904. 

The  explorations  of  Buiton,  Speke,  Grant  and  Baker 
'  turned  the  attention  of  the  Egyptian  Government  to  the 
interior  of  Northern  Africa,  the  Red  Sea  littoral  and  the  Horn 
of  Africa.  In  pursuance  of  the  Khedive's*  ambitious  policy 
for  the  extension  of  his  dominions,  Massowah  was  purchased 
in  1866  from  the  Porte  for  16,000^.  by  Egypt,  which  then  crept 
southwards.  In  1870  it  acquired  the  coast  between  Bulbar 
and  Berbera,  and  established  garrisons  at  those  ports  as  well 
as  at  Zcila,  purchasing  the  Sultan's  suzerain  rights  over  the 
latter  town  for  an  annual  payment  of  15,000^.  In  1874  Eaoof 
Pacha,  at  the  head  of  4,000  men,  took  possession  of  Harrar. 
This  force,  one-quarter  Sudanese  and  the  remainder  Egyptians, 
comprised,  besides  infantry,  one  to  two  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
and  artillery  with  mountain  guns,  Gatlinga  and  rocket  tubes, 


and  was  eventually  distributed  as  follows : — 3,400  at  Harrar 
and  in  the  four  adjacent  highland  provinces,  600  between  Zeila 
and  Berbsra,  with  detachments  at  Tajura,  Gildesaa,  Bulbar, 
Dabarand  other  places. 

In  1877  the  British  Government  signed  a  convention  at 
Alexandria,  which  cocognised  the  Khedival  annexation  of  all 
the  East  African  coast  north  of  Ras  Hafun,  subject  to  the  con- 
dition amongst  others,  that  no  portion  of  it  should  be  ceded  to 
BiDj  foreign  Power,  and  that  Britisli  Consular  agents  should  be 
appointed  at  places  on  the  coast.  The  Sultan  of  Turkey, 
however,  refused  his  ratification. 

Meanwhile  considerable  improvement  had  been  effected  a* 
the  porta,  e,g.,  the  construction  of  piers,  lighthouses,  quarters, 
blockhouses  and  zaribas,  and  the  improvement  of  the  water 
supply,  and  many  benefits  accrued  to  the  country,  with  the 
exception  of  Harrar.  Here  Raoof  Pacha  had  been  guilty  of 
oppression  and  illegal  trading,  and  was  consequently  dia- 
missed  by  General  Gordon,  who  replaced  him  by  Ali  Pacha. 

With  the  exception  of  a  revolt  of  the  tribes  aroimd  Harrat 
in  1880,  nothing  noteworthy  happened  until  1884,  when  events 
in  the  Soudan  led  to  the  evacuation  of  Somaliland  by  the 
Egyptians.  An  independent  Government  under  the  Emir 
Abdulahi  Mahomed,  of  the  old  dynasty,  was  formed  at  Harrar, 
and  the  ports  of  Zeila  and  Berbera  were  occupied  by  detach- 
ments from  the  Aden  garrison. 

In  the  latter  half  of  1884  and  in  January,  1885,  the  British 
Government,  through  the  Resident  at  Aden,  entered  into 
treaties  with  all  the  tribes  now  under  its  protection  except 
the  Warsangli,  who  concluded  a  treaty  in  1886,  and  the 
Dolbahanta,  who  have  signed  no  agreement  In  February, 
1885,  the  establishment  of  a  British  protectorate  over  the 
Somali  coast  from  Ghubbet  Kharab  to  Ras  Galwein  was 
communicated  to  France,  who  in  June  of  the  previous  year 
had  occupied  Obok.  The  evacuation  of  Massowah  by  the 
Egyptians  was  followed  by  the  Italian  occupation  of  that 
port,  also  in  February,   1885,  and  by  the  extension  of  its 


Mr  lai  yn%  m  Dm^ho- rf  Oat  Tcu- 

Ik  the  msw  «(  nOO  te  was  decided  to  amalgamate  the 
Cones  ia  tfaa  bet  .Afatcas  Protectorates  into  one  body,  to 
«U^  was  gmm  the  aame  of  the  Kiiig''s  African  Rifles,  under 
aa  inspeet«r-feBcsaL  In  1901  the  reoTganization  had  not 
b«o  foUr  realised  in  British  Somaliland,  when  the  operations 
against  the  Mollah  caused  the  matter  to  he  Buspended.  It 
was  int^ided  that  the  ^omnliland  Battalion,  the  6tb  Battalion 
King's  African  Rifles,  shoiihl  uonBiBt  of — 

1  oamot  cur]W, 

3  c(>mf«tuffl  infaiilry, 

TfaMptui, 

MilUw. 

nombering  10  Uritiah  *i\d  S  nstivw  ofliccrs,  and  1,037  other 
lanka.    The  tt'h*  was  to  l>o  armed  with  -303  Martini-Enficld 
rifles  two  "430  and  one  -303  Maxims,  and  five  9-pr.  R.M.L. 
|guii». 

The  roor((aiii>iiition  oE  the  Military  and  Civil  Police  into 
rnic  body,  calli'd  tlio  Koot  Police,  was,  however,  taken  in 
hand  and  duly  n>iiiiiK>U't!. 

Mahommed-hiii-vVhdulUih  Hassan  belonged  to  the   Habr 

Pubiman  (or  lliiK"*')  sub-trilw  of  the  Southern  Ogaden,  one 

o(  whoBO  wnteriiiK  iilnoivs  is  ttaladi.     He  had,  however,  spent 

tuuoli  nl  hii  timti  Hiiioii^Nt  till!  Dulhahanta,  with  one  of  whose 

I  «uh-tvibi>i,  tlio  AH  llliori.  Iio  limi  ititor-married.    In  1900  he 

f»  ill  tilt'  prim"  "'  I'to,  hud  IravdhHl  much,  and  was  described 

«  ititrk-oitliilirinl,  lull  itiid  thin,  with  a  small  goatee  beard. 

OtirinK  llii'  yiWit  \^W^  t*)  \W\^  th(«  Mullah  made  several 
wiWT\W»«lO»l«M'"""'''""'i"'""''  lli'"'wt '>t  Muhammed  Saleh, 
»  nv«l 'i!  tliw  Kttdiirlyuh,  I'll'  moul,  iuflnMitittl  and  popular 
rt(»S<>im»Uhuiil. 
Ho  n-HUllii'-l  iii'iiii'  ti'il>'ii"lv  by  (ipditiimn  prfHehiiifi  in 


(M 
L    ,  All 

P*'^*   ten 


iera  in  1895,  after  which  he  returned  to  his  tariga,  Kob 
Faradod,  in  the  Dolbahanta,  Here  ho  gradually  acquired 
influence  Ity  stopping  inter-tribal  warfare,  and  eventually 
started  a  religious  movement  in  which  the  Rer  Ibrahim 
(Mukahil  Ogaden),  Ba  Hawadle  (Miyirwalal  Ogaden)  and  the 
Ali  Gheri  {Dolbahanta)  were  the  first  to  join.  His  emissaries 
sIho  aoon  succeeded  in  winning  over  the  Adan  Madoba, 
■table  amongst  whom  was  Haji  Sudi,*  his  trusted  lieu- 
tenant, and  the  Ahmed  Farih  and  Rer  Yusuf,  all  Habr 
Toljaala,  and  the  Musa  Ismail  of  the  Eastern  Habr  Yunis,  Habr 
Gerhajis,  with  Sultan  Nur.* 

The  Mullah  made  a  special  point  of  breaking  up  the 
tribal  feeling.  To  efEect  this  he  had  offenders  put  to  death 
by  fellow-tribesmen,  thus  substituting  his  own  authority  for 
that  of  the  headmen. 

At  the  beginning  of  1S99,  the  Mullah  committed  Ms  first 
overt  act  of  hostiUty  against  the  authorities  of  the  Protec- 
torate. He  suddenly  appeared  at  Burao,  raided  other  sub- 
tribes  of  the  Habr  Yunia,  and  forced  the  Mahraud  Gerad 
Dolbahanta  to  join  him.    He  then  retired  towards  Bohotle. 

Shortly  after  this  episode,  in  April,  1899,  it  was  estimated 
by  Consul  General  Hayes-Sadler  that  the  Mullah's  following 
amounted  to  about  3,000  men,  hut  he  was  beheved  to  possess 
only  fiO  modern  rifles  and  a  small  quantity  of  ammunition. 

In  the  following  August  the  Mullah  again  raided  the  Habr 
Yunis  tribes,  and  re-occupied  Burao  with  a  force  estimated  at 
5,000  men,  of  whom  1,500  were  horse  and  200  had  rifles. 
He  gave  himself  out  as  the  Mahdi,  and  nimours  spread 
that  he  intended  to  advance  on  Berbera. 

The  Consul-General  accordingly  proposed  an  expedition, 
with  Burao  as  its  immediate  objective.  Delay  was,  however, 
deemed  expedient  by  Her  Majesty's  Government,  having 
regard  to  the  state  of  affairs  in  other  parts  of  the  world, 

*  Haji  Sudi  was  an  ex -interpreter  o£  the  Royal  N'avy.  He  had  teon  at 
Suakin  sad  wafi  coDversaot  with  Decrieh  vajs  and  hud  impoHei  mnay  of 
their  oustoma. 

t  Sultaji  Nur  was  the  disgraced  Sultno  "t  tho  Habr-Y'tn's-lBhak  iril  e, 
•iiid  was  an  outcast  from  his  tribe. 

(8927)  D 


At  the  end  of  October,  1899,  the  Chief  of  the.  Dolbahanta 
tribe.  All,  was  murdered  by  order  of  the  MuUahj  for  refusing 
to  assist  in  hia  plans,  and  British  influence  was  practically 
superseded  in  that  portion  of  the  Protectorate.  The  Mullah, 
however,  apparently  abandoned  his  project  for  an  advance 
on  Berbeia,  and  action  against  him,  in  consequence  of  the 
outrages  above  specified,  was  deferred  owing  to  the  wai'  in 
South  Africa. 

Early  in  the  same  mouth  a  boat  from  Jibuti,  flying  the 
French  flag,  conveyed  a  consignment  of  arms  and  ammunition 
to  the  Itahan  Protectorate,  where,  without  the  consent  of 
the  Italian  authorities,  they  were  bought  by  the  Sultan  Oaman 
Mahmud,  to  be  passed  on,  it  is  believed,  later  to  the  Mullah. 

In  December,  1899,  the  Mullah's  following  dwindled,  and 
he  retired  across  the  Prote.ctorate  frontier  to  Walwal  in  the 
country  of  the  Ibrahim  Ogaden,  3  or  4  days'  march  south 
of  Bohotle.  Here  he  occupied  himself  in  trying  to  combine, 
the  Ogaden  tribes  against  the  tribes  of  the  Piotectorat*, 
who  had  abandoned  his  cause. 

By  the  beginning  of  February,  1900,  the  Mullah  had  appar- 
ently collected  more  rifles,  as  well  as  large  auppUea  of  grain 
and  live  stock ;  but  on  the  rumour  of  the  advance  of  an 
Abyssinian  force  reaching  him,  he  again  retired,  moving 
towards  theWebi  ShebeU.  At  this  time  his  immediate  following 
was  reported  to  be  about  1,200  men,  while  it  was  said  that  all 
the  Ogadens  had  submitted  to  his  authority. 

In  March,  1900,  an  Abyssinian  expedition  of  about  1,500 
well-armed  men  was  despatched  from  Harrar  against  the 
Mullah,  but,  faihng  to  encounter  him,  fell  back,  and  was 
followed  up  by  6,000  spearmen,  chiefly  of  the  Gallas  and  Harrari 
tribes.  This  force  attacked  the  Abyssinians  in  a  strong  zariba 
with  much  boldness,  but  was  eventually  beaten  back  with 
a  reported  loss  of  2,650  men. 

Early  in  June,  1900,  the  Consul-General  reported  that  the 
Mullah  was  quiescent,  bub  that  his  movementa  had  con- 
siderably thrown  back  the  civihzation  of  the  country. 


On  the  9th  June,  1900,  Colonel  Harrington,  the  British 
"Agent  in  Abysainia,  teiegi'aphed  from  Jibuti,  that  the  Emperor 
Menelek  proposed  a  combined  movement  o£  British  and 
Abyssinian  forces  against  the  Mullah,  and  recommended 
acceptance  of  the  proposal. 

In  August,  1900,  the  Mullah  renewed  his  activity  by  a 
sudden  raid,  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  2,000  Aithi- 
galla  camels,  and  in  causing  all  the  British  tribes  to  abandon 
the  Hand  in  confusion.  The  Consul-General  reported  that  the 
tribes  were  losing  confidence  in  out  ability  to  protect  them,  and 
that,  unless  confidence  was  restored,  they  might  be  driven  to 
make  the  best  terms  they  could  with  the  Mullah.  He  accord- 
ii]gly  urged  the  necessity  of  a  forward  movement. 

In  September  the  Mullah  made  a  second  raid  from  Milmil 
on  the  Abyssinian  Habr  Awai  at  Harrhe,  and  on  the  2(jth 
October,  1900,  the  Consul -General  reported  that  the  tribes 
who  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  Mullah  could  no  longer 
be  restrained,  and  were  preparing  to  attack  him  near  Milmil ; 
and  that  consequently  the  half  battalion  2nd  Central 
African  Regiment  had  been  moved  up  towards  Hargeisa. 

On  3rd  November,  the  Consul-General  telegraphed  that  he 
had  heard  from  Harrington  that  the  Emperor  Menelek  was 
willing  to  co-operate  with  a  large  force,  and  strongly  recom- 
mended immediate  concerted  action,  proposing  to  raise  a  levy 
of  1,000  men,  including  two  mounted  companies,  witU  a 
proportion  of  British  officers  under  Captain  (local  Lieut. - 
Colonel)  E.  J.  E.  Swayue,  Indian  Army.  Thb  proposal  being 
motioned,  preparations  were  begun  for  organizing  the  first 
sedition  against  the  Mullah. 


CHAPTER  III. 
THE  FIRST  EXPEDITIOX,  1!K)I.» 
I  Preparations  bor  the  First  Expedition. — The  Opera- 
tions.—Advanced  Post  at  S^uiala  attacked  by  thb 
Mullah. — Skirmish  at  Waylahed. — Subjugation  of 
Hostile  Tribes. — Attack  and  Defeat  of  the  Mcllah 
at  Ferdiddin.— Return  of  the  Force  to  Burao. — 
Dervish  and  British  Casualties.^Observations  op 
Colonel  Swayne  on  the  Expedition. ^)PERATioNa 
of  the  Abyssinian  Force. 
Several  conaiderations  governed  the  decision  as  to  timing  the 
movement  againat  the  Mullah.  In  January,  1901,  a  punitive 
expedition  against  the  Southern  Ogadens  on  the  Juba  was  in 
progress,  and  it  was  expected  that  the  operations  would  last 
to  the  end  of  March.  It  was  therefore  desirable,  if  possible, 
to  defer  the  Somaliland  expedition  till  our  hands  were  free  in 
Jubaland,  unless  it  appeared  that  the  Mullah's  movement  was 
connected  with  the  rising  on  the  Juba.  Time  also  was  requited 
to  organize  and  train  the  levy.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
important  to  consider  whether  it  would  be  an  advantage  or  the 
reverse,  if  the  operations  againat  the  Mullah  were  timed  to 
begin  at  a  particular  season.  The  headquarters  of  the  Mullah 
in  December,  1900,  were  at  Milmil  on  the  northern  boundary 
of  the  Western  Hand,  and  Bohotle,  where  it  was  thought 
that  the  Mullah  might  be  attacked,  aft^r  he  had  been  driven 
eastward  by  the  Abyssiniana,  is  in  the  north  of  the  Southern 
Hand.  The  Haud,  therefore,  became  an  important  factor  in 
the  operations.  During  the  dry  season,  January  to  April,  this 
tract  of  countiy  is  moat  inhospitable,  and  entirely  devoid  of 
water,  thus  rendering  operations  against  Milmil  or  Bohotle 
during  the  first  three  months  of  the  year  a  matter  of  consider- 

*  s™  Map  n. 


able  difficulty.  Yet,  if  the  advance  were  delayed  until  the 
seaBoa  when  water  is  to  be  found  in  that  region,  the  Mullah 
■would  find  it  easy  to  evade  our  columns,  and  the  difficulty 

of  inflicting  a  decisive  blow  would  be  serious. 

On  the  othec  hand,  the  rainy  season  was  perhaps  the  best 
from  the  point  o£  view  of  our  transport  and  water  supply, 
yet,  if  an  efficient  system  of  water  transport  were  maintained, 
a  considerable  advantage  over  the  enemy  might  be  gained  by 
moving  in  the  dry  season  when  his  mobility  would  be  impaired 
for  lack  of  water.  In  the  latter  case,  however,  it  would  not 
be  possible  to  count  with  equal  certainty  upon  the  Abyssiniana 
for  effective  co-operation. 

Conaul-General  J.  H.  Sadler  and  Captain  (local  Lieut,- 
Colonel)  E.  J.  E,  Hwayne,  after  weighing  all  these  considera- 
tions, decided  that  April  would  be  the  most  favourable  time  to 
commence  operations,  and  arrangements  were  made  to  that 
effect.  The  actual  plan  of  operations,  which  was  that  the 
Abyssinians  should  drive  the  Mullah  eastwards  towards 
Bohotle  where  our  expedition  should  attack  him,  depended 
on  two  main  considerations,  namely,  the  position  of  the 
Midlah  at  the  time  the  operations  began,  and  the  extent  to 
which  the  Abyssiniana  would  allow  us  a  free  hand  in  the  Ogaden 
country.  Information  at  the  time  indicated  that  the  Mullah 
was  returning  to  Bohotle  about  the  2Ist  January,  1901,  in 
which  case  the  expedition  would  move  straight  on  that  place  ; 
if  he  stood  fast  in  the  direction  of  Harrardiggit,  Swayne 
woiild  either  have  to  wait  till  he  was  driven  eastwards,  or 
move  to  intercept  the  MuUah'a  retreat  tuwaids  Bohotle,  A 
direct  move  on  Bohotle  was  ujidesirable,  as  this  would  uncover 
the  whole  of  the  Habr  Yunis  country.  Accordingly,  the 
preparations  for  the  expedition  were  made  on  the  assumption 
tiiat  the  advance  would  take  place  in  the  dry  season  in 
preference  to  waiting  for  the  more  favourable  season  of  rains, 
and  concerted  action  to  this  efiect  was  arranged  between 
the  British  Commander  and  Ras  Makounen,  the  Commander 
e  Abyssinian  force. 


5t 

Oil  Mardi  I7ti[\,  1901,  the  situation,  howev-er,  cliaiiged. 
'Jhe  MiiUah  was  driven  out  by  the  AbyBsinians  to  the  Dol- 
bahanta  and  was  between  Bohotle  and  Lansadcr.  Swaync's 
operations  could  not,  therefore,  be  dependent  upon  the  co- 
operation of  the  Abyssinian  force  or  upon  the  expedition 
nn  the  Juba.  In  these  circumstances  it  was  decided  that 
with  a  view  to  prevent  the  Mullah  from  re-eHtabliahiag  his 
]jower  in  the  eastern  portion  of  the  Protectorate,  the  expedition 
should  concentrate  at  Burao  early  in  April,  and  operate 
against  the  Mullah  down  the  Ain  Valley,  after  making  a. 
preliminary  move  against  the  Rer  Ati  to  compel  them  to  effect 
a  settlement  and  return  the  loot  taken  from  our  tribes. 

The  following  instructions  were  issued  to  Lieutenant- 
(■olonel  Swayne  by  Consul-General  Hayes-Sadler  previous 
to  the  departure  of  the  expedition  :— 

air.  BetLera.  Apil  lltb,  1901. 

1  liave  till'  lioniiiic  to  iidilrcas  joii  in  ponneption  with  the  operations  you 
ari'  about  to  imderta]<e  Hgainat  tlie  MulUTi  Muhainmftd-bin- Abdullah. 

The  object  of  the  CTi>editLOTi  is  to  capture  or  defeat  the  Mullah  and  to  pot 
an  end  lo  hiB  movement  in  Ihe  Dolbaiianta.  Your  operations  will  accordingly 
l>e  directed  against  the  Mullah  nnd  fliow  who  may  noiv  be  found  lo  hp 
actively  Boppocting  hiin. 

Of  the  tribes  who  ore  now  roporti'd  to  have  dealings  with  (he  Midlah, 
with  the  expeption  of  the  Ali  Gheri,  who  may  be  ozpsc^^d  to  stand  by  him  / 
to  the  last,  it  is  not  certain  whieh  will  eontinne  to  nylmtain  hia  cause  once  i;^ 
he  is  confronted  with  our  force.  I  enclose  a  note  Fhave  drawn  up  of  our  ' 
de^almga  with  the  tribes  after  the  disturbanpes  of  1899,  and  I  have  noted 
fherdn,  so  far  as  information  is  available,  tile  prespnt  attitude  of  the  Dol- 
bahantA  tribes  from  the  reports  which  have  from  time  to  tinie  been  reeeived. 
Thia  you  will  be  able  to  check  with  information  you  will  yom'selfapquive.  But 
little  reUanpe  pan  be  (ilaeed  on  the  reports  reeoivpd  as  to  the  attitude  of  tlip 
Dolbahanta  tribes,  and  it  is  probable  that  accm'ate  information  as  to  the 
nttitvide  of  the  respective  tribes  will  not  be  obtained  till  the  expedition  enters 
the  coimtpy.  It  in,  however,  Ix^Uevod  that,  with  tlie  excoptioa  of  tbo 
A!i  Gheri  and  possibly  other  aeptiona  of  the  Girad  Farih,  the  majority  of 
the  people  who  have  joined  the  Mullah  in  the  Dolbahanta  have  done  so 
cither  through  fear  of  iiim  or  for  peraoual  gain,  and  that  a  large  seceding 
from  his  following  may  be  expected  when  our  espedition  takes  the  field, 

I  have  briefly  recorded  in  the  note  our  past  dealings  with  the  tribes  in 
order  that  yon  may  know  what  SPttlenienta  were  arrived  at^  and  ii 
1  hose  who  are  not  now  actively  supporting  the  Mullah,  take  no  attion  which 
«ill  conflict  with  those  settlements. 


55 


HOC,  the  post  uiimleeds  of  the  Habr  Tijl)uala  and  cait^ni  llabr 
Yimia  tribes  huve  been  dealt  with,  and  unless  any  uf  them  now  nutivelj 
support  the  Mullah,  wliich  I  do  not  anticipate  if  all  goea  well,  they  should 
not  in  any  way  ba  intOTfered  with. 

Several  of  thein  have  to  Bettto  up  [or  loots,  but  this  is  a  matl^T  uot 
ill  (mediately  connected  with  the  eiipedition  and  which  can  be  attendml  to 
» fterwards. 

The  past  and  pcc-acnt  conduct  of  the  AH  Gheri  necesatateB  that  they 
should  be  punished,  and  I  propose  to  infliot  a  Bne  of  1,000  oajnois  on  them, 
whii^h  you  can  jarataed  tu  enforce  after  the  Miilkh  has  been  dealt  witli. 
As  regards  the  Ararsamah,  the  Ba  Aiarsamah  and  the  Birkad,  much  will 
depend  npou  the  attitude  they  a'^sume  when  our  expedition  is  in  the  Held. 
If  they  do  not  actircly  supitort  the  Mullali,  I  should  be  inclined  to  deal 
leniently  with  thera,  our  object  being  to  suppress  the  Mullah  and  restore 

The  chief  danger  of  a  largo  oodition  of  the  Dolbahauta  agwnst  na  will 
lie  in  the  possibility  of  our  expedition  bemg  looked  iipou  as  an  Ishak 
invoflion  of  the  Dolbahanta  country. 

You  will  doubtless  take  al)  possible  measures  to  allay  any  sinpicion  of  the 
kiod ;  steps  in  this  direction  have  for  some  time  past  been  taken  here- 
with your  knowledge  of  the  country  and  people  I  need  hardly  warn  you 
that  any  looting  by  our  people  of  tribes  who,  though  formerly  with  the 
Mullah,  have  cunce  left  him,  and  arc  not  now  opposed  to  us,  besidcB  being 
impolitic,  would  create  a  dangerous  scare  and  play  into  the  hands  of  the 
Mullah  by  giving  Mm  the  very  means  to  efTect  a  powerful  combination 
against  ns  which  he  if  seeking,  and  which  it  might  seriously  tas  our  resources 
to  meet. 

It  ia  for  this  reason  that  it  is  specially  desirable  to  confine  our  operations 
to  the  Mnllah  aod  those  tribes  who  are  now  found  to  be  actively  supporting 
him.  Above  all,  those  who  seeede  from  the  MuUoh  and  assist  us  against  him 
must  be  protected,  oven  if  the  tribes  who  accompany  our  force  have  any 
'claims  aguint^t  them.  Theeu  will  be  matters  for  settlement  after  the  con- 
clusion of  the  expedition. 

There  are  many  claims  by  our  tribes  for  damage  done  by  the  Hullah 
anil  his  followers ;  it  is  reoaonablo  that  Oovenunent  should  be  reimbursed, 
if  possible,  a  portion  of  the  heavy  expenses  incurred  in  connection  with  the 
expedition  ;  and  the  force  will  expect  "lomething  in  the  way  of  pri^e-raonoy. 
Tlieae  should  be  met  from  any  loot  which  is  found  with  the  Mnllah,  or  the 
ttibca  now  actively  supporting  him,  and  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  a  fair 
proportion  would  be  one-third  to  the  force,  ( 
damage  done,  andtheremainder  for  Gove 
a  very  subsidiary  one,  and  you  will  doubtless  ni 
judicB  the  main  object  of  the  expedition. 

So  far  as  is  known  the  Mjjjarten  are  hostile  to  the  Mullali.   But  informa- 
tion was  received  yesterday  that  four  emissariea  of  this  tribe  have  been 
received  in  secret  conference  by  the  Mullah.     The  object  ot  their  visit  is 
^"tot  known.     Despatches  have  lately  been  sent   by  the  Vice-Consul  tor 


e-third  to  satiafy  claims  for 
:.  This  question  is,  however, 
it  allow  it  in  any  way  to  pre- 


Italy  at  Aden  to  tbo  Coimul-Geuoral  for  that  coiuitry,  who  in  now  at  Raa 
AIiiIb,  to  move  the  Miijarten  under  Sult«n  Osman  Mahniad  and  Sultan 
Yusuf  AU  to  cut  oH  tho  MuIIaIi'b  retreat  should  lie  attempt  to  eaoape  to  tho 
cOBSt  throogh  their  eoantry.  And  I  have  lately  addreHSed  the  Renidiait  at 
Aden  with  a  view  to  Biroilar  warnings  being  givon  to  the  ebiefa  oa  tho 
Bouthern  Arabian  littoral. 

I  shall  be  glad  to  know  if  there  is  any  further  action  wliioh  it  may  occur 
to  yovi  can  now  be  jisetiiUy  tnkcn  (rmn  here  to  promote  the  object  o£  the 
I'speditiOD. 

In  tho  unlikely  event  it  the  Mullah  o&uring  to  surrender,  in  his  case  and 
ill  that  of  the  following— Ahmed  Waraamah  (known  as  Haji  Sudi),  Deria 
Anilf,  anil  Dcria  Giiro— only  an  iinconditiona!  surrender  should  be 
accepted,  no  ^larantce  of  any  kind  aa  to  future  treatment  being  given. 
Kw,  tho  latt  SultuJi  of  the  Habr  YuniB,  may  be  guaranteed  his  life. 
I  have.  Ac. 
iSi^iiied)        J.  HAYRS-SADLER. 

'  As  the  result  of  correaponJeuct,  in  November  and 
December,  1900,  between  the  Foreign  Office  and  Consul- 
General  Hayes-Sadler,  sanction  was  given  to  raise  the  following 
local  levies  :— 

Camel  Corps,   100;    Mounted  Infantry,  400;    Infantry, 
1,000.     The  whole  being   under  the  command    of 
Captain  (Local  Lieut. -Colonel)  E.  J.  E.  Bwayne, 
The  employment  with  this  levy  of  17  British  ofGcers— 
5  captains  and  12  subaltfirna — was  also  approved,  and  recruit- 
ing proceeded. 

The  nature  of  the  work  is  best  described  in  the  following 
extracts  from  Lieut.-Colonel  Swayne's  report  to  the  Consiil- 
General : — 


I  n 


lived  orikrB 


prelirainaiy  measuri 
In  less  than  a.  week  250  men,  com 
OoBst  Police  St^poye  as  N.C.Oh.,  n 
the  use  of  their  rifles.     They  i 


n  the  li-Jnd  l^oveinbei',  1900,  to  tiUBe,  as  a 
number  of  men  to  replace  the  regulars.' 
rising  eight  sections  andnr  the  command  of 
reraised,  armed  and  equipped,  and  taught 
>re  marched  inland  by  mo  on  the  28th 


*  The  residt  of  n  decision  to  withdraw  the  2nd  Battalion  King's  African 
BiSes  from  the  country,  and  to  raise '2.'!i0  men  torefleve  the  outlying  garrisons 
hitherto  furnished  by  them.  The  decision  to  withdraw  the  2iid  Battalion, 
King'a  African  RilleR  was  duo  lo  the  repreEentation  of  lien t. -Colonel  Brake, 
who  received  teporta  that  the  cffioiency  of  tlie  corpa  was  suffering  from  the 
want  of  vegetable  diet  in  tho  Protectorate  and  that  their  prolonged  a  baenci- 
from  Central  Africa  would  seriously  affect  recruiting  then.'  in  Ihu  fviture. 


November,  aad  the  ifgular  dutaciuncnts  at  Ad&dleh  and  Haj'^tsa,  3S  inilea 
and  100  miles  distant  from  Eerbcra,  were  relieved  on  the  morning  of  the 
1st  and  2nd  Deuember  respeutively,  and  aiippliea  of  rationa  and  ammimition 
were  taken  over  at  both  places.  A  defensible  masonry  block-house  for  the 
storage  of  ammunition  was  built  at  Adadleh. 

No  rifles  bad  yet  arrived  from  England,  so  the  new  levies  were  aimed 
with  the  spare  Martini-Henry  and  Snider  rilleB  of  the  Coast  Police,  and 
later  on,  when,  on  my  return  from  Halgeisa  on  the  4th  Deeeml»r,  new 
seeliona  were  railed,  such  other  Berviceable  rifles  of  yarioua  oalibres  as  were 
available  in  tlie  ProteDtorute  were  utilised.  On  the  departure  of  the  regidara, 
l.'iO  Martini-Enfleld  single-loading  '303  rifles  were  left  on  loan  to  the  Pro- 
tectorate, and  these  also  inimediately  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  new  levies. 

There  was  at  this  thne,  owing  to  the  feeling  of  exasperation  causeil  by 
Iht^  sufferings  of  the  people,  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  infantry  recruits,  even 
at  the  low  rate  of  pay  of  10,  rupees  a  month,  a  rate  4  rupees  less  than  that 
jiivea  to  the  Coaat  Pohee,  On  the  first  day  some  1,200  men  eame  forward, 
lu  selecting  men,  only  tliose  vouched  for  by  responsible  Chiefs  and  those 
belonging  to  trustworthy  tribes  were  enlisted,  no  Dolbahanta  being  allowed 
to  enter  the  ranks.  Svery  man,  before  marching  out  of  Bcrbera,  was  paid 
an  allowance  1^  piuohase  his  own  Somali  shoos  and  also  a  piece  of  American 
elolh.  Extra  hides  and  spare  steel  were  sent  up  with  the  sections,  and  the 
men,  amongst  whom  were  many  shoemakers  and  workers  in  iron,  made  and 
repaired  their  own  shoes,  and  wade  axes  with  which  to  cut  thorn  bushes. 
On  the  march  thorn  zaribas  were  made  every  night. 

In  the  beginning  of  December,  when  an  expedition  was  sanctioned,  you 
sutliorised  me  to  increase  the  infantry  of  the  levy  up  to  1,000,  and  later  on 
to  form  a  nioimted  corps  of  500  men.  As  I  was  at  this  tune  alone,  I  had  had 
to  personally  conduct  the  detaehnieiits  up-country,  and  as  this  involved 
journeys  of  200  miles  to  Hargeisa  and  back,  I  now  found  it  unposaible  to 
spore  tlie  four  days  occupied  by  the  journey.  Much  work  had  to  be  done  at 
the  coast  in  brio^g  over  riding  camels  from  Aden,  in  purchasing  ti'ansport 
animals  and  supplies,  and  in  sending  caravans  up-country.  Estimates  hciA 
to  be  prepared,  and  anna,  equipment,  clotlung,  stores,  water  tanks,  &e., 
ordered  from  England,  Egyjit,  or  India.  I  found  it  neccHsary,  therefore, 
to  apply  for  the  immediate  services  of  two  Subalterns  in  order  to  take  charge 
_<tf  the  up-country  posts,  and  on  the  2nd  BattaUon   King's  African  Rifles 

ing  from  the  ooast,  the  services  of  Lieutenants  Byrne  and  Walshe  were 
placed  at  my  disposal.  They  were  at  once  sent  up  to  t^e  charge  of  the 
'  levies  at  Hargoiso  and  Adodleh  (50  miles  apart),  whilst  I  continued  to  enlist 
men  at  Berbera. 

The  raising  of  the  mounted  infantry  gave  much  trouble.     As  aoou  as  he 

could  be  spared  from  Hargeisa,  Lieutenant  Byrne  was  sent  westward  to 

~}ebolek,  where  the  Chiefs  had  agreed  to  bring  up  horsemen  for  enUstment. 

s  succeeded  in  raising  100  men,  bringing  tbeu^  own  ponies  and  saddles, 

t,  owing  to  the  threatening  attitude  of  the  Rer  All  Ogaden  and  to  the 

Mquent  disinolination  of  our  tribes  to  leave  their  flocks  unguarded, 
V  enlistmeitt  come  to  a  standatill. 


^  I  hmk  the  honour  to  luk 
«4*  tka  Km  AIL  Uem. 
tgmm,  *Bal  two  stK^ticins  of 
•«  lb*  burdo'.  You  were 
L  t*  suiction  BO  advance 


•  •d  frm^^i  ht  iwtHlucii  a  contiDgent  of 

:    **    li'J'wr.  Hia  Majesty's  Consul  at 

-•  tlMK  tw  nm*  forward.     Tho  tribes 

•.^  vt  fAntl  from  the  MnUah's  raida, 

.  •.  n>  h**lt.  •»*»».  wi=re  not  affected  by  tho 

•>  «»  tf  <V  m;  mounted  brauoh  I  found  it 

w  {muFB  and  mount  my  in/antty 

i  up  eo  alowiy  that  it  was 

F  tat  starting.      I  had  (o  enliat  estra 

mI  •ho  to  arrangu  for  getting  in  tribal 

•  Ot  operations. 

isleil  for  a  tranBport  torpa.  These 
o  called  up  for  Bcrvioe  or  din- 
tile^  dntm  were  mainly  connected  irith  the 
k  «l  ««^iik4  lirc-slovfc  sent  back  front  the  front, 
•MWttnl  llw  tnuiBiiort  riSemen,  and  were  utiliaed  us 
g  amk  xt  a  distance  from  the  field  columns.  Thn 
«M«  •••  *•  pvot**  part  W'.'wtrd  no  |«y  but  were  given  a  bonus  out  of  the 
|ht>>'^u>.4, 1'A^Mird  fiMiB  ltK>  onwiiy. 

Ki.  tlv  MivkU*  of  Jaaiuu)-,  whiMtLhc  first  British  officers  began  to  arrive 
^  tlw  i-,M>^  OM  mi^  bad  alrrody  boen  raised  and  the  (tutachments  at 
Hmi^M  iM*^  .\iUtllch  «t*e  nmsiawably  strengthened.  These  airaniy- 
mxHm  ¥11*  i»fy  kr\*  iiiatlFJV  iiuk>t  atWr  the  departure  of  the  regulars,  but, 
••4^  tu  tW  cuf!):i>ra)r<l  rei«rta  of  our  strength  which  reached  the  Mullah, 
W  kvMiK'  alipwliMisj™  of  raid!  by  our  levies  and  tribes  on  his  own  live- 
««*.  and  *a  oiaitined  biiuaclf  to  looking  to  his  own  prol-cction,  and 
«l<M<4nn«rt  Hie  itlc*  of  making  any  fiirUier  organised  attacks  upon  our 

Allt^ithi-r  i'l  ofKcers  iHiiiwI  nic,  viK.,  1  major,  6  capfajna,  1  medical 
tilKccr,  and  l;l  tnltaHnnis.  MTien  Ihr  liivy  was  sauctioned  no  local  nulitary 
•itahlixhuiellt"  r^Ulf-d  with  the  exception  of  the  Coast  Police,  of  whom 
*iwiii>  lorly  men  ui>rt>  NvaiUlile  fur  the  charge  of  seotjons.  Likely  men  of 
lltA  l«vy  wvrv  liiailn  aetiug  tion-roromissioned  officers,  and  taught  by  four 
liiillaii  havlldani  Ui>t  inf  timta  Alien.  The  latter  returned  to  India  when 
Ihn  Sinnull*  *pi*  »uttoi*iii(ly  Hdvwitvd  to  lake  oluirge  of  seotions, 
I  llw  InfMilry  waa  lUvidod  into  two  corps  of  5U0  men  each,  and  the 
(muiclry  aiitl  mountwl  Infantry  formed  one  corps.  The  Mounted  Corps 
WW  wMHuiainkxt  by  Maj.w  Vf.  O,  L,  Beynon.  D.B.O.,  I.S.C,  and  he  was 
M>i>lnl  by  l^ptalii  C.  M-  D.  Bruce,  B-K.A.,  who  had  charge  of  the  Camel 
(Vr|«,  aixd  l^plnln  J.  W.  M.  -Mewwether,  I.S.C-,  oonunanding  the  mounted 
liilwiilit.      Ihii  luo  iiiliuiliy  i'or(iii  were  respectively  commanded  l^y  Captain 


5i) 


G.  E.  Phil]ii>a,  R.Ji:.,  ikuI  Caplalji  M.  M.^Xdll,  Argyll  and  S.ilherlurd  Kigh- 
landerF.  (iBptnin  B.  A.  fViedrichs,  R.K.,  was  appointed  Adjutaot,  Lieu- 
fo'nsDt  Btous  Trajiaport  Officer,  and  Lieutenant  Dickinson,  Qiiart«miaHter. 
Biwldac  AtuBa  FArah  raised  and  onmnidnded  one  of  thn  jiiountcd  in/nntry 
I'oni  panie«,  and  beAidex,  acted  aa  Biaaldar-Major  to  the  force.  Chtin^  to 
hh  inlimate  knowledge  of  Somali  ciiatoins  aod  his  iiiHuence  with  the  tribpN, 
I  [ilaeed  uuder  his  ohargo  the  arrangements  for  tribal  sooating  work.  Spies 
nnd  strong  patrols  were  sent  100  miles  aouth  to  report  on  the  Mullah's 
lents,  and  to  captoro  prisonei'a  and  bo  obtain  information.    A  number 

I   of  the  Mullah's  spies  n-ere  caught  and  caraTana  tatinB  eu]iplies  to  hiin  were 

'   captured. 

The  R*r  Oulod  of  the  Aidagalla  were  at  lliis  tuae  trafflcking  with  the 
Mullah,  and  being  an  Ishak  tribo  in  the  midst  of  our  own  peopli 
necessary  to  coerce  them  into  good  bohaTiour.  Risaldar  Musa  Farah  by 
a  rapid  march  with  two  aectiouH  succ^wded  in  capturing  and  bringing  in 
some  d£  the  rhief  men,  and  these  I  found  it  convenient  to  attach  to  the 
exjxidition  as  a  guarantee  for  the  tribe's  good  behaviour.  This  measure 
allayed  the  ansiety  of  tljc  levies  as  to  the  safety  of  their  flocks  duriuf; 
their  absence.  Tho  Aid^alla  bcharcd  well,  and  I  waa  able,  at  the 
end  of  operations,  to  esiiross  my  satiafaction  by  making  them  a 
substantial  present  out  of  tho  captured  camels.  In]  February,  owing; 
to  the  HarranligBit  pool  drying  up,  the  Mullah  waa  compelled  to  shift 
quarters,  and  coneequenlly  withdrew  to  the  Bouthem  edge  of  the  Hand 
desert,  to  a  pool  of  wat-er  called  Mcrai.  The  Abysainians,  after  the 
Mullahs  attack  on  their  post  ut  Jig-Jiga,  recognised  the  gravity  of  the 
danger  to  their  position  amongst  the  Mahommedan  tribes  at  Harrar,  and 
decided  to  address  tlio  British  Government  with  a  view  to  a  joint  expedition. 
Ill  January  a  force  of  Abyssinians,  whith  eventually  reached  16,000  men, 
was  sent  down  to  the  western  edge  of  the  Haud,  from  Jig-Jiga  towards 
Uerlogubi,  with  orders  to  block  that  side  of  the  country  to  the  Mullah  and 
prevent  any  chance  of  his  combining  with  the  Ogaden  tribes,  with  whom 
Colonel  Tetnan's  expedition  was  at  this  time  deahng.  In  February,  owing 
to  the  operations  of  tho  Abyssiuians,  the  Mullah  found  it  necessary  to  leave 
Hersi.  He  had  attempted  to  combine  the  Ogaden  against  them,  but  these 
tribes  having  l>een  badly  treated  by  liim,  would  not  now  help,  and  on  the 
punishment  of  one  of  their  outlying  sections  by  tho  Abysainiana,  the  Mullali 
iound  himaelf  compelled  to  retire  eastward  to  Bohotle  to  our  Dolbahantii 
tribes,  his  own  Idiiamcn,  wlio  have  always  iiroved  to  be  tho  batkbone 
of  his  following. 

Shipments  of  ammunition  began  to  arrive  at  Berbcra  on  the  10th 
January,  and  were  followed  by  the  rillta  on  the  7th  February.  The  newly 
raised  levies  were  put  to  the  work  of  unloading,  and  eaJ'ned  eoJimiendalion 
by  their  willingness  to  perform  fatigue  work,  to  which,  until  then,  they  had 
'  been  totally  unused,  and  which  is  generally  disliked  by  Somalia  All 
K«fft«ers  worked  weil  together,  and  recruiting,  training,  oqnipnipnl  and 
mtlBkntry  instruction  were  quirkly  pushed  forward. 

A   credit    was  aHorded   mo  on  the  llubeca  Ti'casuty,  Mid  nil 


The  Kcr 
Ouled  I '01 


1 


pBiSh.     Lateiona 
Rank  oE  India,  in 


efficient 
ofall  and 
ilequent 
llitj  of 


fcjfer  of 


lid  ailitlcs  [jurcluiacd.  Imally  u"L'ro  paid  for  on  tlif  3|iot.  in 
1  atiiount  was  opened  witli  the  Aden  branch  of  the  If  stioniil 
order  to  enable  mo  to  pay  by  cheque  for  debts  iaourced  un 
account  of  tranait  chargea  and  local  purchaaea.  Small  advances  of  pay 
were  made  to  the  men  in  order  to  provide  for  the  mtuntenanoe  of  their 
families  during  their  iibi<euc<i  in  the  interior. 

Meaats.  Cowaaji  Dinshaw  Bcotliora  tcanahipped  all  afoteg  and  brought 
them  in  their  ateamers  to  thn  coiLSt.  They  perfurmed  thin  work  well.  Some 
delay  was  caused  by  stores  being,  tlffongh  error.  oTcr-oarried  to  Ceylon. 

The  men  learned  to  shoot  quickly,  and  in  a  competitioa  held  at  Biirao 
in  May  actiially  shot  better  than  the  Punjabi  detachment.  Their  volleys 
nt  600  and  SOO  yards  were  well  directed  and  tiro  discipline  becaiuo  good, 
Buglora  quickly  learned  the  few  calla  I  found  it  nvceaaary  to  touch  tliem. 

The  BO  Punjabis,  who  liad  been  sent  for  from  India  tu  act  as  harildara, 
di'ill  instructors,  and  masira  guo  detaehmenta,  nnfortnnately  arrived  on  the 
coast  only  on  the  eve  of  the  expedition  leaving  Biirao,  when  I  had  been 
compelled  to  do  what  I  could  with  such  ecsaity  material  as  was  avidhtblo  in 
theahapeoE  police  on  the  coaat.  I  therefore  decided  to  keep  them  aa  a  aeporate 
body  and  the  Somalia  were  allowed  to  continue  their  work,  (he  tbre«  maxJm 
guna,  wliich  had  been  fitted  to  riding  camels,  being  managed  entirely  by 
them,  under  the  direction  of  Lieul«QantB  H.  W.  Thorp,  East  Torkahiro 
Regiment,  and  J.  C.  Lamprey,  Boyal  Dublin  Fuailiers. 

Whilst  enlifltmeut  wa^  going  on  there  was  much  sickness  in  the  low 
coast  region,  and  over  300  men  had  to  be  discharged  and  other  men  enlisted 
instead.  Tlie  wont  of  grazing  alao  caused  much  difficulty.  The  camels 
as  quickly  as  they  were  purchased  were  aent  up-nountry  with  supplies,  and 
then  had  to  be  driven  out  to  the  grazing  grounda  some  40  miles  distant 
from  the  interior  levy-posts.  The  rains  which  should  ordinarily  have  fallen 
in  the  Erst  week  in  April  were  insufficient  to  bring  out  the  graas,  and  a  bad 
drought  followed  during  April  and  May.  All  animals  had  thecefare  ta  bo 
oonatantly  on  the  move,  roaming  about  in  search  of  food,  and  it  became 
necessary  to  detach  numerous  parties  of  the  levy  to  guard  them.  Even 
with  the  greatest  care  over  100  died  and  the  remainder  became  so  debilitated 
as  to  compel  a  postponement  of  the  advance. 

On  the  Mullah's  move  eastward  from  Merai  to  the  Dolbahanta  country, 
a  corresponding  change  of  base  oo  our  part  became  necessary. 

In  April  men  and  stores  were  sliifted,  partly  with  our  own  transport  and 
partly  with  hired  animala  from  Adadleh  to  Burao.  The  latter  place  was  qnito 
hare  and  the  animals  had  therefore  to  be  brought  back  some  40  lulles  to 
graze.  A  defenaible  post  was  made  at  Burao  and  strengthened  wilh 
haibed  wire,  and  £upply  caiavans  were  sent  up  from  Berbera  by  the 
direct  route  over  tlio  Sheikh  Pats,  Tlie  reserve  animunition  at  the  Adadleh 
block  house  was,  for  safety,  moved  to  Burao. 

The  tribes  at  this  time  of  the  year  require  all  their  transport  animals 
in  order  to  shift  their  encampments  when  changing  ground  in  search  of 
grass ;  moreover,  their  animals  equally  with  ours  were  dying  for  the  want  of 
food.     Much  time  was  consequently  taken  up  at  Adadleh  in  intrrviews  with 


61 


tribal  Eldera,  wlio,  howevpr,  evenhially  diii  what  tliey  ware  aaked  t"  d<i 
ill  the  way  d£  supplying  tranBport. 

Supplies  vfen  c&luutaUd  ontheiusumptionthat  tliQ  force  would  requiie-  Si 
twenty  days'  food  carried  tor  it  forward  from  Hurao,  plus  twelve  days'  ™ 
Hvo-atotk.  Besides  this  a  mootii's  ratioaa  was  to  be  held  in  rcacrvp  at 
Kurao,  and  aoother  montli's  food  was  to  bn  sent  up  to  Bui'ao  from  Bei'bcra 
during  the  progi'ess  of  operations.  All  the  supplies  sent  up  byme  iu  Deceiii- 
br  and  January  wern  eoOBumed  during  the  time  ocoupied  by  the  orgauizit- 
fion  and  training  of  the  levies.  Ijentcnant  L.  Murray,  East  Surrey  Regi- 
ment, vaa  directed  to  take  charge  of  tlie  supplies  at  Biirao.  The  mounted 
-infantry  ponies  were  gra7.ed  at  the  foot  of  the  Golis  range,  where  the  only 
suitable  gcaas  for  horses  at  this  time  was  to  bo  found. 

Whilst  the  movement  to  Uuruo  was  in  progress  steps  were  taken  to  l, 
stop  the  Mullah's  sources  of  itiformation.  His  spies  in  the  lahak  country 
were  cither  captured  or  driven  away ;  caravans  taking  stores  to  the  Mullah 
were  apprehended  wttliin  a  radius  of  00  miles,  and  a  body  of  Iiis  scouts 
was  aurprised  30  miles  south  of  Bnrao  near  Idoweina.  Caravans  coming  in 
from  the  interior  to  Berbera  were,  as  a  rule,  not  interfered  with,  as  it  was 
not  desirable  or  necessary  to  stop  trade ;  moreover,  I  derived  much  useful 
information  from  thum.  Our  own  spies  penetrated  to  the  Rer  Hagar 
Dolhahanta  eocarapmenla  at  (\in  Alio  and  Baliwcin,  75  miles  south  of 
Burao,  and  strong  patrols  acting  on  their  information  captured  prisoners 
in  the  enemy's  country,  who  supplied  us  with  information.  Some  of  these 
prisoners,  after  being  misled  as  to  our  real  line  of  advance  were  allowed 
to  esca[ie  at  night,  in  order  1^3  return  to  the  Mullah  and  deceive  him.  In 
order  to  assist  in  this  object  the  Bolbahanta  tribes  at  Bohotle  were  ordered 
to  have  sheep  ready  for  the  consmuption  of  the  force  at  Eohotlc. 

A  number  of  donkeys  were  purchased  to  asaiat  in  hospital  transport 
and  to  be  at  the  disposal,  for  riding  purposes,  of  twenty  selected  Punjabis 
whom  I  had  decided  to  take  on  from  Buroo  to  my  advanced  field  base. 
The  rest  of  the  Punjabis  I  left  in  the  Burao  post,  as  their  slower  rate  of 
marching,  and  the  amount  of  water  and  auppUea  which  they  would  have 
requited,  would  have  considerably  hampered  our  movements. 

Captain  Phillips,  who  commanded  at  Burao,  took  the  opportunity 
afforded  by  the  delay  caused  by  the  postponement  of  the  rains  to  perfect 
his  men  in  musketry  practice. 

Your  orders  were  to  capture  or  defeat  tlic  Mullali  and  to  put  an  end  to  q 
his  influence  in  the  Dolhahanta  country.  It  was  borne  in  mind  that  once  the  ei 
expedition  started  no  support  could  be  given  from  the  rear.  In  SomalUand, 
life  revolves  round  tho  camel.  The  people  hve  on  the  milk  for  the  greater 
part  of  the  year,  and  without  the  oamel  the  best  grazing  groonds  distant  from 
water  would  be  unattainable,  for  sheep  have  to  be  kept  near  the  wells. 
Without  the  camel  the  bulk  of  the  people  could  n' 

In  fonniug  plans  of  attack,  therefore,  it  ^ 
that  if  the  flocks  and  herds  of  the  enemy  could  b 
inevitably  be  compelled  either  to  make  terms  o 


IS  important  to  bear  in  mind 

le  captured  the  men  would 

a  collect  to  atta/^k  the 


62 


P 


TliB  all- important  point  was  to  matoL  Castci'  tUan  the  eaemy  mid  be 
n,h]e  to  gurprUa  him  instead  of  his  surpiising  an.  Slow  taovement  meant 
the  poasibiJLty  of  attack  by  OTerwhelming  maaaes  o£  the  enemy  who  noul'l 
havB  had  time  to  collect;  and  safety  lay  in  rai>idity  nf  action  nnd  cmi- 
w([iient  disorganiEation  o£  the  enemy's  plans. 

ITie  Mullah's  fort-e  waa  reported  to  tonsist  of  aumo  5,000  nieu,  the 
greater  part  of  whom  were  horsemea,  and  he  probably  had  Bome  600  rifles. 
Tho  tribes  on  whom  he  might  diaw  for  avipport  probably  miialered  anotlicr 
^,000,  but  thcMm  were  uot  able  to  gather  together  for  more  than  a  day  or 
two  owing  to  the  want  of  grazing  for  their  numcroua  ponies.  In  addition, 
doubtful  tribes,  who  would  probably  have  joined  the  Mullah  in  uanc  of  our 
suffering  a  reverse,  possibly  had  some  00,000  spearmen,  and  the  Mijjarten 
tribes  within  the  Italian  sphere  of  influence,  most  of  whom,  however,  were 
too  distant  to  help  the  Mullah,  had  been  estimut-ed  by  the  Resident  at  .Aden 
at  from  60,000  to  70.000  men. 

His  Majesty's  Consul- General  had  sent  out  proi-laniatiuna*  informing 
tribes  that  only  those  who  continued  to  a-ssiat  the  Mullah  would  be  considered 
hostile  to  us,  and  warning  them  that  tribes  as  a  whole  would  be  held  respoii- 
»Lblo  for  fhe  acts  of  individuals.  I  gave  hostile  tribes  ftecjuent  opportnnilies 
of  making  their  submisaiDii ;  and  later  on,  afler  every  aL'liun,  capturcil 
(  hiefs  were  sent  to  them  io  explain  (hat,  provided  they  left  the  Mulhili,  wii 
would  eeaae  to  be  hostile. 

It  was  intended  to  march  direct  on  the  Mullah  wherever  tho  latest 
information  should  have  located  him,  and,  at  the  same  time,  by  striking 
out  at  the  liostilo  tribes  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  line  of  march,  to  drive 
them  back  out  of  touch  with  him.  I  hoped  early  to  capture  sufficient  live 
stodk  to  be  able  to  drop  the  bulk  of  my  transport  at  a  point  within  striking 


^^        the  I 


•  PrudaiiHiiuiit. 

Be  it  knokrn  to  all  concerned  among  the  Dolbahanta  tribes  that  the 
cxjiedition  now  about  to  bo  dispatched  by  the  (lovemment  Is  not  agaiuitt 
the  Durod  tribes  of  the  Dolbahanta ;  it  is  to  operalo  against  the  Mullnli 
&lu(i a mmad-bin- Abdullah  and  those  who  ore  affording  Um  assistance. 

All  persons  found  supporting  this  Mullah  will  bo  considered  as  hostile 
to  tho  Government  and  will  be  treated  as  such  ;  and  tribes  will  be  held 
answerable  for  their  individual  members. 

All  tribes  are  therefore  required  to  refrain  from  any  dealing  or  conunonica- 
tiona  with  the  Mullah,  to  leave  that  part  of  the  country  in  which  he  now 
is  and  bia  followers  are,  and  to  wain  any  of  their  members  who  may  bo  with 
the  Mullah  to  leave  him  at  once  as  they  will  be  held  responsible  for  any  acts 
tted  by  such  against  the  Adminiatration. 


(Signed)        J.  HAYE8-SADLEE, 

ail  Brilajinie  Majaty't  Caneut-GiaiiTal, 
Homiiti  Cooit  Proteflcrate. 


63 

diBtance  of  the  Mullah  and  then  advance  as  light  as  possible  by  fofcud 

inarches  to  the  attack.     In  orilnr  to  nvoid  delay,  whioh  might  huva  oMurrod  Two  coliirnT 

further  on,  the  expedition  was  divided  into  two  columas,  each  of  whiuh  furrned. 

was  complete  in  itself,  200  camela  being  attached  for  water  alone.     The  first  Coluiunn 

column,  oonaisting  of  the  bulk  of  the  levy,  was  under  my  personal  command  ;  ^'"^  ""''''I'l 

it  was  made  as  hght  as  possible  and  a  reserve  of  rationii  ajid  live  stoek  was 

brought  up  by  tho  second  column,  which  consisted  of  aome  20  Punjabis  and 

350  Somali  Rifles,  with  a  number  of  spearmen  fur  transport  work,  all  under 

Captain  McNeill.     Both  cohunna  were  to  mari^h  and  camp  together  until  a 

favourable  opportunity  of  making  a  sudden  attai'k  on  the  enemy  Hhoiilil 

]>rcsent  itself,  upon  which  the  first  column  would  leave  all  trauajioct  aniiaulf, 

iiicept  those  neccaaary  for  the  carriage  of  water,  bnrhed  wire  and  wounded 

nxen,  with  the  second  column,  the  men  relying  for  their  food  upon  the  herdu 

of  camels  which  could  be  quickly  driven  with  them. 

In    the   middle  of   May,  although  Burao  wor  etill  parched,  rehi  was  Concoulrnl  i 
reported  to  have  fallen  sufficiently  in  the  Hand  to  make  a  move  poasible.  "'  "Vinio. 
On  the  ^Oth  May,  therefore,  the  levies  were  concentrated  with  some  StIO 
transport  animals  at  Biu'ao,  and  the  Mounted  Infantiy  and  Camel  Corpn 
were  brought  up  simiJtaueoualy  from  the  Golis  r.inge,  45  milea  distant. 
A  new  site  commanding  the  wella  was  choBeo.  luid  sliMugly  entrcuclicil. 

While  these  preparations  were  proceeding.  Major  the  Hon. 
A.  H.  V.  Hanbury-Tracy,  Royal  Horse  Guards,  who  had  been 
detailed  to  accompany  the  Abyssinian  Force,  had  left  for 
Harrar,  and  on  April  5th  it  was  reported  that  the  British 
expedition  had  commenced  its  movement  on  Burao. 

On  May  22nd,  1901,  Swayne,  leaving  a  garrison  at  Burao  'I'he  ui»m- 
under  three  British  officers  with  a  month's  reserve  rations,  gjart  f™ni 
marched  with  the  force  18  miles  to  Ber.     The  order  of  march  Burao  on 
„  ,      , .  ■  ■       ,  .        ,      tlie  22ml 

was  generally  an  elastic   square,  witii  tne  transport  in  the  Miiy. 

ceutrej  and  Mounted  Corps  half-a-tlay'a  march  ahead,  pre- Order  i^f 
ceded  by  scout*  and  spies.  Mounted  men  and  detached 
parties  were  also  sent  well  out  on  both  flanks  and  to  the  rear. 
At  Ber,  a  check  of  three  days  occurred  owing  to  the  absence 
of  a  number  of  transport  spearmen  who  were  expected  to  join 
from  the  Habr-Toljaala  tribe. 

Before  leaving  Burao,  spies  and  scouts  had  been  sent  out  inforniatii 
to  keep  two  days'  march  ahead  of  the  colnmna,  and  to  send  »tart. 
back  from  time  to  time  such  information  as  they  were  able 
to  obtain,  and  to  capture  prisoners  with  this  object.  On  leaving 
Ber  on  May  the  25th,  the  information  that  the  Mullah  was  at 


u 


I 

I     Kuh.Fm 


Yahelli,  having  moved  there  through  Boliotle  and  Lasaader. 
was  confirmed.  It  was  also  reported  that  the  Dolbahanta 
tribes  had  scattered  for  the  want  of  grazing;  that  the  Eer 
Ilagar  and  Ararsamah  had  gone  southward  towards  Baliwein 
and  Bohotle,  and  that  the  Jania  Siad  and  Barkad  had  mo\Td 
westward  towards  the  eastern  end  of  the  Bur-Dab  range. 

Night  marches  were  made  bo  aa  to  avoid  the  clouds  of  duat 
which  would  have  indicated  the  march  of  the  column,  and  a 
line  of  advance  was  chosen  to  avoid  as  much  as  possible  dense 
bush,  and  to  bring  the  force  between  the  various  sections  of 
the  hostile  tribes. 

Eil  Dab,  72  miles  distant  from  Ber,  was  reached  on  the 
evening  of  the  28th,  after  three  days'  forced  marching  over  the 
waterless  desert ;  the  mounted  corps  being  generally  half-a- 
day  ahead  and  keeping  up  connection  with  the  scouts  further 
1  ahead.  On  the  way,  the  Mullah's  stockaded  village,  and 
former  headquarters,  at  Koh-Faradod*  was  burnt,  the  mosijues 
being  spared  so  as  not  to  offend  Mahommedan  feeling. 

The  transport,  after  a  little  practice,  was  able  to  march  even 
through  thick  bush  at  night,  on  a  broad  front  of  some  six  or 
seven  strings  o£  camels.  SulBcient  water  was  obtained  in  the 
rainpools  at  Ber  to  last  the  officers  for  100  miles ;  the  water 
obtainable  at  Eil  Dab  and  Ain  Abo  being  only  drinkable  by 
Somalis.  At  Eil  Dab  our  scouts  captured  a  MuUah's  caravan 
and  located  the  various  Dolbahanta  tribes, 

Aa  the  biilk  of  the  tribes  was  wavering,  and  it  was 
probable  that  a  sudden  blow  would  decide  them  to  leave  the 
Mullah  alone  and  return  north,  Swayne  was  anxious  to  punish 
the  sections  of  the  Mahmud  Gerad  Dolbahanta  who  had  joined 
the  Mullah,  and  raided  our  Habr  Toljaala  tribes.  The  tribe 
?  generally  on  the  left  flank  of  the  line  of  march,  and  as 
there  was  some  danger  of  its  raiding  as  far  as  Berbera  after 
the  force  had  passed,  it  was  necessary  to  take  steps  to 
prevent  this  and  so  to  reassure  our  men  as  to  the  safety  of 
the  women  and  children  they  had  left  behind  them.  More- 
over, the  troops  wanted  live-stock  badly  in  place  of  heavy 
"See  ]HgB  49, 


65 

bags   of   rice    and-  dattia   which   it   was   desirable   to    leave 
behind. 

Hearing  from  prisoners  that  some  encampmente  of  the 
Jama  Siad  section  of  the  Mahmud  Gerad  tribe  were  some  50 
miles  off,  near  Mayo,  on  the  left  of  the  line  of  advance  to 
Yahelli,  S'wa3Tie  seized  the  opportunity  and  Bent  off  the 
mounted  corps  under  Major  Beynon  to  surprise  them,  the 
prisoners  acting  as  guides.  At  the  same  time  the  infantry  of 
both  columns  continued  its  march  on  the  Mullah's  position 
south  of  Yahelli,  approaching  it  by  an  easterly  detour  which, 
besides  avoiding  the  dense  bush,  enabled  the  force  to  take 
advantage  of  the  grass  plains  and  to  make  night  marches. 
The  columns  reached  a  pool  of  rain-water  at  Samala  on  Arrival  at 
May  30th,  when  news  was  brought  in  that  the  moimted  corps 
had  succeeded  in  surprising  the  Jama  Siad  sections  of  the 
Mahmud  Gerad  and  capturing  some  stock.  Swayne  therefore 
decided  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  captured  herds  and  to 
form  an  advanced  base  before  proceeding  further.  A  strong  AdyanoeU 
zariba,  overlooking  the  wells,  was  conatrncted  on  a  low  hill  ^1*81^1™* 
which  was  admirably  adapted  for  defence,  and  barbed  wire 
was  plentifully  used  to  strengthen  the  work.  Foreseeing  that 
the  captured  camels  and  transport  would  prove  a  strong 
temptation  for  attack  from  the  enemy,  Capt.  McNeill,  who 
was  selected  to  hold  the  post,  was  directed  to  double  the 
zariba,  and  to  fill  water  tanks  to  use  as  cover  against  tiie 
enemy's  rifle  fire.  McNeill  carried  out  this  work  satisfactorily, 
and  the  excellent  disposition  of  the  maxim  gun  on  a  caim 
of  stones  commanding  the  zariba,  afterwards  contributed 
to  a  large  extent  to  the  repulse  of  the  enemy  when  the  post 
WHS  attacked. 

Sections  were  also  sent  out  to  support  the  incoming  mounted  Mullah's 
corps,  which  presently  arrived  with  some  300  captured  camels, 
having  covered  some  90  miles  and  driven  the  hostile  section 
of  the  Mahmud  Gerad  in  flight  northwards,  thus  separating 
them  from  the  Midlab.  In  consequence  of  this  action,  the 
..Mahmud   Gerad   sent  in   deputations  10  make   terms,   and 


66 


liouiid  themselves  to  oppose  the  Mullah,  who  would  now  l>c 
compelled  to  meet  the  force,  or  lose  all  prestige  with  the 
tribes. 

Before  proceeding  with  the  aobsequent  operations  of  the 
first  column  under  Swayne,  it  is  necessary  to  relate  what 
happened  to  Captain  M,  McNeill,  who  was  left  in  zariba 
at  Samala  to  guard  the  live-stock  captured  from  the  Jama 
Siad  and  the  prisoners.  The  British  officers  with  McNeill 
were  Lieutenants  L.  Murray,  East  Surrey  Eegiment ;  J,  C. 
Lamprey,  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers,  and  H.  Younghusband, 
Bedford  Regiment ;  whde  the  native  officera  were  Jemadars 
Mahomed  Yusuf,  H.  A.  Abdurrahman,  and  Jama  Siad,  H.  T. 
Abdi  Mahomed.     Captain  McNeill  reported  : — 

II  1  was  altai'keil  on  the  -211^  dud  .Ird  June,  lliOl,  while  in  lariba  at 
'"  SamaU  by  a  !ocne  of  the  Miillah'^  tiK-n.  cetlmati^d  at  3,000  on  the  Sod  June 
and  0,000  on  the  SIrd.  Theae  estimutes  of  numbers  were  formed  ml  the  spot 
by  niyuelf  and  the  three  British  offii^ers  under  itie,  and  were  subnequently 
I'onfimied  by  what  priBoners,  captiu'ed  aftei'  the  fight,  told  iib.  The  foree 
under  my  command  numbered  just  under  500,  but  of  these  only  about 
370  were  armed  with  ritleH,  the  reot  lieing  jnnda  up  nf  spoarm.en  and  a  few 
tribal  horsemen.  Added  to  this  wo  had  to  guard  forty-8i.\  prisoners,  about 
3,500  caniclB,  about  50  eheep,  goats,  and  cattle,  and  about  fifty  horses. 
I  had  aloo  one  '460  maxim  served  by  Somalia  and  under  command  of  lieu- 
tenant Yoimghusband,  Bedford  Regiment.  The  men  were  in  a  separate 
/.aribatrom  the  camcU,  &c.,  both  zaribas  being  on  ageatle  slope  facing  nearly 
west,  the  luen'n  zariba  being  above,  the  cairtel  zaiiba  below  and  under 
eomuiand  of  view  and  fire  from  the  men's  zariba  above.  The  maxim  was 
placed  on  a  cairn  of  stones  at  the  top  of  the  men's  zariba,  and  commanded 
a  good  tield  of  fire  aJl  round.  'J'ke  ground  on  all  sides  waa  fairly  open,  bein;! 
praetiuolly  clear  of  bushes  for  about  130  yards  round  both  auiba.i.  Tho 
lower  or  south-west  end  of  the  tamel  zariba  is  on  the  edge  of  a  shallow 
pool  of  water  about  100  yards  broad.  On  the  fm'ther  side  of  this  water 
some  fairly  thick  bush  in  |iatcbes  comes  pretty  close  to  the  water's  edge, 
and  it  ifl  to  the  better  cover  afforded  in  this  place  that  I  attribute  the  enemy 
getting  close  up  to  the  camel  zariba.  The  second  eotunm  got  into  their 
T.ariba  on  the  Slst  May  in  the  evening.  Tlie  first  rotumn  deputed  south- 
-  east  about  3  P.M.  on  the  Ist  June — the  morning  of  tho  lat  Jime  being  spent 
by  the  second  cohiiiin  in  strengthening  and  nialiuig  generally  secure  both 
v.sJ'ibas.  Ilie  joumlng  of  the  2nd  Juno  was  also  spent  in  the  same  way. 
The  attack  began  about  3.30  p.m.,  2nd  June. 

Aboat  that  time  I  saw  some  horsemen  on  a  low  range  of  hills  about  a 
mile  to  south-eaat.     These  men  rapidly  moreaaed  in  nmubere,  and  begaa 


tu  (le^Lnd  into  tlie  plain  and  coi]ii<  rapidly  towoids  the  zaribB.  l  at  tmpe 
BCDt  to  eall  in  the  camels,  This  waa  well  and  expeditiimsly  done,  only  two 
camels,  wbicih  broke  away,  being  captured. 

The  animals  were  driven  into  their  zariba  from  both  sides.     On  the  north- 

t  aide,  where  the  greater  nmnber  of  camels  nere,  they  got  somewhat 
towded  in  the  entrance,  and  sbme  got  frigbtened  and  broke  back,  one 
Jot — a  good  ISO  or  eo — getting  right  out  into  the  open  plain  about  600  yp.rdB 
or  BO  distant.  By  this  time  some  of  the  horsemen  had  got  right  round  to 
this  aide,  and  I  began  to  fear  that  I  would  lose  at  least  a  portion  of  the 
camels.  I  Bent  out  Jemadar  Jama  Siad  (of  the  Police)  with  one  section  tu 
try  and  keep  ofl  the  enemy  till,  at  least,  most  o!  the  camels  had  been  got 
in.  I  supported  him  by  turning  the  masim  on  to  the  nearest  horsemen. 
Jama  Siod  pdrfoimcni  his  work  in  a  most  excellent  munaer,  as  he  not  only 
kept  off  the  enemy  till  the  camels  near  the  zariba  were  brought  in,  hut  hb 
also  advanced  well  out  into  the  plain  and  brought  in  all  the  camels  which 
had  gone  out.  Some  of  the  horsemen  had  got  right  round  by  now — a  good 
way  out — but  by  keeping  the  masim  on  them,  supported  by  long-range 
volleys  from  the  Pimjabis,  we  did  much  to  check  them.  Lieutenant  Murray 
hod  aisa  gone  outride  the  south  side  of  the  icariba  with  two  sections  and  got 
all  the  camels  in  oa  that  side.  Meantime,  the  enemy  had  kept  pressing  on 
from  the  south,  the  hoi'semen  being  supported  by  a  large  number  of  infantry, 
mostly  armed  with  speora,  but  some  hiul  riUoa  from  which  they  kept  up  a 
somewhat  irregular  gro  on  the  zariba,  from  which  we  lost  two  men  and  two 
horses  killed  and  one  man  woimded.  Tlie  enemy  advanced  in  the  most 
plucky  faabion,  but  not  a  man  got  up  to  the  zariba,  though  some  weie  shot 
oliKie  to  it.  By  this  time  it  «o.a  getting  pretty  dark,  and  the  attack  slackened 
and  ItnaUy  ceased  (or  a  time,  though  the  enemy  kept  up  an  irregular  fire, 
which,  however,  did  no  further  damage  The  enemy  did  not  go  far  back, 
however,  but  remaioed  faiily  clo«o  They  had  so  far  failed  in  both  their 
obJBUta,  I.e.,  to  cany  off  the  camels  and  get  into  the  zariba.  Just  previous 
to  this  1  sent  Lieutenant  Lamprey  to  hold  the  lower  edge  of  the  uamol  aoriba, 
as  I  muoh  feaj'ed  the  results  of  the  enemy  getting  in  among  the  camels. 
It  was  very  well  I  did  this,  as  a  determined  attempt  was  made  soon  after 
dark  to  rush  the  north-west  comer  of  the  camel  zariba.  Some  of  the  entany, 
asaistod  by  the  darkness  and  the  more  favourable  nature  of  the  ground 
near  here  (on  the  further  side  of  the  water),  got  right  up  to  the  zariba, 
and  were  shot  down  practically  touching  it — on  the  outside,  however, 
not  a,  man  got  inside.  At  the  same  time  another  attack  was  mode  on  the 
^,  jigrth-ooBt  ma.\im  corner  of  the  zarilja.     This  was  held  by  the  seven  men 

o  worked  the  maxim  and  by  twenty-two  Punjabis.     Tlie  outside  of  the 
a  well  protected  by  wire,  whicli  consitlerably  delayed  the  enemy. 

bi  and  some  good  shooting  by  the  Punjabis  ehecked  this  rush  also,  about 
ten  dead  bodies  being  foimd  round  and  near  this  part  next  morning.  No 
further  attai^k  was  made  during  tlie  night,  but  a  dropping  lire  was  kept  up 
by  the  enemy  till  about  10  I'.w,  After  this  we  were  left  in  peace,  but  the 
y  couid  be  heard  all  night  moving  about  in  the  bush  and  calling  to  each 

ler.     Tliey  must  have  carried  awav  a  lot  of  dead  and  wounded  diuing  thu 

1927)  "  \ii      " 


night— H  pretty  goud  proof  of  tbis  bein^  Chat  v/e  siibiuquisotly  fuLmd  aboi 
ten  or  twelve  of  their  borseS  dead  at  TortouB  places  round  t^e  zaxiba.    There 
were  no  s<Lddles  or  bridles  uu  any  of  them-     Our  total  loss  bo  for  wus  two 
killed  and  one  wounded. 

On  the  3rd  June,  oa  soon  aa  it  woa  Light  enough  tn  Bee,  I  thoroughiy 
examined  aJl  the  ground  round  about  and  the  hills  near  with  a  powerful 
telHseope,  but  could  only  pee  about  ton  horsemen  and  two  foot  men  to  the 
east.  These  men  were  about  3  miles  off  and  going  directly  away  from  ufl,  they 
soon  disappeared  trom  sight.  About  8.45  A.M.  a  large  and  rapidly  iuoreasing 
niunber  of  foot  men  began  to  liaue  from  the  hills  to  the  south.  They 
rapidly  extended  out  till  they  Wfrc  in  one  long  line  several  ranks  deep.  They 
advanced  straight  on  uu,  gradually  opening  out  and  enveloping  south  and 
south'WPBt  Bides  of  men  and  camel  zaribas.  At  a  distance  of  1,200  to  1,500 
yards  out,  the  line  extended  fmjn  a  point  behind  and  to  the  east  of  the 
ina.iim  gun  cairn  to  a  point  well  out  and  beyond  the  broken  ground  on 
furtlier  side  of  water  at  lower  (west)  end  of  the  camel  zariba.  They  came 
on  at  a  steady  pace,  opening  out  aa  they  came  and  keeping  a  good  general 
line.  At  about  400  yards  they  ojipnod  fire.  I  should  say  they  must  have 
had  70  or  80  msa.  armed  with  rillca,  and  from  this  lire  we  snUercd  several 
casualties,  though  lui'kily  most  oE  the  bullets  went  high.  I  ordered  my  men 
to  reserve  their  fire  till  the  enemy  were  within  600  yards  of  the  zaiiba. 
This  they  did,  nut  a  shot  being  fired  till  then.  We  then  opened  a  heavy  fire 
from  both  lifiee  and  maxim,  tJle  result  of  which  was  that  not  a  man  got 
within  150  yalds  of  the  sooth  or  east  aides  of  the  zariba,  though  they 
advanced  moat  pluckily. 

Ijentenant  Lamprey,  with  some  transport  and  Bpearmen  again  ht'l<i 
the  camel  zariba,  and  here  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  most  decidedly  fell,  ii«, 
in  faot,  it  did  the  previoui  day- 
Aided  by  the  more  favourable  covet  to  the  went  and  Bouth-wetit,  the 
enemy  got  quite  close  up  to  the  zariba,  about  30  dead  being  found  near  this 
end  alone,  15  of  which  were  dragged  out  of  the  water  close  to  the  zariba. 
However,  Lieutenant  Lamprey  and  the  men  under  him  proved  quite  equal 
to  holding  their  own,  and,  aa  on  the  2nd  instant,  not  a  man  got  into  the 
zariba,  though  aovoral  were  killed  dose  up.  Two  of  our  spearmen  were 
killed  cmd  one  wounded  by  apears  in  thia  zariba.  This  was  the  only  port 
that  was  seriously  threatened,  and  to  lieutenant  lamprey  1  wiali  to  givu 
every  credit  for  the  way  he  held  thia  zariba.  Hod  the  enemy  succeeded  in 
getting  into  this  zariba  it  would  have  been  a  very  serious  matter,  as  they 
could  have  coltected  there  under  cover  of  the  lar^  nuinlier  of  uam^-ls  collected 
in  it.  They  could  then  have  advanced  up  to  attack  the  lower  edge  of  the 
man's  zjiriba  still  under  cover  of  the  camola  till  quite  close  up,  and  even  if 
they  had  not  succeeded  m  getting  into  the  upper  zariba  they  would  almost 
to  a  certainty  have  been  able  to  let  out  all  the  camels  from  the  lower  end. 
After  this  rush  was  stopped  the  eofiuy  relTeat«d,  nor  liid  tbcy  renew  the 
attack.  Our  total  loss  fur  the  two  days'  fighting  was  nine  killed  and  nine 
wounded  (one  wounded  since  dead).  Wc  actually  found  180  enemy  dead 
tound  the  zariba,  and  took  five  prisonci's.     leBtJmate  the  eatuiy's  total  loss 


J 


deti 
^^    Tiff 

i 


1  500  tUlBd  and  wounded  for  these  reasons:    180  dead  antunUy  counted 

jal  accnp  of  fightiiiB,  and  I  ara  practically  sure  thnt  a*,  least  20  dead 

r  been  found,  bavjng  got  away  wouoded  and  died  some  dlataoce 

This  mtvkeB  "200  dead.     Now,  if  it  is  taken  into  oonsi deration  that 

•e  all  round  us  (as  wp  know  they  were}  on  the  night  uf  the  2Qd 

gie,  it  is  (dear  they  must  have  carried  off  a  large  numbcir  of  dead  and 

landed,  and  i£  we  further  reckon  two  men  killed  out  of  five  hit — in  ray 

oa  a  liberal  allowanee — the  oumherg  of  the  enemy  killed  and  w 

d  be  200  killed  Hid  300  killed  and  wounded,  includ'ng  all  carried  away 

e  night  of  the  2nd  instant. 

n  conelucion,  I  wish  to  state  that  I  was  particularly  pleased  with 
B  work  of  all  the  British  and  native  olficers  of  the  column  under  me ; 
y  all  did  their  work  in  a  manner  (hat  left  nothing  to  be  desired. 

To  return  to  Colonel  Swayne'a  movements.     On  June  2nd,  Fimt  column 
r  the  ponies  of  the  mounted  infantry  had  had  a  day's  oianh  on 
after  their  hard  work,  the   first  column,  leaving  behind  Mullah, 
surplus    rations,   and   taking   only   wat«r  and    hospital 
lels,  and  driving  eating  camels   for  rations,   moved   on 
Waylahed,  to  which  place  the  Mullah  hail  by  this  time 
transferred  his  headquarters.     The  direct  rout*  through  the 
difficult  Higloli  Pass,  where  an  attack  under  unfavourable 
conditions  for  the  force  might  take   place,  was  not  used,  a 
detour  being  made  across  the  open  plains  eastward  towarik 
Tifali   and  Las  Anod,   at  which   place    Swayne   succeeded 
interposing  his  force  between  the  Mullah  and  the  Mahraud 
^rad  Dolbahanta. 
In   retiring   to    liis    headquarters    after    his   successive  skinniBh 
iveraes  at  Samala,  the  Mullah  had  passed  his  force  through  ""J'^''™- 
hills  in  detachments  separated  from  one   another  by  a 
considerable   interval,  and    thus,   the    scouts   having   given 
timely  warning,  Swayne  was  able  to  push  between  the  hostile 
detachments  and  complete  their  discomfiture.     The  Mullah 
himself,  together  with  Haji  Sudi,  8ult-an  Nur  and  others,  was 
found  with  some  500  horsemen,  and  appeared  at  first  to 
intend  to  attack  the  rear-guard,  but  on  the  mounted  troops 
Beynon  being  withdrawn  from  the   front  to 
his   horsemen   broke   into   groups,  and,  when 
t  up  into  small  parties,  attempting  t( 


70 

a  score  of  practicable  passes  over  the  stony  hills.  Thi 
occurred  about  5  p.m.,  and  Swayne,  deciding  to  carry  the 
pursuit  through  the  night,  divided  the  mounted  troops  into 
several  detachments,  and  followed  up  the  tracks  of  the 
largest  party  himself  with  the  pick  of  the  horsemen.  Mean- 
while three  companies  of  infantry  (450  men)  were  moved  up 
in  support  and  the  transport  was  zaribaed  at  the  foot  of 
a  low  hill,  protected  by  two  companies.  1 

The  pursuit  was  carried  on  until  it  was  too  dark  to  serf 
tracks,  wliich  became  lost  in  dense  jungle  and  scattered  in 
every  direction.  Having  no  guides,  a  halt  was  made  until 
dawn,  when  the  column  again  proceeded,  and,  eventually 
reached  Waylahed,  which,  with  Ana  Harigli,  formed 
Mullah's  chief  centres. 

At  Waylahed  some  horses  and  prisoners  were  taken,  an( 
the  native  encampment,  large  enough  to  contain  10,000  people, 
was  burned.  As  themenatid  horses  had  not  been  watered  for 
twenty-six  hours,  Swayne  decided  to  retrace  fiis  steps  and, 
rejoin  his  infantry  which  he  met  on  the  way  about  3  p-ig; 
on  the  day  following  the  night  pursuit.  The  horses  were  eO 
fatigued  that  it  was  found  necessary  to  leave  them  behind^*^ 
some  of  them  could  not  even  walk.  During,  and  previoiB 
to,  the  pursuit  some  fifty  of  the  enemy  were  killed  &iji 
some  fifty  taken  prisoners.  Forty-five  horses  were  captoid^ 
and  several  rifles,  ' 

On  the  pursuit  being  continued,  a  combined  movement  w- 
the  force  was  made  on  Ana  Harigli,  where  some  more  of 
the  enemy's  fugitives  were  killed  and  horses  captured.  From 
Ana  Harigh  the  tracks  led  eastward,  and  following  them  up 
the  force  reached  Courgerod  and  Ben  Tagla  (about  latitude  8° 
and  longitude  48°)  on  June  12th,  On  the  way  more  prisoners 
were  made  and  horses  and  camels  captured ;  an  important 
horseman  of  the  Ali  G-herl  being  killed  amonf^st  others.  1 

It  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  only  watered  at  Ben  Tagla, 
and  had  then  moved  south  into  the  Haud,  Reconnaissances 
were  therefore  sent  out  in  all  directions  on  the  12th  and 


J 


the  I3th,  one  under  Lieutenant  O'Neill  penetrating  eastward 
to  latitude  8°  5',  longitude  48°  30',  and  one  under  Risaklar 
I  Farah  (Camel  t'orps)  going  south  to  within  a  day  and  a 
half  of  Mudug.  It  was  discovered  that  the  Dolbahanta 
allies  of  the  Mullah  had  retreated  south-eastward  towards  lUig, 
and  that  the  Mullah  himself,  with  all  hia  herds  and  flocks,  had 
fled  due  south  across  the  Haud  to  Mudug,  abandoning  hia 
camels,  bullocks,  ponies,  &c.,  and  leaving  his  gurgis*  standing. 
Having  an  insufficient  number  of  water-tina  to  take  the  force 
across  the  Haud  at  this  point,  Swayne  found  it  necessary  to 
relax  the  pursuit  until  he  could  obtain  a  aupply  from 
McNeill's  zariba,  towards  which  he  now  marched.  He  hoped 
to  receive  a  sufficient  number  of  tanks,  &c.,  on  the  way  (these 
being  sent  to  meet  him),  and  to  be  then  in  a  position  to  proceed 
with  the  punishment  of  the  Ali  Gheri,  whilst  awaiting  instruc- 
tions as  to  whether  he  should  enter  Italian  territory  at  Mudug. 

During  theae  operations  it  was  ascertained  from  the  Avtion  of 
prisoners  captured  that  Sultan  Osman  Mahmud  had  aided  m'^^j^u^' 
the  Mullah  in  his  escape.  An  aayluni  had  been  granted  him 
in  Mijjarten  territory,  and  the  Sultan  himself  had  sent 
caravans  of  arms,  &c.,  to  aid  him,  while  some  Mijjarten 
emissaries  had  actually  escorted  the  Mullah's  cattle  to  Mudug, 
Captain  Friedrichs  succeeded  in  capturing  one  of  these  cara- 
vans while  on  its  way  from  Bosaso  to  the  Mullah,  and  it  con- 
tained amongst  other  things,  three  rifles  and  a  c[uantity  of 
ammunition  Jn  rice  bags.  In  view  of  this  information, 
letters  were  sent  to  the  Mahmud  Gerad,  Berkat  Gerad, 
Sultant  Yusuf  Ali,  and  Sultan  Osman  Mahmud,  offering  a 
reward  for  the  capture  of  the  fugitive  prophet,  and  the  Berkat 
__and  Mahmud  Gerad  were   asked   to  come   into  the  British 

mp. 

I  the  pursuit  of  l-he   Mullah  to  Illig  would  probably 

ing  the  column  into  collision  with  Sultan  Osman  Mahmud, 

r  *  Oiimel  cloths  used  as  tsata, 

f  t  Yuauf  Ali  was  the  Sultid.  of  Obbio,  who  had  hitherto  been  loyal  fo 
e  British  cause. 


who  waa  an  Italian  protege,  Swayne  considered  it  incumteiit 
on  him,  before  proceeding  across  the  Haud,  to  obtain  in- 
structions. He  therefore  wrote  to  the  Consul -General  from 
Heli  Madu  on  the  13th  June  as  follows  : — 

Mj  force  Is,  I  consider,  adequate  in  the  present  state  of  my  information, 
biit  should  it  tranipire  that  theMiJiarten  forces  are  stronger  than  I  at  jireaont 
think  thera  to  be,  I  shall,  with  your  approval,  concert  meaaures  with  the 
Abyssinian  force  operating  west  of  me  between  Gerlogubi  and  Bohotlc. 
The  Mullah  has  probably  lost  all  chanre  of  dominating  the  northern  Dol- 
hahanta,  but  I  am  not  »t  all  satisfied  that  he  may  not  hereafter  return  anil 
re- establish  hU  authority  with  the  aouthern  Dolbahanta. 

It  is  a  fortunate  thing  that  the  Kayat  tribe,  which  most  strongly  sup- 
ported him,  appears  to  have  suffered  the  severest  loHsefl. 

It  ia  not  in  any  case  probable  that,  provided  the  Protectorate  main- 
tains a  moderate  police  force  available  for  immediate  action,  the  Mullah 
can  again  disturb  the  peace  of  the  Ishak  country,  although,  possibly,  he 
may  compel  the  Dolbahanta  tribes  south  of  BiU'  Dab  to  fly  to  us  for  pro- 
tection or  to  accept  his  domination. 

It  IE  a  question,  having  regard  to  the  possible  forces  which  may  be 
developed  agiunst  us,  and  also  having  in  mind  the  extra  expense  entailed 
by  prolonged  operations,  whether  the  force  should  leave  matters  as 
they  are  or  go  on.  But,  as  the  Italian  territory  and  prot^g^s  woidd  become 
involved,  I  think  it  best  to  Itave  this  matter  to  you. 

Captflju  Friedrichs  goes  in  cojumand  of  some  300  rifles,  escorting  back 
over  2,000  captured  camels,  and  will  await  j-our  reply  at  Burao. 

I  shall  be  glad  to  get  yunr  instructions  as  soon  an  possible,  and  will 
meanwhile  deal  with  the  Ali  Gheri  tribe. 

All  the  officers  with  me  are  well.  I  have  not,  howpver,  heard  from 
Captain  McNeill,  and  cannot  therefore  say,  but  Captain  Fiiedricha  will 
inform  yuu.  No  opportunities  of  communicating  occurred  before  thin, 
owina  to  groups  oEthe  enemy'' s  horsemen  being  on  the  road. 

Consul-General  Hayes-Sadler  received  Swayne'a  despatch 
on  June  20th,  while  at  Sheikh,  and  at  once  represented  the 
situation  to  the  Foreign  Office.  He  pointed  out  that  if  Swayne 
now  withdrew  from  pursuing  the  Mullah  there  would  be  no 
finality  to  the  fanatic's  movement,  and  that  he  might  at  any 
time  return  to  the  Dolbahanta  and  redominate  that  province. 
He  was  of  opinion  that  as  the  Mullah  could  not  be  left  at 
Mudug,  so  close  to  our  Protectorate,  arrangements  should  be 
made  with  the  Abyssiniana  for  a  concerted  move  with  Mudug 
as   the   final   objective.     His   Majesty's   Government   were. 


however,  unatle  to  authorize  the  pursuit  of  the  MuUah  into 
the  Italian  sphere,  and  considered  that  the  operations  should 
terminate  subject  to  any  action  which  might  be  indispensable 
in  the  Ali  Gheri  country,  and  that  Burao  should  be  occupied 
by  a  mobile  force  for  the  protection  of  the  Dolbahanta.  These 
instructions  did  not,  however,  reach  Swayne  until  the 
expedition  was  on  its  way  back  to  Burao  at  the  end  of  July. 

Having  satisfied  himself  that  the  Mullah  had  actually  Sway 
escaped  to  the  Mijjart«n,  with  the  collusion  of  the  Mijjartfin  ^  j^ijo^g 
people,  and  seeing  that  provision  for  more  water  than  he  had  ^If^ '' 
at  Beretabli  was  necessary,  Swayne  decided  to  eifect  a  juncture 
with  McNeill  at  Lassader,  south  of  Samala,  and  there  receive 
from  him  the  necessary  water-tins  to  enable  the  column  to 
proceed,  if  necessary,  across  the  Haud  to  Mndug  in  pursuit  of 
the  Mullah.  He  consequently  moved  off  and  met  McNeill's 
detachment  15  miles  south  of  Samala  without  incident,  the 
road  back  from  Beretabli  being  marked  by  the  bodies  of  men 
wounded  at  the  zariba  who  had  died  on  the  road.  There 
waa,  therefore,  no  doubt  that  McNeill's  estimate  of  casualties 
was  fairly  correct,  and  that,  including  the  losses  inflicted  on 
the  Mullah  by  the  column,  he  could  not  have  lost  lesH  than  600 
men  killed  and  wounded.  It  was  also  clear  that  the  Kayat, 
Adan  Madoba,  Rer  Hagar,  Ali  Gheri,  Jama  Siad,  Nur 
Ahmed,  and  Mijjart«n  tribes  were  all  implicated  in  the 
attack  on  the  zariba,  as  was  evidenced  by  the  bodies  of  men 
actually  shot,  and  by  wounded  men  found  on  the  road. 

In  these  circumstances,  Swayne  resolved  to  punish  these 
refractory  tribes.  On  the  19th  June,  by  making  forced 
marches,  the  Rer  JIagar  karias  were  surprised  at  Jillib,  and 
more  karias*  of  the  Rer  Hagar  and  Ararsamah  were  attacked 
at  dawn  on  June  20th  some  20  miles  further  on,  with  the 
result  that  over  3,000  camels,  20,000  sheep,  and  620  cattle 

e  captured. 

The  effect  of  these  sudden  seizures  and  attacks  on  the  Jama 


I 


Siad  and  Rer  Hagar  had  a  salutary  effect.     Overtures  ' 
made  by  both  tribes,  also  by  the  Nur  Ahmed,  and  the  Beikat 
pxpressed  their  willingness  to  come  in. 

It  now  only  remained  to  compel  the  Ali  Gheri  to  come  to 
terms.  By  Jidy  8th  this  tribe  was  subdued  after  suffering  a 
loss  of  some  50  men  and  6,000  camels.  The  Eiders  came  in  and 
some  25  of  them  were  sent  north  to  Berbera. 

While  at  Kurmis,  Swayne  tried  to  communicate  with  the 
Abyssinian  force  operating  on  the  western  aide  of  the  Hand, 
but  his  scouts  returned  from  GJerlogubi,  reporting  that  the 
Abyssinians  had  gone  south-westward  in  search  of  food, 
and  had  then  marched  back  to  Harrar,  He  received  a  letter 
from  the  Abyssinian  Commander  by  a  roundabout  way, 
asldng  for  instructions,  but  found  it  too  late  to  assist  him,  and 
many  of  the  Abyssinians  died  for  want  of  food. 

In  the  meantime  the  Mullah,  who  had  succeeded  in  getting 
together  his  more  fanatical  followers*  at  Mudug,  being 
threatened  from  the  south  by  Sultan  Yusuf  Ali,  of  Obbia,  and 
finding  his  retreat  to  the  Ali  Gheri  comitry  blocked  by  our 
levies,  moved  north  again  across  the  Haud  to  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Beretabli  in  British  territory. 

As  it  was  important  to  give  the  Mullah  no  time  to  re-es 
lish  his  authority  with  the  tribes,  Swayne  determined  to 
transport  his  force  once  more  across  the  breadth  of  t^e 
Dolbahanta  country  and  attack  him,  but  on  coming  up  with 
the  enemy's  rearguard  near  Courgerod  orders  of  recall  reached 
the  force.  Swayne  was  now  over  340  miles  from  the  coast, 
with  no  support  nearer  than  Burao,  150  miles  distant,  and  to 
retreat  before  an  active  enemy,  through  a  country  teeming 
with  possible  enemies,  was  courting  serious  danger.  He 
therefore  decided  on  the  offensive,  and  proceeded  to  break  up 
the  Mullah's  force  before  returning  to  Burao. 

Arriving  at  Courgerod  after  an  18-mile   march  at  simset-' 

•  These  men  were  called  Derawpsh  (Dcrviahc),  and  were  midfir  oa 
fij;ht  for  theit  leligion. 


75 


the  16tli  Jiilj,  his  scouts,  who  had  been  sent  ahead, 
lorated  the  Mullah  at  Ferdiddin.  some  14  miles  eastward, 
Swayne  decided  to  continue  the  march  the  same  night  and 
attack  the  enemy  at  dawn. 

There  was  no  moon,  so,  in  order  to  enable  the  column  to 
get  through  the  bosh,  only  the  maxim,  hospital,  and  water 
camels  were  taken  forward,  some  sixteen  animals  all  told, 
while  the  rest  of  the  transport  was  left  at  Gourgerod  in  a 
strong  zariba. 

The  strength  of  the  column  had  been  reduced  (owing  to  the 
necessity  of  detaching  parties  to  escort  captured  animals  and 
prisoners  back  to  Burao)  to  about  700  rifles,  100  of  whom 
were  left  to  guard  the  transport  at  Courgerod.  The  mounted 
troops  numbered  about  75  men,  exclusive  of  some  350  to  4(XI 
Dolbahauta  tribal  horsemen  upon  whom  no  reliance  was  to 
be  placed. 

The  force  started  at  midnight  preceded  by  scouts,  and  by 
dawn  had  descended  into  a  shallow,  bush-covered  valley. 
Here  some  prisoners  were  captured,  who  reported  the  Mullah's 
villages  to  be  just  beyond  a  spur  on  the  right  of  the  valley, 
about  3  miles  distant.  The  Mounted  Corps  was  accordingly 
sent  forward  at  a  trot  to  reconnoitre  and  report,  while  the 
eolumn  assumed  the  following  formation  of  attack  :— 

The  Head-quarter  escort  (Came)  Corps)  in  the  centre,  with 
Lieutenant  P.  A.  Dickinson's  company  as  a  reserve  ;  the  1st 
Corps  under  Captain  Phillips  on  the  right  flank  to  crown  the 
hills,  and  the  2nd  Corps  under  Captain  McNeill  to  keep  on 
the  left  over  the  plain  ;  allunits  being  warned  to  keep  well  in 
touch  of  the  centre,  and  not  to  be  led  into  a  disorganized 
pursuit. 

The  smalt  Mounted  C?orps,  some  75  men  all  told,  under 
Major  Beynon,  under  whom  were  Captain  Friederichs  and 
Lieutenant  Walshe,  soon  rounded  the  spur  some  two  miles 
ahead,  followed  by  350  tribal  Dolbahanta  horsemen,  while  the 
Head-quarter  Camel  Escort  was  moved  up  as  a  link  to  connect 

1  the  column. 


Ferdiddin 
17th  JtinD 
1901. 


saaco  by 
tluunted 


Heavy  firing  coninienced  aln\ost  iDimediateiy  behind  the 
spur  and  along  the  hills  above,  and  the  Dolbahanta  horsemen 
at  once  galloped  back,  Recognising  that  the  mounted  branch 
must  be  more  heavily  engaged  than  he  had  intended,  Swayne 
directed  the  reserve  company,  under  Lieutenant  F.  A. 
Dickinson,  to  move  to  the  edge  of  the  spur,  whence  a 
commanding  fire  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  enemy  in 
the  plain,  while  the  rest  of  the  troops  were  ordered  to 
extend  and  follow  quickly  in  the  order  previously  inti- 
mated. 

Lieutenant  Diddnson's  men  doubled  over  the  intervening 
two  miles  and  seized  the  spur,  suffering  somewhat  from  the  fire 
of  the  enemy  on  the  commanding  hills  beyond.  Thanks 
to  the  fire  of  the  Head-quarter  Escort,  however,  that  portion 
of  the  enemy  which  was  in  the  bush  in  the  plains,  and  was 
then  attacking  Major  Beyuon's  Mounted  Corps,  was  checked, 
and  the  latter  were  able  to  fall  back  on  the  spur,  but  not 
before  a  number  of  our  men  were  killed  and  wounded. 
Lieutenant  Dinkinson  was  among  the  latter,  and  the  maxim 
camels  and  some  ponies  were  shot  down.  Our  SomaUs,  how- 
ever, clung  steadily  to  the  spur,  and  even  managed,  of  their 
own  accord,  to  disentangle  the  maxims  from  the  dead  camels 
and  bring  them  into  action  on  commanding  ground. 
'  The  advance  of  Captain  Phillips'  corps  over  the  hills  on  the 
right  had  now  brought  a  considerable  volume  of  fire  to  bear 
on  the  enemy  in  this  direction,  with  the  result  that  the 
dervishes  were  compelled  to  take  cover  and  fire  from  behind 
boulders  and  bushes.  This  fire,  however,  did  not  last  long, 
for  Lieutenant  C.  H.  Stigand's  company,  which  was  on  the 
extreme  right,  presently  outflanked  the  enemy  and  compelled 
hira  to  retire. 

Immediately  the  enemy's  attention  was  occupied  by  the 
1st  Corps,  Lieutenant  Dickinson's  men  went  forward,  under 
a  native  officer,  and,  descending  at  a  run  down  the  further 
sidey  of  the  spur,  drove  the  enemy  from  the  hilla  beyond. 
The   dervishes'  casualties  became  so  heavy  when  they  lost 


P"*    plac 


cover  tliat  they  gave  way  all  almig  the  line  and  the  retire- 
inent  became  a  rout. 

In  the  meantime,  the  2Ed  Corps  advancing  steadily  on  the 
left,  drove  back  the  enemy  which  had  been  engaged  with  the 
Mounted  Corps,  and,  moving  fast  through  the  bush-covered 
plain,  outflanked  the  derviahes  on  the  left.  The  enemy  then 
mounted  their  ponies  and  galloped  into  the  bush,  continually 
losing  men  by  our  rifle  fire.  The  pursuing  force  reached  the 
Mullah's  encamp-Tient  and  alter  burning  it,  chased  the  enemy 
for  five  miles  or  so  through  the  dense  bush.  The  enemy  tried 
Jiere  and  there  to  make  a  stand,  but  could  not  face  our  fb-e, 
Buffered  considerable  loss. 

The  Dolbahanta  horsemen,  on  whom  no  reliance  had  been 
placed,  took  no  further  part  in  the  fight,  but  galloped  away  to 
loot  the  Mullah's  flocks  and  herds. 

Captain  Friednchs  was  killed  at  the  commencement  of  the 
action.  He  had  been  sent  forward  by  Beynon  with 
some  of  the  Mounted  Corps  to  act  as  an  advanced  party,  and, 
seeing  the  enemy  on  the  hills  some  distance  to  his  front,  he 
concluded  that  the  plain  was  clear  of  them,  and  advanced  into 
some  very  dense  bush  where  an  ambush  had  been  prepared. 
Immediately  firing  broke  out,  Beyiion  moved  up,  dis- 
mounted, in  support ;  but  nearly  half  his  camels  and  ponies 
were  almost  immediately  shot,  and  the  enemy's  riflemen, 
increasing  in  numbers  at  every  moment,  advanced,  completely 
outflanking  the  Mounted  Corps  on  both  flanks.  Beynon 
then  directed  a  retirement.  Owing  to  the  loss  of  their  mounts, 
the  men  could  not  get  away  without  suffering  loss,  but  the 
casualties  would  have  been  much  heavier  bad  not  Lieutenant 
Dickinson's  company  and  the  Ist  Corps  checked  the  enemy  by 
firing  from  the  spur. 

On  the  pursuit  being  continued,  the  enemy  fled  south, 
across  the  Italian  border,  into  the  dense  bush  of  the  Hand, 
leaving  dead  and  wounded  everywhere,  and  scattering  in  all 
directions. 

After  the  pursuit  had  been  continued  some  miles  the  cohe- 


Deatb  oe 
Caploii) 
Fciedrichs. 


I 


78 

fiioii  ol  our  levies  becanif.  somewhat  loosened,  ao  McNeill, 
who  had  got  ahead  of  the  lat  Corps,  decided  to  make  a  check, 
and  reorganize  his  man.  Here  he  waa  joined  by  a  company 
of  the  1st  Corps,  luider  Lieutenant  C.  H.  Stigand,  Royal 
West  Kent  Regiment,  which  had,  by  Captain  Phillips'  order, 
assisted  in  the  pursuit,  wheeling  round  from  our  right  flank. 

By  this  time  the  force  was  nearly  50  miles  distant  from  its 
last  watering-place,  and  there  was  no  water  nearer  than  Bere- 
tabli.  The  water-tanks,  with  Lieutenant  C,  H.  Taylor  {York 
and  Lancaster  Regiment)  at  Courgerod,  were  nearly  empty, 
the  meu  had  expended  the  water  they  carried  themselves, 
while  only  six  camel-loada  of  water  remained  for  the  wounded 
men.  The  ponies  and  camels  of  the  Mounted  Corps  had  not 
been  watered  since  the  evening  before,  when  only  a  limited 
quantity  waa  given,  while  many  ponies  and  camels  had  been 
killed  or  wounded  by  the  enemy's  rifle  fire.  The  Dolbahanta 
horsemen,  moreover,  were  useless,  and  had  disappeared. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  being  also  in  some  anxiety  as 
to  his  wounded,  Swayne  found  himself  compelled  to  abandon 
the  pursuit.  After  giving  the  men  a  few  camels  for  their  meal, 
collecting  and  burying  the  dead,  and  arranging  for  the  carriage 
of  the  wounded,  he  returned  the  same  evening  to  Coiu"gerod 
(H  miles),  arriving  at  the  zariba  at  nightfall. 

It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  from  midnight  on  the  ITith  to 
midnight  on  the  17th,  during  which  time  they  had  drunk 
nothing  but  such  water  as  they  carried,  the  men  had  marched 
40  miles,  and  had  fought  an  action  in  dense  bush  and  over 
stony  hills. 

Among  the  enemy,  the  Mullah's  own  kinsmen,  the 
backbone  of  his  following,  had  been  severely  handled.  Over 
00  dead  bodies  were  counted  on  the  ground  and  the  pursuit 
IS  many  more,  a  large  number  of  Sheikhs  and  well- 
known  men  being  found  amongst  the  dead.  From  subaeqnent 
reports,  it  was  found  that  the  Mullah's  following  never  stayed 
their  flight  into  the  waterless  desert  for  five  days,  and  few 
reached     the     wells    of    Mudug    and    Bia-Aun   'alivfij-  for 


y 


niim'bera  died  of  thirst  ty  tlie  way.  TLe  Mullali  Limself,  hia 
Bon,  and  his  CUef  Adviser,  Haji  Sudi,  were  reduced  to  makiiig 
uBe  of  the  water  found  in  the  stomachs  of  dead  camels,  while 
his  chained  prisoners  escaped  and  his  supporters  scattered  in 
all  directiona  seeking  their  own  safety. 

No  water  being  found  at  Courgerod,  Swayn'j's  force  moved  Mareh  to 
at  dawn  on  the  10th  June,  down  a  steep  ravine  to  the  plain  ^^^y  '  " 
below,  marching  on  a  made  road,  possibly  of  Phcenician  or 
Indian  origin.  It  reacted  Heli  Madu,  the  first  watering  place 
since  Las  Elberdali,  some  80  miles  back,  at  mid-day  on  the 
18th.  Hereahaltofhalf-a-day  was  made  in  order  to  fill  water- 
tanks,  and  to  enable  Lieutenant  H.  St.  G,  Boulton,  I. M.S.,  to 
look  after  his  wounded.  Beretabli,  where  a  detached  portion 
of  the  Mullah's  force  which  had  not  taken  part  in  the  fight, 
was  reported  to  be,  was  also  reconnoitred,  but  the  horsemen 
reported  that  the  enemy  had  fled. 

Marching  some  20  to  25  miles  a  dav,  Swayne  con- 
nected up  with  liis  advanced  base  at  Tifali  and  moved 
to  Burao  via  Eil  Dab,  going  through  the  site  of  t'aptain 
McNeill's  zariba  at  Samala.  At  Eil  Dab  the  column  was 
met  on  the  morning  of  the  24th  July  by  a  party  of  the  mounted 
corps  which  had  returned  from  Burao  under  Captains  Mere- 
wether  and  Bruce,  and  finally  reached  Burao  on  the  2yth  and 
3fHh  July,  1901.  During  the  last  loO  milea  of  the  return 
journey  no  good  drinking  water  for  Em'opcaiis  was  found, 
but  the  Somalis  managed  to  procure  water  at  Eil  Dab,  whence 
they  easdy  traversed  the  95  miles  to  Buiao  subsisting  on 
the  water  they  themselves  carried,  supplemented  by  a  few 
tanks.  The  wounded  were  brought  back  some  350  miles 
to  the  coast  on  camels  or  on  stretchers  carried  by  the  prisoner?, 
only  one  man  dying  on  the  way.  During  the  operations  the 
force  suffered  the  following  casualties  : — 


m 

British  Officers. 

N.C.Os.  and  Men.       1 

^^^H                     KUW  in  action 

^^^H                     Accidental  death!> 
^^^^H                     Died  fruuk  WDunda 
^^^^H                             from  diaeoBC 

I 

^H             

^^^P                                     Total 

■2 

1 

1 

1 

,—           1 

In  his  final  report  on  the  operations,  Colonel  Swayne  made 

the  following  observations  : — 

SlBrfliiTig               The  leyies  had  covered   Bome    1,170   milea  in  tliree  montlia,  including 

power  of           ^^f^y^  at  ]j„r^_  ^^n^  ^,^^  freqi.eutly  marched  30  milee  n  day.     On  days  of 

Hction,  sa  at  Odprgoeh,  on  two  occasiona  in  the  Aiarsauiah  country,  at 

1                               ICurmis,  and  on  several  occaalona  in  tho  All  Gh?ri country,  andat  Ferdiddin, 

^^^                  -10  miles  had  been  covered  or  over.     Besides  thU,  detached  seetions  asd 

^^^B                  companies  liad  travei-eed  an  aggregate  distance  of  1,TUU  mileH.     This  does 

^^^1                  not  include  the  work  of  parties  of  scouts  and  sjiies,  who  frequently  worlied 

^-^-                    two  days  ahead  of  the  force. 

Their                      The  infantrj  carried,  besides  rifle,  bayonet,  equipment  and  100  rounds 

"""                    containing  about  a  gallon  of  water.     Blankets  and  superfluous  clothes  were 

left  l«ihind  at  Burao.     Every  Britiah  officer  was  mounted. 

Behuriour  In         Although  the  men   in   some   cases   were  excited  in  action,  they  soon 

action.              Bettled  down  to  work,  and  on  no  occasion  did  the  loss  caused  by  the  enemy'a 

^^^                   .iQe  fire  ttlect  them  so  as  to  cause  them  to  heaitttte  in  their  advance.     At 

^^^L                Fcrdiddin  the  Somalis,  of  their  own  miliative,  extricated  the  maxima  from 

^^^H                ihe  dead  camels  and  worked  thein,  paying  proper  attention  to  sights  and 

^^^H                trial  shots..   They  took  up  new  positions  whenever  the  advance  of  the 

^^^V                infantry  rendered  tliia  desiraMc.     In  the  eamo  action,  the  Mounted  Corps, 

^^^H                 which  had  suffered  severely  in  men  and  animals,  was  ordered  to  temporarily 

^^^^1                  fall  back  on  the  infantry,  but  advaoced  again  ivith  tlicm  directly  a  forward 

^1^^                  move  vras  made. 

iThe  Boinnlia-          Ko  attempt  had  been  made  to  teach  thcmen,  in  the  limited  time  av^Uhle,, 

and  movementa  necessary  for  general  cohesion.     They  could  march  well, 
L                             and  being  all  more  or  leas  used  t-o  iatcrtribal  lighting,  they  quickly  adapted 

81 


tiicmsehc'S  tu  our  Lwliiia.  'llipy  understood  llie  care  and  louding  of  trftiis- 
port  animals,  could  Uvb  on  meat  alone,  and  oould  essily  go  (or  two  dajs 
subaistiug  only  ou  the  water  they  themsolves  oarried. 

I  found  no  diffionlty  in  at  once  finding  as  many  riders  aa  were  necessary 
to  ntiliae  such  poniefl  as  we  were  able  to  hiiy  or  capture. 

Sorao  difficidty  occurred  at  the  start  owing  to  there  being  no  non- 
commiaBioued  officers  or  training  nlaff  av^able,  tlie  men  we  eventually 
used  for  this  purpose  being  merely  coast  policemen,  eonie  of  whom  bad  less 
than  a  year's  service.  The  men  learned  fast,  however,  and  directly  non- 
coramiasioned  officers  Tiegan  to  come  forward  from  amongst  them,  thtco 
was  no  further  trouble. 

It  was  not  advisable  nor  was  it  necessary  to  dragoon  the  leviea,  whone 
mobility  was,  to  a  great  estent,  the  outoome  of  their  being  an  irregular 

Provided  the  niou  arc  treated  with  the  same  consideration  at)  ia  used  Amenability 
in  uhe  native  army  in  India,  they  will  readily  respond  by  doing  their  beat,  to  discipline 
It  was  unforluDHte  that  many  of  the  officers  eould  only  communicate  witlt 
ttieir  m.en  through  interpreters  who,  in  some  eases,  were  prone  ({)  mate  the 
jnost  of  their  position. 

The  ievios  were  placed  under  the  Eurmah  Mihtary  Pohce  Eeg?ilations  Diaoipliiie 
and  Somalilaud  Order  in  Coimoil  of  1S90.     Iljero  was  very  little  crime,  and 
the  punishments,  which  it  was  found  necessary  to  inflict  in  a  few  serious 
cases  of  phiodering,  having  been  very  severe,  a  stop  was  at  onee  put  to 
anything  of  the  load. 

The   fever  from   whiob   both  British  men  and  officers  suffered  whilst  Health, 
in  the  low-lying  coast  counti'y,  diaappsared  when  once  the  force  had  left 
Burao,  and  the  percentage  of  sickness  was  then  very  small     One  or  two 
officers  soilered  from  the  want  of  vegetables,  but  the  men  were  not  affected. 

The   total   number   of   casualties  inflicted  on  the  enemy  at  MeNeill's  Eoemv'a 
zariba  and  in  tlve  subsequent  pursuit  in  the  Ararsamah  and  the  Ali  Gheri  totnl  losses, 
country,  and  at  Fcrdiddin,  cannot  have  fallen  far  short  of  some  1,200  men 
killed  and  wounded.     Some  300  prisoners,  including  many  Cliiefs  and  many 
Headmen,  who  were  for  the  most  part  afterwards  released,  were  also  taken. 

The  cameto  were  either  given  as  compensation  to  the  Ishak  tribes  who  Captures  : 
had  been  looted  by  the  Mullah  or  were  handed  over  to  the  men,  with  their  how  disposed 
consent,  iu  lieu  of  pay,  thus  reducing  the  cost  of  the  expedition.     A  large  ™' 
number  of  transport  spearmen  were  ptud  entirely  in  camels,  and  wounded 
men  and  the  relatives  of  the  dead  were  in  the  same  manner  compensated. 
Compenaatifiii  was  given  for  all  tribal  horse?  killed,  and  others  were  purchased 
from  the  trihes  in  exchange  for  camels.      All  casualties  in  the  transport 
were  made  good,  and  friendly  tribes  were  given  a  bonus  for  services  rendered. 
The  Field  Force  for  some  time  lived  entirely  on  its  captures. 

The  sheep  and  milch  goatg,  excepting  a  small  percentage  of  the  fonner 
eaten  by  the  force,  were  returned  to  the  enemy's  women  and  children.  No 
person  who  applied  fot  relief  was  turned  away. 

Thus,  at  the  end  of  operations,  our  tribes  had  rcg^ed  at  least  a  good 
proportion  of  the  losses  previously  sustained  by  tbcm.     All  services  had  been 
(8927)  F 


paid  foi,  and  our  transport  and  Mounted  Corps  had  been  pat  on  a  proper 
footing.  In  apite  of  nearly  the  whole  of  our  horws  having  been  tdlled, 
there  were,  owing  Iti  captures  and  exichangta  in  lien  of  camelH,  more  left 
at  the  end  of  uparatians  than  there  were  at  the  beginning. 

The  Abyssinian  co-operation  conaiated,  as  mraBged,  in  Mocking  the 
wertem  side  of  the  conntry.  They  never  actually  came  in  tonch  with  the 
Mullah,  nor  were -they  Been  by  our  levies. 

Mekomoters  were  badly  wanted  for  the  mauma,  but  none  were,  un- 
fortunately, available  at  Bombay  or  Aden,  and  there  wcs  no  time  at  tha 
last  to  get  them  from  England.  The  mBximi  bad  a  triolc  of  jamming  at 
critical  momenta,  but  were  quickly  set  right  again.  ITie  tanlt  may  have  been 
line  to  the  bolts. 

Uufortimately,  owing  to  the  dust  storms  and  haze  which  during 
Api"!!,  May  and  June  prevailed,  signalling  with  C-in.  heliographs  was  out  of 
the  question.  Possibly  a  larger  size  might  have  been  useful,  but  none 
were  quickly  available. 

Gun   cotton  for  enlarging  rocky  wella,  bine  lights  and  signal  rocketa 
*"-  were  kindly  supplied  by  General  More-Molyneui,  oommandiog  at  Aden. 

Punjabi  I  had  ordered  from  India   three   months'  rations   for    the  Punjabis, 

rations.  Fiather  rations  were  arranged  for  by  the  Indian  Commissariat  at  Aden. 

Unexplored  The    portion   of   the  country  oyer  which  the  fighting  took  place  was 

eountry.  unmapped,  except  in  the  northern  portion,  by  Major  Wellby'a  compass  route, 

and  as  we  did  not  march  along  tlus  bat  crossed  and  recrossed  it,  we  had  to. 
rely  entirely  upon  native  information. 
Guides  and  Our   guides  were  fiurly  accurate  in  the  northern  part  of  the  country, 

nt  got  hopelessly  adrift  in  the  country  where  we  got  in  touch  of  the  MuUah, 
nd  we  bad  consequently  to  do  the  best  under  the  circumstances,  and  rely 
on  capturing  priiioners  and  getting  information  from  them.     Marches  were 
set  by  conipass  bearing,  and  at  night  we  marched  by  the  stars, 
iledieal  alaff.        Lieutenant    Boulton,   I.M.S.,   was    assisted    by  iwo    Indian  honpital 


Mali  ma. 


SignoUiiig- 


lllne  lights, 


Operations  ot 
ihe  AbjB- 


Up 


o  April  the  native  armoun-rs  who  happened  to  bo  available  oa 
^  attended  to  the  rifles,  but  in  April  British  Anuourer-Sergean^ 
tn  me.     A  number  of  iron  workers  n  td  been  cnfisted  and  provoA. 


Before  concluding  the  narrative  of  the  operations  of  the 
first  expedition,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  the  co-operation  of  the 
Ahyaainians. 

In  January,  1901,  the  Abyssinians  despatched  an  expedition 
of  some  10,000  men  into  Ogaden,  but,  owing  to  defective  supply 
arrangements  and  want  of  water,  the  force  never  got  into  touch 
with  the  Mullah,  who  retired  before  it  into  the  Ibrahim  country, 
and  it  eventually  halted  at  the  Gerlogubi  Wells. 


A  fresh  force  of  10,000,  ■with  only  a  month's  supplies,  was 
ifiespatched  in  May,  and  arrived  on  the  24th  of  that  month  at 
Eilld  Crabro,  on  the  Fafan,  where  it  was  joined  by  two  Britieb 
officers,  Major  Hon.  A.  Hanbury-Tracy,  Royal  Horse  Guards, 
and  Captain  R.  P.  Cobbold,  late  60th  Rifles.  Here  con- 
;nts,  anxious  for  plunder,  raised  the  numbers  to  14,000, 
the  commander,  the  Kanyazmach  Abanabro,  was 
esirous  of  moving  via  the  Webi  Shebeli  on  Mudug,  in  order 
Wio  replenish  liia  supplies  and  punish  the  Adoni  on  that  river, 
who  had  shown  an  inclination  to  join  the  Mullah.  A  rumour 
:  the  latter'a  defeat  by  the  British  expedition,  however, 
[  encouraged  him  to  proceed  direct  on  Gerlogubi,  where  he 
^wnived  on  the  11th  June. 

In  spite  of  long  marches,  c.ij.,  50  miles  in  two  days,  and 
Ijfrequent  daily  marches  of  2j  miles,  the  force  eflected  little 
beyond  the  severe  punishment  of  the  Ibrahim,  owing  to  the 
natural  difficulties  of  this  arid  country.  Water  was  generally 
scanty  and  the  heat  intense,  for  the  rains  had  not  yet  begun. 
In  places  where  water  was  abundant,  e.g.,  Baligadud,  it  was 
impure,  being  the  rain  washings  from  the  surrounding  country 
mixed  with  animal  excreta.  There  was  very  httle  fodder  for 
ponies  and  mules.  No  supplies  were  obtainable  except  meat, 
to  which  the  Abyssiniana,  who  bve  mainly  on  grain,  were 
unaccustomed,  and  frequently  raids  on  the  tribes,  e.g.,  to 
Galadi  and  Bur  Wells,  35  to  40  miles  east  and  south  of  Wardair 
respectively,  where  the  Makahil  had  collected,  were  failures 
owing  to  the  defection  of  guides  or  to  the  inadequacy  of  the 
system  for  the  transport  of  water.  Consequently,  on  the  21st 
June,  the  force  moved  south  to  Faf  on  the  tug  Fafan,  where 
it  arrived  on  the  4th  July,  looting  the  friendly  Her  Ughaz 
en  route.  It  then  returned  via  Sasami  to  Karrar,  reaching 
the  latter  town  about  the  eud  of  the  month. 

Major  Hanbury-Tracy  furnished  the  following  summary  of 
the  work  accomplished  in  connection  with  his  employment 
with  the  forces  of  the  Ras  Makonnen  :— 


(8927) 


Si 


I 


Leaving  London  on  the  Sth  March,  I  proceeded  to  Aden  by  P.  ftnd  0. 
Bfeamer,  arriring  at  the  latter  place  on  the  17th  March. 

On  the  ISthMaJob  I  croased  to  Berbcra,  where  I  spent  somo  days  witb 
Colonel  Sadler  maldng  pTeliminary  arrangementa  as  to  the  forjnation  of  m]r 
caravan.  Colonel  Sadler  being  of  opimon  that  Berbera  would  be  a  better 
base  to  start  from  than  Zeila,  provisions  for  the  men  at  the  latter  being  a 
difficulty.     Acting  on  his  advice  I  arranged  to  hire  camels  aa  far  as  Jig  Jiga. 

As  it  was  impos^blo  to  foretell  tho  duration  of  the  operattons,  I  made 
provjaian  for  a  possible  absence  of  nine  months  for  myself  and  a  two  month"' 
provision  of  rations  foe  my  caravan,  it  being  arranged  that  a  further  supply 
of  dates  and  "  ghi "  should  be  forwarded  later  on  from  Brcbcra  to  Jig  Jign, 
which  place  I  intended  to  use  a?  my  advanced  base. 

As  it  wna  known  tliat  the  country  in  which  the  Abyaainians  were 
likely  to  opecaio  contained  but  little  water,  a  considerable  number  of  camels 
were  aeceaaary  to  cairy  water  tanks. 

My  paitf  consisted  of  1.  Headman,  4G  cameU,  23  attendants  and  an 
escort  of  I'Z  Somalis,  besides  my  personal  servants.  The  camels  and  also 
the  servants  engaged  by  Captdin  Cubbold  ate  included  in  thesa  numbers, 
amd  were  uo  charge  to  Goverument. 

Having  oompletcli  the  formation  of  the  expedition,  1  returned  to  Aden 
to  pick  up  my  luiggage,  reaching  Berbera  again  on  the  2Tth. 

The  2Sth  waa  spent  in  making  preparations  for  my  start  and  receiving 
uutructiona  from  Colonel  Sadler,  the  copy  of  which  is  annexed." 

On  the  2Qth  I  left  lierhera,  and  directing  Captain  Cobbold  to  proceed 
with  the  caravan  by  the  m^n  road  to  Jig  Jiga,  I  branched  oC  to  Adadleh 
where  Colonel  Swayne's  Somali  levy  was  situated  at  that  time.  I  obtained 
front  that  officer  a  general  idea  of  bis  proposed  operations,  for  the  informa- 
tion of  Bas  Makonnen  and  my  own  guidance,  and  then  rejoined  the  caiavan. 

Jig  Jiga  WHJi  reached  on  tho  8th  April.  Here  I  found  the  Fitauraii 
BanaguM,  who  is  in  charge  of  the  district.  Here  I  discharged  the  camels 
which  had  been  hired  to  this  point  only,  and  leaving  my  baggagu  Ixihind 
proceeded  to  Harrar,  where  the  Acting  Governor,  in  Bas  Makonnen's 
absence,  received  me  extremely  weh. 

Mr.  Gerolimato,  the  Italian  Consul,  met  me  on  the  rond  before 
entering  the  town,  and  informed  me  that  Bas  Makonnen  was  absent  at 
Colubbi,  a  country  seat  of  his  some  30  miloa  on  the  Adis  Ababa  road, 
where  he  intended  to  spend  Easter- 
He  returned  a  few  days  later  and  had  an  interview  with  me  at  onte, 
when  I  found  hini  averse  to  the  idea  of  allowing  Captain  Cobbold  and 
myself  to  join  the  army,  wbieli  under  the  ffitaurari  Gabri  had  now  been 
in  the  field  since  the  beginning  of  the  year.  He  complained  of  the  delay 
in  Ibc  start  of  the  British  force,  which,  he  said,  had  been  promised  should 
be  in  readiness  to  take  the  field  simultaneously  with  the  Abyssinians,  whom, 
he  allied,  were  now  worn  out  by  fatigue  and  the  privations  they  had 
Tandergone,  end  were  not  in  a  state  to  assist  in  further  operations. 

Aftar  sevBtal  interviews  I  thought  it  beat  to  ask  Colonel  Harrington  to 

"  Not  pr.ntei. 


M 


I  outer  from  the  Emperor' Menelek  nllowiiiy  us  In  proceed,  and 
I  ttis  lie  kindly  did,  and  the  Bas  was  ordered  to  aeJid  a  freah  force  to  replace 
the  array  ot  Gabri,  and  to  allow  os  to  proceed  with  all  deBpatck 

A  fresh  body  ot  troops  was  now  collected  to  tlie  number  of  10,000  men, 
who  were  ordered  to  concentrate  ot  Dagaha  Msdo.  a  place  on  the  Ogaden 
border  aome  diitanre  sooth  of  Harrar,  the  command  beinR  jriTen  to  the 
Kanyaimach  Abanabro,  who  had  served  with  Makonnen  at  the  battle  of 
Adowa,  where  he  had  diatinguished  himself. 

The  hospital  asaiatant  who  had  been  orderod  to  join  me  from  India 
not  being  forthcoming,  and  aa  I  considered  it  imperative  in  the  interest  of 
the  Abyssinians  as  well  as  in  my  own  thut  a  medioal  man  should  accompany 
the  force.  I  asked  Br.  Martin,  who  liappantd  to  have  recently  arrived  from 
Adis  Ababa,  to  join  the  e^qtedition.  I  considered  that,  being  an  Abys- 
sinian hy  birth,  his  presence  would  he  grateful  to  the  force,  and  (he  Bu 
Tiewed  the  idea  favourably. 

Dr.  Martin  agreed  to  my  proposal  aiiU  joined  mo  at  .lig  Jiga  ou  the 
0th  May. 

Rbs  Makonnen  detuled  Baaha  Ballina  and  his  following  as  our  escort 
and  ho  joined  ua  ot  Jig  Jiga  and  remained  with  me  till  my  return  to  Hatrw, 
■erving  me  excellently  well. 

Whilst  completing  preparations  for  our  departure  from  Jig  Jiga  to 
Join  the  army  we  heard  again  that  the  Ras  was  endeavouring  to  delay  the 
departnce  ot  the  troops,  and  was  anirious  that  we  should  not  proceed  nntil 
arrangements  were  further  advanced.     This,  however,  I  disregarded. 

I  arranged  by  mounted  runners  a  system  of  commimication  with 
Colonel  Swayne'a  column  before  my  departure  from  Jig  Jiga  on  the  11th 
May,  leaving  all  surploa  bBfi;pagB  at  this  point. 

I  proceeded  south  towards  Dagaha  Mado,  receiylng  on  my  way  a  letter 
from  Colonel  Swayne.  who  was  anxious  that  a  force  might  be  detached  to 
■panish  the  Ber  All,  which  tribe  had  been  causing  him  aome  annoyance. 

The  Abyasinian  array  joined  ua  ot  Dagaha  .Mado  on  the  2Gtli  Slay. 
nSt  consisted  of  some  10,000  men,  but  it  was  impossible  to  obtain  a  correct 
mate  of  their  numbers  aa  the  Kanyaimach  himself  had  but  a  liaiy  notion 
[pf  the  number  of  men  with  him. 

At  Bassamani  a  letter  was  received  from   Colonel   Swuyue  asking  the 

jAbyasinians  to  co-operate  in  pmiishing  the  All  Gheri,  but  as  information  had 

IS  that  the  Blullah  was  retreating  south  from  the  Dolhahanta  before 

a  British  column,  I  thought  it  better  to  lose  no  time  in  endeavouring  to 

Fent  off  his  retreat  by  occupying  the  country  around  and  to  the  east  oi 

Gerlogubi  with  all  possible  speed.     The  Kanyaj.macli  concurred,  promi^ng 

to  punish  the  All  Gheri  on  the  return  joumev". 

I  alreEidy  foresaw  thut  diflioulties  utuat  arise  in  feeding  this  large  force, 
mbcrs  had  lieen  swollen  by  the  arrival  of  large  numbers  of  vulun- 
'—  teers  aggregating  some  thousands. 

A  question  on  this  point  aoon  arose,  for  it  transpired  that  whereas 
B!41u]  Hiiny  had  brought  with  them  a  month's  rations,  the  newly-arrived 
KTolmiteora  were  ignite  unprovided  for  and  had  to  be  fed.     A  discussion  then 


ss 


I 


enmied  bb  w  the  ail  visa  tiility  of  proceeding  Bouthwards  to  the  Wehi  in 
ssarch  of  grain  or  of  ^)0^'ing  enat  on  Gerlogubl :  aiul  as  the  Mullah  was  re- 
ported in  the  vicinity  the  latter  oouree  was  deuided  on. 

On  arrival  at  (Jeriogubi  on  the  12tli  Juno,  the  Mullali  was  reported  iti 
the  thick  bush  Bome  50  miles  east.  It  was,  however,  imposBible  to  obtain 
reliable  iafurmatioa.  Tbo  country  was  denuded  of  any  Ogaden  who  might 
have  aRorded  information,  these  having  fled  in  tenor  at  the  ap[iroach  of 
tho  Abyssinians,  who  had  no  idea  of  any  system  of  obtoinin^  inletUgence, 
and  were  also  afraid  to  move  about  except  in  large  bodies. 

I  urged  the  Kanyazmaoh  to  break  op  bis  huge  force  into  three  Snialler 
eoluraoB  to  increaae  their  mobility  and  render  it  Oflaior  to  feed  them,  but  he 
would  not  do  so. 

Accordingly,  the  whole  army  maruhed  eastwards  some  5(1  miles  into 
tho  country  of  the  Eer  Ibrahim,  where  it  was  said  that  the  Mullah  had 
Bought  shelter.  The  report  of  the  latter's  whereabouts  proved  incorrect, 
but  the  Ibrahim  who  had  been  supporting  him  were  severely  punished,  the 
Abyseiniana  pursuing  them  for  two  days  in  scattered  parties  and  driving 
them  into  the  handa  of  Cubnel  Swayno's  advanced  guard,  who  further 
completed  their  discamforture  and  captured  aomo  2,000  camels.  The 
Abysainisns  killed  some  *200  of  the  tribe,  and  some  hidden  ammunition  was 
unearthed  and  brought  in. 

The  Mullah's  brother  and  some  of  his  family  being  reported  at  Uatadi, 
the  position  of  which  is  shown  on  the  map,  and  a  large  concentration  of 
tribesmen  being  reported  there  with  large  quantities  of  sheep,  I  advised  the 
Kanyaimaoh  to  send  his  main  body  and  baggage  to  (Jeriogubi  and  detach 
a  strong  column  to  Galadi  and  a  second  one  to  B\ir,  some  30  miles  south  of 
Wardair,  where  the  Slekoliil  tribes  had  asaemblci).  having  beou  driven  from 
the  wella  at  Walwal  and  Wardair.  He  agreed  to  this  plan  which  wonU,  if 
it  had  been  carried  out  at  that  time,  have  resulted  in  »,  blow  being  struck  at 
the  Hakahil,  one  of  the  sub-sections  of  whom  ia  the  Ba^ori,  the  tribe  of  the 
Mullah — and  would  also  have  provided  plenty  of  fund  for  the  troops — but 
afterwards  changing  his  mind,  led  the  array,  alreadj'  half  starving,  by  a 
oircoitouB  route  back  to  Gerlogubi. 

We  bad  warned  the  Kanyazmach  that  it  was  essential  for  the  men  each 
to  carry  a  skin  of  water,  and  had  told  lum  of  the  distances  which  we  knew 
through  some  of  our  own  men — whom  we  sent  with  him.  No  preparations 
for  catTying  water  were  made  ;  the  advice  of  our  men  was  disregarded,  and 
he  has  no  one  to  thank  for  this  miafortnue  but  himself.  He  afterwards 
Informed  us  that  it  was  the  will  of  Ood  and  mu.it  be  aacepted  as  such. 

The  Kanyazmach  now  gave  orders  for  parties  to  scatter  themselves 
all  over  the  conntry,  and  the  friendly  tribes  m  the  Fafan  valley  were  looted, 
large  quantities  of  cattle  and  sheep  were  forthcoming,  and  the  crisis  was, 
for  the  moment,  averted. 

The  long  course  of  camel  meat  diet,  to  which  the  Abyssiniana  are 
imoccnstomed,  now  showed  its  eSect,  the  men  being  in  a  weakened,  dis- 
heartened and  sullen  condition.  Their  horses  and  mules,  owing  to  the 
scarcity  of  grass  in  this  inhospitable  coimtry,  had  been  grcnlly  rpdiiicd  in 


I  prop 

r  fortl 


and  it  was  decided  to  latum  to  the  vtilley  of  the  FataJi,  whera 
grass  wan  abundant,  and  to  there  decide  on  the  best  steps  to  talte. 

Before  leaving  Gcrlogiibi,  a  letter  waa  received  from  the  Officer  Com- 
manding at  Burao,  in  wikjoh  waa  mentioned  the  report  o£  the  Mnllaii'a 
capture,  and  as  tlua  was  corroborated  by  prisoners  and  from,  other  aourcos, 
WB  planed  some  reliirace  in  it. 

The  Fafan  waa  reached  in  the  first  woelt  in  July.     The  Kanyaimach 
proposed  to  proceed  south  to  the  Wobi,   stating  that  ha  was  sure 
pis  grain  could  be  obtained  there,  and  that  when  this  was  collected  he 
proposed  to  take  the  army  bavk  to  Harror.  since  they  were  unfit  for  fmrther 
and  internal  dissensions  ^vith  his  Chiefs  had  a^en.    I  did  not 
lyself  believe  it  likely  that  any  grain  would  be  obtainable  in  the  Webi. 
country  had  been  devastated  by  Oabri  only  a  short  time  previously, 
afterwards  conclusively  proved  that  I  wai  correct  in  my  sup- 
position.    It  seemed  to  mo  that  the  Konyaimach'a  plana  courted  disaster, 
for  the  men  were  worn  out  and  in  a  had  state  generaUy,  and  if  no  grain  was 
fonnd,  it  meant  that  none  of  them  would  return. 

I,  therefore,  at  a  Coimcil  of  Chiefs  which  was  held,  did  my  best]  to 

the  Kanyazmoch  from  t^iis  idea,  and  tlie  Chiefs  gave  me  a  pretty 

leral  support.     Tlio  spirit  of  the  soldiery  » 


The  Kanyazmoch  endeavoured  to  force  the  hand  of  his  Cliiefa  by  oaUing 
the  volunteers  to  follow  luni,  but  they,  too,  refused,  and  when  he  con- 
sented to  return  to  Hanar,  tbo  Ohiefs  and  the  men  appeared  grateful  to  ns 
fat  our  refusal  to  oountfinanca  his  scheme. 

At  this  point  we  parted  company,  and  returned  slowly  to  Jig  Jiga 
along  the  courae  of  the  Jcrcr.  Our  camels  were  in  a  bad  state,  all  our  ponies 
exoeptitig  one  had  died,  and  tho  men  had  hod  a  hard  time. 

Mr.  Gerolimato  met  us  at  Jig  Jiga,  and  after  a  short  halt  there,  whore 
reduced  the  strength  of  tho  party  by  dismissing  all  the  men  not  abaolntely 
[uired,  we  proceeded  to  Horrar. 

Tho  Ras  was  abFicnt  at  Kombulcha,  but  the  Acting  Governor  gav/i  ua  a 
reception  in  his  abseniu. 

tl  the  following  day  the  Ras  arrived,  and  I  had  an  interview  with 
in  which  I  gave  liim  an  account  of  the  operations  concluded, 
[e  stated  that  the  Chiefs  and  men  had  appreciated  our  presence  with 
force,  and  thanked  us  tor  having  refused  to  agree  to  tha  Kanyaanath'B 
nneof  proceeding  further  south  when  hia  force  were  in  such  a  bad  plight — 
ch  would  have,  he  agreed  with  us,  ended  in  probable  disascer. 
returned  the  Kas'  visit  to  Kombiilcha  on  our  return  journey  to  Jig 
when  he  reoeived  ua  in  a  markedly  friendly  manner  and  presented 
Durbar,  by  the  Emperor's  command,  with  the  Order  of  the  Star  of 
iopia  of  tho  second  class,  and  a  letter  thanking  us  for  onr  services. 

Bas  hero  placed  in  our  charge  a  zebra,  a  gift  from  the  Emperor 
lelek,  to  His  Majesty,  which,  at  King  Menelek's  request,  we  took  with 
Aden  and  shipped  in  good  condition  on  board  the  B.I.  steamship 
Manoca,"  and  Uo  haa  since  safely  arrived  in  London. 


88 


After  leaving  Kombiilcha  we  returned  via  Fuyambiro  to  Jig  Jiga. 
At  Fuyambiro,  where  the  Kanyazmach  has  his  headquarters,  a  great 
reoeption  was  given  us  by  the  Chiefs  and  many  of  the  soldiers  who  had 
composed  the  expeditionary  force  who  accompanied  us  as  far  as  Jig 
Jiga,  where  they  left  us  with  many  manifestations  of  good-will. 

I  feel  sure  that  our  association  with  the  force  has  created  a  personal 
feeling  of  a  most  friendly  nature  with  the  Chiefs  and  soldiery. 

Erom  Jig  Jiga  we  returned  to  Berbera. 

On  arrival  at  Berbera  the  expedition  closed  with  the  paying  off  of  the 
caravan. 


CHAPTER  TV. 
THE   SECOND  EXPEDITION,  1902  * 

EEORaASIZATION     OP     THE     LOCAI,     FoRCES. — PkEPARATIONS 

FOR  THE  Second  Expedition. — Plan  of  Operations. — 
^^^H  Situation  ON  the  Ist  June,  I!)02. — The  Operations.— 

^^^^bfoVEMENTIJ  AGAIN.ST  THE    HoriTILE    TrIBE-S, — AcTION  AT 

^^^FErigo.— Return  of  the  Force  to  Bohotle. 

On  the  concluBion  of  the  first  expedition.  Consul -General 
I      Hayes-Sadler  considered  that  it  would  he  impracticable  to 

!  attempt  to  defend  the  whole  uf  the  Dolbahanta  country,  and 
tliat  our  attention  should  be  confined  "  to  watcliing  that 
country  and  safeguarding  against  attack  on  our  posts  and  the 
nearer  portions  of  the  Protectorate  which  may  be  threatened 
by  any  further  move  on  the  Mullah's  part." 

For  this  purpose  he  proposed  in  a  despatch  to  His  Majesty's 
1      Government,  dated  1st  August,  1901,  that — 

Burao  should  be  occupied  by  a  garrison  of  500  infantry 

and  100  camel  corps. 
A  reserve  company  should  be  quartered  at  Berbera. 
The  remainder  of  the  Infantry  should  be  formed  into  a 

Militia. 
The     permanent    transport     should    be    retained    near 

Burao. 
The  150  mounted  infantry  should  be  disbanded. 
A  couple   of   "  pompoms "   or   2-7-pr.   guns   were   aiso 
asked  for. 

His  Majesty's  Government  in  reply  stated  that  they  (elt 
unable  to  sanction  the  permanent  occupation  of  Burau,  or  the 
formation  of  a  new  corps  to  hold  either  that  place  or  other  posts 
in  the  interior.     The  retention  of  a  force  not  exceeding  the 

b'uB   Map  II. 


I 


tJon  of  the 
Local  Ford's. 


90 

niunber    proposed    by    the    CohbuI- General    was,    ho  we' 
sanctioned  as  a  temporary  measure. 

For  a  brief  period  the  Mullah  remained  in  a  state  ■ 
quiescence,  and  on  the  25th  September,  Mr.  H.  E.  S.  Cordetri 
{Acting  Consul -General),  reported  that  he  was  about  15  i 
20  miles  south  of  the  south-east  corner  of  the  Protectors! 
and  that  there  did  not  appear  to  be  any  immediate  dang«E 
liis  returning  in  force  to  the  Dolbahanta  country. 

On  the  25tli  October  the  Mullah  was  reported  to  bav 
advanced  westwards  to  Heli  Madu,  aceompaiiied  by 
following  of  about  500  riflemen  and  90O  horses.  In  reportin 
this  movement  the  Acting  Consul- General  stated  that  it  wa 
difficult  to  estimate  its  exact  significance,  but  that  it  migh 
be  a  preliminary  step  to  a  retirement  south  into  the  Hawiy 
country.  4 

All  doubt  on  this  point  was  soon  dispellnd,  for  on  Idl 
December  Mr.  Cordcaux  telegraphed  that  the  Mullah  wa 
reported  to  be  at  Lassadcr  in  force  with  advance  posts  a 
Bohotle,  Kirrit,  and  Gosawein.  A  few  days  later  (21e 
December)  it  was  stated  that  he  had  moved  {oiwardiJ 
Idoweina  with  a  large  following,  composed  piincipallj^ 
mounted  riflemen,  with  the  apparent  intention  of  m^l 
an  attack  on  the  Ishak  frontier  north  and  south  of  Bnia%J 

On  receipt  of  the  above  telegram,  the  Foreign  Offiofr^ 
formed  Mr.  Cordeaux  that  steps  were  being  taken  to  ivH 
with  the  fresh  outbreak,  but  warned  him  to  be  careful  aboii 
assuming   the   offensive   pending   the   arrival   of  additiont 


PrepiirBtiuiis  In  the  meantime  Lieut. -Colonel  E.  J.  E-  Swayne,  India 
e""  |.?^'°'"'  Army,  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  new  expeditioi 
and  six  offieers  of  the  King's  African  Rifles  were  ordere 
out  from  England.  The  British  Central  Africa  Protectoral 
was  warned  to  hold  in  readiness  300  troops  and  two  Maxin 
gun  sections,  and  H.M.S.  "  Cossack"  was  directed  to  pr< 
ceed  from  Aden  to  Berbera. 

On  the  2Sth  December  the  Mullah  was  reported  to  1 


retired  to  Eil  Dab  (about  70  miles  soutb-east  of  Burao),  but  to 
be  stiil  threatening  to  reBume  the  ofEenaive,  His  force  at  that 
time  was  estimated  at  12,000  men,  the  majority  of  whom  were 
mounted,  with  about  1,000  rifles. 

Burao  was  garrisoned  by  a  force  of  650  men,  and  an 
advanced  post  was  established  at  Huguf,  commanding  the 
Meriye  Pasa  east  of  Sheikh,  consisting  of  fourteen  men  o( 
the  Habr  Toljaala,  and  six  sowars  of  the  Coast  Camel  Corps. 

On  the  9th  January,  1902.  five  officers  of  the  King's  African 
Rifles  reached  Berbera,  and  active  measures  were  taken  to 
reorganise  the  Somali  levy,  wbich  was  raised  to  a  strength  of 
1,500  men  by  the  time  Swayne  reached  Berbera  on  18tU 
January. 

On  his  ariival  from  England,  Swayne  reported  that  owing 
to  the  continued  importation  of  firearms,  the  Mullah  had  not 
only  recovered  from  the  losses  inflicted  on  him  during  the 
previous  year,  but  that  he  had  compelled  the  greater  proportdon 
of  the  Dolbahanta  tribes  to  return  to  his  domination,  thereby 
swelling  the  number  of  his  following  to  about  13,000,  of 
whom  10,000  were  said  to  be  mounted. 

Active  measures  were  at  once  taken  to  defend  the 
threatened  tribes,  and  arrangements  were  made  with  the  chiefs 
to  withdraw  their  people  from  the  threatened  localities  and 
concentrate  at  Bale-Shala-Shala,  '60  miles  south  of  Burao. 

On  the  8th  February  Swayne  started  for  Burao,  and 
while  on  the  march  he  received  news  of  a  destructive  raid 
by  the  Mullah  on  the  J ama-Siad- Dolbahanta.  On  that 
occasion  the  Mullah's  force  was  reported  to  be  4,000  strong, 
and  to  have  covered  70  miles  on  the  day  of  the  attack. 

On  the  12th  February  Swayne  arrived  at  Burao,  and 
on  the  following  day  arrangements  were  begun  for  an 
evening  march  to  Balc-Shala-Shala,  in  order  to  protect  the 
tribes  concentrated  there.  Before  the  arrangements  could 
be  completed,  however,  wounded  men  from  the  tribes  began 
to  arrive,  who  reported  that  a  dervish  force  between  4,000 
and  5,000  strong  had  juat  raided  tlie  live  stock  at  Amudleh, 
killing  a  large  number  of  people. 


On  teceiptoE  this  information,  a  coIumTi  under  Captain  (local 
Major)  A.  G.  Sharp,  Leinster  Regiment,  was  despatched  to 
Amudleh,  and  catching  up  the  enemy's  rearguard,  recovered 
£rom  10,000  to  15,000  sheep,  but  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy  managed  to  escape,  and  Major  Sharp's  men  being 
too  exhausted  to  continue  the  puramt,  the  column  returned 
to  Burao  on  17th  February. 

Owing  to  the  increase  of  prestige  gained  by  the  Mullah  by 
these  raids  and  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  Ishak  tribes, 
Swayne  urged  the  importance  of  organizing  a  counteratroke. 
To  carry  out  tliie  plan  he  proposed — 

To  raise  a  new  corps  of  500  men  in  addition  to  the  levy 
of  1,500. 

To  convert  100  infantry  into  a  camel  corps. 

Six  additional  of&cers  and  some  signallers  were  also 
asked  for. 

During  the  early  part  of  April  information  was  received  that 
emissaries  from  the  Mullah  were  actively  employed  in  tamper- 
ing with  the  coast  tribes  east  of  Berbera,  and  that  the  latter 
were  beginning  to  waver. 

In  order  to  frustrate  the  Mullah's  plans  Swayne  decided  to 
interpose  a  detachment  of  the  levies  between  him  and  the  dis- 
affected tribes  thus  severing  communication  between  the  two 
parties.  At  the  same  time,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Mullah  from 
interfering  with  this  arrangement.  Major  G,  E.  Phillips,  R.E., 
was  ordered  to  make  a  demonstration  from  Burao  towards 
Burdab,  with  a  force  of  750  men  and  two  maxims.  This 
movement  was  successfully  carried  out  and  several  chiefs  of 
the  disaffected  tribes  were  killed.  The  interposing  force  then 
returned  to  Berbera. 

By  this  time  arrangements  for  the  counterstroke  againat 
the  Mullah  were  completed,  and  on  26th  May  Swayne 
with  the  force  noted  below*  marched  from  Burao  to 
Wadamago,  where  he  arrived  on  28th  May. 

•  so  moonted  infantry,  20  camel  corpa,  1,200  infantry,  3  tnaTima, 
two  7.pr.  guns,  1,000  burden  eameU.    ' 


The  Mullah  wa*  now  said  to  bs  near  Baraa  with  some 
15,000  followers,  of  whom  12,000  were  mounted,  with  1,500 
rifles,  while  his  live  stock  was  being  driven  southwards  to 
some  rainpools  at  Damot,  in  the.  otherwise  waterless  Haud 
district  As  far  as  could  be  ascertained  he  apparently 
intended  to  move  his  non-combatants  and  impedimenta 
towards  the  Hawiya  country,  whither  our  advanced  party 
had  already  gone,  and  to  fccep  back  the  bulk  of  his  force  in 
order  to  observe  our  levies  and  to  take  advantage  of  any 
chance  that  might  present  itself  of  raiding  our  line  of 
communications  to  Berbera. 

In  the  meantime  Risaldar-MajoxMusaFarah  had  been  sent 
with  a  tribal  force  of  450  rifles  to  operate  from  Dairor  against 
the  outljTng  encampments  of  the  MuUah  in  the  direction  of 
Bohotle,  and  to  drive  them  eastwards  off  the  Bohotle — 
Hawiya  road. 

The  British  force  halted  at  Wadamago  in  order  to  give 
time  for  the  Risaidar-Major's  flank  movement,  and  on 
receiving  information  from  spies  that  the  Mullah's  encamp- 
ments had  taken  alarm  and  fallen  back  eastward  to  Bohotle, 
messengers  were  sent  to  Musa  Farah  directing  him  to  join 
Swayne's  main  column  at  Wadamago. 

Having  ascertained  by  means  of  patrols  that  the  road 
from  Berbera  to  Mayo  was  free  from  the  Mullah's  horse- 
men, and  that  there  were  no  indications  of  any  attempt 
to  carry  out  mounted  raids  eastward,  Swayne  decided  to 
advance  on  Bohotle  on  the  Ist  June,  with  a  view  to  attack 
either  the  Mullah's  encampment  at  Damot  or  his  main  force  at 
Baran.  The  selection  of  one  of  these  objectives  depended  on 
the  information  brought  in  by  a  strong  patrol  which  had  been 
Bent  out  on  30th  May  to  establish  contact  with  the  enemy  at 
Baran. 
f  On  the  lat  June,  the  situation  was  briefly  as  follows  : —     s 


British  Forces. 
Main  body  under  Colonel  Swayne. 
■'50  Mounted  Infantry 
20  Camel  Corps 
1,200  Infantry    .. 
3  Maxims     . . 
3— 7-pr.  guns 
1,000  burden  and  ration  camels    J 

Reinforcements  under  Captain  P.  B.  Osborn,  .'ird  King' 

African  Rifles. 
400  Mounted     Infantry     andl 
Camel  Corps 
50  Infantry    . . 

Detached  force  under  Risaldar -Major  Musa  Farah. 

Tribal  Force  with  450  rifles — ^Operating  from  Darror  towards 

Bohotle. 

Buran  garrison  under  Major  A.  C  Sharp. 

lijO  Infantry '  „ 

,  ,,     .  ,  ,  _  )-iJurao. 

1  Maxim  and  1  7-pr,  gun  . .  i 

Las  Durnh  garrison. 
KKl  Infantry    .. 


'At  Wadamago. 


I  On  march  from  Burao  to 
I      Wadamago. 


1  Maxim 


:)B, 


Mockhoi 


MiiVnh's  Forces. 


12,000  mounted  men 
3,000  foot  with  1 .500  rifles 
Enemy's    live   stoi?k    and 
families 


I  Moving    southwards    itoi 
I      Damot. 


Thp  Open]-  Swayne's    column    left    Wadamago    on   the    evening   of 

*'""■■  the  1st  Jime,  and  reached  Bohotle  (54  miles  to  S.S.E.)  on 

4th  June,  a  day's  halt  having  been  made  at  Soljokto  to  allow 

of  a  reconnaissance  towards  Baran. 


95 

From  Bohotle  patrols  were  sent  out  to  gain  tonch  with  the 
Mullah,  with  Eisaldar -Major  Musa  Farah  (who  was  still  in 
the  west),  and  witli  Captain  Oaborn'a  detachment,  expected 
from  Eurao.  Whilst  waiting  at  Bohotle  a  strong  stockaded 
fort  was  built  to  command  the  wells  and  protect  the  reserve 
stores. 

The  patrols  sent  out  from  Wadamago  joined  Swayne  at 
Bohotle.  They  had  met  the  MuUah's  advanced  parties  at 
Laasader,  and  reported  that  they  liad  killed  seven  men  and 
captured  two.  The  prisoners  stated  that  Baran  and  Lassader 
had  been  evacuated  by  the  bulk  of  the  Mullah's  force,  and  that 
after  leaving  3,000  horsemen  to  observe  Swayne's  force  at 
Damot,  the  Midlah  had  retired  to  Erigo  (one  day's  journey 
north  of  Mudug),  whence  he  had  sent  half  the  live  stock  and 
the  families  to  a  place  one  day's  march  east  of  Mudug.  Swayne 
considered  that  this  movement  indicated  a  change  of  plans, 
and  that  instead  of  going  to  Hawiya,  the  enemy  might  be 
intending  to  seek  refuge  with  Sultan  Osman  Mahmud,  who 
was  reported  by  the  prisoners  to  be  actively  assisting  the 
Mullah  with  arms  and  ammunition.  From  the  same  source 
of  information  it  was  further  ascertained  that  150  rifles  had 
recently  reached  the  Mullah's  force  from  Bandar  Kasim 
(Bosaso),  and  that  during  the  past  6  months  caravans  had 
been  passing  continually  between  the  Mullah  and  the 
norlheru  Mijjarten  ports. 

At  this  time  (4th  June)  Mndug  offered  a  safe  refuge  for 
the  Mullah's  live  stock,  and  Swayne  felt  compelled  to 
make  arrangements  to  cross  the  Haud  desert  in  pursuit,  leaving 
a  garrison  of  228  rifles  and  one  masdm  in  the  newly-constructed 
fort  at  Bohotle.  If  this  plan  were  carried  out  it  seemed 
reasonable  to  expect  that  the  Mullah's  horsemen  left  in  observa- 
tion at  Damot  would  be  sooner  or  later  drawn  back  to  oppose 
the  British  advance ;  in  any  case  it  was  useless  to  go  in 
pursuit  of  the  horsemen,  who,  owing  to  superior  mobUity,* 

•  Tlif  mobility  of  the  British  forto  had  at  thia  lime  been  Betiousl_v 
diminiahed,   owin);  to  an  outbreak  of  glanders  whieli  destroyed  half  tbe 


i)6 

cuuld  eahiJy  avoid  tiie  Brit'iHli  lorce,  while  the  remaiuder  of 
the  Mullah's  mounted  men  would  be  enabled  to  raid  the  Ishak 
country  up  to  the  coast. 

On  the  7th  June,  a  detachment  of  100  rifles  and  1,400 
wpearnieu  was  sent  southwards  from  Bohotle  to  separata 
the  Mullah  from  some  of  hia  outlying  encampments. 

On  the  lOth  June,  Eisaldar -Major  Musa  Fara.h  reported 
his  arrival  at  Kuriiiis,  ']7  miles  to  the  S.M.W.  of  Darror,  where 
he  effected  a  jimc-tion  with  the  1,500  men  mentioned  in  the 
preceding  paragraph.  He  stated  that  he  had  capttired  1,450 
camels,  and  had  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  services  of  some 
400  Ishak  horsemen,  and  that  he  had  despatched  300  rifles 
and  the  same  number  of  spearmen  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 
To  prevent  any  chance  of  Muea  Farah'a  separated  force  being 
attacked  by  overwlielniiiig  numbers  of  the  enemy,  Swayne 
decided  to  move  towards  him  with  1,250  rifles,  three  maxima, 
and  two  guns. 

At  this  juncture,  His  Majesty's  Government  decided  to  send 
a  small  force  of  Indian  troops  to  act  as  a  garrison  at  Berbera, 
and  on  6th  June  a  telegram  was  sent  to  the  Consul-General 
of  the  British  Central  Africa  Protectorate  ordering  a  detach- 
ment of  60  Sikhs,  under  a  British  Officer,  to  be  despatched 
from  Chindc  by  the  first  available  steamer. 

On  the  10th  Jime  Swayne  left  Bohotle,  and  on  the  night 
of  the  11th  effected  a  junction  with  the  advanced  poition 
of  Risaldar-Major  Musa  Farah's  levies  at  a  point  20  miles 
south-west  of  Bohotle.  The  united  force  then  returned 
to  Bohotle, 

On  the  11th  June,  a  raiding  party  of  the  enemy's 
forces  attacked  and  captured  a  caravan  of  Government 
camels  Ijrin^ng  provisions  to  Bohotle  from  Burao,  under 
an  escort  of  50  tribal  horsemen  and  200  spearmen.  The 
escort  lost  32  killed,  besides  a  number  of  wounded.  The 
attack  took  place  at  Baliwein  (28  miles  north-west  of  Bohotle), 
and  as  soon  as  the  news  reached  the  latter  post.  Major  Sharp, 
the  officer  in  command,  immediately  despatched  50  riflemen 


on  ponies  to  the  scene  of  the  disaster.  The  ponies,  however, 
became  exhausted,  and  the  force  was  compelled  to  return 
to   Bohotle   without   meeting  the   enemy. 

On  the  14th  June  fiity  aoouta  with  rifles,  accompanied  by 
ten  horsemen,  proceeded  towards  Damot,  and  on  the  following 
day  tliese  scouts  were  followed  by  the  main  British  force, 
with  the  exception  of  238  rifles  and  3CX)  spearmen  mjflsr 
Sharp,  who  remained  in  the  fort  at  Bohotle  to  take  charge 
of  the  reserve  of  supplies,  and  prevent  the  Mullah's  horse- 
men from  obtaining  water. 

On  the  20th  June  41  riflemen  and  a  number  of  spearmen 
were  sent  hack  from  Damot  to  reinforce  Bohotle.  During 
these  movements,  owing  to  the  presence  of  large  bodies 
of  horsemen  blocking  the  roads  northwards,  Swayne 
experienced  much  difficulty  in  conveying  information  to 
Berbera,  and  he  did  not  consider  it  advisable  to  weaken  his 
force  by  detaching  any  lai^e  bodies. 

The  Mullah's  encampment  and  followers,  who  had  been 
threatened  by  Swayne  in  his  advance  towards  Damot,  were 
now  driven  into  the  Haud,  but  although  they,  were  pursued 
by  two  separate  British  columns  for  25  miles  into  the  desert 
only  a  few  stragglers  were  captured.  The  latter  reported 
that  the  Mullah  was  at  Erigo  near  Mudug,  and  that  the 
tribes  were  so  distressed  for  want  of  water  that  numbers 
were  compelled  to  leave  the  Haud  and  proceed  north-east- 
wards to  the  Nogal. 

When  Swayne's  force  reached  Damot  it  was  found  that 
the  water  was  practically  exhausted,  and  there  was  not  suffi  - 
cient  to  enable  the  force  to  cross  the  desert.  He  therefore 
moved  north-eastwards  to  Las  Auod.  The  prisoners 
captured  by  patrols  confirmed  the  previous  reports  that  a 
large  section  of  the  Mullah's  tribe  had  left  the  Haud, 
and  was  marching  towards  the  Nogal,  eastward  of 
Beretabli,  and  it  was  further  ascertained  that  the  Mullah 
had  moved  from  Erigo  to  Rohr,  and  thence  north-eastwards 
1^  Eil-1 -Koran    preparatory  to     following   the  tribes.      On 


receipt  of  this  infoimation  Swayne  decided  to  proceed  east- 
ward to  Beretftbli  and  interpose  his  force  between  the  Mullah 
and  the  detacted  tribes,  with  the  object  of  attacking  the 
latter  fromthesouth  and  driving  them  in  a  northerly  direction. 

ConsefLuently,  the  Britiah  force  left  Las  Anod  on  the 
23rd  June,  and  arrived  at  Beretabli,  35  miles  to  the  east- 
ward, on  the  25th  June.  On  the  same  night  the  mounted 
infantry  and  camel  corps,  with  a  number  of  spearmen,  were 
detached  under  the  command  of  Captain  (Local  lieut.- 
Colonel)  A.  S.  Cobbe,*  to  attack  some  encampmenta  of  the 
enemy  reported  to  be  at  Gerrowei  (34  miles  further  east  of 
Laa  Anod).  Unfortunately  one  of  the  advanced  mounted 
patrols  gave  the  alarm  to  the  enemy,  and  Cobbe  was  unable 
to  overtake  them  until  they  reached  Yiwehil,  onthe  northern 
edge  of  the  Nogal,  when  the  enemy  lost  150  men,  i.OOO 
camels,  and  several  thousand  sheep.  The  casualties  in  the 
detachment  were  seven  men  killed  and  one  wounded.  On 
this  occasion  the  enemy  used  their  rifles  well  and  attacked 
boldly. 

Cobbe  rejoined  Swayne  at  Gerrowei  on  the  Ist  July, 
having  been  unable  to  proceed  further  owing  to  the 
exhausted  condition  of  his  ponies  and  camels^  and  to  the 
necessity  for  guarding  the  large  amount  of  stock  captured. 
On  the  following  day  Major  G.  E.  Phillips,  who  had  been 
sent  with  tliree  companies  to  Weyiweyteyn  (30  miles  south- 
east of  Gerrowei),  returned  to  the  latter  place,  having 
captured  a  considerable  number  of  camels  and  sheep,  and 
killed  25  of  the  enemy. 

The  whole  column  was  leasHembled  at  Gerrowei  on  the 
2nd  July,  where  Swayne  decided  to  await  the  rettim  of  the 
scouts  who  had  been  sent  out  towards  Halin,  and  to  get  into 


•  Captain  and  Local  lieu t. -Colonel  A.  8.  Cobbf,  D.S.O.,  lat  Battalion 
King'fl  Airican  Rifloa  was  Chief  Staff  Officer  to  Colonel  Swayne.  He  received 
the  Victoria  Crosa  (London  Gaif  tte,  20th  January,  1903)  for  his  gallantry  in 
woi'Iiing  a  njaxim  gun  and  in  aseietiog  a  wounded  aoldier  under  a  hot  fiie  at 


99 

touch  with  any  of  the  Mullah's  tribes  who  might  still 
be  dependent  on  watering  places  in  the  Nogal.  The 
occupatioa  of  Gertowei  had  brought  considerable  pressure  to 
bear  on  the  Haud  tribes,  but  owing  to  want  of  sufficient 
glazing  for  the  ponies  and  for  the  large  amount  of  captured 
stock,  Swayne  felt  obliged  to  move  again,  and  on  Bth  July, 
he  marched  to  Bihen.  During  the  previous  night  his 
scouts  returned  from  Beretabli  and  the  west,  and  reported 
that  the  tribes  drawing  water  from  the  Nogal  in  that  direction 
had  made  their  way  across  the  Haud  to  join  the  Mullah 
near  Mudug,  and  that  there  were  no  longer  any  tribes  in 
the  Nogal  district,  except  those  north  and  east  of  Gerrowei. 

Before  advancing  to  Mudug,  it  was  necessary  to  tate  MovemeiitE' 
steps  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  the  raids  from  Halin  and  the  ^^^  ""  " 
eastern  Nogal  into  the  Ishak  country,  as  these  incursions 
were  causing  considerable  unrest  amongst  the  levies,  owing  to 
the  danger  incurred  by  their  unprotected  families  and  pro- 
perty. To  clear  the  whole  of  the  eastern  Nogal  district, 
however,  would  take  considerable  time,  so  Swayne  arranged 
while  operating  in  the  Nogal  to  strengthen  Bohotle,  and  place 
a  fortified  post  at  Wadamago. 

On  the  7th  July,  the  main  column  left  Bihen  with  the 
object  of  clearing  the  Nogal  district.  It  was  decided  to 
advance  first  on  Halin  from  the  south-east  in  order  to  drive 
away  the  hostile  detachment  occupying  that  place,  and 
separate  from  the  Mullah,  who  was  at  that  time  located  neai 
Mudug,  any  hostile  tribes  who  might  be  encountered. 

Moving  vid  Kallis,  the  column  attacked  the  Nur  Ahmed 
and  Hassan  Ugaz  tribes  at  Hareyelahu,  and  drove  them 
in  the  direction  of  lUig,  capturii^  41  ponies.  After 
returning  for  water  to  Garserio,  Swayne  moved  to  Murr 
(lat.  8°  27'  N.,  long.  48°  53'  E.),  from  whence  two  columns, 
under   Major    Q.   E.   Phillips,*  R.E.,  and   Captain  Osborn, 


•  Major  G.  B.  Phillips,  E.E.,  D.S.O.,  w 

expedition.    He  waa  subsequently  killed  in  i 
(8937) 


9  second  in  cominuid  of  the 


100 


to  attacl^l 


King's  African  Rifles,  respectively,  were  despatched  to 
some  Nut  Ahmed  and  Mijjarten  encampments  which  were  in 
the  vicinity  of  Bohotle.  These  tribes  were  driven  northwards 
towards  Bandar  Easim,  and  a  number  of  live  stock  were 
captured. 

Swayne  then  moved  in  a  north  -  westerly  direction 
towards  Halin,  detaching  bodies  of  scouts  to  watch  all  the 
watering  places  on  the  southern  edge  of  the  Nogal,  and  to 
collect  information  regarding  the  Mullah's  movements. 

During  these  operations  the  transport  animals  sufiered 
so  heavily  owing  to  want  of  grazing,  that  1,000  casualties 
occurred  among  the  camels ;  the  losses  were,  however, 
made  good  from  the  numbers  captured  from  the  hostile  ■ 
tribesmen. 

Leaving  Afladigid  on  the  25th  July,  the  column  reached 
Lower  Halin  on  the  27th  July.  At  the  latter  place  the 
live-stock  and  baggage  were  left  under  a  strong  guard,  and 
a  detached  force  proceeded  the  same  night  to  Biyu  Gudud  and 
attacked  the  Naliya  Ahmed  and  Nur  Ahmed,  the  pursuit  being 
carried  into  the  plain  of  the  Northern  Hand  as  fat  as  Kol 
Dorran.  Some  guns  and  ammunition  were  captured  and  the 
tribes  fled  northward  towards  some  wells  about  50  miles 
from  the  sea.  The  whole  force  then  returned  to  Biyu  Gudud 
on  the  1st  August,  and  the  dervish  fort  at  Halin  (9  nules 
N.N.E.  of  Lower  Halin)  was  destroyed.  Scouts  were  sent 
to  Shilemadu  and  Bur  Anod  to  ascertain  whether  the  road  ■ 
to  Berbera  was  free  from  dai^er,  as  the  troops  at  this  time 
were  accompanied  by  a  considerable  number  of  live  stock, 
amounting  altogether  to  about  12,000  camels,  35,000  sheep, 
besides  cattle,  and  much  difficulty  was  experienced  in  pro- 
viding 80  many  animals  with  grazing  and  water. 

On  the  5th  August  the  column  arrived  at  Gaolo,  where 
Swayne  learnt  from  scouts  who  had  returned  from  Kallis  and 
Gerrowei  that  the  bulk  of  the  enemy's  cattle  had  been  sent 
to  the  neighbourhood  of  Kallis,  owing  to  the  Mullah's 
inability  to  keep  them  any  longer  at  Mudug.     It  was  further 


reported  that  100  Dervish  rilles  had  also  been  d 
Gerrowei  to  observe  the  movementa  of  the  Biitbh  force. 

To  meet  this  situation,  a  detached  column,  consiating  of 
500  rifles  and  a  maxim  gun,  under  the  command  of  Major 
G.  E.  PhilUps,  was  despatched  to  make  a  reconnaissance 
towards  Grerrowei,  BeietabH  and  HeU  Madu,  all  of  which  are 
distant  some  45  miles  from  Gaolo.  At  the  same  time, 
Swayne  proposed  to  work  back  towards  Las  Anod  so  as  to 
re-open  communication  with  Bohotle  and  Burao,  and  regain 
touch  with  the  Mullah.  This  plan,  however,  was  subject  to 
alteration  according  to  the  information  sent  in  by  Phillips. 

.  Between  the  5th  and  20th  August  the  foice  was  engaged 
in  a  series  of  operations  round  Gaolo,  along  the  northern 
and  southern  edges  of  the  Nogal,  with  the  object  of 
preventing  the  return  of  the  Mullah's  followers  to  water  in 
that  district.  On  one  occasion  a  detachment  encountered 
heavy  opposition,  being  attacked  by  a  iorce  of  about 
200  rifles.  Owing  to  the  overcrowding  at  the  wells  in  the 
vicinity  of  Mudug,  the  Mullah's  people  were  reported  to  be  in 
great  straits  for  want  of  water,  and  a  large  number  had  been 
forced  to  take  the  risk  involved  in  looming  towards  Las  Anod, 
in  which  position  they  blocked  the  communications  of  the 
British  force  with  Bohotle, 

As  the  general  scarcity  of  water  proved  very  trying  to  the 
large  number  of  men,  women,  and  children,  besides  animals, 
which  encumbered  Swayne'a  column,  he  decided  to  send  all 
surplus  hve-stock  to  Shilemadu  and  Haiuk,  escorted  by  100 
rifles  under  Major  Osborn. 

On  the  7th  September,  Swayne,  writing  from  Las 
Anod,  reported  that  the  road  to  Bohotle  was  still  blocked 
by  hostile  tribes,  but  that  Osborn's  detachment,  on  its  way 
to  Burao  in  charge  of  8,000  animals,  had  reached  Eurdab  in 
safety.  It  was  further  reported  that  Yusuf  Ali's  fort  at 
Galkayu  had  been  attacked  and  captured  by  a  portion  of  the 
Mullah's  forces,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  success  the 
ige  of  the   MuUah   had   considerably  increased   among 


102 

the  southern  and  western  tribaa  ot  the  Mudug  district. 
Information  had  also  been  received  that  several  large 
caravans  of  rifles  had  lately  reached  the  Dervishes  from 
Sultan  Oaman  Mahmud's  territoiy.  In  these  circumstancea, 
SwajTie  considered  it  necessary  to  cross  the  Hand  without 
further  delay,  and  so  prevent  the  Mullah  from  re-concen- 
trating his  scattered  tribes  aud  still  further  increasing  his 
importation  of  firearms  from  Mijjarten  ports. 

On  the  7th  September,  all  was  ready  to  cany  out 
this  offensive  movement,  and  Swayne  only  awaited  news  of 
the  arrival  of  the  half  of  the  2nd  {Central  Africa)  Battalion 
King's  African  Rifles  *  at  Bohotle  before  putting  his  plans  into 
execution. 

On  the  10th  September,  the  force  moved  to  Las  Anod, 
and  then  to  Tifali,  where  it  awaited  the  arrival  of  the 
expected  reinforcements  from  Bohotle,  under  Cobbe,  who 
had  been  sent  to  the  latter  place  to  make  arrangements  for 
bringing  on  the  half  of  the  2nd  Battahon  King's  African 
Rifles  and  the  detachment  of  60  Sikhs  from  Burao.  Mean- 
while, PhiOips  was  operating  in  the  Eastern  Nogal  in  the 
vicinity  of  Beretabli, 

When  his  force  was  complete,  Swayne  advanced  to  Baran, 
which  he  reached  at  the  end  of  September.  At  Baran  the 
British  commander  realized  that  so  far  as  the  state  of  affairs 
between  Yusuf  Ah  and  the  Mullah  was  concerned,  the  success 
of  the  latter  over  the  former  was,  as  regards  the  Mudug 
district  decisive  and,  considering  that  the  moment  was 
favourable  for  an  advance,  he  decided  to  march  across  the 
Hand  on  the  following  day.  Writing  from  Baran  on  the 
2nd  October,  Swayne  described  the  situation  as  follows  :— 

The  Mullttli,  whilflt  trying  to  find  a  way  out  of  his  graiing  and  water 
difficultioB  at  Mudug,  had  Bent  dGtaehmonts  to  negotiate  with  the  Hawiya 
in  one  direction,  and  with  the  Ogadeo  in  another.  The  latter  is  still  away 
in  the  direction  of  Faf,  but  the  former  has  met  with  opposition,  and  there 


103 


lias  been  Huycre  fighting  with  t'he  Uavriyo.  Guns  were  taken  and  lost  on 
both  sidea,  but  eventually  the  MuUoh  appears  to  have  had  considerably  the 
beat  of  it. 

Reports  vary  as  to  the  number  of  riflemeu  actually  with  the  Mallah 
at  Mtidug,  eeveral  detachments  being  away.  The  higheBt  estimate  ia 
1,200  riflemen,  with  a  large  number  of  spearmen.  Although  the  Mullah's 
siiceena  over  Yuauf  A]i  enabled  him  to  more  his  ponies  at  onoe  to  Oalkayu, 
where  they  managed  to  get  some  gracing,  a  very  large  number  have  died, 
and  out  of  aome  9,000  poniea  which  he  is  atill  reported  to  have.  I  think 
very  few  will  now  be  fit  for  work.  Tho  enemy's  transport  animals  and  live 
stock  have  Buffered  very  heavily,  and  he  has  too  few  oamela  fit  for  work  to 
move  his  encampments  away  from  Mudug. 

'IThe  (oroe  has  been  in  this  neighbourhood  for  23  days,  awaiting  the 
arrival  of  the  regolars  wbo  left  Sheikh  on  the  1 6th  September.  I  fear  that 
tlioy  must  have  been  delayed  by  tranapoct  ajid  bngg^e  difficulties.  Trona- 
poi't  ia  an  arid  region  like  this  presents  a  difficult  problem,  and  it  has  only 
been  posaiblo  for  me  to  move  lergD  bodies  of  men  about  owing  to  tho  fact 
that  not  an  ounee  of  food  has  to  be  carried  for  Somalia,  and  that  their  water 
allowance  ia  half  Uie  usual  amount. 

I  do  not  like  to  wait  any  longer,  as  the  scouts'  information  is  favourable 
for  an  advance,  and  the  recent  fall  of  rain  in  the  Haud,  whilst  giving  us  a 
cbttnco  of  finding  tain  pools  on  the  road,  will,  at  the  same  time,  preaontly 
relieve  tho  Mullah  of  his  difficulties  and  enable  him  to  carry  off  the  greater 
part  of  his  horses  and  live  stock. 

Major  Phillips'  detaclmients  has  been  brought  in  from  Beretabli, 
60  miles  distant,  and  I  expect  all  outlying  patrols  and  scouts  in  from  the 
Eastern  Nogol  to-mortow.  Some  Hut  Ahmed  who  attempts  to  descend 
to  the  eastern  edge  of  the  Nogal  have  been  driven  back,  with  loss,  by  our 
patrols.  Water  tanks  have  already  been  staged  forward  20  miles  due  south, 
and  I  propose  to  start  for  the  march  across  the  Haud  to-morrow. 

The  arrangements  on  the  lines  ot  communication  will  bo  as  follows  : — 
t  Sheikh. — A  small  masonry  blockhouse,  with  two  O-prs.  in  charge  of 

police  and  levies. 
:   BuTao. — A    strong    entrenched    post,   with  9-pre.   in  charge  of  a 

detachment  of  the  levy. 

At  Bvrddb.- — A  post  ot  observation  of  50  Somali  RiQes. 

At  BoJioUe.^A.   strong   masonry    blockhouse,   with   two  9-prs.   and   a, 

detachment  of  Sikhs  and  Somali  levies. 
[tBarim. — 75  Somali  Rifles  and  100  spearmen,  with  unfit  poniea  and 
spare  live  stock. 

.  besides,  a  strong  moKunry  bhiukhouae  at  Las  Dureh,  in 
|B  of  the  levies,  blocking  the  eastern  line  of  approach  to  Uerbera. 
"Should  the  men  of  the  reservo  battalion  arrive  to-morrow  in  time  to 
start  with  us,  I  would  take  them  on  and  leave  300  Somali  levies  and  600 
spearmen  to  operate  in  the  Eastern  Nogal  and  block  all  approaches.  Should 
'  e  troops  be  too  late,  I  would  leave  them  and  250  Somali  Rifles  at  Baran 
of  our  operations  from  Mudug  and  then  they  would  operate 


104 

in  Biioh  direotion  as  would  enable  them  to  get  in  on  the  Hulloh's  line  of       I 

rctreut. 

I   baiB   inf armed   Colonel     Harringtion   that   wo   laay    be    eonipelled 

t^  follow  the  Mullah  to  tlie  Webi,  and  have  asked   him   to   prepare   ths 

Abysaiiiians  for  this,  so  aa  to  avoid  misnnderataading. 

I  much  regret  that  throe- quarters  of  my  Camel  Corps  and  [luntes  ore 

at  pi'esiint  useless,  liut  hope  tJiat  they  will  shortly  pick  up  on  the  improved 

grazing  brought  about  by  the  recent  fall  of  raia. 

Caravana   of  riQes   still   eoatiuue  ba  roAch  the  Mullah.     The  frequent 

visit?  of  the  '  Perseus,'   and  her  recent  aucccas,  have,  however,  hod  an 

exeelient  effect,  and  the  dhow  tialBo  in  arma  is  practically  stopped  aa  far 

eastward  as  Gaxdoful. 

It  is  much  to  be  desired  that  these  lisits  should  continue  just  now,  and 

more  especially  that  the  Italian  coast  tie  not  left  for  any  length  of  time 

without  n  ship  of  war. 

On  the  3td  October  Swayne  began  his  march  across  the 
Haud,  and  nothing  was  heard  of  the  force  until  the  16th 
and  17th  of  October  when  Consul- General  Cordeaux 
telegrs.phed  the  news  of  an  engagement  which  had  taken  place 
at  Erigo  on  the  6th  inst,  The  fighting  had  been  severe, 
and  Swayne  was  retiring  on  Bohotle.  This  brief  account  was 
amplified  in  a  despatch  by  Swayne  who,  writing  on  his  return 
to  Berbera  gave  the  following  narrative  of  the  operations  ; — 

We  advanced  from  Baran  on  the  evening  of  the  3rd  October.  A 
priaooer,  tbis  day  brought  in  by  scouts  from  Mudug,  coufinned  previous 
information  aa  to  the  fcoquent  arrivals  of  caravans  of  arms.  Shortly  atler 
Baran  we  entered  very  dense  thorn  bosh,  and  this  continued  for  some 
35  miles  without  a  break.  On.  the  4th  our  scouts  aent  back  to  report  that 
thoy  were  in  pursuit  of  aonio  of  the  enemy's  horsemen.  On  the  morning  of 
the  6th  the  tracks  of  live  of  the  enemy's  scouts  were  found  on  our  left  flank 
and  followed  by  our  scouts.  Our  horsemen  returned  from  the  front  having 
come  upon  30  men  who  ran  into  the  thick  bush  after  losing  one  killed  and 
leaving  one  prisoner.  The  liitt«T  reported  that  the  enemy  was  moving  up 
in  strength  from  Mudug,  but  was  still  two  days  oS.  We  entered  a  clearing 
about  2  miles  wide,  and  in  the  evening  diverged  to  the  right  in  order  to  find 
u  clear  line  of  advance  which  prisoners  said  we  could  obtain  in  this  direction. 
However,  towards  4  p.m.  we  entered  very  dense  tush  and  camped  at  5  p.m., 
making  a  thorn  zariba.     This  place  is  called  Awan  Erigo. 

2.  At  night  a  distant  volley  was  heard,  and  in  the  morning,  shortly 
after  starting  from  camp,  our  mounted  men,  who  had  remained  some 
2  miles  to  our  front  during  tho  night,  reported  that  two  of  the  enemy's 
scouting  patrols  had  flred  into  each  other  by  mistake.  They  also  informed 
me  the  enemy  was  advancing  in  force  and  was  close  by.  We  were  iu 
oxfremoly  dense  bush,  so  I  decided  to  move  on  very  slowly,  hoping  to  Cud  a 


oluotiug,  wluL'li  v/an  uonildaully  ivportod  by  pcisouers.  After  about  2  uiilea 
however,  the  bush,  becoming,  if  anythmg.  denser,  our  uioiinteil  men  galloped 
in  to  say  the  enemy  waa  advancing.  A  halt  was  mode  and  our  fonnatian 
was  dressed  as  f ar  at^  the  dense  biuh  and  tJio  number  of  our  transport  eomels 
would  pennit.  Our  fonnation  was  three  Bides  of  a  sqviaro  round  the  trans- 
port, with  tliree  companies  closing  up  the  rear.  Our  people  in  treea  could 
sec  the  enemy'a  scouts  perched  in  trees  about  -100  yards  off. 

3.  After  waiting  for  some  tinie,  and  it  being  evident  that  the  enemy 
intended  to  wait  till  we  moved,  we  again  advanced  very  slowly.  Im- 
mediately  our  outlooks  reported  the  enemy  to  be  advancing  froia  all  sides 
and  in  two  or  three  minutes  the  firing  began — the  enemy  running  in  and  out 
amongst  (he  hushes,  firing  as  they  euno  and  immediately  men  and  camels 
began  to  fall.  The  rear  companies  stood  firm,  as  did  also  the  companies  of 
the  2nd  King's  Afrlean  Rifles,  two  of  whleh  were  on  the  extreme  right,  and 
two  companies  of  the  6tb  King's  African  Bifles  (Somalia),  on  the  left  of  the 
2nd  King's  African  BlUeB.  The  companies  on  the  left,  however,  fell  back 
on  the  centre  in  sudden  panic,  and  were  followed  by  one  and  a-half  com- 
panies of  the  front  fatie  ;  but  one  half  company,  whilst  the  retirement  waa 
going  on,  charged  to  its  front  and  drove  the  enemy  olf.  After  thin  another 
company  of  the  front  face  advanced,  and  the  companies  on  the  left  also 
returned  and  advanced  beyond  the  position,  I  then  proceeded  with  two 
companies  of  the  2nd  King's  African  RiSes  and  two  companies  of  Somalia 
and  cleared  the  ground  beyond  the  left  rear  corner  of  our  formation. 

4.  The  transport  camels,  had  all  stampeded  in  this  direction  owing  to 
the  noise  caused  by  the  hring  in  such  denae  bush,  and  some  tliouaand  camels 
with  water  tins  and  ammunition  boiea  jammed  against  each  other,  rushed 
away  into  the  jungle,  scattering  their  loads  everywhere.  We  drove  the 
enemy  away  from  the  loads  and  recovered  all  with  a  coat  of  only  two 
casualties.  In  tJie  evening  I  proceeded  with  one  company  of  the  2nd  fOng's 
African  Rifies  and  two  of  SomaUs  to  the  front,  driving  the  enemy  before 
UB  for  2  miles,  and  returning  with  some  1,300  of  oui  camels.  The  Somalia 
as  well  as  the  Yaos  behaved  very  steadily.  We  lost  only  one  man  wounded, 
although  one  was  killed  and  two  womided  in  the  zacabi  behind  us  owing  to 
the  high  firing  of  the  enemy. 

B.  I  regret  that  the  loss  of  the  maxim  gon  waa  not  reported  to  me  till 
lata  in  tlio  day,  and  although  every  search  was  made  we  never  reoovered 
it.  It  never  came  into  action,  as  the  men  carrying  it  dropped  it  on  the 
enemy's  sudden  attack. 

6.  I  very  much  regret  the  deaths  of  two  very  good  officers.  Uajor 
Phillips,  R,E,,  was  killed  whilst  rallying  his  men.  He  waa  at  the  time 
with  lieutenant  Everett,*  who  waa  then  wounded.  Captain  Howard" 
was  wounded  about  the  same  time.  Captain  Angus*  waa  killed  whilst 
serving  his  guns,  and,  after  his  death,  a  Somaii  gun  detachment  went  on 

•  Lieutenant  L,  W.  D.  Everett,  2ad  Battalion  Welsh  Regunent. 
Captun  T.   N.  S-  M,  Howard,  Weat  Yorkshire  Regiment,  Captain  J.  N. 


10(i 

svrving  a,  gun,  the  uCDmy  L'litu'giiiy  up  ao  close  that  their  rluthing  was  act 
na  fire  by  the  oaae  ahot.  We  loat  56  levies  and  43  truisporl  Epeannen 
killed,  and  84  levies  ajul  transport  were  wounded. 

7-  Within  a,  belt  of  20  to  25  yards  of  the  front  face  alano,  I  counted 
fl'2  bodies,  40  of  whom  were  recognised  as  Eajis  and  Miillaha.  The  six 
tesdcrs  of  the  enemy's  foree  were  killed,  and  prisoners  subsequently  taken 
reported  that  135  Dervish  riflemen  hod  been  killed,  as  alao  a  very  macb 
larger  anmber  of  xpewinen,  and  tliat  the  woimded  were  many.  These  prisoners 
reported  the  Mullah  himaeU  had  gone  back  to  hiirrf  up  reinforcements. 

8.  On  the  evening  of  the  0th  we  buried  the  dead  in  the  presence  of  the 
oMcers  and  ntade  a  zariba.  Bcouts  were  sent  out  and  located  the  enemy's 
scouts  on  the  further  side  of  a  small  clearing  some  4  miles  ahead.  We  made 
a  zariba  and  had  a  quiet  night.  My  information  was  that  Mudug,  the  only 
oertaia  water  in  front  of  me,  held  by  the  Mullah,  was  still  40  miles  off, 
some  30  miles  of  which  were  through  dense  bush.  Owing  to  many  camels 
having  been  shot  and  many  having  stampeded,  our  ttaOHport  was  very  much 
disorgoniacd.  We  could  not  fight  again  in  this  very  dense  bush  with  so 
much  transport,  nor  could  the  transport  bo  loft  where  it  was,  under  a  guard, 
whilst  we  advanced  t<i  Mudug,  becauBe  it  was  certain  that  before  our  return 
the  transport  column,  which  would  be  sure  to  be  watched  by  the  enemy, 
would  be  obliged  to  move  for  want  of  water,  and  would  inevitably  be  cut 
up  if  attacked  whilst  retiring  through  the  dense  bush.  I  therefore  decided  to 
get  the  transport  back  whilst  keeping  the  enemy  in  play  by  mounted  scouts. 

3.  Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  we  retired  about  6  mdea  to 
a  pool  of  ram-water,  called  Eil  Garaf,  ia  a  glado  about  6  miles  off.  The 
evening  of  the  7tli  was  occupied  by  strongly  entrenching  tin  transport 
over  tUo  water,  and  it  was  arraliged  that  a  column,  lightly  equipped,  con- 
sisting of  three  compoJiies  2nd  King's  African  Rifles  and  five  of  levies  should 
proceed  to  attack  the  enemy,  supposed  to  be  encamped  some  10  miles  off 
in  the  bush. 

10.  On  the  day  of  the  fight,  in  spile  of  the  sudden  panic  on  the  left 
and  along  the  greater  pact  of  the  front,  the  companiea  appear  to  have 
recovered  rapidly,  and  behaved  well  when  led  out.  During  the  7th,  however, 
Uie  severity  of  the  fighting  had  apparently  sunk  into  the  minds  of  the  men, 
and  on  my  msrching  out  with  the  column  on  the  morning  of  the  8tii,  the 
senior  officers  reported  to  me  that  they  could  not  rely  on  the  men.  Scouts 
reported  that  the  Mullali  was  making  ovory  endeavour  to  collect  reinforoo- 
ments.  Having  in  view  the  officers'  statements  as  to  the  unreliability  of 
tlieir  men,  the  very  great  disadvantages  encountered  in  bush,  where  often 
not  more  than  four  or  five  men  could  see  each  other,  oud  that  even  \Fith  out 
reduced  transport  some  400  camels  were  necessary ;  also  that  the  country 
was  unexplored,  and  it  was  impossible  to  actually  find  out  the  enemy's 
numbers  or  dispositions,  I  had  to  decide  wbether  I  was  j  ustified  in  taking  the 
I'uik  involved  in  an  advance.  Should  a  sudden  panic  occur  again,  I  don't 
think  I  could  have  saved  the  force  or  even  the  transport  camp  left  behind  us. 
Under  the  circumstances,  I  regretfully  decided  to  give  up  the  attempt,  and 
return  to  our  camp  in  the  open,  where  I  knew  we  could  repulse  any  attack. 


11.  Not)  knowing  how  hard  the  Mullah  had  boon  hit,  I  intended  to  wsit, 
howerer,  untjl  our  parties  of  scouta  had  been  abla  to  oolleot  reliable  informa- 
tion aa  to  the  enemy.  I  was  awace  that  we  could  always  repulse  the  enemj 
in  the  open,  and  it  was  necessary,  aa  muoh  as  possible,  to  diminish  the  cSeot 
of  the  retirement.  The  transport,  after  its  recent  exertions,  also  was  iiuitc 
unfit  to  march  fast  imtH  it  bad  had  rest,  and  there  were  many  wounded  to 
be  attended  to.  I  Boat  soouts  boolt  along  all  the  roada  t-o  see  that  they  wero 
clear  behind  lib,  and  to  examinn  an  altemativo  road  said  to  be  clear  of  bush. 
Having  heard  firing  lu  tho  buah  in  the  night,  scouts  were  sent  out  early  on 
the  9th,  and  I  moved  out  with  tliree  companies  of  Somalis.  It  turned  out 
only  to  be  firing  betweon  patrols.  Soouta  sent  out  on  the  8th  to  the  enemy, 
and  back  along  the  roads,  bad  not  returned  by  night. 

12.  On  the  10th  our  scouta  came  in  bringing  a  prisoner,  who  reported 
that  further  consignments  of  rities  had  just  reached  tbo  Mullah,  and  that 
men  were  coming  up  from  all  aide^,  but  could  not  bo  here  for  some  days. 
In  the  evening  the  scouts  sent  back  along  tho  road  lichiud  ub  reported  all 
was  clear,  and  that,  owing  to  tho  buah,  tbo  road  wo  had  eome  by  was  the 
only  practicable  one.  On  the  1  Ith,  arrangements  were  made  to  send  back 
all  sick  and  transport,  whilst  the  headquarter  column,  coneiating  of  threa 
componiGfi  of  the  2nd  Kiug'a  African  Ki&es  and  five  companies  of  Somalia, 
remained  behind  to  cover  the  retirement,  at  half  a  day's  distance.  The 
wounded  and  transport,  with  five  companies  of  leviea  and  the  bulk  of  the 
horsemen,  with  three  British  officerB,  left  at  nigbt ;  and  at  6  a.m.  the  next 
morning  the  headquarter  column  followed  slowly,  leaving  a  strong  party  of 
horsemen  behind  to  observe  and  liro  into  the  enemy.  We  reached  LaaSuban, 
near  Dam.ot,  35  miles  distajit.  on  the  night  of  the  I3lh,  and  there  found  the 
wounded  cohimn  encamped,  as  also  some  levies  sent  down  to  meet  the 
wounded  column  from  Bohotle.  Except  for  tho  last  3  miles  or  so  the  bush 
had  been  very  dense.  On  the  14th  both  columns  rested,  scouts  having  ' 
reported  all  clear  to  the  Boufh.  On  the  morning  of  the  15th  the  wounded  „  ,  „  ,,  , 
column  marched  oS  to  Bohotle,  followed  in  the  evening  by  the  heodquu'ter  ;f  Qr(,g  to 
column.  A  party  of  horsemen  was  left  at  Damot  to  follow  after  two  days  ;  Bohotle.  | 
scouts  were  also  left  to  stay  for  a  week.  We  arrived  at  Bohotle,  45  miles  i 
fromLosSuban.ontheovening  of  the  nth,  and  found  the  wounded  column 
had  arrived  all  well. 

13.  The  constant  importation  of  arms  has  brought  about  the  spread 
of  fanaticism.  When  I  was  ordered  out  in  January  lost  the  only  way  to 
put  B,  stop  to  raids  which  were  reducing  our  tribes  to  destitution  was  to 
organize  rapid  counter-raids,  and  this,  owing  to  the  urgency  of  the  case  and 
the  rapidity  of  movement  necessary,  and  the  waterless  nature  of  the  country, 
could  only  be  done  by  levies.  The  Mullah  was  driven  ont  of  our  Pro- 
tectorate and  all  our  tribes'  losses  were  gradually  recovered ;  but  the 
superstitious  awe  which  attached  to  the  Mullsib's  name  after  his  December 
and  January  raids  had  sunk  deeply  ulto  the  ntiuds  of  all  Somalis — how 
deeply  I  did  not  know  until  the  action  of  the  6th  October.  I  now  realise 
that,  evea  with  close  training,  most  Somalis  would  be  deeply  impressed  by 
the  Mnllah'a  name,  andcouldnotin  close  fighting bereliedupon>    The  am- 


I'luyniont  u£  rogiiiar  lruii|i3,  uii  tLc  other  Uftiid,  whilst  biiiiig  extremely 
ospcnsivo,  haa  very  many  drawbatka  in  this  diflluult  coimtrj. 

It  will  be  observed  from  the  above  narrative  tliat  the 

disorganization  of  the  transport  and  the  moral  effect  of  the 
severe  fighting  upon  the  Somali  levies  rendered  a  further 
advance  against  the  Mullah  a  proceeding  too  hazardous  to  be 
undertaken  without  further  consideration  of  the  situation. 

Although  it  was  found  impossible,  after  the  severe  fighting 
at  Erigo,  to  follow  the  Mullah  across  the  dense  waterless  bush 
to  Mudug,  yet  his  attack  was  repulsed  with  such  heavy  loss 
that  he  was  obliged  to  desist  from  further  attacks  ou  our  tribes 
and  to  retire  from  Mudug  to  Galadi  in  Itahan  territory  and 
the  country  to  the  westward,  where  he  remained  until  com- 
pelled to  move  by  the  advance  of  an  AbyBsinian  force  some 
nine  months  later. 

During  the  operations,  the  headquarters  of  the  expedition 
covered  some  1,500  miles,  while  detached  columns  marched 
a  considerably  greater  distance.  The  result  of  the  expedition 
was  that  all  the  losses  suffered  by  our  tribes  had  been  recovered 
and  some  1,600  camels  remained  available  for  rations  and 
transport  purposes,  while  the  enemy  had  sustained  a  loss  of 
1,400  casualties,  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners,  and  some 
25,000  camels  in  addition  to  a  large  number  of  sheep,  cattle  and 
horses. 


Preparations    for  the   Third  Expedition. — Brig.-Gbn. 

IW.  H.  Manning  appointed  Commander. ^Negotia- 
tions WITH  Italy.— Abyssinian  Cto-OPERATION. — Plan 
op  Campaign, — Control  of  Opehations  assumed  by 
THE  War  Office. — Organization  of  Field  Force. — 
The  Operations  .—Landing  at  Ocbia. — Advance  ow 
Force  from  Obbia. — Occupation  of  Galea  yd  and 
Galadi  by  General  Manning.  —  Lieut.-Colonbl 
Oobbe's  Reconnaissance. — Action  at  Gumburu. — 
Major  Godgh's  Reconnaissance.  —  Abyssinian 
Advance. ^Concentration  of  Force  at  Bohotle. — 
General  Manning's  Observations  on  the  Opera- 
tions— List  op  Casualties. 

The   action   at  Erigo   on  the   6tli   October,  1902,  and  the  Prepamtioi 

,-.,,„  ...  for  the  Ihii 

subsequent   retirement  of    Colonel  Swajme  s  expedition  to  eipeditjon. 

Bohotle  created  a  new  development  of  the  military  situation 

in  Somaliland.     It  was  feared  that  the  cessation  of  active 

operations  against  the  Mullah  would  probably  result  in  a 

general  rising  of  the  Dolbahanta,  and  it  was  clear  that  our 

levies,  though  loyal,  could  not  be  safely  depended  upon,  and 

that  if  decisive  results  were  to  be  secured,  it  was  necessary  to 

employ  regular  troops  for  conducting  the  campaiga. 


At  tbe  time  of  tlie  action  at  Erigo,  the  foUowing  tioopa 
were  in  Somaliland  under  Swayne's  orders : — 


Corps. 

NationaUtj. 

Strength. 

Ist  BatUlioa  Kiag-s  Afrii^an  Rifles   . . 
2ad  Battalion  King's  Airican  Riflea  . . 
«th  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles  . . 
T»(val  levies        

Sikh.  . . 
YaM.. 
Somalia 
Somalia 

fiO 

300 

500 

1,500 

Total 

2.3m 

with  two  7-pr.  (200  Ibe.)  and  bix  9-pr.  R.M.L.  guns. 

As  soon  as  the   news  reached  England,   reinforcements 
were  sent  to  Berbera  as  under  :^ 


Corps. 

NationaUty. 

Strength. 

Date  of 

-irrival. 

1  Bt  Bombay  Gransdiors*  (from 

Aden) 
1  SudBQeae  Company  of  the 

Indian 

274 

22nd  October 

Sudanese 

loot 

9tli  November 

3rd  Battalion  King's  African 

Rifles  (from  East  Africa) 

6th  Battalion  King's  African 

1001 

9th  November 

Rifles  (from  Uganda) 

1st  Battalion  King's  African 
BiBeH  (from  C^itral  Africa) 

SOSikha         J 

370 

37th  November 

2nd  Battalion  King's  African 

Yaos  . .         . . 

345 

27thNovMnboi 

Eiaea  {from  Central  Africa) 

Total 

1,180 

I     Aden  The  garrison  of  Aden,  with  a  view  to  poseible  calls  from 

[  ^"i^taK"^.  Somaliland,  was  reinforced  by  the  2nd  Bombay  GrenadieraJ, 
400  men  of  the  23rd  Bombay  Rifles||  and  a  field  hospital,  all 
of  which  sailed  from  Bombay  on  the  23rd  October. 

The  2nd  SikhslT  were  warned  for  service,  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  intimated  that  in  addition  to  that  corps  they 


Ill 


were  prepared  to  send  from  India  infantry,   camel  corps, 
mountain  artillery  and  the  necessary  lioapitala. 

Brig.-General  W.  H.  Manning,  Inspector-General  of  the 
King's  African  Rifles,  had  been  directed  on  the  4th  October, 
to  proceed  at  an  early  date  to  Berbera,  his  presence  there 
beir^  considered  necessary  in  view  of  the  importance  of  securing 
the  long  lines  of  conmiunication  at   a  time  when  Swayne  BrigadJer- 
might  be  engaged  in  carrying  out  a  forward  movement  against  m^"^^„ 
the  Mullah's  forces  at  a  distance  from  his  base.     Arriving  aiipointed  lo 
there   on    the  22nd   October,    General    Manning  forthwith 
strengthened  the  Berbera-Bohotle  line  by  sending  a  company 
of  tbe  lat  Bombay  Grenadiers  to  Sheikh  and  another  to  Burao. 

On  tbe  30th  October  he  was  informed  that  as  the  Govern- 
ment desired  to  consult  with  Swayne  regarding  future 
movements,  he  was  to  take  over  command  of  tbe  troops  from 
that  officer,  reorganizing  them  and  strengthening  the  lines  of 
communication.  Swayne  consequently  left  Berbera  for 
England  on  the  5th  November,  About  this  time  six  special 
service  officers  left  England  for  Somaliland,  and  at  General 
Manning's  request  the  force  was  reinforced  by  150  Punjab 
mounted  infantry,  with  two  British  officers,  who  sailed  from 
Bombay  on  the  22nd  November,  and  arrived  at  Berbera 
on  the  28th  November.  During  the  lull  following  the  action 
of  Erigo,  the  negotiations  between  the  Foreign  Office  and  NogotiatianB 
the  Italian  Government  which  ultimately  led  to  the  dis-  **''  *  ^' 
embarkation  of  a  British  force  at  Obbta  in  Italian  Somali- 
land  were  in  progress.  On  the  9tb  August  the  desirability  of 
attacking  the  Mullah  from  tbe  eastern  coast  of  tbe  Italian 
Protectorate  had  been  laid  before  the  Italian  Government, 
who,  though  disinclined  to  accept  the  suggestion,  proposed 
that  a  conference  should  be  held  at  Rome  in  order  to  examine 
the  situation  and  decide  as  to  what  should  be  done.* 


•  The  MarguMi  oj  Lanedoimt  to  M.  Fansa. 
yom  Eicellenoy,  Foreign  OfBce,  Anguat  Bth,  1B02. 

We  aio  moat  aaxious  to  bring  to  a  successful  conolnBion  the  operations 
whjcli  we  ftTo  now  carrying  on  against  the  Mullah  in  Somaliland,  and  our 


112 


On  the  IStli  September,  before  his  departure  for  England, 
Swayne  had  telegraphed  to  the  Foreign  Office  pointing 
out  the  importance  of  supporting  Yusul  AH  in  the 
Mudng,  and  snggested  that  a  force  of  600  Soudanese  and 
four  guuB  should  be  landed  at  Obbia.     He  waa   informed 

military  ndviacrs  axa  of  opinioa  tliat  in  order  to  secuie  our  object  it  may  he 
advisBble  for  us  to  further  atrengthea  onr  foroes.  We  have  accordingly 
added  io  them  a,  lefierve  of  about  360  men,  and  it  ia  suggested  that  we 
might  with  advantage  orgamso  a  small  expedition  from  the  eastern  oooat  of 
the  Italian  Frotootorate,  so  as  to  attack  the  Mullah  on.  more  aides  than  one. 
For  this  purpose   the  permission  of  the  Italian   GoTemment  would  bo 

Nothing  can,  however,  he  decided,  so  far  afl  we  are  concerned,  until  wo 
have  further  news  from  Colonel  Swayne.  In  the  meanwlule,  however, 
we  should  like  very  much  to  have  your  permission  to  find  out  whether  it 
would  be  possible  to  land  a  few  hundred  men  on  the  east  coaflt.  and  eapecially 
at  a,  place  called  Illig.  1  have,  therefore,  the  honour  to  oak  whether  the 
Italian  Government  would  have  any  objection  to  our  sending  a  ship  lo 
examine  the  oooet  at  this  point.  It  would  be  clearly  understood  that  for 
the  presait  we  ask  only  for  facilities  to  obtoin  information.  Should  ths 
result  be  encouraging,  and  should  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  a  divecsion 
of  the  kind  which  I  have  auggeated  ia  desirable,  wo  should  then  approach 
the  Italian  Govomment  with  a  formal  request. 

We  should  he  most  grateful  for  any  help  which  the  Italian  Government 
may  ho  able  to  give  us  in  this  matter. 

I  have,  &c. 
(Signed)  lANSDOWNE. 

Memorandvm  commuvicated  hy  M.  Carignani,  Av^'ist  251k,  1902. 
(Translation.) 

His  Italian  Majesty's  Government  have  taken  in  careful  consideration 
Lord  Lansdowne's  proposals  contained  in  the  note  of  the  !)th  instant, 
addressed  to  his  Excellency  M.  Pansa,  and  the  Memorandum  handed  by 
hifl  Lordship  to  M.  Catignuii  on  the  13th,  on  the  subject  of  the  pending 
military  operations  in  Somaliland,  viz.,  the  landing  of  a  few  hundred  British 
troops  at  Illig,  the  blockade  of  the  Jlijjarten  coast,  the  seizure  anrl  eventually 
the  burning  of  dhowa. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Italian  Government  these  measures  are  all  rather 
drastic,  and  the  aucceas  of  landing  troops  at  Illig  is  doubtful ;  morcorer, 
the  experience  of  the  past  haa  proved  the  inefficiency  of  the  otiier  measuTei 
above  mentioned,  and  the  actual  situation  in  Somaliland,  too,  might  render 
them  futile. 

The  Italian  Government,  however,  consider  it  advisable 
plan  of  action,  more  especially  aa  the  information  supplied 
Swayne  respecting  the  arms  now  in  the  Mullah's  posses.' 


iablo  to  prepare  k 
ipplied  by  Colonel     n 
ion  Mid  the  course     | 


that  the  advance  of  the  season  precluded  for  the  moment 

suoh  an  operation  from  being  carried  out,  but  that  it  would 
be  taken  into  consideration. 

On  the  lOth  October,  the  British  Government  suggested  to 
the  Italian  Government  that,  as  it  was  important,  before  coming 
to  any  decision  regarding  operations  based  on  th";  east  coast, 


of  the  operationa  does  not  altogether  agree  with  the  intoUigence  received 
in  Borne,  and  the  GoreriuuDntare  oxtlemelyonxioijs  an  to  the  tlanquiUitj 
of  tho  Bonadir  country,  which,  nntil  now,  lias  never  been  threatened  by 
tlie  Mullah.  For  this  purpose  the  Miuist^sr  for  Foreign  AlInirH  suggests  that 
a  CooferencQ  bo  held  at  Rome  in  September  next,  with  Sir  Benneil  Rodd, 
or  whoever  might  be  appointed  to  represent  His  Majesty's  Governracut,  at 
which  M.  Panaa,  who  will  bo  then  in  Italy  on  leave,  and  a  Ecpresentative 
of  the  Italian  Department  of  the  Navy  should  be  present,  in  order  to 
examine  the  situation  and  to  decide  as  to  what  shoidd  be  done. 

His  doeUency  M.  Prinetti  trusts  that  the  Marquess  of  Lanadowne 
vill  have  no  doubts  as  to  liis  desire  of  co-operating  with  the  British  Govem- 
mcut  for  the  purpose  of  patting  an  end  onca  tor  all  to  the  Mullah's  rebellion, 
with  dne  regard,  however,  to  Italian  interests  in  Somaliland. 

The  punitive  mission  of  His  Italian  Majesty's  ship  "Govemolo" 
sgainst  the  Mijjartens  has  been  carried  out.  The  culpabihty  of  Bandar 
Kaaim  and  Bandar  Ziada  in  the  trade  of  arms  has  not  been  proved ;  but 
Candala,  the  landing  place  of  Bandar  Khor,  conscious  of  giiilt,  maintained 
a  hostile  attitude  towards  the  "  Govemolo,"  and  was  bombarded  with 
effect.  The  Miijartca  complain  strongly  of  the  damage  which  they  allege 
t'olonel  Swayne's  expedition  has  inflicted  upon  them  m  loss  of  Ufe  and 
property. 

Italian  Embassy,  Laiidtm,  Aitguel  25th,  lOOS, 
Meinofaitdiim  communiealed  to  It.   Carignani  [lialian  Cluirgii  d'.-iffaiTe/j, 
October  l(Uh,  1902. 

His  Majesty's  Government  have  not  failed  to  give  their  earnest  con- 
wderation  to  the  proposal,  contained  in  the  Memorandum  commnnicatocl 
by  the  Italian  Embassy  on  the  25th  August  lost,  for  a  Conference  to  he  held 
between  the  two  Governments,  with  the  object  o£  examining  the  situation  of 
affairs  in  Somaliland,  and  deciding  on  the  course  of  action  that  might  moFit 
lirofitably  be  adopted. 

They  have  delayed  their  reply  to  this  proposal  in  the  hope  of  obtaining 
from  Hia  Majesty's  Conunissioner  in  Somahland,  who  is  at  present  in 
command  of  the  forces  operating  against  the  Mullah,  a  full  report  on  the 
military  Mtuation,  auoh  as  would  enable  tbcm  to  enter  a  Conference  with 
more  precise  knowledge  oE  the  existing  ciraumstances  ;  but  the  latest 
partioiUara  received  from  Colonel  Swayae  are,  in  many  respects,  too  meagre 
to  render  it,  in  their  opinion,  likely  that  a  Conference  at  (he  present  moment 
d  be  attended  with  practical  results. 
"»fl27)  .        --^  ^    g 


114 

to  ascertain  fully  the  capabilities  of  landing  places,  they  pro- 
poBed  that  a  British  man-of-war  should,  during  the  coming 
winter,  pay  a  viait  to  the  east  coast  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
examioing  the  porta,  eapecially  lllig  and  Obbia. 

The  Italian  Government  consented  and  in  company  with 
the    Italian    man-of-war    "  Voltumo,"    H.M.S.    "  Pomone " 


0  the  difficulty  which  haa  been,  and  which  rauat,  probably,  for 
some  time,  be  experieaced  in  aomjuunicating  with  tha  British  Commander, 
His  Majesty's  GoTernincnt  feel  pceoliided  from  putauing  foe  the  momen 
the  idea  of  orgajiixing  Bubeidiary  operations  from  the  east  coast  with  a  view 
to  hiB  BBfiiBtaaoD,  more  especiftlly  as  the  near  approach  of  the  raonaoon 
aod  the  lack  of  accurate  information  an  to  the  practicability  of  landing 
troojM  at  any  particular  point  of  the  east  coast,  renders  it  virtually  im' 
]iuKaitile  to  uadcrtaks  auch  operations  during  the  next  few  months. 

Ncvertbeleas,  His  Majesty's  Government  are  of  opinion  that  the  question 
of  facilitating  the  success  of  the  miUtary  operationa  againat  the  Mullah  by 
the  employment  of  a  force  landed  on  the  oast  ooaat,  tmd  having  its  base  at 
IHig,  Obbia,  or  aome  other  suitable  place,  should  not  bo  altogether  abondoned 
without  further  consideration.  Such  consideration,  however,  in  order  to 
have  any  practical  value,  must  bo  based  on  a  careful  study  of  the  local 
conditionB,  natural  and  mihtary;  and  His  tlajesty's  Government  think 
that  it  would  be  well,  as  a  neccsaary  preliminary  to  further  deliberation  [n 
the  matter,  to  ascertun  aa  fully  as  posaible  the  capabihtiea  of  any  tanding- 
placeB  which  might  be  available  on  the  east  coast. 

In  making  this  suggestion  His  Majesty's  Govonuuont  feel  confident 
tliat  the  Italian  Government  fuUy  realise  the  supreme  importance,  in  the 
inl«reats  of  both  countries,  of  aporing  no  eSorts  to  insure  the  complete 
suppreasiou  of  the  fanatical  moTement  which  ia  disturbing  the  tranquillity  of 
extensive  regions  under  Italian  protection  at  the  same  time  that  it  endaogora 
the  peace  and  security  of  the  British  Protectorate.  They  hope,  therefore, 
to  have  the  cordial  concairence  of  the  Italian  Government  in  their  proposal 
to  take  Buoh  preparatory  measures  as  would  allow  of  detailed  plans  being 
framed  for  facilitating  Colonel  Svrayne's  task — by  assisting  him  from  the 
eastern  coast — should  saoh  an  eventuality  at  a  future  date  recoinmead 
itself  to  the  two  Governments. 

His  Majesty's  Government  would  accordingly  auggeet  that  Mi  arrange- 
ment should  be  mode,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Italian  Government, 
under  which  a  small  British  ship-of  .war,  at  present  stationed  in  those  watws, 
should  pay  a  visit  during  the  coming  nint«t  t^  the  east  coast  for  the  solo 
purpose  of  esamining  the  ports,  especially  lllig  and  Obbia,  ivith  a  view 
to  ascertain  their  capabilities  as  landing-places  and  temporary  bases  for  a 
■  small  force.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  hoped  to  obtain  such  further  informa' 
tion  concerning  the  situation  in  Somaliland  and  the  movements  of  the  British 
espediljoo  now  in  the  field,  as  would  enable  His  Majesty's  Government — 
if  tlie  Italian  Government  agree — to  concert  with  them  precise  plans  for 


^i^ 


carried  out  thia  sorvey.  Besides  Illig  and  Obbia,  the  ports  of 
Merka,  Brava,  KiamaTU  and  Mogdishu  were  exanuned  by 
one  of  His  Majesty's  ships,*  but  that  of  Obbia  was  selected 
as  the  most  suitable,  its  value  being  greatly  enhanced  hom 
the  fact  that  Yusuf  Ali  offered  to  assist  us  there  with  6,000 
camels  and  300  mounted  scouts. 

While  providing  for  an  advance  against  the  Mullah  from  Abj-nainmn 
the  east,  the  desirability  of  preventing  hia  escape  to  the  west  f'-fperatjoB 
had  not    been   lost   sight    of.      Such   a   movement  on  his 
part  could  best  be  forestalled  by  arranging  for  an  Abyssinian 

fatare  oo-operation.  They  will  be  then  quite  prapMed  to  hare  tha  matter 
disouased  at  n  Conferenoe  of  British  and  Italiiitt  Representativea,  whetliBr 
at  Rome  or  in  London. 

The  Italian  GoTernment  can  rest  asaurcd  that  in  no  case  doea  His 
Majeat/a  Govemment  propose  to  take  any  action  on  that  part  of  the  east 
ooaat  which  19  under  the  protection  of  Italy,  except  with  her  full  ooDBcnt. 

M.  Pansa  to  tM  Marquess  of  Lanadoamt. — {Received  November  Itl.) 
(Translation.  I 
My  Lord,  Italian  Embassy,  London,  October  30th,  1903. 

With  reference  to  the  converaationa  which  I  had  the  honour  to  have 
vith  your  I..ordahip  regarding  the  affairs  of  Somaliland,  and  to  year  Lord- 
ship's Memorandum  on  the  subject,  dated  the  10th  ijiatmt,  I  hare  pleasure 
in  informing  you  that  I  have  to-day  receired  a  despatch  from  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Rome.  His  Excellency  aothorizes  me  to  communicate 
to  you  the  conaent  of  His  Majeaty'a  Gorecoment  to  a  Britiah  gnn-boat 
prooeedlng  to  lUig  or  Obbia,  aa  suggested  by  your  I^^irdship,  in  order  to 
make  a  pceliniinary  examination  of  the  possibility  of  lauding  troops  there, 
with  a  view  to  aa  eventual  dirersion  from  that  quarter  against  the  Mullah. 
The  Italian  Government  hare  also  directed  a  ship  of  the  Ro3ral  Nary, 
having  on  board  officers  acquainted  with  the  coast,  to  join  the  British 
gun-boat  and  assist  in  the  preliminary  inreatigatjoa.  lu  accordance  with 
^our  Lordship's  suggestion,  it  is  understood  that  this  investigation  shall 
not  prejudice  the  question  relative  to  the  desicabiUty  or  otherwise  of  the 
landing  of  troops  end  of  the  contemplated  expedition.  These  points 
will  he  considered  later,  according  to  the  ciroum stances  into  which  the  tno 
Governments  reserre  to  themselves  the  right  of  inquiring  in  due  comae. 

Meanwhile,  I  should  he  obliged  if  your  Excellency  would  inform  me  of  the 
date  on  whiuh  it  is  int*>nded  that  the  two  rossels  should  be  at  IUle  to  h^ii 
Iheir  PX[>Mlilinn. 


111.  *c. 


(Signed) 

t;Sv>   Captain  Bethell's  report  (Chapter  XIV,  4)  a 
IT  fol  th?  purpuac  of  diseuibsrUatioo. 


PANSA. 

1  the  advBntflges 


tioD  uf  Locul 


116 

force  to  occupy  the  Tug  Fafan  Valley,  and  on  IStli  November 
Lord  Cromer  was  requested  to  send  to  the  British  Agent  in 
Abyssinia  a  telegram  inquiring  whether  the  Emperor  Menelek 
would  consent  to  co-operare  with  us  and  accept  the  services 
of  British  officers  to  organize  the  force  and  direct  its  move- 
ments. On  13th  December  the  British  Agent  replied  that 
there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  arranging  for  Abyssinian  co- 
operation or  for  the  presence  of  British  officers  with  the  force, 
While  these  arrangements  were  in  progress,  Gi^neral 
Manning,  who  had  assumed  command  of  the  troops  in  the 
Protectorate  on  the  4th  November,  1902,  began  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  force.  A  supply  of  rations  was  forwarded  to  tha 
advanced  post  at  Garrero.  The  tribes  who  usually  brought 
in  camels  for  biro  were  approached,  and  a  large  number  ol 
animals  for  the  transport  of  stores  was  gradually  collected,  and 
by  the  5th  November  General  Manning  had  organized  a  flying 
column  at  Garrero  with  which  he  proceeded  to  Bohotle  on  the 
17th  November,  to  deal  with  any  attempts  oE  the  enemy 
to  interfere  with  the  lines  of  communication.  Bohotle  was 
reached  without  opposition,  and  most  of  the  levy  garrison 
there  were  relieved  and  sent  to  Berbera  for  disbandment. 
The  levy  companies  were  reorganized  as  follows  : — 
Moimted  Infantry  . .   150 


Camelry 
Infantry 


50 


. .  400— In  four  c 
. .  150 — For  garrisons   at  las 
Dureh,     Elkadalan- 
leh,  Shimber  Bexris, 
Lower    and    Upper 
Sheikh. 
By  the  30th  November,  when  the  reinforcements  had  arrived 
in  the  Protectorate,  the  strength  of  the  garrisons  of  the  posts 
on  the  Hnes  of  communication  from  Berbera  to  Bohotle  were 
laid  down  by  General  Manning  as  follows  : — 
Hargeisa. 
i  Company,  1st  Bombay  Grenadiers. 
1  Company,  Somah  Levies, 


I J  Company,  Ist  Bombay  Grenadiers. 
1 2  Gompames,  Somali  Levies. 

Garrero   and   flying   Column. 

1  Company,  lat  Bombay  Grenadiers. 
Detachment    1st    K.A.R.,     Indian    Contingent,    Britisli 

Central  Africa. 

2  Guns,  Camel  Battery. 
Detacbmeot,  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners. 
2nd  Battalion,  King's  African  Kifles. 

^^^B  1  Company,  Somali  Levies. 

^^H  Bohotle. 

^^^P 1  Company,  1st  Bombay  Grenadier?. 

Detachment    Ist    K.A.R.,    Indian    Contingent,     Britbii 
Central  Africa. 

During  this  period  the  Mullah  gave  no  signs  of  activity,  re- 
ports from  spies  showing  him  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  Galadi, 
probably  awaiting  the  next  move  on  our  part.  The  nature  Conraea  of 
of  this  movement,  regarding  which  GL-neral  Manning's  views 
had  been  obtained,  was  the  subject  of  several  meetings  of 
representatives  of  the  Foreign,  India  and  War  Offices.     Three 

Irees  of  action  had  come  under  their  consideration : — 
1.  The  defence  of  the  Protectorate  without  attempting 
further  offensive  operations  against  the  Mullah, 
2.  Further    operations   against   the   Mudug,   where     the 
Mullah  had  taken  up  his  headquarters. 
3.  Operations  against  the  Mudug,  combined  with  a  tem- 
porary occupation  of  the  Webi  Shebeli. 
Of  these,  the  second,  subject  of  course  to  the  consent  of  the 
iwilian  Government  to  our  moving  a  force  through  their 
Protectorate    and   the    Emperor    Menelek's    willingness    to 
M)-operate,  was  now  decided  upon. 
I.  Briefly  the  plan  was  as  follows  : — 

\  A  force  was  to  advance  fromObbia  and  occupy  the  Mudug.  PknoE 
ined  there  by  a  column  from  Bohotle,  a  mobile  column  '^'""I'^S" 


I 


hom  the  combined  force  would  be  organized  to  pursue  the 
MoUah  into  the  interior.  Meanwhile  a  body  of  Abysainians, 
5,000  strong,  accompanied  by  two  British  officers,  would  have 
reached  the  Tug  Fafan  in  order  to  prevent  hia  retreat  in  that 
direction. 

On  the  6th  December  the  Foreign  Office  handed  over  the 
military  and  financial  control  of  the  forthcoming  expedition 
to  the  War  Office,  stipulating  that  political  questions  were 
Htill  to  be  dealt  with  by  them  and  that  a  Committee  of  repre- 
sentatives from  the  Foreign,  India  and  War  Offices  should  sit 
at  the  War  Office  to  discuss  details  and  ensure  Foreign  Office 
consent,  the  accounting  of  the  expedition  to  be  carried  out 
by  the  Indian  Accounts  Branch.* 

On  the  16th  December,  the  result  of  the  Conference  at  Rome 
being  known,  it  was  decided  at  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  to 
proceed  with  the  Somaliland  expedition,  using  Obbia  and 
Bcrbera  as  bases  of  operations.  It  has  already  been  mentioned 
that  such  a  Conference  had  been  suggested,  and  during  the 
second  week  of  December  it  met  and  considered  the  proposed 
plan  of  action.     A  memorandum,  drawn  up  by  Sir  B.  Rodd, 


•  On  the  10th  December,  a  diatribution  Bta,tement  s 
under  (JenBral  Manning  tci  be  composed  of  ; — - 
BlitiBh  Officers         


md  -aos). 


BritUh  Non-commiS8ioned  Officers 
Hospital  ABBistants 

IRegnlar  troopB  (Alricon  and  Indiai 
6th  K.A.R,,  M.I„  and  So]ii«li  I,ovi 
Total     . . 
ArtiUBTy— 
C  9-poimders. 
4  7-poundera  of  200  ibs. 
II  Maiira  giina  (■4£ 
Animals — 
1(!G  riding  camels. 
348  ponies. 
eO  muleB. 
1,4U  truiBport  onimala  (EXtO  fit,  iCA  ii 
ith  four  monthi'  aiipplie>9  for  the  irholo. 


H.M.  Charge  d' Aflaires  at  Eome,  Lieut. -Colonel  E.  A.  Altliam, 
A.Q.M.Cr.  (Intelligence  Division),  and  Mr.  Eyre  Crowe,  o£  the 
Foreign  Office,  was  considered  by  the  Italian  representatives, 
and  upon  it  certain  formuliB  were  prepared  by  Sir  B.  Rodd 
and  laid  before  the  Italian  Miniater  for  Foreign  AfEaiis,  and 
on  the  tollowing  day  he  consented  to  its  tenm.  In  doing  ao,  n^]^^,, 
however,  he  urged  that  it  should  be  impressed  upon  the  co-operntiu, 
General  Officer  Commanding  the  Obbia  force  how  strat^- 
eally  and  politically  important  it  was  to  cut  the  Mullah  off 
from  the  south,  and  he  recommended  that  the  advance  on  the 
Mudug  should  be  so  directed  as  to  force  the  Mullah  to  retite 
either  north  or  west.* 


*  Tht  Marqiisea  of  Lanadoione  Id  Sir  S.  Rodd. 
(Ejttraot.)  Foreign  Office,  December  6th,  1902, 

In  my  deaptttoh  of  the  8tli  October,  I  stated  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment would  be  ready  to  enter  into  a  oauference  with  the  Itahan  GoTemment 
in  regard  to  the  situation  in  Somalilood  as  soon  as  they  have  received 
Biifflcient  infommtioa  to  ensblo  them  to  do  so  with  a,  fiiU  knowledge  of  the 
local  conditions  on  the  north-east  coast  of  Africa. 

The  results  of  the  inspection  carried  out  by  H.M.S.  "  Pomone,"  and  the 
Italian  vessel  of  war  "  Volturno,"  enable  them  now  to  enter  such  Conference 
and,  in  accordance  with  the  wish  of  the  Italian  Oovernment,  experts  have 
been  placed  under  orders  to  proceed  at  once  of  Rome  to  assist  you  in  the 
disoiiBsions,  in  which  you  will  bo  guided  by  the  following  instructions  .'^ 

It  seems  clear  that,  upon  whatever  scale  operations  against  the  Mullah 
are  undertaken,  we  cannot  predict  with  certainty  that  they  will  result  in  hia 
captore.  He  may  even  deny  ufl  an  opportunity  of  trying  conclusions  with 
him,  and  of  inflicting  on  him  eii:BmpIary  defeat.  In  these  ciroumstances 
our  object  must  be,  if  possible,  to  take  some  step  which  will,  at  any  rate, 
strike  a  blow  at  the  Mullah's  prestige,  restore  our  own  authority,  and 
perhaps  oompel  him  to  eome  to  terms  with  us. 

It  is  admitted  that  these  objects  are  most  likely  to  be  obtained  by  the 
occupation  of  the  Mudug  oasis,  and  that  this  can  be  most  conveniently 
effected  by  a  column  using  Obbia  as  its  base. 

Although  we  are  preparod  to  bear  the  chief  burden  of  the  expedition, 
yet  we  do  not  regard  the  struggle  as  one  in  which  British  interests  and 
responsibilities  are  alone  at  stake,  and  we  rejoice  to  find  that  within  certain 
limits  tfae  Italian  Govenunent  are  prepared  to  co-operate  with  us.  We 
cordially  appreciate  the  permission  to  land  a  force  at  Obbia,  which  that 
Government  are  ready  to  give.  We  also  regard  with  satisfaction  the]propoBal 
that   ItaUan    oBicej's  should  accom]>any  tlie  Mudug    force,    which   might 


.  these  arraagements,  it  was   decided  that 
the  force  in  Soma'iland  should  be  composed  as  followa  ; — 
ObUa  Force.    Total,2,^9G. 
From  South  Afiica : — 

1  Company  British  Mounted  Iniaatry  (141). 
1  Company  Boer  Mounted  Infantry  (100). 


furtbor  be  strengtbened  by  the  addition  of  a,  cert^u  number  of  men  in  tlie 
emploj'ment  oE  the  Italian  Govenunent. 

Aa  soon  as  Mudug  is  occu[iied  tliere  will,  no  doubt,  be  aa  opportunity, 
in  the  Lgbt  of  any  eiperienoe  that  may  have  bean  gained,  to  issue  further 
iuatructionit  to  the  officer  oommonding. 

It  may  be  useful  for  your  guidance  in  the  negotiations  to  add  some 
obaerTationa  upon  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  expedition  to  which,  an  at 
present  advised,  we  look  forward.  This  must,  of  course,  to  b.  large  extent, 
lie  governed  by  circumetancea  to  which  I  aball  briefly  advert,  but,  in  any 
case,  we  contemplate  Anally  a  resumption  of  the  march  in  a  aortberly 
direcUon  to  our  own  Protectorate,  and  ultimately,  at  the  conclusion  of  tho 
operations,  to  Berbera. 

How  soon  it  may  be  wise  to  leave  Sludug  must  depend  upon  our  success 
In  getting  touch  with  the  enemy  during  our  advance  on  that  place  or  upou 
our  arrival  there.  In  that  case,  wo  may  bo  able  at  once  to  inflict  the 
neoeasary  punishment  upon  him.  It  would  then  be  poaaibla,  if  such  a  course 
recommend  itself  to  the  ItaUan  Government,  to  restore  Yusuf  Ali  to  the  ooii- 
trol  of  the  district  under  their  authority  before  we  more  on  to  tho  north. 
For  this  purpose  it  would  be  neoeasary  to  provide  him  with  a  fort,  suitable 
annnmeut,  and  sufficient  supplies,  so  that  he  would  be  strong  enough  to  hold 
his  own,  and  to  deny  Mudug  to  the  Mullah  should  the  latter  reappear  on 
the  scene.  In.  this  event,  however,  it  would  seem  to  be  indispensable  that, 
at  any  rate  until  it  could  be  seen  whether  an  arrangement  could  be  come 
to  with  the  Muilah,  Yusuf  Ali  should  receive  a  certain  amount  of  support. 

I  have  indicated  the  later  conduct  which  we  contemplate  tor  the  eipedi- 
tion  in  the  event  of  oiu:  suocesaftiUy  xmnishing  the  Mulloh  in  tho  eoursB  of  out 
advance  upon  Itludug.  It  is,  however,  very  possible  that  he  will  have 
removed  hia  cattle  from  the  oasis  and  will  retire  in  front  of  ua,  ao  that  we 
cannot  being  him  to  an  engagement  or  inflict  serious  damage  upon  his 
herds.  In  that  caae  it  may  be  necessary  for  the  espedition  to  remain  a 
longer  time  at  Mudug,  whilst  small  forces  of  mounted  troops  aweep  the 
surrounding  country.  Even  so,  he  may  escape  punishment  at  our  bands, 
and  we  shall  have  to  be  content  with  an  imopposod  march  through  the  heart 
of  hia  country  to  our  own  Protectorate.  Though  a  defeat  of  the  enemy 
would  be  much  more  useful,  we  may  hope  that  even  this  operation  *ill  have 
a  salutary  eScct  in  destroyiug  hia  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  his  followers  and  of 
raising  oor  own.     (Vc  should  be  ready  to  take  all  reasonable  precautions 


FromBerbera : — 

1  Company  Punjab  Mounted  Infantry  (150). 
King's  African  Rifles  (550). 


to  [irevent  injury  to  Italian  interests,  which,  it  must  be  temembered,  cannot 
but  greatly  gain  by  Any  check  wMoh  our  military  operations  may  ijinioao 
upon  the  growing  power  of  the  Mullah. 

SifR.  Jloddlathe  Marqitus of  Lanedoicni. — (Bixdved Daemha  IGi/i.) 
Jly  Lord,  Rome,  December  llth,  1903. 

Aft«r  a  proliminary  meeting  with  the  SlinistorB  of  Foreign  Affairs,  War 
Waiine,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  Italian  army  on  the  evening  ot  the 
9th  inftsnt,  it  wa^  arranged  that  Colonel  Altham,  Mr.  Crowe,  and  myself 
should  meet  yesterday  morning  the  Director  of  the  African  section  of  tho 
Foreign  Office  and  two  staff  officers  from  the  War  Office  and  tho  Ministry  of 
Marine  respecttvely. 

After  a,  somewhat  eihauatiye  diseuasion  of  the  situation  in  Somalilonii 
and  the  proposed  plan  of  action,  it  was  suggested  that  we  should  draw  up  a 
memorandum  setting  forth  the  considerations  which  we  had  laid  before  them, 
for  their  further  deliberation  with  the  Minister  (or  Foreign  AffaiiH,  I  have 
the  honour  to  enclose  herewith  the  summary  statement  which  was  then 
drawn  up  before  we  separated. 

In  tho  afternoon  Colonel  Altham  and  Mr.  Crowe  had  an  interview  with  the 
Administrator  ("  Amministratore  Delcgato")  of  the  Benadir  Company 
in  the  presence  of  the  Italian  Staff  Officers  and  the  Director  of  the  African 
section  of  the  Foreign  Office. 

I  have,   &.C. 
(Siguedl  EENNELL  RODD. 

MemoTandv-in. 

The  power  of  the  Mullah  is  a  growing  one,  which,  if  left  unchecked,  will 
certainly  menace  not  only  the  whole  hinterland  of  the  ItaUan  Protectorali', 
bat  also  the  north  of  British  Hast  Afj'ica.  The  British  Government,  having 
carefully  considered  all  posiible  modes  of  action,  have  decided  that  under 
present  conditions  only  two  lines  of  action  ore  practicable  : — 

(I)  To  remain  on  the  defensive  within  the  limit  of  our  own  Protectorate, 
leaving  the  Mullah  free  to  extend  his  power  in  the  interior,  that 
is  to  say,  in  the  ItaUan  sphere  of  influence  ; 
.  (2)  To  strike  an  immediate  blow  at  bis  influence  by  the  dispatch  of  a 
strong  column  to  Mudug  from  Obbia. 

Madug  is  at  present  the  hose  from  which  the  Mullah  is  operating,  and, 

according  to  our  information,  the  majority  of  his  force  consista  of  tribes 
who  are  not  disposed  to  quit  the  vicinity  of  Mudug  and  Bohotle.  The  loss 
of  lifudug  would  not  only  greatly  lower  the  prestige  of  the  Mullah,  but,  in 
U  probability,  diminish  his  force  to  very  small  proportions,  in  which  ease 
f  Tovld  cease  to  be  a  serious  political  danEfr  to  the  Protoot orates  of 


122 

From  India  : — 

Bikanir  Camel  Corps  (200). 
1  Section  Native  Mountain  Battery  {'2  guns). 
1  Company  Sappers  and  Miners. 
2nd  Sikhs. 

1  Native  Field  Hospital  and  1  Section  British  Field 
Hospital. 


two  coonUieB.  It  ia  anticipated  that  a,  gruat  proportion  of  his  oattte,  the 
ohief  wealtli  of  tliB  country,  will  be  taken  there. 

It  IB  hoped  that  vx  opportunity  will  bo  found  of  defeating  the  Mullah 
in.  the  vicinity  of  Mudug.  But  in  the  least  favourable  case  of  the  Mullah 
avoiding  on  engagement,  his  power  and  prestige  would  be  considerably 
broken  by  the  occupation  of  his  base,  and  hia  separation  bom.  the  bribes 
upon  whose  support  he  now  depends,  who  would  then  be  reduced  to  sub- 
mission. In  the  event  of  the  Mullah  withdrawing  north  or  west,  there 
would  be  reaBonable  hope  of  the  Mullah  being  eventually  captured. 

In  the  ovenl  of  his  withdrawing  south,  he  would  appear  in  tho  form  of 
a  disoredited  leader,  and  would  be  extremely  imlikely  t<i  be  able  to  raise 
again  a  fresh  foUowiug  sufficient  in  strength  to  tbroaton  seriously  the 
Benadir  Settlementa  or  the  British  posts  on  the  Juba ;  and  it  is  not,  there- 
fore, considered  that  the  advanee  on  Mudug  is  likely  to  result  in  the 
Mullah  Hubaequentiy  becoming  a  menace  to  those  regions,  in  the  security  of 
whioh  Hia  Majesty's  Government  are  naturally  concerned. 

It  is  contemplated  that  a  column  from  the  force  occupying  Mudog 
should  pursue  the  Mullah  in  his  retirement ;  the  extent  of  such  pursuit 
must,  of  course,  depend  upon  circumstances,  such  as  the  amount  of  water 
obtainable  in  the  direction  of  his  retreat.  The  operations  of  this  oolvuLa 
would  be  of  a  nature  to  intercept  any  communications  between  tho  Mullah 
and  his  followers  in  the  north,  who  could,  in  the  meanldme,  if  necessary, 
be  dealt  with  by  the  Protectorate  force. 

Other  forma  of  attack  have  been  fully  considered,  but  it  has  been  liniUly 
decided  that,  owing  to  climatic  conditions  and  other  limitations,  if  any 
action  other  than  defensive  be  taken,  tJie  Obbio-Muddug  scheme  is  the 
only  course  available. 

The  exclusively  defensive  scheme  must  aUnost  inevitably  have  most 
serious  results  in  the  future  for  both  Governments.  The  utuatiuu  in 
Somaliland  is  closely  analogous  to  that  which  existed  in  the  Soudan  after 
tho  establishment  at  the  influence  of  the  Mahdi.  His  Majesty's  Government 
then  tried  for  many  years  a  defensive  policy,  which  led  to  so  great  an  inorease 
of  the  Mahdi's  power  that  a  series  of  campaigns  on  a  large  scale  bad  to  be 
undertaken  before  he  was  linally  crushed.  The  Mullah  is  undoubtedly 
following  in  the  Mahdi's  footsteps ;  he  has  already  conceived  large  designs 
of  absorbing  all  Somaliland,  and  eventually  building  up  an  omjHre  in 
North-Bast  Africa. 


Berbera  Force.    Total,  1,745. 
Flying  Golumn  of  the  Protectorate,  consisting  oE  the  Sikh 
cootiageat,  Ist  Battalion  King's  African  RiBea,  and  the  2nd 
Battalion  King's  African  Rifles  ;  total,  650. 


Politically,  therefore,  immediate  action  aeemsnecesaary,  and  while  it  ia 
imponaible  to  elimiaate  Brory  imtavourable  ohoJioe,  the  plan  submitted 
appears  to  the  STilitary  Advisora  of  His  Majesty's  Qovemment  to  nffpr 
the  mitiimuin  xuik  having  regard  to  all  the  ciroiunstauoea  of  the  oose. 
Rome,  Deoembar  10th,  1003. 

Sir  R.  Rodd  lo  the  Miirqiie^s  of  Liiisiawne.~{Receiviid  December  2WA.t 
My  Lord,  Rome,  December  I7th,  1002. 

I  have  the  honour  to  transmit  hiu-awith  copy  of  the  note  whirh  I  ad- 
dressed to  the  MiuLsttr  for  Foreign  AJIiuca.  placing  on  record  tho  undcr- 
slauding  arrived  at  with  regard  to  the  disembarkation  of  British  troops  at 
Obbia,  and  also  eopy  and  trauslation  of  the  note  which  hia  Exeellejiey  has 
addressed  to  me  in  reply. 

I  have.  &f. 
(Signed)  EENNELL  RODD. 

Sir  R.  Rodd  lo  M.  Prinetli. 
M.  la  Ministre,  Rome,  December  IBth,  1B02. 

With  ceference  to  tho  conforeuces  wliich  we  have  held  on  the  situation  in 
British  and  Italian  Somaliland  arising  out  of  the  action  of  the  Mullah,  I 
have  tile  houour  to  plaice  on  reoord  aud  to  submit  for  your  Excellenoy'ii 
approval  and  agreement  the  following  considerations  -.^ 

The  consultations  which  have  taken  placo  between  Colonol  Trombi  and 
Commander  Count  Filipponi,  acting  on  behalf  of  the  Italian  Governmeat, 
on  tlio  one  hand,  and  Lieut. -Colonel  Althont  and  Mr.  Crowe,  on  behalf  of 
ilia  Itfajesty's  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  have  resulted  in  an  under* 
Standing  tipon  the  following  basis  :  — 

1'he  oiaot  route  to  be  followed  in  the  advance  from  Obbia  on  Mudug 
and  the  disposition  of  the  troops  employed  in  this  advanoe  must 
neoesBarily  depend  on  the  latest  inteDigenoo  of  the  enemy.  The 
final  decision  on  these  points  must,  therefore,  be  left  to  the  discretiOD 
of  the  Commanding  Officer  on  the  spot ;  but  it  is  recognised  by 
tho  British  authorities  that  it  is  strategically  and  politically 
important  to  cut  tho  Mullali  off  from  the  south.  This  view  would 
be  impressed  on  the  General  OfBcer  Commanding  the  Obbia  force, 
and  he  would  bo  instructed  to  cndDaTour  to  make  such  disposition 
of  his  troops  in  advancing  on  Hudug  aa  would  be  likely  to  force 
the  Midlah  northward  or  westward. 
TliB  terms  of  this  understanding  have  received  the  approval  of  His 
Maj'^sly's  Principal  Secretary  of  Rtate  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


m 

lanes  of  Commoiucation,  BerbeTa-Boliot3e : — 
From  India: — 

1  Pioneer  Repment  (737). 

3  CompanieB  lat  Bombay  Gtenadieta  (300). 

1  Native  Field  Hospital. 
From  England : — 

I  Telegisph  Section  Royal  Engineeis  (68). 


These  points  being  establislied.  I  imderstood  that  I  am  authoriziNl  to 
inform  the  Mnrqiioss  of  Lonsdowne  that  the  Govoramcnt  of  His  Slojestj 
tlio  King  consent  to  the  disembarkation  of  a  British  force  at  Obbio. 
I  avail,  &c. 
(Signed)  EENNELL  RODD. 

M.  Prinetli  to  Sir  S.  Bodd. 

(Trnnalatian.) 

hi  1e  Chaig£  d' Affaires,  Rone,  December  16th,  1902. 

With  reference  to  jour  note  of  the  IGth  instant,  and  to  the  conferences 
which  we  have  held  on  the  situation  in  British  and  Italian  Somalilond, 
arising  out  of  the  action  of  tbe  Mullah,  you  did  me  the  honour  of  placing  oi: 
record  and  submitting  for  my  approval  and  agreement  the  following  can- 
si  derations  ; — 

The  (.-onsultations  whicli  hare  talton  place  between  Colonel  Trombi  and 
Conunandcr  Count  Filipponi,  acting  on  behalf  of  the  Italian  Gorerrunent, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Lieut. -Colonel  Altham  and  Mr.  Crowe,  acting  o 
behalf  of  Hia  Majoaty'fl  Government,  on  tbe  other,  have  resulted  in  an  under- 
standing upon  the  following  basis : — - 

The  exact  route  to  be  followed  in  the  advance  from  Obbia  on  Mudug, 

and  the  disposition  of  troops  employeU  in  this  advance  must  nocea- 

sarilj  depend  on  the  latest  iii1«lligBnce  of  the  enemy.     The  final 

decision  on  these  points  must,  therefore,  be  left  t«  the  discretion 

of  the  Commanding  Officer  on  the  spot ;  but  it  is  recognised  by  the 

British  authorities  that  it  is  slxategicaUy  and  poUtically  important 

to  cut  the  Muilah  oB  from  the  south.     The  importauce  of  this 

view  would  bo  impressed  on  the  General  Ofllioer  Coinman^ng  the 

Obbia  force,  and  ho  would  be  instructed  to  endeavour  to  n 

Buoh  disposition  of   his  troops  in  advancing  on  Mudug  as  would 

be  likoly  to  force  the  Mullah  northward  or  westward. 

Tbe  terms  of  this  underHtandJog,  according  to  your  note,  have  received 

the  approval  of  His  Majeaty's  Principal  Secretary  of  State  tot  Foreign 

A (loirs. 

These  points  being  eatablishcd,  you  understand  that  you  are  authorised 
to  inform  the  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  that  the  Government  of  H"'"  Majesty 
the  King  consent  to  the  disembarkation  of  a  British  force  at  Obbio. 

I  have  taken  note  of  this,  and  I  lose  no  time  in  informing  you  tliat,  b 


Tiie  troops  from  Iii(Ha  and  Africa  were  to  be  despatcTied 
a3  soon  as  possible,  bringing  witli  tbem  500  rounds  of 
ammunition  per  rifle,  500  per  gun,  and  30,000  rounda  per 
machine  gun,  6  montlis'  supplies  and  obligatory  mule  trans- 
port (Indian  troops).  From  Soutb  Africa,  in  addition  to  cobs 
for  the  Eiitish  and  Boer  Mounted  Infantry  Contingents*  and 
50  per  cent,  spare,  400  ponies  and  400  mules  with  saddlery 
were  to  be  sent.  Arrangements  were  also  made  for  the  supply 
of  the  following  stores  :— 2,400  water  tanks,  8,000  yards  of 
barbed  wire  in  lengths  of  100  yards,  500  buckets  {for  draw- 
ing water  from  wells)  with  5,000  yards  of  rope,  canvas 
watering  troughs,  portable  pumps,  canvas  water  bags  for 
troops,  light  axes,  seta  of  heliograph  apparatus,  and  other 
stores. 

General  Manning  was  directed  to  occupy  Obbia  aa  soon 
as  possible,  whence  it  was  hoped  that  the  movement  on 
the  Mudug  would  be  feasible  about  the  end  of  January, 
He  was  informed  that  he  would  be  accompanied  by  ItaUan  imiian 
officers  wbo  would  arrange  for  the  future  administration  of  J^'JJ,,'*'*" 
the  Mudug  after  its  occupation,  and  that  in  advancing  there 
he  should  endeavour  to  force  the  Mullah  northward  as  the 
Italian  Government  were  anxious  that  he  should  not  be 
driven  to  the  south.  Lastly,  he  was  told  that  the  Emperor 
Menelek  had  been  asked  to  place  a  blocking  force  of 
Abysainians  to  prevent  the  enemy  retreating  in  a  westerly 
direction,  and  that  on  account  of  monsoon  difficulties,  the 
base  at  Obbia  would  have  to  be  evacuated  not  later  than 
early  in  May. 

Detailed  instructions,  in  amplification  of  the  Secretary  of 


accordance  with  the  terms  and  Btipulations  whith  constitute  tho  unilpr- 
standing  MTived  at  by  the  tcclmical  BeprDsentatiTea  o{  both  coiutriea,  the 
Royal  Govotunent  conaents  to  the  disembarkation  of  a,  British  force  at 


Obhia,  who  aball  take 

I  request  you 
of  Lnnsdowne. 


a  that  point  against  the  Mullah. 

the  Bubstimce  of  the  above  to  the  MarqQFHi 


I  huTD,  Ac. 
(Siiincd)  PRINETTI. 


12(5 


State  for  War's  t«Ipgram  were  sent  to  General  Manning  an  the 
18th  December  by  direction  of  the  Commander-in-Cliief*  to 

the  following  effect : — 
Brig.-SeDernl        ^'  Withreference  to  Ihe  above  telegram  (Sacretary  of  SUte  for  War's  tole- 
UanninE'a        gram  nf  1  Ttb  December,  1902),  I  am  to  Btal«  that  tha  object  of  jour  operationa 
nBlnictioiii,     ehould  primarily  be  the  expulsion  of  the  Mullah  from  tbe  oasis   of  llitdug. 

which  baa  formed  the  base  of  bia  recent  raids  on  the  Somaliload  Protectorate. 

3.  The  Italian  Government  have  made  it  a  condition  of  their  assent  to 
the  diaembarkatioQ  of  a  force  of  His  Majesty's  tioope  at  a  port  within  the 
Italian  sphere  of  influenoe,  that  so  for  as  the  miUteiy  situation  will  pramit, 
the  direction  ond  diatcibutiou  of  the  troops  in.  their  subsequent  advance  on 
Mndug  should  ain\  at  preventing  the  BliiUah  from  retreating  southward 
into  the  Webi  Shobell  valley.  His  Majesty's  Government  have  accepted 
this  condition,  aa  it  is  obvious  that  the  retirement  of  the  Mullah  into  the 
Webi  might  result  in  bis  ultimately  becoming  a  serious  menace  not  only 
to  the  Itaban  Protectorate  but  also  to  the  Jubaland  province  of  British 
East  Africa,  The  details  of  your  final  dispositions  for  the  advance  from 
Obbia  to  Mudug  must,  however,  depend  on  your  latest  intelligfoice  as  to 
the  enemy's  movement-e,  and  Bie,  therefore,  left  entirely  to  your  discretion. 

4.  If  the  Mullah  should  be  driven  from  the  Mudug  or  should  retire 
therefrom  withoot  contesting  your  aeiinre  of  that  district,  you  should 
endeavour,  if  Uie  conditions  of  the  country  and  of  your  force  permit,  to 
pursue  him  with  mounted  troops ;  bat  this  pursuit  should  not  be  pushed 
to  any  greater  distance  than  four  or  five  days'  march  to  the  south  or  wost- 

6.  The  Italian  Govermnent  are  onxions,  if  possible,  to  establish  at 
Mudug  some  form  of  administration,  and  with  a  view  to  tfua  it  has  been 
agreed  between  His  Majesty's  Government  and  the  Italian  Government 
that  an  Italian  oSicer  will  accompany  your  advance  from  Obbia  as  political 
officer.  Probably  it  would  be  found  expedient  to  reinstate  TuBut  Ali  at 
Mudug,  aiL'I  to  assist  him  in  making  his  position  there  secure  for  the 
future  i  bnt  as  to  this  you  should  be  guided  by  the  views  of  the  Italian 
political  officer. 

6.  Tou  will  be  good  enough  to  report  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
your  occopation  of  Mudug  and  the  results  achieved  by  that  ocoupation, 
with  a  view  to  further  instructions  being  issued  for  your  subsequent  gnidance, 

7.  It  is  lioped  that  an  Abyssinian  force,  accompanied  by  two  Eritisb 
officers,  will  occupy  the  eastern  Abyssinian  frontier,  and  thus  act  as  a  stop 
to  the  Mullah  should  he  retire  in  that  direction.  You  will  be  intomied, 
however,  by  telegram  later  if  the  Emperor  Mencluk  consents  to  carry  out  this 
nrrangenient. 

R.  You  will  bear  in  mind  that  as  the  south-west  oiDnsoon  will  make  the 
use  of  Obbia  as  a  port  dangerous,  if  not  impracticable,  after  the  end  of 
April,  it  will  be  necestiary  to  embark  all  troops  and  stores  left  at  that  bam 
before  that  dafc^     The  Commander-in-Chief  considers,   however,   that  It 


*  Field  Marshal  Eatl  Itoberts. 


will  probably  be  desirable  that  tbe  Obbia  column  Bhould  not  return  to  the 
;  should  marcb  tlu-oiigh  the  country,  rid  Bohotle,  on  Berbopa. 
His  Lordship  ie  of  the  opinion  that  thia  niovpmettt  is  likelj  to  liiiTe  a  Bttlutary 
effect  OQ  the  tribes. 

9.  His  Majesty'ti  Government  attach  much  importance  to  the  oonstma- 
tion  of  good  roada  imd  the  hnprovemcnt  of  water  Gupplioa  by  the  Bioking 
of  wells  in  the  Proteotorate,  espucinlly  on  the  northern  fringe  of  tha  Hand, 
It  is  believed  that  If  the  oountry  is  opened,  up  by  these  m.ejuiB,  a  feeling  of 
scom'ity  will  be  engendered,  and  the  maiiitenBJii:e  of  internal  order  much 
facilitated.  For  thia  reason  it  has  been  decided  to  place  a  Pioneer  Regiment 
on  the  linen  of  communication  from  Berbera  to  Bohotle  in  lieu  of  the  Bombay 
KMeB  and  the  remainder  of  the  Bombay  Grenadiera  originally  proposed  by 
you.  You  flhould,  therefore,  impress  the  importonce  of  this  worh  strongly 
on  the  Officer  Commanding  the  troops  in  tha  ftotcctocate.  The  work  is 
to  be  taken  in  hand  immediately  oa  the  arrival  of  the  Pioaeer  Regiment 
from  India.  The  direction  of  the  roads  ronatnrcf^^d  and  the  sites  chosen 
for  sinking  wells  must  be  aelectpd  primarily  having  rogard  to  military 
considerations  ;  but,  subject  to  this  limitation,  tha  permamint  development 
of  the  Protectorate  must  be  carefully  borne  in  mind.  On  this  point  you 
sbonld  consult  with  Hia  Majesty's  Acting  Commissioner  for  the  Protecbiratc. 

10.  Finally,  I  am  to  remind  you  that  on  the  termination  of  iba  opora- 
teons  it  will  be  desirable  that  the  British,  Indian  and  the  greater  portion  of 
the  African  troops  should  return  to  their  normal  stations.  You  will,  there- 
fore, consider  carefully  what  should  be  the  strength  and  composition  of  the 
future  garrison  of  the  Protectorate,  and  you  will  report  fully  your  views  on 
these  points  tor  the  consideration  of  Hie  Majesty's  Government. 

On  tlie  same  date  the  Secretary  of  Stat«  for  India  was 
requested  to  hold  in  readiness  for  immediate  emharkation 
the  troops  of  the  Indian  Contingent,  wliile  it  was  desired  that 
the  Pioneer  Regiment,  which  was  required  for  duty  on  the 
Berbera  line  of  communication,  to  replace  the  advanced 
troops  about  to  be  sent  to  Obbia,  might  be  sent  to  Berbera  at 
once. 

On  ihe   23rd  December,  after   it   had  been   ascertained  ludio 
from  General  Manning  that  the  base  at  Obbia  would  be  ready  "'"'  " 
for  the  reception  of   troops  on  the  7th  January,  1003,  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  India  was  informed  that  the  Indian 
contingent  should  be  denpatched  so  as  to  reach  there  as  early 
as  practicable  after  that  date. 

Instructions  regarding  the  despatch  of  the  British  and  South  Africa* 
Boer  Mounted  Infantry  from  South  Africa  were  telegraphed  *^ 
on  the  17th  December  to  the  General  Officer  CouunaiKliiig  the 


contingent. 


128 

Transvaal  and  Orange  Eivcr  Colony,  and  he  was  desired  to 
report  their  probable  date  of  arrival  at  Obbia. 

On  the  17th  December  also,  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  telegraphed  to  Lieut. -Colonel  Harrington, 
H.M.  Representative  at  Adia  Ababa,  desiring  him  to  inform 
the  Emperor  Menelek  that  operations  against  the  Mullah 
(rom  the  east  coast  would  begin  in  about  three  weeks'  time, 
and  that,  in  consequence,  it  was  desirable  that  he  should 
take  atepa  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  retiring  to  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Abyssinia. 

The  proposal  to  send  two  British  officers  to  Berbera  in 
anticipation  of  Emperor  Menelek's  approval,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  accompanying  the  Abyssinian  force  was  mentioned, 
On  the  17th  January  a  reply  was  received  from  Colonel 
Harrington  which  stated  that  Emperor  Menelek  had 
issued  orders  for  a  contingent  to  be  prepared  for  use 
in  the  event  of  the  Mullah  approaching  the  high  country 
and  had  arranged  to  strengthen  the  Abyssinian  posts 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Somaliland.  The  suggestion 
that  two  British  officers  should  accompany  the  Abyssinian 
force  was  approved.  Colonel  A.  N.  Kochfort,  C.B.,  Royal 
Artillery,  and  Captain  (Local  Major)  E.  P.  Cobbold,  Reserve  oi 
Officers,  had  been  selected  for  this  duty,  and  were 
awaiting  instructions  at  Aden.  They  were  directed  to 
proceed  forthwith  to  Harrar  to  discuss  matters  with  Ras 
Makonnen.  These  officers  reached  Harrar  on  the 
9th  February,  and  were  joined  on  the  13th  by  Dr.  C.  Martin  of 
the  Eurmah  Uncovenanted  Medical  Service,  who  had  been 
detailed  by  the   Indian   Government  to   accompany  them. 

The  principal  steps  connected  with  the  mobilization 
of  the  troops  for  operations  in  Somaliland  have  been  related 
above,  but  in  addition  to  these,  many  other  arrangements 
had  to  be  made  before  the  force  could  be  said  to  be  in  a  con- 
dition to  take  the  field. 

Detailed  information  regarding  these  points  will  be  found 
in  the  chapters  dealing  with  organization  oi  commands  and 
Unes  of  communication,  services  and  departments. 


129 


On  the  22nd  December,  1902,  the  transport  "  Hatdari,"  Tiie 
carrying  the  following  troops  *  : — 

Officers 19 

Punjab  Mounted  Infantry  . .         . .  150 

1st  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles, ,  350 

3rd  Battalion  King's  African  Riflas . .  98 

5t!i  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles. .  102 

L  719 

^B  2  9-pr.  guns. 

^^  5  Maxim  gun^. 

with  six  months'  stores,  sailed  from  Betbera.  This  force' 
'which  was  under  the  command  of  Major  P.  A.  Kenna,  V.C., 
D.8.O.,  2lBt  Lancers,  was  to  disembark  at  Obbia  and  there 
form  a  base. 

Major  Kenna  received  the  following  instructions  : — 

The  objMts  oE  the  laodinR  are  us  Jrflowa  :^ 

1. — (o)  To  protect  Yuauf  Ali  and  hia  peoijlr,  aa  far  as  posaihle,  from 
rqids  by  th«  Mullah. 

(6)  To  acranne  tot  the  fnpply  of  transport  animals,  c^mela  and  ponies, 
for  the  nsj  of  ao  eipeditiou  proceeding  from  Ohbia  tn  tho  ioterior. 

(c)  To  establish  a  bnse  for  an  expedition  laodin?  from  India  or  elsEwhera 
proceeding  to  the  interior. 

{d)  To  obtdiD  auob  supplies  as  cnn  hi  bought  for  tliB  nsi;  of  thn  expedi- 
tion, such  IB  grain,  cattle,  sheep,  foraee. 

(r)  To  obtiiin  such  information  as  to  routeu,  water  supply,  grazing,  &c., 
aa  will  be  of  srvic?  to  the  foica  advancing  to  tho  interior. 

2.  The  for'*,  immediately  on  landing,  will  entrench  itself  as  stronely 
as  posaiblo,  and  will  mount  two  9-pi'.  guns  And  all  masiiuH.  a  strong  zariba 
ihoold  be  made  round  the  eulrenohraent,  and  every  pro'iantioo  aBainat  a 
■UTfffiBo  attsclr  should  be  made.     Too  much  reliance  cannot  bf  plB:ied  upon 

*  The  following  also  embarked  on  tha  "  Haidaci "  ; — 

Press  cortespondenta         2 

Hospital  Assiatanta            . .         . ,         . ,         . .  3 

Storekeeper            1 

Maxim  gun  carriers            . .         . .         . .         . .  Q2 

Public  followers 03 

Private          „         38 

Horses          9 

Riding  camels        .,         ..         -■         ■■         ..  11 
(8927)                                                                             I 


KIO 


fha  piopln  o'f  Yiuiif  Ali,  ftud  th?  itriutajt  prei-autioii:^  ehould  be  token  in 
dealing  with  tbe^a  pooplc.  Ni  Roaalis  ahoiilii  ba  pmnitted  bo  outer  tbe 
camci,  (uid  no  coliectiou  ot  peJple  should  bi!  allowed  in  the  virimty  of  tho 
camp.  All  dpalinga  vit'b  tb?  Somalia  will  be  tbroui;h  Yamt  All,  Strict 
ordurs  will  be  issued  that  oo  floldi>;ra  ol  t):o  force  are  to  enl«r  tliB  vilUges  of 
the  Somnlis.  The  il1-t>reatment  of  nativen  ay  so'.iien  ot  Uit>  Torco  u  to 
Iw  punishcil  with  sevoiity,  ea  in  hto  any  ijtorfecoD'W  with  *iv  wnraea  of 
the  country.  Siccp  the  sufiof»w  of  the  movement  will  depend  in  a  large 
Qjposuru  upon  the  ^ood  fcelinf;  «jtabb«hed  with  the  OAtiven,  evei}  endeavour 
Bhoulu4id  made  to  prevnt  [ri^tioti. 

3.  The  namen  of  those  oativea  wiUiog  to  aell  or  hire  camok  will  be  i.d1^, 
and  the  number  of  camela  .tr.tilable  noted  againot  their  namuB.  A  Ink  piice 
flbould  be  offered  for  oamclb  on  nnle,  'he  priee  paid  in  Berbera  ia  4I>  to  43 
tnpeei.  with  ropi»  and  herios  complctt,  the  price  maj,  however,  be  less 
in  Ob>ia.  Ponies,  wbieh  are  oonsidered  aa  likel;  w  make  good  Mounted 
Iniont^y  poniea,  nhonld  also  be  purchased  up  to  60  in  number.  The  price 
of  such  ponn-B  in  Becliera  vaiioii,  and  depeuds  upon  the  demand  Iroui  Adidn, 
hence  much  lower  prices  should  bo  cnrrBnt  in  Obbia. 

4.  Arranijementa  for  the  purchaao  of  grain  should  be  mad.',  provided 
that  it  can  be  properly  atoced.  Empty  bags  should  be  takin  from  Berbera 
£oi  the  purpose  of  storing  grain. 

6.  The  Intelligence  Ofiieer  must  lose  no  opportunity  of  obtaining  in- 
iormatioo,  and  should  prOieed  as  far  a£  compatihic  with  safety  along  routes 
leading  to  the  interior,  accompanied  bj  mounted  escorts  of  Yusuf  Ali's 
people.  A  tew  Sikh.i,  who  can  ride,  should  invariably  accompany  the 
lnt«Uigeiice  Officer. 

6.  The  force  will  not  attempt  to  engage  any  forces  oL  the  Mullah  unless 
threatened  by  attack  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Obbia  (By  the  immediate 
vioinil.y  la  meant  at  a  radiua  of  5  miles  from  Obbia.)  It  must,  however, 
bo  homo  in  mind  that  the  function  of  the  Obbia  foice  is  the  defence  of  a 
bane,  and  Ihat  itt  operations  muat  be  for  the  present  atriotly  defensive, 

•  7.  When  troops  ore  employed  in  drilling,  or  any  other  duty  outside 
tJie  fort,  strong  guards  nili  always  be  kept  in  the  fort ;  when  employed  on 
fatigues  outnide  the  foit.  men  will  invaiiably  carry  their  riflea  »lung,  and  a 
proportion  of  the  men  so  employed  will  alwai^  be  on  the  alei't  as  guard, 
EJlen  are  never  to  be  piled  When  in  the  fort  each  man's  rifle  is  to  be 
jJaoBd  at  the  spot  which  he  will  occupy,  should  the  fort  bo  attacked.  Men 
will  bltep  ttl  the  same  spot.  In  addition  to  the  garriHoorag  the  walla  ot 
the  lort,  on  iuijing  picket  uf  at  least  100  men  will  occupy  a  central  spot 
ill  tllB  fort,  to  be  used  as  a  reinforcement  at  any  point  where  it  may  be 
required.  Itflaorve  ammunition,  at  100  roimdn  per  man,  in  boxei,  will  be 
iaaued  to  «Hoh  company  nightly,  to  be  opened  and  distributed  in  case  of 
nttaoli,  Uid  will  be  returned  to  the  magazine  in  the  morning;. 

H.  'I'ht  Medwal  OlUoer  accompanying  the  force  will  causa  strict  orders  as 
li'  tuulUktiuu  to  bo  Msuvd.     The  water  supply  for  the  force  will   be  chusen 


131 


vary  carefully,  aiid   aucb  place  or  places  chown  aliould  be  cocetiilly  looked 
after  uid  enclowid  by  a  zariba,  a  guard  and  sentries  being  posted  by  day. 

9.  Since  a  large  Britieb  and  Indian  foroe  (1.600  approximBtely}  will 
be  loaded  at  Obbia,  »  good  cH-mpijig  lite  ohoold  be  eelected  tor  thii  toree, 
tho  proximity  to  water  supply  being  a  neoesBity. 

10.  The  Kite  having  been  chosen,  should  bo  marked  out  and  cleared 
fljjd  krpt  clean.  Wells  should  be  prepired,  and  ^  nkftoh  ot  tho  aiw  should 
be  made  and  handed  to  thp  Oflic?r  C-jQimftoding  troupa  oj  hia  ftrrivnL 

11.  All  pr"))B,rationB  Ihnt  van  be  made  with  the  matcrialB  available  fuf 
facilitntin);  iho  land.ina  of  troop')  tnd  storcn  at  Obb'a  nhould  bo  nndertitlcen 
at  once.  GoikI  ruiulB  from  thu  Ifuiding  plane,  to  both  I'ritiih,  Indian,  and 
baio  camp?  should  ba  made.  A  stock  of  firewood  should  be  punhued 
lUld  stored  imdor  n  guard  for  the  Indian  troops. 

12.  The  Officer  Commaiiding  Obbia  Fortf  will  takf  with  him  10,000 
mpcra  lor  eipenses.  All  payments  niiist  be  properly  vouched  by  signed 
receipts  in  duplicate. 

13.  A  diary  of  all  evpnts  occmriug  wil!  be  kfipt  by  the  ORcnr  Com- 
mending tioops,  and  will  be  posted  to  Berbera  for  the  informa.tion  of  the 
General   OfGcer   Commanding.   SomolQand   Field   Force,   aa    opportunity 

14.  Watfi-tins  taken  with  the  foroe  wJl  invariably  be  kept  filled  in 
the  camp,  sufficient  for  a  two  days'  supply. 

16.  Every  endeavour  should  be  made  to  purchase  spare  herioa  and  mpe 
for  oamel  loading. 

16.  Every  opporturxity  munt  be  token  to  practise  the  men  in  drill 
suited  to  fighting  in  thick  bush  country.  Great  attention  ia  to  be  paid  to 
fire  diacipline.     Fatigues  must  not  interfere  with  this  training. 

IT.  The  Intelligence  OfGcer  wiU  send  all  information  obtained  by  him 
to  Berbera,  for  the  information  of  General  OlScer  Commanding,  Somalilond 
Field  Force,  as  opportunity  offers. 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  disembarking  operations,  instruc-  Pia< 
tions  had  been  given  by  the  Admiralty  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  East  Indies  Station,  to  co-operate  with  General 
Manning,  and  with  this  view  three  cruisers  and  a  gun  boat 
had  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Senior  Nasal  Officer 
at  Aden.  The  "Haidaii"  reached  Obbia  on  the  26th 
December,  where  she  was  joined  by  H.M.S.  "  Pomone," 
which  had  left  Aden  with  lighters  on  the  22nd,  but  owing  to 
continuous  bad  weather,  the  work  of  disembarkation  occupied 
seven  days.  On  this,  aa  on  almoste  very  succeeding  occasion, 
the  landing  of  troops,  transport  and  stores  was  greatly  im- 
peded by  the  inclement  weather  and  the  unfavourable  nature 
(8927)  1  2 


132 


ol  the  spot  selected  for  the  disembarkation,  but  the  work, 
which  continued  without  interruption  till  the  last  transport 
was  cleared  on  the  16th  February,  was  admirably  carried  out 
by  H.M.  Navy  under  the  direction  of  Captain  Hon.  A,  E, 
Bethell,  Senior  Naval  Officer.     (See  Chapter  XIV.  i.) 

On  the  evening  of  the  3rd  January,  1903,  (Jeneral 
Manning  reached  Obbia,  and  on  the  next  day  landed. 

He  then  found  that  the  supply  of  camels,  aa  reported  in  the 
reconnaissance  of  H.M.S.  "  Pomone,"  was  not  forthcoming, 
and  it  was  evident  that  the  numbers  under  the  control  of 
Yusuf  Ali  had  been  much  over-estimated,  while,  to  znake 
matters  worse,  the  tribes  of  the  interior  declined  to  submit 
any  for  sale  through  that  chief. 

A  few  words  regarding  Yusuf  Ah,  Sultan  of  Alula  and 
Obbia,  in  explanation  of  the  obstructive  attitude  of  the  tribes, 
are  here  necessary.  This  peraonage,  who,  as  Governor  of 
Alula  had  fought  for  several  years  with  some  success  against 
Osman  Mahmud,  Mijjarten  Sultan,  concluded  peace  with  him 
in  1884,  when  he  turned  his  attention  to  Obbia.  This  place 
he  captured  by  surprise  with  only  50  matchlockmen,  and  an 
attempt  of  the  Hawiya  owners  of  the  settlement  in  1885  to 
expel  him  failed.  His  transactions  by  treaty  with  Italy 
have  already  been  alluded  to  in  Chapter  II.  With  the 
assistance  of  Italy,  Yusuf  Ah  extended  his  power  inland  over 
the  Hawiya  and  partly  over  the  Marehan ;  later  he  con- 
sohdated  this  extension  by  the  occupation  of  the  Galkayu 
Wells  in  the  Mudug  district,  and  by  the  construction  of  a, 
small  fort,  which  he  garrisoned  with  troops  armed  with  rifles. 

To  return  to  the  operations,  it  will  be  evident  from 
what  has  been  said  that  the  situation  at  Obbia,  with 
regard  to  the  question  of  camel  transport,  was  a  serious 
one.  Fortunately,  however,  the  arrival  there  of  transporte 
with  the  Indian  contingent  ofEered  a  partial  solution. 
Aa  soon  as  the  troops  had  been  disembarked,  the 
transports  were  sent  to  Berbera,  and  by  the  8th  Febmary 
had  brought  back  from  theie  1,000  camels,  which  had  formed 


I 


part  of  the  transport  of  the  troops  on  that  line,  and  were, 
without  much  difficulty,  replaced  by  hire  and  purchase.  In 
the  meantime  every  endeavour  was  made  to  induce  Yusul  Ali 
to  fulfil  the  promise  which  he  had  made  to  supply  500  camels 
by  the  end  of  January,  it  being  estimated  that  this  number, 
together  with  the  quota  from  Berbera,  would  enable  the 
force  to  advance.  In  these  negotiations  General  Manning 
-was  greatly  assisted  by  Count  Lovatelli,  the  Italian  Political 
'officer  with  the  Obbia  Force,  Captain  Finzi  and  Consul- 
General  Chevalier  F.  Sola,  who  had  arrived  from  Aden  ;  but 
promises  and  threats  were  equally  unavailing,  and  on  the 
39th  January  it  was  found  necessary  to  remove  the  recalci-  Yuguf  Ali 
trant  chief  and  his  son  to  Aden,  whence  the  Italians  aubso-  ''"*.'°°, 
quently  banished  them  to  Erythrea.  The  deportation  of 
Yusuf  Ali,  who  appears  to  have  been  in  league  with  the  Mullah 
to  place  every  obstacle  in  our  way,  soon  had  a  marked  effect 
on  the  attitude  of  the  tribes,  and  in  three  weeks'  time 
General  Manning  succeeded  in  procuring  locally  500  camels. 

On  the  14th  January,  while  the  arrangements  regarding  Lieuteiim 
camels  were  proceeding,  a  reconnoitring  force,  under  theQ^^°^*,j, 
command  of  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  8.  Cobbe,  V.C.,  32nd  Sikh 
Pioneers,  equipped  with  mule  transport,  was  despatched  to 
examine  the  route  to  Kine  Wells,  vid  El  Abelli,  an  advance  by 
which,  if  practicable,  woidd  place  the  Obbia  column  upon  the 
line  of  retreat  of  the  Mullah,  should  he  decide  to  fly  to  the 
south.*      Owing,  however,  to  lack  of   water  the  route  was  Po<*s 


ocoupied, 


•  Extraots  from  Field  Porte  Order,  No.  372,  dated  I2th  January,  1903 : — 
A  foroe  composed  as  under  will  proceed  on  a  recaimaisaance.  the  data 
and  hour  of  departure  to  be  notified  hereafter  ; — 

In  command. — Lieut.-Colonel  A.   S.   CoLbe,  VC->   I^t   King's   Aftioan 
Rifles. 

The  IntoUigonce  OfGcer,  Somaliland  Field  Force,  will  detail  an  offiter 
for  iolieUigencQ  work. 

The  Chief  Supply  and  Transport  Officer  will  make   arrangaments  for 
iply  and  transport  duties. 

B  Senior  Medical  Of&cer  will  dttail  a  medical  officer  to  Bccompany 
e  force  and  will  arrange  for  hospital  requiremonta  for  the  force,  in  com- 
(mnnication  with  the  Officer  Commanding  rt 


134 

found  to  be  unauitable,  and  the  intention  to  follow  it  was 
abandoned  in  favour  of  the  line  G  a  bar  we  in,  Lodobal, 
Bl  Dibber  and  Dibit,  all  of  which  places  were  occupied  by 
the  6th  February  as  posts  on  the  lines  of  communication. 

The  wells  at  these  posts  were  cleared  and  water  stored  in 
tanks  constructed  ol  tarpaulins,  and  aa  transport  became  avail- 
able sapplies  were  poshed  forward  in  anticipation  of   the 


2nd  Siths,  60  men  (from  a  Mohammedan  company). 
iBt  KEng'8  African  Rifles.  300  mHii. 
3rd  King's  African  Rifles,  75  men, 
5th  King's  African  Rifles,  75  men. 

Units  will  take  their  maxims  with  them  (2nd  Sikhs,  1  maiim). 
Reaerro  ammunition,  SO  counda  per  rifle,  carried  on  mules,  will  be  drawn 
in  bulk  from  ordnance  by  the  Officer  Commanding  force,  and  handed  over 

Barbed  wire  and  entrenching  tools  will  accompany  the  force.  Officer 
Crommanding,  Ist  King's  African  Bifles,  will  arrange  the  amount  of  wire  and 
tools  to  be  taken. 

If  sufficient  transport  is  available,  30  water  tins  will  be  taken. 

Allowance  for  officers'  baggage :  80  Iba.  per  officer  (to  ini-Iude  his  own 
Idt,  H  days'  rations  for  self,  7  days'  for  sprvant). 

Indian  aoldicra'  kit?,  5  lbs.  per  man. 

No  tents  will  Ire  (aken. 

Officers  will   be   allowed  ration 
horse,  rations  for  a  horse  and  syce. 

14  days  half  Indian  rat 
1  lb.  per  man  per  day  will  be  i 
in  lieu  of  half  rations. 

Indian  troops  will  carry 
cooked  (two  days'  rations  i 
filled.     African  troops  wiU  carry  one  < 
rations)  and  water  bottle  and  water  bag 

Transport  mulea  will  carry  ^  lbs.  grain  per  mnle  in  addition  to  160  lbs. 
load.  Grain  rations  only  will  be  carried  for  mules.  OfRaers  must  make 
arrangements  to  carry  their  horse's  grain  rations  on  their  horses. 

The  five  Somali  Camel  Corps  camels,  with  their  Sowara,  will  accompany 
the  force  and  will  carry  their  own  rations  and  camel  rations. 

The  Transport  Officer  will  arrange  that  transport  followers  will  oarry 
one  day's  rations  cooked  (two  days'  half  rations),  and  water  bottles  and 
water  bags  filled. 

All  troopi  and  Indian  pnblic  followers  will  take  two  canvas  water  bags 
per  man,  one  of  which  will  invariably  be  filled. 

No  natives  should,  on  any  preteit  whatever,  be  allowed  to  enter  the 
camp,  or  til  comp  within  the  lines  of  pickets  when  halted  by  day. 


,,  and,  if  entitled  t 


their  persons  one  day's  frill  Indian  rafjons 
half  rations),  water  bottle  and  water  bag 
rations  (two  days'   half 


135 


approaching  advance.  From  Dibit,  58  miles  north-west  of 
Obbia,  reponnaissancea  were  made  toward  Galkayu,  101  mileo 
distant,  to  the  north  of  which  place,  in  the  Galadi  district, 
the  Mullah  was  reported  to  be.*  The  result,  of  the  recon- 
naissances was  the  selectionof  the  route  to  Galkayu  vii}  Rhakn 
and  Wargallo,  places  which  are  37  miles  and  67  miles 
respectively  north-west  of  Dibit.  Several  intermediate  water- 
ing placea  were  also  occupied  before  the  arrival  at  Dibit 
on  the*  25tKT'ebruary  of  the  force  under  the  General  Officer 
Commanding. 

In  thia,  as  in  the  previous  expeditions  against  the  Mullah,  Wat«r 
the  question  of  water  supply  was  one  of  paramount  importance,  '"^^  ^' 
Not  only  did  it  limit  the  number  of  men  and  animals  composing 
the  force,  but  further  restricted  its  line  of  advance  to  one  where 
wells  could  be  found,  and  so  removed  all  possibility  of  intro- 
ducing into  the  conduct  of  the  operations  the  element  of 
surprise.  To  have  carried  a  supply  in  camel  tanks  and  so 
gained  some  freedom  of  movement,  would,  owing  to  the 
laok  of  sufficient  transport,  have  been  impossible,  and  in  order 
even  to  meet  the  requirements  of  a  force  adhering  to  a  fixed 


In  thick  bush  ccnmtry  the  advance  will  invariahl}'  be  in  square  forma- 
tion, with  the  transport  and  all  followers  in  centre ;  the  front  and  lenr  facen 
of  the  square  moving  in  lines  oE  seutions  at  deploying  intervals. 

Whenever  a  halt  is  mode,  the  tocoe  will  invariably  hslt  in  square  forma- 
tion, transport  in  the  centre,  and  strong  pioquelH  will  he  thrown  ont  to  the 
front,  rear  and  both  flanks. 

Anns  will  never  ba  piled. 

Officers'  servantfl  and  all  foUowoi's,  othec  than  trajisport  followers 
will  march  immediately  in  the  rear  of  the  transport  animals.  Transport 
animals  will  march  in  several  lines  ;  the  number  of  lines  nacessary  tieing  ■ 
determined  by  the  number  of  troops  available  to  form  the  side  facta  of  the 
square,  which,  when  halted,  should  be  able  to  completely  protect  the 
transport  animals  in  the  centre. 

Hoapitol  will  march  immediately  in  front  of  transport  animals. 

Arrangements  will  be  made  hy  the  Bane  Contmondant  to  undeavoui 
to  keep  op  signalling  communicatians  with  the  force  from  Gbbin. 

*  These  rsconnaifsancea  were  chiefly  carried  out  by  the  BIkanir  Carnal 
Corps,  which  did  excellent  work.  On  one  ocea^icn  a  patiol  did  100  milea 
S  hcurs  on  camels,  and  two  days  afturwards  the  aamo  oamela  eovered 
^BO  milea  m  three  days. 


leoQtiDgentii 


136 

line  of  communication  much  labour  liad  to  be  expended  botli 
in  deepening  the  existing  and  in  sinking  fresh  welis. 

During  the  time  that  the  necessary  arrangements  were 
being  made  for  the  advance  of  the  force  to  the  Mudug,  the 
troops  from  India  and  South  Africa  arrived  at  Obbia  and 
disembarked.  (See  Chapter  XIV,  4.)  On  the  17th  February 
Coi'iner'^''  General  Manning  wrote  to  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  C.  Swann,  lat 
Swann.  Bombay  Grenadiers,  commanding  the  Berbera-Eohotle  force, 

informing  him  that  a  flying  column  would  leave  Obbia 
on  the  22nd  February  and  arrive  at  Galkayu  oa  or 
about  the  3rd  March.  Swann  waa  directed  to  despatch  a 
party  with  sappers  and  miners  and  pioneers  to  Damot,  a 
place  some  50  miles  south-east  of  Bohotle,  and  if  sufficient 
water  were  found  to  send  the  flying  column  there  by  the  16th 
Match.  Thence,  should  communication  with  Galkayu  have 
been  opened  up,  it  would  be  advisable  to  send,  not  earlier 
than  the  30th  March,  a  strong  reconnaissance  towards  that 
place,  which  would  be  met  by  a  force  from  the  Obbia  column.* 
In  endeavouring  to  establish  communication  between  the  two 
forces  the  Marconi  system  of  telegraphy,  to  work  which 
parties  had  been  sent  from  England  under  Lieutenant  A.  E. 
Silvertop,  R.N,,  was  to  be  utilised.f 

*  The  following  wcie  the  inBtructiona  iBBued  to  IJeut.-Colouel  Swtuui  i 
jHetnorandvni. 
Head-quartGi'B,  Somaliland  Field  Force, 

Obbia,  17th  PebrHflj-y,  1903. 

1.  The  Olibia  force  will  advance  to  Galkayu  as  toUowa : — 
A  flying  column  leaving  Obbia  on  the  22nd  February,  arriving  at  Galkayu 

on  or  about  the  3rd  March. 

A  column  carryirig  rations  will  leave  Obbia  oa  the  4tli  March,  reaching 
Galltayu  I3th  March. 

On  the  13th  March  the  whole  force  will  be  coacoatratcd  at  Galtayii. 

2.  The  Mullah's  forcea  are  said  to  be  in  the  ncighbuurhood  of  Galadi. 
Ar  anon  as  poaaible  after  the  concentration  of  troops  at  Galkayu  a  force 

willmoTe  out  against  the  Midlob' s  force  at  Galadi,  thiawiD  probably  be  about 
the  16th  March.  , 

This  force  will  be  able  to  proceed  about  .5  days'  from  Galkayu,  towarda 
Galadi,  in  pursuit  of  the  Mullah.  Tbia  will  be  a  distance  of  about  SO  miles, 
in  case  no  water  found,  but  onaiderably  further  ahould  water  be  discovered 
on  Ibe  way. 

I  See"page"4S4. 


137 

On  the  Slat  December,  shortly  after   tlie  departure    of  Indian  traoiW' 
Creneral  Manning  from   Berbera,   the  7tli  Bombay  Pioneers  u^ptera' 
(subsequently    the    107th    Pioneers)    arrived    from    India, 
and  two    days    later    began   the    construction   of   a   road 
from  Berbera  to  Bohotle,     This   road   was  undertaken  in 
accordance  with  the  Commander-in-Chief's  instructions  of  the 
18th  December  to  General  Manning.  (Str  page  126.)  In  addition  Woik". 
to  working  at  roads  and   improving   wells,  blockhouses  of  a 
permanent  nature  were  constructed  at  all  the  principal  places 
on  the  lines  of  communication.      {See  Chapter  XIV,  1.) 

Supplies  in  large  quantities,  to  meet  the  requirements  of  Supyliea 
the  flying  column  of  the  Protectorate  at  Bohotle  and  for  the 
Obbia  troops,  who  would  lat«r  be  fed  from  that  place,  were 
pushed  up  to  Bohotle, 

3.  The  troops  of  the  flyiag  colomn  at  Bohotle  most  move  down  and 
occupy  Dam ot,  provided  that  water  caa  iio  obtained  there.  For  the  purpoau 
ot  aacortaiaing  this,  a  party,  with  sappers  and  miners  and  pioneers,  will 
move  down  at  ones  to  Domot,  oairymg  water  with  them  to  that  place,  and 
will  there  form  a  strongly  entrenched  and  zarlbaed  po9t,  and  dig  a  well. 
Water  is  to  be  sent  down  regularly  from  Bohotle  for  this  party.  (It  has  been 
found  here  that  men  employed  on  such  labour  require  at  least  one  gallon  of 
water  per  diem.) 

Should  water  be  discovered,  the  Bohotle  Flying  Column  {or  as  many 
men  as  the  water  will  supply)  will  occupy  Damot. 

4.  Shoidd  wator  not  be  disoovEred  at  Damot  it  may  still  ba  possible 
to  occupy  Damot  by  forming  tanks  of  sailcloth,  in  which  water  can  be  stored, 
and  convoya  of  catnels  running  regularly  will  keep  up  the  supply.  Theaa 
tanhs  work  well  on  this  side,  and,  when  covered  in,  little  water  la  lost  by 
evaporation. 

a.  Messengers,  both  foot  and  mounted,  will  be  despatched  from  Damot> 
to  endeavour  to  open  up  communication  between  that  place  and  Galkayo. 

guttilarly,  messengers  will  be  despatched  from  Galkayu  for  the  samo 
purpose  to  Bobotle. 

Every  endeavour  must  al-'^o  be  mode  to  obtain  communication  by 
wireless  telegraphy. 

Messengers  sent  out,  both  from  Damot  and  Galkayu,  will  have  a  dis. 
tinguishing  mark.  If  moimtcd,  a  piece  of  white  elotb  will  be  tied  round 
the  neck  of  the  pony,  if  dismounted  a  piece  of  white  cloth  will  be  fasteneil 
to  the  spear.     Tiiis  will  enable  messcngeBra  to  be  reoognised. 

Messengers  need  only  carry  this  mark  when  approaching  a  post. 

6,  From  native  information  it  is  believed  that  many  of  the  Dolbahanta 
flocks  have  been  driven  into  the  Nogal.  and  that  the  tribcsnien  are  collected 


On  the  23rd  January,  the  Telegraph  Section,  w  hich  sailed 
from  England  on  the  2nd  January,  arrived  at  Berbers,  and  on 
the  8th  March  the  telegraph  line  reached  Bnhotle,  a  distance  of 
2041  miles,  conatmcted  over  difficult  country  in  41  days.  To 
secure  telegraphic  communication  beyond  this  place  100  milea 
of  cable  accompanied  the  section  from  England,  and  on  the 
14th  March  an  office  was  established  at  Daraot.  (See 
Chapter  XIV,  2.) 

As  regards  Abyssinian  co-operation,  it  has  been  stated  that 
Colonel  Rochfort  reached  Harrar  on  the  9th  February,     On 


with  the  Mullah  in  the  ncighbourhuod  of  Oaladi,  and  are  bent  on  fighting. 
It  a  also  understood  that  a  number  of  Uijjtirten  and  other  tribes  are  in 
the  npighbourliood  of  the  Amai  Wells  with  their  flocks. 

The  occupation  of  Gallioyu  and  Damot  will  bring  both  forces  within 
80  milta  of  one  another,  and  interposed  between  the  two  forces  of  theMullali, 

It  is  intended  to  drive  oH  the  enemy  in  the  neighboochood  of  the  Amai 
Walls  as  soon  as  Oalkayii  ia  occupied.  The  Mijiarten  will  probably  proceed 
west  towartls  Jeriban.  and  the  operations  undertaken  on  the  Ifith  Moroli 
toward*  Galadi  wiU  probably  have  the  effect  of  diiring  the  Mullali  east- 
In  this  event  the  line  between  Damot  and  Galkayn  will  probably  be  free  of 
the  enemy  in  any  niiiuber?. 

7.  Should  water,  therefore,  be  found  in  Damot,  and  should  the  Bohotle 
fljing  column  be  able  to  occupy  that  plane  by  the  IHth  March,  and  should 
conununicalion  with  Galbayit  have  been  opened  up,  it  would  be  advisable  to 
push  out  a  Ntrong  reconnaissanoe  toward?  Galtcayu. 

The  date  of  this  reeonnais'^adce  should  not  he  earUer  than  the  30th  Maicii. 

A  similar  recannaisHance  would  be  pushed  out  from  Galkayu  towards 
Damot  to  meet  the  force  coming  from  that  place.  The  opening  ap  of 
commtmicationa  will,  however,  enable  the  exact  date  to  be  fi^ied,  and  every 
endeavour  must,  therefore,  be  mode  to  accomplish  this. 

8.  When  messengers  are  seut  through,  the  latest  information  of  the 
movements  of  the  Mullah,  and  all  news  of  importancp,  moat  be  included 
in  despatches. 

Despatches  should  be  donlieatod,  and  sent  by  different  ineasengew, 
and  numbered  consecutively. 

By  Order, 
G.  FORESTIEE-WALKER, 

Chief  Stag  Olfiecr. 

StmitUiland  Field  Force. 
The  Officer  L'ommanding, 

Berbera- Bohotle  Force, 


i3t» 

the  IStli,  after  a  satisfactory  interview  with  Raa  Makonnen, 
he  reported  by  telegram  that  an  expeditionary  force  of  5,000 
selected  men  would  start  from  Harrar  on  tlie  16th  under 
Fitaurari  Gabri  and  rendezvous  at  Daghamado,  Bome  200 
miles  to  the  aouth-west  and  situated  between  the  Webi  Shebeli 
and  Tug  Fafan  valleys.  Aa,  however,  such  a  movement  would 
take  the  Abyssiman  force  beyond  its  owu  border  and  within 
the  sphere  of  the  Italians — a  course,  the  undeairabillty  of 
which  had  been  pointed  out  in  the  instructions  sent  to 
Rochfort  at  Aden — ^the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  tele- 
graphed, on  the  21st  February,  directing  him  to  delay  his 
advance  until  fresh  instructions  reached  him.  On  the  28th 
February  he  was  informed  that  the  Italian  Government  con- 
sented in  principle  to  the  advance  of  the  Abyssiniana  to  the 
Webi  Shebeli,  and  Goledi  on  that  river  waa  reached  by  them 
on  the  26th  March.  The  information  which  led  Kochfort 
to  urge  Raa  Makonnen  to  send  a  force  as  far  south  as  the 
Webi  Shebeli  had  reached  him  in  a  telegram  dated  the  18th 
January  from  General  Manning,  which  laid  stress  upon  the 
importance  of  the  presence  of  troops  on  that  river  to  act  as 
a  atop  against  any  movement  of  the  Mullah  in  that  direction. 
In  addition  to  providing  the  column,  which  Rochfort 
accompanied,  Ras  Makonnen  despatched  troops  to  guard 
the  line  Jig  Jiga-Sasami-Faf,  and  so  prevent  the  Mullah 
from  escaping  to  the  west. 

On  the  21st  February  Cobbe's  column*  returned 
to  Obbia  from  Elhur  and  Haradera.  That  officer,  after 
carrying  out  the  reconnaissance  of  routes  to  Galkayu, 
had  been  despatched  on  the  3rd  Februaiy  to  the  south- 
west for  the  purpose  of  collecting  transport  animals  belonging 
to  Yusuf  Ali  and  had  succeeded  in  obtaining  by  purchase 
270  burden  camels  as  well  as  some  200  head  of 
cattle.     Cobbe    reported    that    he    had    met    no    signs   of 

■  lOO  Punjab  Mounted  lafmtry,  75  Bikanir  CaraiJ  Corpa,  1  oompanj 
1st  Battalion  King's  Afririan  Riflpa,  I  company  5th  Ba,ttalion  King's  African 
This  reconnaisanncG  had  been  deBpsCched  on  the  2nd  Fobruary. 


140 

the  enemy,  and  as  inforraation  about  the  podtion  of  the  ' 
Mullah   was   very   unreliable,   it  seemed   possible  that   the 
occupation  of  the  Galkayu  Welk  might  meet  some  opposition 
and  80  clear  up  the  situation.     General  Manning  decided  to 
move  forward  a  flying  column  to  seize  these  wells. 

On  the  22nd  the  advance  to  the  Mudug  from  Obbia  began." 
On  that    day  General    Manmng   marched  to  Gabarwein,  a 
distance   of   llj   miles,   taking   with   him  a  flying  column,  , 
composed  aa  follows  : — 


Mounted  Troops,  under  Maj  or  Kenna^ 
British  Mounted  Infantry    . . 
Boer  Mounted  Infantry 
Punjab  Mounted  Infantry  ,. 
Bikanir  Camel  Coips 

Infantry— 

2nd  Sikhs       

1st  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles, . 
3rd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles . . 

To  be  joined  at  El  Dibber,  Dibit  and 
Wargallo  by — 
Punjab  Mounted  Infantry  . . 
Bikanir  Camel  Corps 
Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners 
2nd  Sikhs        


Rifles. 

50 
50 
100 
75 


•  Field  Force  Order,  No,  415,  dated  1st  February,  11103  :— 

The  following  will   be   the  scale  of  baggage  allowed  (o  all  oflioera  ondl 
troops  proceeding  to  the  front  ; — 

British  officers,  160  lbs i  For  kit  and  10  days'  ralioiwf 

Britiah  warrant  and  non-eoDimisBioned  V     for    self    and    Bervaot, 
oficera,  100  lbs J      taken. 

British  and  burgher  troops,  15  lbs. 

Nalivo  oflicera  and  hoapital  asaUtants,  25  ibn. 

NHtiye  troops  and  followers,  12J  lbs. 

Eatiooa  tor  officers'  chargers  will   be    carried   by  Supply  Dcpartmer 
Transport  for  the  carriage  of  mesa  utensils,  &c.,  will  be  allowed  for,  and  iat  1 
the  carriage  of  coating  pota  for  rank  and  file, 


Making  a  total  of— 

Mounted  Troops        383 

Sappara  and  Miners,  Inlaatty  .       755 

Total  ..   1,138' 

together  with  one  section  of  a  British  and  one  section  of 
an  Indian  Field  Hospital.  Rations  for  14  days  and  reserve 
supplies  for  11  days  were  carried. 

"With  this  force  it  was  intended  to  push  through  to  Galkay  u, 
the  centre  of  the  Mudug  region,  while  the  remainder  of  the 
troops  at  Obbia,  under  Lieut. -Colonel  C.  G.  M.  Fasken,  2nd 
Sikhs,  convoying  one  month's  rations  for  the  entire  force, 
was  to  follow  on  the  6th  March.  Lack  of  transport  and  an 
inadequate  water  supply  at  the  various  posts  upon  the  route  to 
be  traversed  necessitated  this  division  of  the  Obbia  column 
into  two  portions,  About  this  time  it  was  reported  that  the 
Mullah  had  vacated  the  Mudug  district  and  that  his  men 
had  filled  up  the  wells  at  Elfurdan. 

On  the  23rd  the  advance  was  continued,  Lodobal,  13|  miles 
beyond  Gabarwein  being  reached  at  '6  p.m.  The  direction  of 
the  march  lay  nearly  due  north,  at  first  passing  through  low 
tufted  grass  and  scrub,  and  later  over  several  miles  of  low 
sand  dunes.  Tlie  mounted  troojra  marched  independently 
under  Kenna.f 

On  the  24th  the  column  proceeded  to  El  Dibber,  a  distance 
of  17  J  miles,  while  Major  K.  G.  Brooke,  7th  Hussars,  D.A.A.G., 
in  command  of  the  advanced  section  of  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion, occupied  Wargallo,  35  miles  south  of  Galkayu,  and  took 
steps  to  improve  the  water  supply  there. 

*  For  further  details  rpguding  thu  Dumters  of  the  Obbia  Pield  Foroe 
■oe  Chaptei  IX,  Field  States. 

t  Sereille  was  at  4.30  a-m.  on  23rd  February,  but  it  waa  not  until 
after  an  i^arly  breakfast  that  the  force  took  up  the  lino  of  march.  The 
order  tbto  and  sincu  has  been  to  rise  at  4.30  a.m.  and  move  oS  at  7  a-m. 
The  '  going '  for  the  most  port  was  Treiy  toilBome ;  at  first  rough,  low, 
tufted  grass  and  scrub,  then,  later,  milt's  of  low  sand  dunes,  titiug  ae  the 
■lioreB  of  ShoeburjneHE. 


142 


Ontlie25tli,  the  colunm  left  El  Dibber  at  7  a.m.  At  Aolu, 
5J  milee  to  the  north-west,  the  iufaiitry  under  Cobbe,  halted 
for  the  day  to  enable  the  transport  camels  to  water  and  grass. 
Genera!  Maiming  pushing  on  with  headquarters  and  the 
mounted  troops  to  Dibit,   8J  miles  further  on. 

Oa  the  2fith  the  troops  at  Dibit,  wheie  supplies  for  n 
month  for  the  whole  force  had  been  stored,  were  given  a  halt, 
and  were  joined  there  by  the  infantry  fiom  Aolu. 

On  the  27th,  a  distance  of  16i  miles  to  Inideenli  was 
covered,  the  force  moving  in  square  formation.  The  country 
passed  over  was  open,  and  the  weather  hot,  but  cloudy. 

On  the  28th  the  troops  marched  to  Rhalni,  12J  miles, 
where  it  was  found  that  the  water  supply  was  insufficient, 
both  for  watering  the  horses  of  the  mounted  corps,  and 
for  filling  water  tanks,  required  for  the  forward  march.  It 
was  decided,  therefore,  to  send  back  the  mounted  troops 
together  with  170  camels  to  Inideenli,  where  the  animals 
could  he  watered  and  water  tins  refilled.  The  watering  of 
the  troops  and  transport  at  Rhakn  was  continued  all  night,  a 
lift  and  force  pump,  six  of  which  had  been  despatched  fioui 
England  in  January,  being  found  of  the  greatest  service. 

On  the  1st  March  the  force  halted  at  Rhakn  and  information 
regarding  the  water  difliculties  which  had  been  encountered, 
together  with  instructions  as  to  the  best  method  of  over- 
coming them,  were  sent  to  Obbia  to  Fasken. 

On  the  2nd  March  an  advanced  force  under  Major  S.  R 
Davidson,  2nd  Sikh.s,  left  Rhakn  at  7  a.m.  for  Bhirokhode, 
lOJ  miles  towards  Wargallo,  the  remainder  of  the  troops 
following  at  2.15  p.m.  The  mounted  troops,  which  had  been 
sent  to  Inideenli  on  the  28th  February,  returned  to  Rhakn 
at  2  p.m.  on  the  2nd  March  and  were  directed  to  join 
the  column  at  Wacgallo  on  the  following  day. 

On  the  2nd  also,  Brooke,  fearing  that  the  water 
supply  at  Wargallo  would  prove  insufficient  for  the  flying 
column  as  well  as  for  the  whole  garrison  of  that  post,  sent 
foiwatd  at  (i  a.m.,  towards  Galka.yu,  30  men  of  the  Punjab     • 


K 


143 

Mounted  Infantry  and  50  men  of  the  Bikaair  Camel  Corps. 
under  Captain  A.  Williamson,  Indian  Army.  Thia  party 
took  with  it  live  days'  rationB. 

On  the  3rd  March  the  column  left  Bhirokliode  at  6  a.m.  and 
reached  Wargalloat  12.30  p.m.,  a  distance  of  15 J  miles,  where 
it  was  joined  later  by  the  mounted  troops  fromRhakn.  In 
the  evening  Lieut.  W-  H.  Evana,  R.E.,  Field  Intelligence 
Department,  who  had  accompanied  Williamson's  party, 
retu.ned  to  Wargallo,  reporting  that  Galkayu  had  been 
reached.  No  enemy  had  been  met  with,  and  while  the 
water  supply  at  the  Mullah's  stronghold  was  sufficient  for 
the  requirements  of  the  Obbia  column,  there  was  none  to  be 
found  on  the  road  thither. 

On  the  4th  March  the  Moimted  troops  of  the  flying 
column  (175  men)  under  Kemia,  left  Wargallo  at 
(i  a.m.  and  reached  Galkayu  at  5.30  p.m.  Here  they 
joined  the  small  force  under  Williamson  who  had  con- 
structed a  zariba  for  its  protection.  The  main  body 
marched  at  ti.lo  a.m.  to  a  camp  20^  miles  distant,  passing 
over  open  country  with  scrub  and  bush  in  places,  This 
march,  owing  to  the  heat  and  the  limited  supply  of 
water,  was  much  felt  by  the  troops. 

On  the  5th  the  main  body  reached  Galkayu,  where  tbe  GbIUsju 
whole  Hying  column  was  now  concentrated. 

The  march  from  Obbia  to  Galkayu,  a  distance,  by  the  route 
taken,  of  159  miles,  had  occupied  12  days  and  had  been 
accomplished  without  opposition,  considerable  numbers  of 
the  Mullah's  followers  having  retreated  westward  on  the 
approach  of  the  column. 

Writing  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  from  Galkayu  on 
6th  March,  1903,  General  Manning  reported  : — 

lu  the  course  of  the  uexi  ievi  days  I  hope  to  be  able  to  locate  tbe 
poMtiou  of  tlie  MuUah's  force,  which,  I  bohHve,  to  ho  in  the  nEighbourhood 
of  this  place.  Native  spies  reported  the  viciuity  of  a  number  of  men  und 
luumalB  OD  the  mocoiiig  of  the  day  of  our  arrival  in  Damp  )  thia  would  appear 
to  have  been  a  party  nho  hod  comu  douii  tu  souie  neighbouring  wells  Cor 
ihi.^  pui'poH!  of  wati-Ting  aniiuuls.     I  sent  out  spies  a  few  houi's  after  niy 


urival  hero  to  tradi  these  people,  and  held  a  forae  of  mounted  traapa  and 
infantry  in  readtneaa  to  march  out  at  niglit,  if  newa  of  their  still  being  close 
at  hand  nas  received  during  the  night.  These  series,  however,  have  not  yet 
rptumeil,  and  it  is  therefore  evident  that  the  Mullab'a  people  i)ave  moved 
oS  on  hearing  of  our  arrival.  The  occupation  of  these  wella  will  compel 
the  Mullah's  force  to  break  up,  since  the  watmitg  difficulties  will  bo  very 
graat.  The  capture  of  some  of  the  enemys  men  by  our  spies  will  enable 
us  to  diacotrer  vhere  the  Mullah  has  fixed  his  headqnart«rB ;  at  present 
we  have  no  infonnation  on  this  point  whatever,  though  it  is  evidout  that  bo 
is  at  no  great  distance  from  this  place. 

To-morrow,  the  7th  instant,  as  most  of  the  transport  animals  return  tn 
Dibit  to  bring  up  supplies  vith  the  main  column,  we  shall  be  left  with  a  small 
nmnber  of  transport  animals  until  the  17th  instant.  The  interval  will, 
however,  be  utilised  to  thoToughlj'  rooounoitro  th<!  country  round,  so  that 
upon  the  arrival  of  the  main  colmun,  an  advance  will  be  made  at  once  on 
any  collfection  of  the  enemy  withm  striking  distance. 

I  have  been  obliged  to  ask  for  more  Supply  Officers,  as  the  peculiar 
nature  of  operations  in  this  country,  and  the  long  lines  of  commiinjcntion 
lo  be  kept  open  to  Obbia,  render  it  very  necessary  that  this  department 
should  be  thoroughly  well  supplied  with  a  staff,  and  the  move  of  the  flying 
column  to  Galkayu  has  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  staff  of  the  Supply  De- 
partment is  quito  inadequate ;  so  much  so,  that  on  the  march  up  here, 
I  experienced  much  difficulty' in  carrying  out  the  proper  supply  duties  of 
the  force. 

I  have  addressed  a  communication  ta  the  Italian  RepresentatiTS 
accompanying  the  force,  asking  him  to  inform  me  without  delay  as  to  the 
date  on  which  he  intends  to  take  over  the  occupation  of  this  place,  in  order 
that  he  may  notify  to  bis  Government  the  occupation  of  Mudug. 

The  marches  up  here  have  been  extremely  hot  and  trying,  but  the 
troops  have  borne  them  well.  The  mounted  troops  particularly  have  had 
OQ  arduous  time,  but  Major  Kenua's  good  manageuient  hs^  so  far  resulted 
iu  the  loss  of  only  one  mounted  infantry  horse. 

The  route  of  our  advance  is  fairly  well  watered,  but  oonsiderable 
urganizitioa  is  necessary  at  each  watering  place  to  make  the  utmost  use  of 
the  wells  possible. 

I  shall  at  once  endeavour  to  obtain  communication  with  Bohotle,  vid 
Damot,  which  place  I  hope  has  been  occupied  by  the  flying  column  from 
Bohotle. 

The  health  of  both  officers  and  men  remains  excellent. 

In  the  original  inatmctions  of  His  Majesty's  Goyenunent 
to  the  General  it  waa  pointed  oat  that  the  expulsion 
of  the  Mullah  from  the  Mudug  was  regarded  as  the 
primary  object  of  the  expedition.  Should  he  be  driven  from 
that  district  or  retire  therefrom  without  contesting  ito  seizure, 
an  endeavour  was  to  be  made,  provided  that  the  conditions  of 


_L. 1 


146 

the  country  and  of  the  force  permitted  to  pursue  Ilim  with 
mounted  troops  to  the  south  or  west,  but  not  to  a  greater 
distance  than  four  or  five  days'  march.  Such  a  course, 
however  desirable,  could  not  be  carried  out  immediately 
on  reaching  Galkayu,  for  the  force  then  was  in  no  condition 
to  occupy  effectively  the  various  wells  within  the  Mudug 
district,  far  less  to  undertake  a  pursuit  over  an  unknown 
country  against  an  unbeaten  enemy.  Lack  of  sufficient 
transport,  which  had  necessitated  the  march  to  Galkayu  in 
two  separate  columns,  forced  Greueral  Manning  to  halt  there 
until  supplies  and  troops  could  be  moved  up  and  so  enable 
the  advance  to  be  resumed. 

Retaining  therefore  with  the  flying  column  only  a  Binall 
number  of  transport  animals  and  thereby  rendering  it  for  the 
time  practically  immobile,  General  Manning  sent  back  850 
camels  to  Dibit,  whence  they  were  to  bring  up  supplies 
accompanied  by  the  main  column  which  had  left  Obbia  on 
the  6th  March,  and  was  now  advancing  under  Fasken.  This 
column  consisted  of : — 


Mounted  Troops — 

British  Mounted  Infantry     . . 

87 

Boer  Mounted  Infantry 

62 

Punjab  Mounted  Infantry     . . 

51 

Bikanir  Camel  Corps 

114 

Lahore  Mountain  Battery  (2  guns) 

Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners    . . 

09 

2ud  Sikhs 

270 

1st  BattaKon  King's  African  Rifles      . 

98 

5th  Battahon  King's  African  Rifles     . . 

70 

Making  a  total  of— 

Mounted  troops 

304 

Sappers  and  Miners,  Infantry 

503 

Total 

807 

OporatioQB 
of  Berbei'ft 


In  the  interim,  General  Manning  proceeded  to  send  out 
small  reconnoitring  parties  to  examine  the  country  in  the 
vicinity  of  Galkayu  and  ascertain  where  any  bodies  of  the 
enemy  were  collected,  so  that  as  soon  as  Fasken's  column 
should  arrive,  operations  might  be  undertaken.  Thus, 
Bera,  16  miles  to  the  north-west  of  Galkayu,  Rohr  and 
BadweiQ,  30  miles  in  the  direction  of  Bohotle,  were  recon- 
noitred, and  information  obtained  that  the  main  body 
of  the  Mullah's  force  was  at  Galadi,  while  he  himself 
was  at  Dikwein,  Intelligence  reports  showed  that  the 
Mullah  had  2,500  riflemen  at  Galadi  (mostly  mounted), 
5,000  to  6,000  horsemen,  16,000  spearmen,  and  about  4,000 
spare  ponies. 

On  the  Berbera-Bohotle  line  movements  of  a  similar 
nature  were  also  in  progress.  On  the  3rd  March,  acting 
under  instructions  from  General  Manning  (see  page  136), 
Lieut. -Colonel  Swann  had  despatched  from  Bohotle,  under 
command  of  Major  J.  E.  Gough,  Rifle  Brigade,  a  flying  column 


of:- 

2  companies  7th  Bombay  Pioneers,* 

12  men  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners, 

100  men  Somali  Mounted  Infantry, 

50  men  SomaU  Corps. 

2  Masims. 

Marconi  Detachment. 


ove  tne 


Gough's  orders  were  to  occupy  Damot,  improve 
water  supply  and  endeavour  to  open  up  communication 
with  Galkayu.  A  defensible  post  was  to  be  constructed  for 
the  protection  of  the  wells  and  the  mounted  troops  were  then 
to  return  to  Bohotle. 

Damot  was  reached  at  daybreak  on  the  4th  March,  and 
a  small  party  of  the  Mullah's  adherents  driven  off,  losing 
in  their  retreat   three   killed  and   seven  prisoners.     On  the 


IHn    s   sfoong   sariba    was    conatmcted,   and   on 

mounted  troops,    leaving   the   inlantiy 
retomed  to  Bohotle. 

On  the  loth,  Lasakaat«  wella,  situated  some  30  miles  due 
south  of  Bohotle,  and  on  the  direct  route  to  Galadi,  were  seized 
by  another  force  under  Lieut. -Colon el  Plunketi  consisting  of 
170  mounted  troopa  with  two  companies  King's  African 
RiSes  in  support.  On  this  occasion  lifteen  of  the  enemy 
were  killed  and  sixteen  taken  prisoners.  As  the  wells  con- 
tained water  sufficient  only  for  the  small  scouting  parties  o£ 
the  enemy,  they  were  filled  up,  and  the  force  returned  to 
Bohotle  on  the  12th. 

It  had  been  hoped  that  the  Naval  party  which  had  been 
sent  from  England  with  Marconi  telegraphic  apparatus  to  both 
the  Berbera  and  the  Obbia  forces  might  have  been  of  some 
service  towards  establishing  communication  between  the  two 
forces,  but  the  conditions  of  ground  and  climate  in  Somaliland 
were  alike  unfavourable,  and  on  the  20th  April  the  Admiralty 
was  requested  to  recall  the  detachments. 

On  the  13th  March  communication  between  Galkayu  and 
Damot  was  established,  some  Sowars  of  the  Bikanii  Camel 
Corps  aniving  at  the  latter  place  with  despatches  from 
General  Manning,  and  on  the  14th  March  Swann  moved 
his  flying  column  to  Damot,  where  a  telegraph  station  was 
established. 

On  the  17th  March  Swann  received  orders  from  Greneral 
Manning  to  despatch  from  Damot  to  Galkayu  a  force  consisting 
of  300  men  of  the  2nd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  50 
men  Somali  Mounted  Infantry,  and  2  guns  of  the  camel 
battery.  These  troops,  who  were  to  be  accompanied  by 
1,000  camels,  2  months'  rations,  and  at  least  400  water  tins, 
were  to  reach  their  destination  by  the  25th  March,  in  time  to 
take  part  in  the  advance  from  Galkayu.  A  further  supply  of 
1,000  cameb  was  ordered  to  be  collected  at  Bohotle  a'l  a 
reserve  for  the  Obbia  force. 

(8927)      .  K  2 


Usin  column         The  main  column  under  Faskcn,  wtirli,  owing  to  water 

O^kn^u  ^"^  transpoifc  difficulties  *  had  been  divided  into  two  paities, 

reached  Galkayu  on  the  17th  and  24th  respectively,  and  on 

the  evening  o£  the  25th  the  detachment  from  Damot,  under 

the   command   of  Plunkett,  arrived. 

General  Manning  was  now  in  a  position  to  move  against 
the  Mullah,  who  was  reported  to'  have  left  Galadi  and 
retired  to  Waidair  and  Walwal.  These  places  are  situated 
some  150  miles  to  the  west  o£  Galkayu,  and  can  only  be  reached, 
ill  the  dry  sea,son,  by  passing  over  an  almost  waterless  tract 
nf  country,  thickly  covered  with  bush.  In  view,  however, 
of  Gejiernl  Manning's  instructions,  which  restricted  his  opera- 
tions within  an  area  of  four  or  five  daj-a'  march  from 
Galkayu,  it  would  have  been  undesirable  to  have  proceeded 
so  far;  but  this  had  been  foreseen  by  His  Majesty's 
Grovemment,  who,  on  the  2l9t  March,  telegraphed  to 
the  General  giving  him  a  free  hand  as  regards  movements  to 
the  westward,  t 

•  In  a  despatch,  dated  3rd  Apcil,  General  Mnnumg  said :  I  regret 
fo  rpjxirt  that  great  mortality  haa  occurred  among  the  camel  trajiapoct. 
Tho  camelB  brought  roimd  to  Obbia  from  Berbera  suffered  cojlaiderably 
uwlng  to  tbe  impossibility  of  laftding  them  immediately  ou  tlieir  arrival, 
HtDoe  a  hcavyaea  was  running  for  some  days  subsequent  to  the  arrival  of  the 
transport.  The  camels,  though  given  10  days  rest  and  grazing,  have  never 
entirely  recovered.  Grazing  at  tliia  time  of  year  ia  almost  non-eiUtent, 
the  whole  country  being  dried  up.  Tills  loss  of  camels  has  hampered  the 
transport  of  rations,  &c,  on  the  line  of  commimications,  and  has  compelled 
ine  to  keep  back  about  IM  mounted  infantry,  50  Bikanic  Camel  Corps,  and 
the  Mounted  Batlcry  Section  on  the  line  of  commimicatiooa  between  Dibit 
and  Obbia. 

"f  Genera!  Manning  telegraphed  on  7th  March  from  Galkayu  (received 
ISth  March)  lo  the  Saccetory  of  State  for  War  :— 

From  a  prisoner  caught  tbi<t  morning  the  following  iitfomialion  has 
been  received :  The  Mullah  left  Claladi  oa  tecciipt  of  information  of  our 
arrival  at  Obbia  two  months  ago,  and  went  with  ICO  horsemen  and  40  men 
onfoot  to  Dikweio,  which  is  near  HarrarDiggit,  and  close  to  Kusati.WeUby'H 
route  Ko.  64.  His  personal  belongings  and  all  his  riflemen  are  at  Qoladi 
with  the  remainder  of  his  horaea.  The  Dolbahanta  and  Ali  Giiori  tribes 
are  in  strength  at  Galadi.  The  Mullah  informed  the  Dervishea  that  if  he 
received  promises  of  support  from  the  Ogaden  he  would  send  back  this 
information,  and  that  be  intended  to  attack  Bohitle.     Up  to  now  he  hai 


149 

On  the  2(3tli  March,  leaving  a  garrison  oE  the  2nd  Sikhs  Adranre 
t  Galkayu,  and  taking  with  him  the  following  troops  : —         w^da^ 
Bank  and  file. 
British  and  Boer  Mounted  Infantry    . .       284 
Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners    . .         . .         20 

2ndSikhs 278 

Ist  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles  ..  149 
2nd  Battalion  King's  African  Kifles  . .  300 
5th  Battahon  King's  African  Rifles      , .         50 

Total        ..         ..     1,081 
I  General  Manning  marched  to  Bera,  (15  miles)  which  place 

had  been   occupied   by  a  party  of   the    2nd   Sikhs   as  an 
advanced  post,  on  the  19th  March. 

On  the  27th  the  force  halted  to  allow  the  camels,  which 

had    accompanied     Plunkett's    force   from   Damot,  to   rest 

and  graze.     In  the  evening  a  force  of  240  mounted  infantry 

imder   Kenna,    was    despatched    with    orders    to  push    on 

to    Dudub,    but    if    unable    to     advance    without    serious 

opposition,  it  was    to   fall  back   on   the   infantry  column, 

which    would    leave    Bera   next    day.      General    Manning 

expected  to  encounter  severe  opposition  in  the  thick  belt  of 

bush  between  Bera  and  Dudub,  and  although  the  moimted 

I  infantry  would   probably  be   able   to  push   through   under 

cover  of  night,  he  considered  it  hkely  that  the  large  camel 

I  convoy  which  accompanied  his  infantry  would  be  attacked. 

^^v        On  the   27th  also,   acting   under  mstructions  from  the 

^^^ffieneral  Officer  Commanding,  Swann  had  sent  out  the  Bohotle 

^^•-Mnt  back  no  information,  anil  it  is  to  be  presumed  tlie  Ognili^n  tefuse  to 

assist  him.     Haji  Sudi  and  Sultan  Nui  accompany  the  Mullah.     Haji  Sudi 

i«  reported  to  have  died  at  Dikwein  ;  thia  latter  report  con  be  taken  ob  true. 

On  Slut  March  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  replied  : — 

YoumiL;  now  CQnaider  that  you  have  a  free  hand  og^nst  the  Mullah  in 

bU  operations  to  the  westward,  but  restriction  imposed  by  paragraph  4 

of  your  inatciietioiis  of  the  lath  December  must  apply  still  to  movements  to 

Boutfa.     Communicate   direct   to   Boi^hfort   your   wiehea   as   mgartla 


150 

flying  column,  under  Major  A.  G.  Sharp,  Lemster  Regiment, 
from  Damot  in  order  to  intercept  any  of  the  Mullah's 
following  who  should  endeavour  to  enter  the  Nogal 
Plain  when  the  Galadi  force  advanced.  Sharp's 
operations  lasted  foi  a  week,  during  which  time  98  of  the 
enemy  were  killed,  2,000  camela  and  6,000  aheep  captured. 
The  camels  were  for  the  most  part  milch  and  young, 
only  a  small  percentage  being  of  value  for  trajisport  puxposes. 

Major  R.  Brooke  also  was  sent  out  from  Badwein  to 
endeavour  to  stop  the  Mullah  from  marching  across  the 
Hand  to  the  Nogal,  if  he  was  defeated  near  Bera.  Brooke 
captured  a  few  camels  and  goats  and  killed  a  few  of  the 
enemy. 

On  the  28th,  taking  with  him  six  days'  watei  In  tanks 
for  the  whole  force,  General  Manning  resumed  hia  march.* 
Bera  was  left  with  a  garrison  of  100  rank  and  file  of  the  2nd 

•  Tho  force  which  mnrched  out  at  8  a-m.  from  Bera  waa  composed  of : — 


Rank  and  File. 


Eeatliinart^?ra  Staff 

Italinna  . . 

Mounted  Corps 

Camol  Battery 

Bombaj  Sappers  and  Miners  . 

2nd  Sifchs 

1st  King's  African  Ritle! 


Hospital 

Transport 

Intelligenoe  Department 
Survey  Saetion  . . 
Provost  Maishal 
Veterinary  Department 

C.B.E 

Supply  Department     . . 

Total       .. 

and  431  (oUoTera. 


347    and    I    British 

Warrant  Officer. 

1    and    1    ABsiatant 

SHTgeoa. 


1   (Warrant  Ol&oer) 


and  oth  Battationa  King's  African  Rifles,  the  original  garrison 
of  the  2nd  Sikhis  joining  the  advance.  Beyond  the  bush, 
open  country  was  reached  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  and 
the  column  halted  on  a  grassy  plain  19  miles  from  Beta. 
Feeling  considerable  uncertainty  regarding  the  water  supply 
ahead,  as  to  which  no  report  had  yet  come  in  from 
Kenna,  the  General  decided  tu  send  back  to  G-alkayu  338 
of  the  2nd  Sikhs,  thereby  reducing  the  infantry  to  529 
rifles,  which  he  considered  an  adequate  force  with  which 
to  occupy  Dudub,  more  especially  ao,  as  the  route  before  him 
was  stated  to  pass  through  open  country.  By  this  reduction 
another  day's  water  was  gained. 

On  the  29th  the  force,  starting  at  G  a.m.,  marched  to 
within  8  miles  of  Dudub,  where  it  bivouacked  about  sunset, 
after  covering  17J  miles.  At  noon  a  report  was  received 
from  Kenna  that  he  had  occupied  that  place  without 
opposition  on  the  previous  evening  and  had  captured  a 
few  prisoners.  A  later  report  from  the  same  oflicoi  stated 
that  he  had  learnt  that  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  was 
holding  Galadi  Wells,  whither  he  intended  to  proceed  on  the 
night  of  the  29th  so  as  to  secure  the  water  supply  there. 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  force  reached  GJakdi 
Dudub,  which  proved  to  be  44  miles  distant  from  Bera,  and  "'^^''P"^''- 
afforded  an  excellent  water  supply,  sufficient  for  the  require- 
ments of  a  considerable  force.  A  halt  was  made  there  until 
10  a.m.,  when  the  march  was  resumed  for  a  distance  of  12 
miles  towards  Galadi.*  During  the  evening  a  message  was 
received  from  Kenna  stating  that  he  had  occupied  Galadi  at 
8.30  a.m.,  killing  several  of  the  enemy  and  capturing  a  few 
prisoners  and  a  small  quantity  of  live  stock.  On  the  31st 
General  Manning  joined  Kenna  at  Galadi,  where  the  water 
supply  proved  to  be  fair  and  suflicient  for  a  small  force. 

From  information  extracted  from  the  prisoners  captured  Raiding 
at  Galadi  it  appeared  that  immediately  Qalkayu  was  occupied  "P"™*"""*' 

■  Sixcjmea  unilar  Cbptiia  W.  F.  Diigmare,  U.S.O.,  were  lef  t  to  Kmrciaon 


153 

by  the  British,  the  Mullah  evacuated  Galadi  aud  retreated  to 
Walwal.  His  live  stock,  however,  which  should  have  followed, 
waa  stated  to  be  still  in  the  vicinity  of  Gumburu,  some  30 
miles  distant  from  Galadi.  As  the  capture  of  camels  would 
greatly  assist  the  further  advance  of  the  force,  Plunkett 
and  Cobbe  were  despatched  for  this  purpose  from  Gaiadi 
on  the  1st  and  2nd  Apiil  respectively,  with  detachments 
of  the  1st  and  2nd  Battalions  King's  Afiican  Bifles. 
Plunkett  moved  in  a  westerly,  and  Cobbe  in  a  southerly  direc. 
tion,  where,  according  to  spies,  large  quantities  of  live  stock 
had  recently  been  seen.  With  a  view  to  economise  the  food 
supplies  of  the  Indian  and  Afiican  troops,  they  were  placed 
on  half  rations  of  rice  or  atta,  in  place  of  which  extra 
quantities  of  meat  were  issued. 

In  order  to  carry  out  his  intention  of  moving  further  west, 
ward,  General  Manning  was  obliged  to  halt  for  a  brief  space  at 
Gaiadi,  there  to  collect  a  sufficient  stoie  of  food.*  Thequestion 
of  water  was  also  one  which  had  to  be  solved,  for  the  coliimn, 
which  was  engaged  in  following  up  the  Mullah,  was  now 
about  to  pass  over  a  district  piactically  devoid  thereof,  and 
before  an  advance  was  possible,  arrangements  must  be 
made,  either  to  transport  a  sufficient  quantity  in  tanks,  or 
establish  along  the  route  to  be  followed,  posts,  from  which  o 
supply  could  be  drawn.  Neither  of  these  courses  was  free  from 
seiious  objection,  for  in  the  one  case  a  lengthy  and  consc. 
quently  vidnerable  transport  train  was  inevitable,  while  as 
regards  the  other,  the  establishmentof  posts  not  only  weakened 
the  force  from  which  they  are  drawn,  but  exposed  thera  to  the 
possible  risk  of  annihilation  in  detail.  Yet  it  was  obvious  that 
if  the  force  was  not  to  remain  stationary  in  a  country  where 
water  is  a  commodity  only  to  be  met  mth  at  rare  Intervals, 
one  or  other  of  these  systems  must  be  employed. 

General  Manning  proposed  to   adopt   a  combination   of 

•  Orders  were  eent  to  lie ut.- Colonel  Bwann  (Bcrbera-Bobotle)  lo 
il.esi>ateli  a  conToy  of  500  oaitiob  to  Dudob  rid  Damot  with  one  montli's 
supplies  for  500  Afripsn  troops 


J^ 


both,  and  establisLed  a  post  20  miles  distant,  where  water 
for  2  days  for  the  whole  force  could  be  stored  in  addition  to 
the  necessary  amount  for  the  garrison,  and  a  similar  post  some 
15  irules  further  on.  As  soon  as  both  these  water  depots 
had  been  established,  his  purpose  was  to  move  from  the 
further  of  them  with  tanks  carrying  5  days'  supply,  trusting 
to  reach  Wardair  on  the  third  day,  where,  if  report  were  true, 
ample  water  was  to  be  found. 

On  the  8th  April  a  party  of  50  men  of  the  5th  Battalion 
King's  African  Rifles,  under  Captain  G.  W.  G,  Lindesay,  35th 
Sikhs,  carrying  with  them  two  days'  water  for  the  column 
which  was  to  follow,  left  Galadi  to  establish  the  first  of  these 
posts  20  miles  on  the  road  to  Wardair. 

On  the  6th  and  7th  April  Plunkett's  and  Cobbe's  forces 
had  returned  from  their  raid  against  the  Mullah's  live  stock, 
bringing  with  them  1,630  camels,  most  of  which,  however,  were 
milch.  Plunkett  had  moved  out  some  36  miles  towards 
Gumhuru,  where  he  had  found  and  attacked  Bome  of  the 
enemy's  karias,  kiUing  36  men.  Cobbe  returned  to  camp  at 
2  a.m.  on  7th  April,  and  reported  that  he  had  surprised 
the  enemy's  karias  and  inflicted  severe  loss  on  them.  As  the 
remainder  of  the  supplies  and  troops  required  for  the  advance 
on  Wardair  would  not  arrive  from  Galkayn  until  the  17tb 
instant.  General  Manning  decided  to  utilise  the  interval  by 
sending  forward  a  strong  reconnaissance  to  endeavour  to 
discover  the  road  to  Wardair,  and  if  possible  occupy  that 
place.  This  decision  was  come  to  on  the  receipt  of  native 
information  that  the  Mullah  had  abandoned  both  Wardair 
and  Walwal  and  had  retired  to  the  west  or  north-west. 

On  this  point  General  Manning  wrote  : — "  I  felt  that  this 
advance  was  the  hmit  to  which  I  could  proceed,  since  the  state 
of  camel  transport  would  not  permit  of  any  further  pro- 
longation of  my  lines  of  communication,  and  I  had  hoped, 
by  occupying  Wardair,  to  be  able  to  seize  a  number  of  the 
enemy's  camels.  I  had  arranged  for  the  arrival  of  350  of 
^e  2nd  Sikhs  and  70  3rd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifies  at 


Galadi  on  the  17th 


the  return    of   the 


inetant,  ao  ' 
shotild  be  able  to  advance  on  Wardair  with 


I 
nearly  1,000  men." 

At  5  p.m.  on  the    10th  April,  Cobbe,  who  was   detailed 
to  conduct  this  reconnaiasance,  began  his  march  weatward. 
He  was  accompaiued  by  the  : — 
Ist  Battalion  King's  African  Riflea,  120  rank  and  filft  and 

2  maximB, 
3nd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  280  rank  and  file  and 

2  masims. 
6th  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  15  rank  and  file. 
Camel  Battery,  two  7-pr.  guna, 
together  with  two  medical  officers  and  transport. 

Ten  days'  rations  and  water  for  6  days  at  the  rate  of 
1  gallon  per  man  and  2  gallons  per  horse  were  carried.  Cobbe 
was  directed  to  refrain  from  attacking  the  enemy  if  there  was 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  main  body  of  his  force  was  at  hand, 
but  should  no  strong  opposition  be  encountered,  Wardair  was 
to  be  occupied,  so  as  to  secure  a  water  supply  for  the  main 
column,  which,  as  already  mentioned,  was  timed  to  follow 
on  the  17th  instant. 

Cobbe  was  further  instructed  to  water  his  column  at  the 
post  which  had  been  established  20  imles  west  of  Galadi, 
taking  with  him  the  garrison  of  the  5th  Battalion  King's 
African  Rifles,  but  leaving  in  charge  1  officer  and  10  men  of 
the  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners.* 

''Copy  o)  Inslrvdions  for  LievL-Coloiid  Cobba,  V.C,  O.S.O.,  Commanding 
Column  detailed  in  Force.  Orders  of  BIh  April,  1903. 

1.  All  inionnaticm  lately  received  tends  to  the  belief  tliat  Mulllkk's 
fgrcea  ace  now  in  the  area  of  country  rnughly  eaelosed  within  the  iHiundarieB 
WMdaic,  Suryu,  Danot. 

ITie  Mullah  himself,  with  his  personal  bodyguard,  is  believed  to  bo  at  a 
spot  called  lUig,  some  18  milea  nortli  o[  Wardair. 

Wardair  is  believed  to  ha  70  or  SO  mittiB  north  of  Oaladi. 

■2.  Your  object  will  be  to  cfFeot  a  reconnaisGouce  in  the  direction  of 
Wardair  and,  if  no  stron;j  opposition  is  met  with,  to  seize  and  hold  that  place, 
thuH  seriiriag  the  watei'  supply  to  the  Main  Columo,  wliioh  will  advanoe  from 
GaUdi  OQ  17Ui  instant. 


155 

On  the  1  Ith  April  50  men  of  tlie  British  and  Boer  Mounted 
Infantry,  under  the  command  of  Captain  G.  C.  Shakerley, 
4th  Battalion  King's  Boyal  Rifle  Corps,  left  Oaladi  to  join 


You  will  refrain  from  attacking  the  enemy  if  you  have  reason  to  sappose 
that  tlie  main  body  of  Ma  force  is  at  liand,  but  it  is  probable  tliat  you  will  be 
in  poBBesflion  of  the  wellfi  before  any  important  body  of  the  enemy  oan  be 
conoentrated  to  meet  you. 

Once  in  posBSBsion  of  Wardair,  and  in  strong  defensive  position,  you 
I  ■kould  be  able  to  liold  your  ovm  withoot  difficulty,  and  to  inOiat  the  soreroflt 
I  loBsea  on  the  enemy  if  he  ventureB  to  attack  you. 

3.  As  pTByioualy  ordered,  you  will  start  to-night  with  that  portion  of  your 
oolumn  detailed  to  move  to-day,  and  you  will  reach  to-moirow  marning  the 
water  post  which  has  been  eBtablished  20  miles  towards  Wardair. 

At  this  poBt  you  will  obtain  1  day's  water  for  your  column,  and  on  the 
nth  instant  you  vrili  proceed  towards  Wardair,  taking  with  you  the  detach- 
ment 6th  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles  now  at  that  post,  and  leaving  ob 
garrison  one  oificer  and  10  N.F.R.*  Sappers  and  MiueiB  now  at  the  water  post 

By  the  morning  of  the  12th  instant,  it  is  presiuned  that  you  will  have 
accomplished  some  38  miles  from  Galodi,  and  by  the  evening  of  the  12th 
iBBtant,  some  55  milee. 

4.  The  mounted  infantry  of  your  column  wiU,  as  already  detuled, 
start  on  the  evening  of  the  11th  instant,  reaching  the  water  post  on  tlie 
morning  of  the  12th.  and  receiving  from  it  1  day's  water. 

l^e  mounted  infantry  will  start  again  on  the  evening  of  the  12lh,  and 
will  maroh  nntil  they  join  your  oolumn  on  the  morning  or  attamoon  of  the 
13th  instant,  rcoeiviog  that  night  the  first  of  the  4  days'  water  supply 
oairied  by  you  for  them. 

6.  Every  endeavour  will  be  made  to  form  a  watering  post  at  Gumburu 
(40  miles)  by  the  0th  instant,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  you  will  have  tins 
or  hausf  available  to  store  more  than  750  gallons,  to  include  water  foe 
gairison  of  10  men. 

6.  Your  further  proceedings  must  be  left  to  your  judgment,  bearing  in 
mind  the  general  instructions  embodied  in  paragraph  2. 

7.  You  will  keep  the  General  Officer  Commanding  informed  as  to  yout 
movements,  and,  in  the  unlikely  event  of  such  opposition  being  conoen- 
tiftted  as  to  compel  you  to  fall  back,  you  will,  in  addition  to  reporting  on 
the  military  situation,  state  what  your  requirement  will  be  in  the  way  of 
Mttet,  in  order  that  a  water  convoy  may  be  despatched  without  delay. 

8.  At  present  arranged,  the  Main  Column  will  start  from  here  un  the 
17th  instant,  and  should  have  acoompliahed  some  BB  miles  by  the  morning  of 

""'eaoth  instant. 

a.  FOBESTIER- WALKER,  LisiU.-Gdoaei, 

ChUI  Staff  Officer,  SomtUVand  Field  Force. 


'  Native  I'ank  ai 


I  flip. 


t  Somali  water  vessels. 


156 

Cobbe's  column,  which  had  reached  the  water  post  that 
morning. 

As  it  was  found  tliat  the  water  post  had  been  established 
considerably  south  of  the  direct  route  to  Wardair,  Cobbe 
marched  hb  force  in  a  north-westerly  direction,  and  on  the 
12th,  after  passing  through  thick  bush,  struck  the  track  to 
Gumburu,  This  was  followed  for  about  10  miles,  when  the 
column  halted  for  the  night.  During  the  day  a  few  of  the 
enemy's  scouts  had  been  seen,  who,  as  soon  as  they  detected 
the  hostile  advance,  galloped  off. 

At  4  a.m.,  on  the  13th,  Cobbe's  command  pressed  on  again, 
and  by  nightfall  bad  reached  a  point  distant  some  53  miles 
from  Galadi,  During  the  mid-day  halt,  Shakerley's  party 
of  Biitish  and  Boer  Mounted  Infantry,  which  had  been 
following  in  the  wake  of  the  column,  came  up  with  it,  and  in 
the  afternoon  they  and  the  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  were 
sent  forward  with  orders  to  proceed  along  the  road  foi  8  miles, 
it  being  Cobbe's  intention  to  follow  them  by  moonlight.  The 
Mounted  Infantry,  however,  lost  their  way  in  the  thick  and 
high  impenetrable  bush,  and  as  efforts  to  communicate  with 
them  proved  unavailing,  Cobbe,  after  coveiing  4  miles, 
bivouacked  for  the  night. 

At  6  a.m.  on  the  followiog  day  Cobbe  attempted  to  continue 
liis  advance,  but  the  bush  becoming  thicker  and  the  track 
far  from  clear,  he  decided  to  return.  While  doing  so,  the 
enemy's  horsemen,  who  so  far  had  held  off,  fired  into  the 
advanced  guard,  stampeding  a  portion  of  the  transport  animals, 
most  of  which  were,  however,  recovered.  The  guns  were  brought 
into  action  and  dispersed  the  assailants,  who  were  driven 
off  by  the  arrival  of  the  mounted  infantry,  attracted  to  the 
scene  of  action  by  the  noise.  The  retirement  was  continued 
til!  a  place  near  and  to  the  north  of  Gumburu  Hill  was  reached. 
From  here,  Cobbe  sent  word  to  General  Manning  that  in 
accordance  with  hia  instructions,  he  proposed  to  establii-h  a 
post  at  his  present  camp,  and  return  to  Galadi,  bringing  with 
him  the  remainder  of  hia  column. 


On  the  15th  April  heavy  rain  fell,  enabling  tanks  to  be 
filled  and  horses  watered,  and  Cobbe  decided  not  to  march. 

On  the  16th  parties  were  sent  in  several  directions  to 
reconnoitre  and  search  for  water,  several  pools  of  which  had 
been  found  on  the  previous  day.  Two  of  these  parties,  under 
Captains  Morris  and  Luard,  consisting  each  of  halt  a  company, 
met  the  enemy,  who  showed  fight.  The  mounted  infantry 
were  despatched  to  their  assistance  and  covered  their  with- 
drawal to  camp,  losing  Lieutenant  Chichester  killed,  and  three 
wounded. 

During  the  day  a  water  convoy,  with  some  extra  rations, 
arrived  from  Galadi,  escorted  by  Captain  Vesey  and  48  men, 
2nd  Sikhs.  This  convoy  had  been  sent  by  General  Manning, 
who  knew  that  the  supply  of  water  which  Cobbe  had  had 
with  him  would  only  lastto  the  16th.  In  the  event  of  Cobbe 
not  being  found  at  Guraburu,  the  convoy  was  intended  to 
form  a  water  post  there. 

On  the  16th  also,  General  Manning  heard  from  Cobbe,  who 
reported  that  owing  to  the  rainfall  of  the  15th  he  had  decided 
to  remain  out  for  some  days  longer,  as  he  had  been  unable  so 
fat  to  find  the  road  to  Wardair.*  General  Manning  now 
determined  to  reinforce  Cobbe  and  direct  him  to  return,  as 


"  The  following  despatoli  was  received  from  Lieut. -Colonel  Cobbe   at 
la  midnight,  dated  Gumbuni,  I6th  uiatant,  9.30  a.m.  : — 

Since  my  last  letter  of  evening  o£  14th,  I  have  had  rain,  and  yeslerday 
was  enabled  to  fill  up  some  water  tins,  and  Bo  decided  not  to  march  biick 
as  our  scouts  wore  engaged  with  the  enemy's  acDuta  yesterday  morning. 
-  .This  morning  I  sent ; — 

(a)  Half  company,  under  Captain  Luard,  in  weat-flouth-weat  direction. 

(ft)  Half  company,  under  Captain  Moms,  along  road  weat. 
I  *(e)  Mounted  patrol  north. 

(il)  Spies,  sonth-soiith-eitst. 

All  to  look  for  water  and  enemy. 

Party  (d)  have  returned  and  reported  water.  I  am  now  sending  out 
strong  escort  and  empty  tins  and  water  baga  ;  it  these  are  filled  I  shall  have 
full  thcoa  days'  water  from  to-morrow,  not  counting  convoy  which  I  expect 
to-day.  I  have  heard  firing  from  party  (a),  and,  on  a  message  from  party  (5), 
I  sent  mounted  itifantry  out  to  them  and  from  them  were  seat  to  party  (a), 
has  come  bacit,  8.45,  and  has  tepotfcd  that  there  nas  a  strong 


158 

he    conBidered  it   would  be  wiser   to   advance  by  a 
further  to   the  north,  which,  according   to   native  informa- 
tion, led  to  Walwal  and  thence  to  Wardair. 

Accordingly     a     party     of      monnted     infantry 
detailed  to  proceed  to  Gumburu,  but  on  the  night  of 


loate  ^ 

iorma-  I 

was  I 

of  the  V 


body  of  the  enemy  in  the  front  of  them  who  watohed  them  but  did  not 
attack.     Pattj  (e)  has  not  yet  come  in. 

I  have  ordered  thD  convoy  on  the  road  to  join  me  to-night  as  thc're  is 
bush  on  the  road  here, 

I  am  of  opinion  that  the  enemy  is  cnllet'ted  in  the  rery  thick  bush, 
about  10  milee  west  of  here,  in  which  I  was  attacked  by  the  horsemen,  and 
that  they  have  thrown  forward  aome  bodies  of  ecouts. 

Captain  Moms  reports  froni  the  trarkH  that  there  were  probably 
200  horsemen  and  as  many  footmen.  The  mounted  infantry  sent  ont 
have  come  back  without  reaching  party  (a).  Party  (a)  bos  aent  back  four 
men  and  a  captured  '303  rifle  and  horae  taken  from  enemy's  patrol,  and 
Bays  he  is  following  enemy's  patrol.  I  am  sending  out  mounted  infantry 
again  on  road,  Captain  Morris  returned  to  have  a  go  at  the  enemy,  as  Captain 
Morris  says  they  are  collected  not  far  from  camp.  I  tliink  some  more 
mounted  men  oot  here  would  be  useful,  as  I  think  there  Is  a  good  water 
pool  (in  party  (a)  direction),  which  infantry  cannot  reach  to-day,  and  have 
little  doubt  that  we  can  find  water  for  them  unless  all  rains  cease,  which 
seems  unlikely.  I  don't  yet  know  which  ts  the  road  to  Wardair ;  if  it  is 
the  road  I  went,  the  bush  is  very  thick  and  I  could  not  look  after  my  water 
camels  with  ray  present  force  in  it,  but  if  my  surauBo  ia  true  I  think  we  could 
raise  a  fight  12  miles  from  here.  I  want  to  hold  this  place  with  all  my  force 
if  water  permits,  as  I  can  reconnoitre  enemy  and  water,  and  also  it  protect 
the  40  odd  miles  from  Galadi  wliich  passes  through  a  lot  of  bush.  There  is 
no  doubt  the  enemy's  scouts  are  the  Uullah'a  good  men  from  his  harona.* 

Party  (c)  from  north  back,  have  gone  to  north  road  which  runs 
east  and  west  alwut  7  miles  north  of  here.  They  found  no  water  pool  or 
enemy. 

I  will  say  that  the  bush  we  got  to  was  very  dense,  so  much  so  that  I 
was  with  centre  of  front  face  and  left  face  and  half  transport  went  on  about 
60  yards  from  me  when  1  checked  force  a  few  minutes  and  I  could  not  see 
them  pass,  and  later  found  them  all  about  300  yards  in  front  of  me,  a  real 
niii  up.     This  wna  before  we  returned  baek,  and  before  any  enemy  met  ua. 

So  one  does  not  want  to  go  into  it  with  much  trflnBpott,  which  strings 
out  so  much  and  stampedes  at  the  first  shots. 

'303  rifle  captured  is  one  lost  at  Erigo. 

tHialoB  recognise  two  horses  as  belonging  to  the  Mullnh's  relsiions. 

■■'  Hear! quarters  encampment. 


1 


17th,  before  these  teinforcemenla  could  leave,  a  despatch  of 
that  morning's  date  was  received  from  Cobbe,  statang 
that  he  feared  that  some  reverse  had  befallen  a  detach- 
ment under  Plunkett,  which  had'  been  nent  out  from 
camp  to  bring  in  a  company  o£  the  2nd  Battalion,  King's 
African  Rifles  ei^aged  on  reconnaissance  duty.  Although 
Cobbe'e  despatch  gave  no  details  which  would  lead  to  the 
conciusion  that  a  disaster  had  occurred,  General  Manning 
decided  to  move  to  his  assistance  at  once  with  all  avaOable 
troops.  Shortly  after  midnight  on  the  17th-18th,  he 
left  Galadi,  taking  with  him  320  men  2nd  Sikhs,  and 
60  men  3rd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  and  sending  on 
in  advance  100  mounted  men  under  Kenna,  with  orders 
to  endeavour  to  push  through  to  Gnmburn.  Kenna 
bore  a  despatch  for  Cobbe,  informing  him  that  reinforce- 
ments were  moving  on  Guinburu,  and  directing  him  to  fall 
back  on  the  19th  instant,  on  which  date  General  Manning 
proposed  to  be  within  12  miles  of  that  place. 

By  the  morning  of  the  18th  General  Manning's  force  had 
covered  20  miles.  At  1  a.m.  on  the  19th  Cobbe  reported  that 
at  1  p.m.  on  the  previous  day  Kenna  with  the  mounted 
infantry  had  reached  him,  and  that  he  proposed  marching 
out  of  Gumburu  the  same  morning. 

Thereupon  the  General  decided  to  free  himself  of  his 
transport,  sending  the  whole  back  to  Galadi,  except  the 
camels  carrying  water,  and  to  form  a  zaiiba  at  the  camp  where 
his  force  now  was,  leaving  in  possession  a  strong  guard. 
Thus  unencumbered,  and  taking  with  him  250  men  of  the  2nd 
Sikhs,  he  marched  towards  Cobbe,  prepared,  if  the  latter'a 
retirement  were  molested,  to  render  him  timely  assistance. 

On  the  morning  of  the  IDth  he  moved  12  miles,  halting  at  Ueu 
a  point  about  10  miles  from  Gumburu,  where  a  message  was  ^'J. 
received  from  Cobbe  that  he  was  on  his  way  back, 
and  hoped  shortly  to  join  forces.  About  noon  Cobbu  arrived 
with  all  hifi  transpott  intact,  the  withdrawal  from  Gumbutu 
bviog  been  unmolested.  The  retirement  was  continued  with- 
it  incident,  and  Galadi  was  reached  at  sundown  on  the  20th. 


160 


When  Of  Tieral  Manning  left  Galadi  on  the.  night  of  the  17tli- 
18th  he  waa,  aa  has  been  stated,  only  partially  aware  of  what 
had  befallen  Plunkett'a  detachment,  but  during  hia  march 
towards  Gumburu,  messengers  despatched  by  Cobbe  made 
it  clear  that  a  disastrous  engagement  had  taken  place,  and 
when  the  two  forces  met,  further  details,  based  upon  the 
evidence  of  those  who  had  succeeded  in  escaping,  waa 
obtained. 

The  following  reports   from  Cobbe   and  Shakerley  give 
a  detailed  accoimt  of  the  reconnaissance  : — 
from  Lieut.-CtdoHtl   A,   S.    C'nbltr.,    Commanding   Jiccoitnuinsiiiice   towantt 

Wordair,  to  Iho  Chief  Slag  Olfmr,  SomalOand  Field  f  orrr. 
^iir.  Galadi,  2Ut  April,  IKOX 

I  hove  the  honour  to  report  that,  in  Bccordanco  with  the  inBtmelbiis 
received,  I  proooeded  on  the  night  of  the  10th  instant  from  Galadi  with  a 
force,  strength  as  below,*  to  the  water  post  which  had  been  eetablifihcd 
on  the  IStii  instant,  20  miles  Bouth-wcat  of  Galadi.  I  arrived  at  the  post  on 
the  morning  of  the  11th  instant,  and  found  that  it  bod  been  eatabliahed  on 
the  wrong  road,  and  tflO  far  to  the  south. 

I  reported  that  tliia  was  the  case,  mid  informed  you  that  it  was  niy 
intention  to  atrihe  ofi  in  a  north-westerly  dire:rt  on  until  I  shoiUd  reach  the 
proper  road,  which,  according  to  the  informotion  received  from  the  guide, 
Bhould  be  the  northernmoet  road  from  Galadi. 

I  marobed  across  country,  taking  with  rae  the  dataolunenl,  5th  Battalion 
King's  African  Rifles,-|-  who  Lad  garrisoned  the  water  post,  and  sending 
scouts  to  Gumburu,  and  passed  the  southern  road  to  Gumburu  on  the 
morning  of  tho  10th  instant,  at  II  miles  from  the  water  post.  At  16  miles 
I  reached  the  centre  road  to  Gumburu  after  passing  through  thick  bush, 
and  halted  on  it.  I  forwarded  a  letter  from  this  camp,  through  the  Officer 
Commanding  water  post,  suggesting  the  reraovoi  of  that  poat,  and  stating 
I  would  send  book  the  empty  comala  direct  by  the  road  on  which  I  now  was, 
also  informing  you  that  two  of  tho  enemy's  horsemen  hnl  bean  seen  close  Ic 
our  oarap,  from  which  they  had  galloped  away. 

As  my  mounted  men  had  given  me  no  news  of  a  road  further  north  than 
this,  I  decided  to  move  by  this  road  to  Gumburu.  This  is  the  rood  which 
Colonel  Plunkelt  used  when  lie  raided  to  Gumburu  previously. 

•  Camel  Battery:  1  Brilish  officer,  20  N.F.R.  1st  BaltaUon  King's 
African  Rifles  :  6  British  olBcers,  116  N.F.R.  2nd  Battalion  King's  African 
Rifles ;  10  British  officers,  1  British  warrant  otficer.  233  N.F.R.  Gtb  Bat- 
tiJion  Eing'a  African  Rifloa ;  1  British  officer,  10  rank  and  file.  Indian 
Medical  Service:  I  British  officer.  Transport:  1  British  officer,  I  non- 
commissioned officer,  134  assistants,  380  camels,  33  followers. 

t  5th  Battalion  King's  AMcan  Rifles :   1  British  ofllcor,  ^0  rank  and  file 


It 

^^r  the 


In  the  aft«raoou  X  stuit  the  Somali  Mouuted  Infaatry   imdsr  Lieutenoat 
Ciiichester,  to  tlie  front,  with  orders  to  go  about  10  mileb  before  dark,  sad 
marched  mjself  by  moouiight  until  I  reached  tlrnn,     Liuiit«naut  Chicheatcr 
reported  that  about  seven  of  the  enemy's  honiumen  bad  been  ae 
seeing  our  men,  tbej  bad  galloped  off ;    the  scouts  whom  I  had  si 
Gumbuiu  aiso  reported  that  they  had  fired  on 

I  baited  here  aud  suut  on  eight  Ijomoli  Mounted  Infuutry  nich  about 
12  foot  scouts,  to  go  through  the  night  and  oxamine  the  road ;  the  scouts 
were  ordered  Ui  wait  and  report  to  mo  at  daylight,  while  the  m.ounted 
iulsntry  scouted  furtber  to  the  frunt. 

1  started  at  4:  a.m.  on  the  13th  and  moruhed  10  miles,  being  met  at 
varioua  poinis  by  my  scouts,  who  reported  that  tbe  road  was  clear,  and  that 
the  tracka  of  the  enemy's  horsi^men  led  away  to  the  west.  As  the  guide 
appeared  to  be  doubtful  whether  we  wore  on  tbe  cigbt  road  to  Waidair  or  not, 
Ireoallod my  scouts  irom  the  road  leading  west,  and  sent  £ve  mounted  men 
out  to  (he  north-west  to  look  lor  oootber  ruud  further  north.  I'hey  teturaed 
and  repeated  that,  after  passing  through  thick  bush,  they  had  fouud  a  path 
which  seemed  to  be  much  less  used  than  the  one  on  which  I  was  marching, 
I,  therefore,  decided  to  keep  on  the  same  road. 

The  Britiah  andBurgberMouutedlufantry,"  under  Captain  Sbakerley, 
joined  me  at  tbe  mid-day  bait,  and,  bufore  miirubiug,  1  sent  bouk  70  camola 
with  empty  water>tind  imder  an  escort.  X  reported  that  1  was  extremely 
doubtful  of  the  road,  and  that  1  was  about  49  miles  west  of  lialadi,  but  that 
1  should  go  on  till  mid-day  on  tbe  next  day,  and  tlten,  if  X  bad  found  out 
ithiog  defiiiite  about  tbe  road  to  Wardair  and  the  wells,  X  should  have  to 
um,  as  X  could  not  aSard  to  go  furtber  with  the  water  which  1  had. 
(Ju  tbe  alteruooa  of  the  iStb,  1  sent  on  all  the  mounted  infantry  in  front, 
ith  orders  to  go  about  H  miles  along  tbe  road,  which  would  enable  me  to 
^lOBich  by  moonlight,  1  started  at  s  p.m.  with  tbe  infantry,  but  shortly  after 
Btatting,  not  seeing  tbe  tracks  of  the  mounted  infantry  on  the  road,  X 
inspected  that  tbey  had  been  guided  by  the  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  on  to 
noiUiBra  toad,  wbich  the  Somalia  bod  previously  reiounoitted.  1  sent 
camel  sowora  to  loUow  their  trai;ks  aud  recall  them,  who  returned 
without  finding  their  troolu, 

Asl  wasaoivin  Ibick  bush  and  hod  no  scouts  ahead,  X  baited  before  dark, 
after  4  miles,  and  made  a  zarilia.  'lbre«  scouts  were  sent  back  to  tbe  altar- 
noon  Damp,  to  lullDW  on  the  tracks  ol  the  mounted  inlantry,  with  a  letter 
recalling  them  tome.  Uhese  did  not  reach  the  mounts:  d  iuiau  try  till  7  o-m. 
At  4uju.  on  the  14th  instant,  X  sent  my  remaining  u:outba  Hburt  distance 
ahead,  but  did  not  march  mysell  until  dayughi,  at  li  a.m.  X  advonoed 
shortly,  and  as  tbe  bush  grew  thicker  aud  the  paths  dispersed,  X  decided  that 
X  could  do  no  more  by  mid-day,  and  so  ordered  tbe  column  to  retire. 

After  retiring  for  about  a  mile  aiLd  a  holt,  the  new  advanced  guard  waa 

■  LiritLBb  Mounted  XufauLry :  '2  oliiGers,  ill  non-cummisaioned  officen 
men.  i^urgher  Aluunted  Infantry  :  1  -uUiuer,  1^  non-commissioned 
d  mcu. 


1R5 


flred  into  by  the  enemy's  horsBmen.  I  was  able  to  collect  moat  of  the 
truiaport  into  the  zariba,  but  some  atampeded,  and  the  tive  nompiuues  ia 
front  dispersed  tbs  horsemen,  who,  however,  CDntiniied  to  huig  about  till 
the  mounted  infantry,  hearing  our  guns,  came  up  and  chased  them  away. 

T  continued  the  retirement  to  a  place  north  of  Gumburn  hill,  about 
42  miles  from  Goiadi,  and  sent  back  a  letter  saying  that  I  proposed  to  leave 
a,  post  there  and  to  return  myself  to  Galadi.  This  letter  I  sent  by  two 
Somali  Mounted  Infantry,  who  returned  saying  they  had  met  seven  of  the 
enemy.  I  then  sent  it  by  10  British  Mounted  Infantry.  During  the  night 
I  sent  out  my  scouts  to  watch  the  bush  for  the  enemy's  scouts ;  in  the 
monung  they  fired  at  and  dispersed  some  of  the  enemy's  horsemen  who  had 
galloped  up  to  them  unawares.  I  decided,  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  to 
rest  the  men,  who  had  had  a  trying  time.  During  the  morning  it  rained 
hard  for  one  hour,  and,  sending  men  out,  I  found  some  pools,  where  I  filled 
up  empty  tanks  and  watered  the  horses,  and  I  decided  not  to  maroh.  I 
received  a  letterinfonning  me  that  a  convoy  WM  on  its  way  to  Oiunburu. 

On  tlie  monung  of  the  ISth,  I  sent  out  half  a  company  to  the  west,  under 
Cftptain  Morris,  and  half  a  comptmy,  under  Captain  Luard.  to  the  W.S.W-, 
to  reconnoitre  for  the  enemy,  and  to  look  for  water ;  also  a  mounted  patrol 
to  the  north  to  look  for  the  northern  rood  and  water,  and  scouts  to  8.8.E. 
who  retiu^ed  and  reported  water. 

I  sent  out  a  strong  escort,  with  camels  and  empty  tins,  end  obtained 
some  water.  The  patrols  came  back  from  the  north  later,  and  reported  that 
they  had  gone  out  7  miles  but  had  seen  no  water  or  signs  of  the  enemy. 

In  the  morning  firing  was  heard  from  the  direction  of  Captain  Luard'a 
party,  and  Captain  Morris  reported  the  enemy  in  front,  but  that  they 
retjred  and  advanced  in  accordance  with  his  movements.  I  sent  out  the 
moimted  infantry  to  him,  and  when  they  reached  him  they  saw  no  enemy, 
and  Captain  Morris  showed  them  the  direction  Captain  Luard  had  taken, 
whence  firing  had  been  heard.  They  went  in  that  direction,  but  saw  no 
enemy,  and  came  on  some  of  Captain  Luard's  men  sent  bact  by  bim  with  a 
note,  in  which  he  said  that  lie  had  been  fired  on  by  the  enemy's  mounted 
patrols,  but  had  chased  them  and  killed  three  ponies,  captured  a  rifle, 
wounded  some  of  them,  and  was  following  them,  but  would  be  back  by 
10  a,ni.  Captain  Morris  returned  and  reported  that  he  had  seen  the  enemy's 
scouts  again  since  the  mounted  infantry  had  left  him,  so  I  sent  half  a  company 
to  follow  Captain  Luard's  tracks  and  remtorcB  him  should  it  bo  necessary. 
I  also  sent  the  mounted  Infantry  out  to  occupy  the  enemy  on  the  west. 

I  sent  in  a  report  of  what  I  was  doing,  also  expressing  an  opinion 
that  the  enemy  were  collected  in  the  thick  bush  about  10  to  12  miles  distant, 
where  I  had  been  attacked  by  the  horsemen  on  the  14th,  and  were  sending 
out  scouts  towards  us ;  also  stating  that  I  wished  to  hold  my  post  with 
all  my  force  until  the  arrival  of  the  main  coliunn  if  my  water  would  last. 
I  also  sent  a  letter  to  officer  commanding  convoy  to  march  straight  in. 

As  this  letter  was  leaving  I  heard  firing  from  the  mounted  infimtry, 
and  a  messenger  came  in  asking  for  reinforcements,  which  I  sent  out.  Very 
shortly  afterwards  I  received  another  letter  from  Captain  Sbakerley  saying 


that  Captain  Liiard,  hearing  the  firing,  had  coma  up  on  the  flank  of  ths 
enemy,  who  had  galloped  o3. 

Convoy,  under  Captain  Vesey,*  oam.B  in,  bringing  hack  my  letter,  and  I 
o  it  another  letter,  giving  the  casualties  in  the  mounted  infantry, 
le.,  Lieutenant  Cliiohester,  killed  ;  Burgher  Hill,  B<-vcre!y  wounded:  and 
iwo  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  wounded  (one  since  dead).  I  also  said  that 
I  would  send  bock  all  the  empty  cornels  possible  the  next  day  to  Galodi. 

In  the  aftcruoon  I  sent  out  a  strong  reooonaiesance  of  200  men,  under 
Major  Margesson,  to  see  it  any  of  the  enemy  were  about.  He  wenc  about 
4  mileB  and  saw  no  enemy. 

I  decided  to  send  back  all  except  150  eamela  next  afternoon,  with  empty 
watet-tins,  putting  my  water  into  a  tank.  I  ordered  a  reconnaisaancB  on  the 
morning  of  the  17tb,  consisting  of  one  company  2nd  Battalion  King's 
African  BiHca,  under  Captain  Olivcy,  wHich  would  proceed  to  the  wcat  about 
3  miles,  and  a  half  company  Ist  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  under 
Captain  Walker,  to  proceed  to  a  hill  about  1^  miles  to  the  aouth-west,  to 
see  if  the  country  was  clear  of  the  enemy.  I  made  a  tank  in  the  zariba  for 
wafer  about  4.45  a.m. 

I  received  a  report  from  Captain  Olivey,  despatched  7.45  a.m.,  saying 
that  he  was  3  to  4  miles  out,  had  seen  no  enemy,  but  only  the  tracke  of  one 
foot  man,  and  that  he  was  coming  back.  Shortly  afterwards  I  received 
another  report,  marked  S.3  B.m.>  saying  that  the  enemy,  both  horse  and 
foot,  were  advan<:ing,  and  that  he  was  retiring  slowly  and  required  rein- 
forcements. 

I  ordered  Colonel  Plunkett  to  take  out  one  company  2nd  Battalion 
King'sAfrican  Rifles  and  50  men  of  the  2nd  Sikhs  with  two  maxims  to  bring 
Captain  Olivey  in,  and  a  gun  was  fired  to  recall  Captain  Walker. 

Colonel  Plunkett  started  about  D.I5  a.m.,  owing  to  the  slight  delay 
occasioned  by  loading  the  maxima  and  distributing  50  rounds  extra  per  man. 
Ab  Colonel  Plmikett  started  another  report  from  Captain  Olivey  arrived 
saying  that  he  was  within  1}  miles  of  the  zariba  and  was  not  in  action. 

This  was  shown  to  Colonel  Plunkett,  to  whom  I  had  given  orders  that  he 
.  was  only  to  bring  Captain  Olivey  back. 

■       I  reported  the  news  which  had  been  received  to  you  at  8  a.m.,  saying 

^ttat  I  could  not  send  the  convoy  back  yet,  and  that  my  eommunicatioas 

might  be  cut.      I  also  sent  a  horseman  to   recall  Captain  Walker,  and 

proceeded  with  decreasing  and  strengthening  my  zariba  and  entrenching  it. 

At  11.45  a.m.  Somalis  reported  that  they  beard  firing ;  it  was  Hcarcely 
andible,  but  when  it  seemed  ceitaii.  that  there  was  firing,  I  sent  out  mounted 
Somalia  to  report — one  of  them  came  back  about  12.45  p.m.  carrying  Colone 
PIunkett'B  guide,  wounded,  on  lus  pony.     This  man  said  that  the  force  had 


been  cut  np. 

I  sent  more 

mounted 

men 

to  find  out  n 

wa,  and  sent  a 

report  at 

p.m. 

to  Galadi,  and  another  at 

2.30 

p.m.,  when  so 

ne  18  men  had  returned. 

The  fighting 

appears  t. 

have  been  some  0 

niles  from  the 

aribaace 

rding 

t        „.._. 

*  -2nd  Sikha 

1  British  Officer.  48  N.F.R, 

(8927) 


to  ttlH  BuuuunU  of  tliemeli  WUO  returned,  and  tliu  tiring  ]w&a  barely  auUilile, 
being  at  first  mistokea  for  the  wind. 

(■>  Colonel  Flunkett,  afl«r  meeting  Captaja  Olivef,  wbicb  he  Bhould  hsve 
done  within  a.  mile  of  the  zariba,  must  have  gone  on,  taking  Captain  Olirey 
with  him,  and  bcC3i  drawn  on  by  the  enemy  imtil  attacked  by  the  whole  of 
the  Mullah'a  forucs.  I  did  not  consider  myeeli  able  to  take  out  reinforce- 
ments to  him,  as  I  had  about  '250  men  left  and  oould  not  take  out  more  than 
160  men,  as  even  100  would  have  bean  insufficient  to  defend  our  zariba 
BB  it  waa,  ii  uiiiously  attacked,  and  any  rdinforuements  which  I  could  lake 
could  not  have  arrived  at  the  scene  of  the  light  until  it  was  over. 

In  the  afternoon  I  sent  out  a  mounted  patrol  to  see  if  they  could  find 
more  stragglers,  with  ordtirs  nut  to  allow  themselves  to  become  engaged  with 
the  enemy  on  any  account.  These  went  some  3  milea  and  saw  au  enemy's 
picquet  and  at  once  returned.  They  were  shortly  followed  by  a  large  number 
of  horsemeo,  whoaedust  could  be  seen  from  the  zariba.  A  couple  of  shrapnel 
were  fired  which  sent  them  back. 

The  enemy  made  no  attack  on  our  zariba,  but  bad  men  watching  it,  and 
at  night  sent  their  scouts  close  to  it,  where  they  were  Urcd  on  by  my  patcols. 
At  1  p.m.  on  the  Itith  instant,  Major  Kenna  with  100  mounted  infantry 
arrived,  giving  me  instructions  to  retire  if  possible  on  (iolodi,  and  infoimiug 
me  of  the  arrangements  made  on  the  rood,  1  sent  a  letter  informing  you  of 
my  plana,  and,  after  patrolling  all  round,  1  started  aeit  morning  with  oil 
my  transport,  wounded,  &c.,  and  met  you  at  mid-day  without  coming  into 
contact  with  tho  enemy,  tracka  of  their  soouts  and  lii'cs  in  the  west  being 
the  only  signs. 

On  the  iUth,  after  the  arrival  of  the  convoy  under  (Japtoiu  Vesey,  1 
found  that  I  had  full  water  rations  for  i  days,  and  was  still  filling  tins  from  a 
rolnpool,  and  I  could  moke  my  water  last  six  days,  so  1  wished  to  keep  all 
my  force  holding  the  enemy  and  covering  the  advance  of  the  main  column 
from  Calodi,  which  I  expected  would  reach  me  by  'JUth,  when  I  oootidently 
txpcl-ted  that  the  General  Officer  Commanding  would  be  able  to  attack  the 
enemy  within  10  miles  from  my  zariba-  Un  the  17th,  when  the  enemy 
waa  reported  in  full,  I  wished  to  get  in  thu  componiea  safely  which  were  out 
Fccomioitring,  and  then  considered  that  I  was  quite  strong  enough  in  my 
xariba,  which  it  waa  extremely  doubtful  that  the  enemy  would  attack, 
and  1  also  hod  sufficient  water  to  lost  me  for  some  days  after  1  expected  thu 

In  the  thick  hush  on  tho  14th,  I  found  the  left  Uauk  uompoiky  and  a  large 
amount  of  transport  hod  paused  within  00  to  )>0  yards  of  me  without  being 
■een,  and  got  in  front  of  the  front  face,  and  later,  when  retiring,  and  my 
odvancedguaid  was  fired  on  by  the  enemy,  who  were  very  few,  and!  was  able 
to  collect  nearly  all  my  transport  before  any  shots  were  Hred  Irom  a  ilank, 
and  the  transport  happened  to  be  in  an  open  patch,  even  then  a  few  camehi 
stampeded  and  some  loads  wore  lost. 

1  think  it  would  be  a  very  difficult  thing  to  protect  one' s  transport  in  the 
thick  bush,  and  as  the  number  of  eamels  is  found  to  be  as  many,  if  m>t  more 
Ihou  the  numbe'  of  fighting  men  when  carrying  several  days  water,  a  ooluuu 


165 

is  square  fotmatioii  in  dense  bush  prootioall^  reBolrsi  itself  into  faurdetAohed 
Bliodies  of  troops  ont  of  sight  and  touch  of  eanh  other.  There  ia  little  doubt 
\  &a,t  the  enemy  suffered  very  aeyerely  on  the  I7th,  as  they  made  no  attempt 
mtio  interfere  with  my  retirement  on  the  19th,  nftM  1  had  received  the  rein- 
X  foroement  of  100  mounted  infantry. 

I  attach  the  report  of  the  OGicer  Commuiding  Mounted  Infantry  on  the 
action  of  the  10th,  and  his  recommendation  ol  Riflemrui  AUIler,  King's  lloyal 
Rifle  Corps  Mounted  Infantry,  for  the  favourable  consideration  of  the 
General  Officer  Commanding.  I  also  wiah  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the 
General  Officer  Commanding  the  very  able  manner  in  which  Captain 
Shalterley,  King's  Royal  BiHe  Corps,  and  Captain  Foster,  Bur^hei  Mounted 
Infantry,  coUeoted  their  men,  who  were  galloping  in  extended  order,  when 
suddenly  attacked  by  a  large  body  of  the  enemy,  and  also  the  very  steady 
behaviour  of  the  British  and  Burgher  Mounted  Infantry,  which  atone  enabled 
them  to  heep  oS  the  enemy  until  the  appearance  of  the  infantry  made  the 
enemy  retire. 

I  also  wish  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  General  Officer  Commanding,  for  his 
favourable  consideration.  No.  A  750  Private  Mandelumbe,  2nd  Battalion 
King's  African  Rifles,  who  brought  in  No.  883  Private  Gomani,  who  wna 
wounded  in  the  arm,  a  distance  of  (i  miles  to  the  zariba. 

The  following  is  a  list  of  oaeualties  on  the  various  dates  ; — 
14th  April. — One  Somali  Guide,  slightly  wounded. 


166 


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i                      oi 

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_„,__,, 

:    -S        :        :       -    8 

;      ::         :     •    :        :    - 

Gum bum, 
Ir,  17th  April,  1903. 

I  bave  the  honour  to  report  that  in  accordance  witli  orders  I  proceed«1, 
tm  16th  April,  1!K)3,  with  my  pfltcol,  strength  iw  per  oiBrgin,*  along  the  road 
running  H-est  bom.  the  zariba ;  when  wo  had  gone  about  li  miles  we 
encountered  three  o£  the  enemy's  scouts,  we  pvirsued  them  and  after  going 
about  half  a  mile  oame  suddenly  upon  a  conaidetahle  force  of  the  enemas 
mounted  men  in  an  open  clearing ;  we  opened  lire  and  in  a  very  short  timB 
I  found  that  they  were  working  round  my  flanks  and  rear ;  I  retired  about 
40  yards  to  amorefaToiirablexiositionandfDrmed  asmall  cirele,  the  enemy 
were  Ix'tween  mo  and  the  sariba,  and  I  bad  wounded  men  and  one  killed ; 
a  hriak  fire  waa  maintained  for  about  three  quarters  of  an  hour,  the  enemy 
showing  much  courage  and  persistence,  one  man  and  horse  being  killed  within 
12  yards  of  the  circle.  I  denpatohed  a  messenger  to  the  Officer  Commanding 
Column  informing  him  of  our  poaition.  We  eventually  suoccBded  in  driving 
off  the  enemy  at,  I  believe,  a  considerable  loas  to  them.  About  10  minutes 
after  Che  firing  was  over,  Captuin  Luard,  King's  African  Rifles,  came  tm 
the  scene  with  bia  company,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  approach  of  this 
force  aaeiated  me  materially.  A  force  from  the  nariba  arrived  lat«r.  I  very 
much  regret  to  report  the  following  casualties ; — Lieutenant  Chichester, 
Somali  Mounted  Infantry,  killed.  Trooper  Hill,  Burgher  Conting-nt, 
and  two  Somalia  wounded ;   three  horses  kilted  aud  seven  wounded. 

Two  of  the  enemy's  dead  were  found  on  the  ground  and  13  dead  ponies, 
but  I  believe  they  suKered  considerably  as  moat  of  the  firing  waa  at  fairly 
close  range,  and  several  were  seen  to  fail  from  their  horses.  The  enemy 
being  round  us  some  time  after  the  firing  waa  over,  I  jircaume  they  were 
removing  their  dead  and  wounded. 

I  estimate  their  numbers  at  about  200.     1  have  brought  to  the  notice  of 
the  Officer  Commanding  Column,  in  a  separate  letter,  the  good  aervioes  of 
Bifleman  Miller,  King's  Royal  Rifle  Corps  Mounted  Infantry. 
I  am,  &D., 
G.  C.  8HAKERLEY,  Oa^in, 
CommandiTig  British  {King'e  Royal  Fiflr.  Corps) 
Mounted  Iitjaniry. 
To  the  Staff  Officer  to  Column  under 

IJeut.-Colonel  Cobbe,  V.C.,  D.S.O. 

Gum  burn. 
Sir,  18th  April,  1903. 

I  wish  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  Officer  Commanding  Column  the  good 
BcrvicBB  of  No.  2566  Rifleman  Joabef  Miller,  4th  Battalion  King's  Royal 
Rifles  (Britiah  Mounted  Infantry). 

On  IBth  April,  1903,  I  was  in  command  of  a  mounted  patrol,  scat  out 
from  the  column ;  wo  came  in  contact  with  some  mounted  dervishes  and  were 

*  British  MmmCed  Infantry,  1  OfGcer,  4  men ;  Burgher  Mounted 
Infantry,  I  Officer,  12_Men;  8 omali_Monnted_ Infantry,  1  Officer,  12  men. 


J 


leg 


eveiitnally  Bunounited  by  suviraL  hundred.  RiUpmnn  Miller  n-sn  ntaiiding 
close  to  me  and  heard  nlP  flay  that  I  was  going  t/>  aend  a  ineBBaga  to  the 
Officor  Commanding  Column ;  he  immediately  volimtecred  to  c-arry  this 
meflflage.  I  gave  him  a,  letter ;  he  succeeded  in  fi;alkiplag  through  tlie 
enemy's  linen  at  great  rial,  and  delivered  the  letter  to  the  Officer  Oom- 
manding  Column, 

I  liBve,  &o., 
■  G.  0.  SUAKERLEY,  Oaplain,  King's  Boyid  Ri/U  Oorpiy 

I  Coinmaluiiitg  BriUth  SJoaiited  Infantry. 

To  the  sun  Officer, 

The  Officer  Commajiding  Column 
Forwaideil  to  Chief  Staff   Officer  for   the  fuvoiirahle  consideratian   nf 
General  Officer  Commanding.     Ilia  horse  was  wounded  when  getting  hock. 
A,  S.  COBBE,  Lii!Vi.-CDlontl, 

Commanding  ReconnaUsaMf.. 

Such  is  the  tale,  ao  far  as  known,  of  the  first  engagement  Aoiion 
during  this  campaign  in  which  our  troops  measured  arms  with  Gumbur 
the  main  force  of  the  Mullah  Haji  Muhammed-hin- Abdullah's 
followers,  commanded,  it  is  said,  in  person  by  their  chief. 
On  both  aides  the  losses  were  heavy,  ours  being  9  officers 
and  187  men  killed  and  29  men  wounded.* 

It  is  obviously  impossible  to  state  with  accuracy  what 
numbers  on  the  other  side  fell  in  this  action.  Native  report 
is  proverbially  unreliable,  more  especially  that  of  the  Somali, 
and  while  some  say  that  the  killed  numbered  but  270,  others 
assess  them  at  ten  times  that  total,  but   on  all  hands  it  is 

•  The  following  is  a  narrative  of  the  Actioj 
1903,  estraoted  from  evidence  by  survivors 
Enquiry  held  at  Galadi  and  elsewhere  : — 

The  focco  which  muched  out  of  the  zariba  at  Gumburu,  under  LieuL- 
Colonel  Plunliett,  on  the  17th  instant,  oonaiated  of  48  men,  2nd  Sikha,  and  a 
company  2nd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles, 

About  1  mile  from  the  zariba  this  force  met  "  C"  Company  of  the  3nd 
Battalion  King's  African  RiHes,  under  Captain  Olivey.  The  force  then 
apparently  formed  square,  with  the  Sikhs  in  the  front  faoe,  and  marched 
aome  6  miles  further  to  an  open  spot,  wMoh  waa  surrounded  by  thick  bush. 
The  distance  of  the  bush  from  the  square  is  variously  eatimaled  from  300  to 
600  yards.  The  enemy  hod  apparently  collected  in  this  bush,  and  advanced 
on  the  square  from  it.  First  horsemen,  then  foot  riflemen,  and  afterwards 
speannen,  attaoked  the  square  on  all  siiles.  The  horsemen  and  riflemen  were 
driven  back,  but  ammunition  beconiing  exhausted,  the  square  was  broken 
by  the  rush  of  spearnien. 


170 

admitted  that  the  number  of  wounded  was  very  great.  That 
the  Mullah  at  Gumbura  lost  many  of  hia  bravest  adherents,  is 
undoubted,  and  is  supported  by  the  fact  that,  despite  Cobbe'a 
email  force  being  encumbered  with  about  1,000  camels,  no 
attempt  waa  made  to  harass  Him  in  his  retirement.  The  Yaoa 
who  escaped  to  tell  the  tale  of  the  disaster  related  how  the  dead 
bodies  of  the  enemy  lay  in  heaps  before  the  square,  a  monu- 
ment to  the  determined  valour  of  the  devoted  band  of 
defenders  who  composed  it. 

In  describing  in  a  despatch  the  occuirences  of  the  17th 
April,  General  Manning  considered  "  that  under  the  circum- 
stances IJeut,- Colonel  Cobbe  acted  in  the  beat  manner  that 


B  the  enemy  frequently  ci 


In  spite  of  the  fire  of  the  troops  and  I 
up  as  close  bs  10  yfuds  from  the  Bquore. 

When  the  ammunition  was  eihausted.  Colonel  Plunkett  gaire  orders  for 
Ihe  troopa  to  charge  with  the  bayonet  back  to  the  Eariba.  Previous  to  this, 
however,  it  appears  that  many  offioera  and  men  had  been  killed  and  wounded. 

Some  evidence  poiata  to  the  front  face  of  the  square  being  first  pushed 
back  by  a  rush  of  apearmen  upoa  the  Sikha,  who  fought  with  the  bayonet 
but  re-formed.  At  this  period  of  the  fight  moat  of  the  casualties  ocoulred, 
and  from  the  evidence  of  mitnesBes  the  whole  of  the  officera  were  killed, 
together  with  the  two  men  of  the  King's  Royal  Rifles  who  accompanied  the 
force.  Captain  Johnston- Ste wait,  before  being  killed,  told  those  who  could 
to  get  back  to  the  laribn. 

The  fight  appears  to  have  lasted  some  two  hours.  Colonel  Plunkett  left 
oamp  at  0.16  a.m.,  and  at  1 1,45  a.m.  firing  was  heard  in  tha  distance.  This 
would  make  the  Bcene  of  action  about  7  miles  from  the  zariba.  The  return, 
at  12.4S  p.m.,  of  a  Somali,  who  brought  in  news  that  all  waa  over  in  the 
square,  cannot  be  accepted  as  reliable  evidence,  as  he  proiiably  escaped 
early  in  the  fighti  and  waa  brought  in  upon  the  pony  of  the  aoout  aent  out 
to  see  what  waa  happening. 

The  numbers  of  the  enemy's  dead,  as  stated  by  witness.  Tiny,  bat  the 
Somali  or  Yao  cannot  lie  relied  upon  to  estimate  numbers  with  Bjay  approach 
t<i  exactitude.     The  Yao  can  only  count  up  to  10. 

Tha  evidence  of  the  Somalia  points  to  the  fact  that  some  outside  tribes 
(Adonis  probably)  were  engaged  in  the  attack. 

The  evidence  of  the  Yao  speaks  of  fair  men  (probably  Arabs)  and  others 
(probably  Adonis),  who  are  negroes,  and  Somaiis,  as  having  been  Been  in  the 
fight. 

The  whole  evidence  goes  to  prove  that  the  fight  was  a  most  gallant  one, 
and  that  the  majority  of  the  men  had  finished  their  ammunition  before  the 
square  was  broken  by  an  overwhelmii^  rush  of  spearmen. 

(Odb  company*had  100  rnundB  ppr  man  and  the  other  ISO.) 


171 

he  could.  Plunkett  had  marched  so  far  from  the  zariba  that 
to  have  despatched  reinforcementR  in  time  to  avert  destruc- 
tion would  have  been  impossible  and  would  have  ao  weakened 
the  garrison  of  the  zariba  as  to  render  it  liable  to  be  captured." 

After  the  withdrawal  to  Galadi,  the  General  considered  TlieQei 
that  to  advance  at  once  on  Wardair  and  Walwal  was  im-  *^""" 
practicable,  his  reasons  being  that  "  the  delay  caused 
by  the  events  at  Gumburu  had,  in  any  case,  too  far 
reduced  the  available  rations  and  transport,  while  the  know- 
ledge gained  of  the  country  to  be  traversed  and  of  the  military 
spirit  of  the  enemy  would  have  necessitated  a  larger  force 
was  available  at  Galadi,"*     Aa  Fasken  had  reached 


telegram  received  by  the  Secretary  of  Stal«  for  Wor  o 
April,  General  Manning  reported  ; — 


24th 


runner  from  Galadi-Damot 
Reconnaiasance  ■  townidB  Wardair  proves  that  that  place  is  ftbout 
miles  from  here,  and  there  ia  no  water  on.  the  way.  Country  is  very  dense 
bush,  and  so  fur  no  road  leading  to  WordBir  has  been  found.  To  enable  me 
to  adranoe  I  should  require  large  number  of  camels  to  transport  my  foroo 
Gorrying  water  for  10  days.  The  danger  of  tliis  operation  would  be  an  attack 
on  convoy  camels  in  dense  bush,  which  could  only  be  very  inadequately 
defended,  since  square  formation  in  very  dense  bush  ia  impossible.  An 
advance  in  these  circumstanceB  would  he  very  risky  and  might  end  in  the 
loss  of  transport  camels  by  stampede,  and  therefore  the  loss  of  our  water 
supply.  Tho  bush  from  here  to  Gumburu  is  so  tbiclt  (hat  mounted  infantry 
cannot  operate  in  moat  places.  In  any  case  I  should  require  a  force  of  at 
least  1,000  men,  and  for  this  force  would  require  about  2,000  camels ;  and 
my  total  available  camels  to-day,  including  those  on  the  liaca  of  communica- 
tion, is  2,200.  The  supply  of  camels  from  Berbera  is  becoming  exhausted, 
and  great  difficulties  would  be  experienced  in  obtaining  sufficient  numbers 
to  enable  me  to  advance  and  still  push  up  suppUes  from  Obbia.  I  am 
reluctantly  compelled  t«  come  to  conclnaion  that  I  cannot  advance  on 
Wardair  at  once,  and  that  such  advance,  whenever  undertaken,  would  bo 
extremely  risky,  and  in  view  of  large  number  of  enemy  collected  at  Wardair 
I  feel  that  such  an  advance,  with  tho  force  at  my  disposal,  would  not  ba 
aaSe.  We  will  hold  Galkayu,  Dndub,  Bera  and  Galadi,  and  an  Abyssinian 
force  operating  from  the  west  could  more  easily  reach  the  Mullah,  since 
ronte  to  Wardair  on  that  side  is  well  watered.  The  condition  of  most  of 
the  transport  animals  ia  very  poor  owing  to  want  of  grazing.  I  had  collected 
a  fortnight's  supplies  here  for  advance  to  Wardair,  but  tho  shortage  of  the 
osmels  on  the  lines  of  communication  compels  me  to  send  back  majority 
tbe  force  from  here  to  Galkayu,  and  to  utilira  every  animal  to  bring 
ipplies  up  from  the  base. 


nmtc,      ^ 


heedqaarters  from  (Jalkayti  on  the  17th,*  General  Maiminff, 
after  d-'ducling  Cobbe's  losses,  hed  still  with  him  1.0S5 
men. 

While  the  movement  on  Wardair  which  haa  just  been 
described  was  in  progress,  another  of  a  similar  nature  was, 
under  instructions  from  the  Cleneral,  being  carried  out  from 
Bohotle. 

Major  J.  E.  Gough,  who,  as  Staff  Officer,  had  accompanipd 
Plunkett  when  he  marched  to  Galkayu  towards  the 
end  ni  March,  had  been  selected  for  the  ui.dertaking, 
and  was  directed  to  return  to  Damot  and  assume  commai.d 
of  the  flying  column.  Gough  reached  Damot  on  the  9th 
April,  and  leaving  there  a  post  consisting  ot  60  rank  and 
file,  7th  Bombay  Pioneers,  arrived  with  the  flying  column  at 
Bnhotle  on  the  llth. 

The  general  nature  of  the  operation  which  was  about  to  be 
carried  out  had  been  indicated  by  General  Manning,  and  was 
to  consist  of  a  movement  to  the  "  west  and  south-west  with 
the  double  object  of  collecting  information  and  stock,  and 
interposing,  if  necessary,  between  the  Mullah  and  the  district 
to  the  north  and  north-east  of  Hodayuwein."  The  flying 
column  was  further  to  "  endeavour,  as  far  as  possible,  to 
keep  up  communication  with  the  advanced  force  operating 
from  Galadi." 

In  consultation  with  Swann,  it  was  decided  that  Gough 
should  proceed  to  Danot,  some  75  miles  in  a  straight  line 
to  the  south-west  of  Bohotle.  Reaching  there  as  quickly 
aa  possible,  he  would  be  in  time  to  co-operate  with  the 
force  under  Cobbe,  and  perhaps  cut  off  such  of  the  Mullah's 


•  2nd  Siklis 

lat  Battalion  King's  Africmi  RiSea 
3rd  Battalion  King's  African  Biflea 
British  Field  Hospital 
Details         

Total,  M  ranks      , . 


following  as  nuglit,  owing  to  the  udvance  ut  that  oliiuer,  fall 
back  to  the  north  or  north-eaat. 

At  Danot,  according  to  local  report,  there  was  a  con- 
siderable pool  of  rain-water,  and  the  seizure  o£  that  place 
would  provide  a.  useful  pivot  tor  further  operations. 

At  4  p.m.  on  the  13th  April,  Gough'a  colunni,  with  Captain 
C.  M.  Bruce,  R.F.A.,  as  Staff  Officer  and  Captain  G.  M.  Holland, 
lOlst  Grenadiers,  as  Intelligence  Officer,  left  Bohotle  :  — 


► 

Officers. 

N.COs. 
British. 

Ranlc 
and 
FUb. 

Maxim 
Runs. 

staff 

Indiirn  Contingent,  B.C.A 

2nd  Bfttt-alion  King'a  African  RiHeB . . 

Msdioal 

Supply  and  transport . . 

3 
8 

2 

S5 
200 
22 

20 

2 
1 

Total 

14 

2 

387 

3 

h 


and  176  followers. 

They  took  with  them  406  camels,  carrying  5  days'  water, 

days'  rations,  and  reserve  ammunition. 

In  a  despatch  from  Bohotle,  dated  28th  April,  iyo3,  Qough 
ive   the  following  account  of  his  operations,  and   the  fight  ji^^^t^igi, 
at  Daratoleh*  :— 

Ualti'd  at  5.30  p.ui.     Dmtanue  ot  niarcli  4  miles,  on  tiie  KurmJa-Bohotle 

Uo  the  14th  April,  1>J03,  left  zariba  at  5.30  a.iu-,  and  marched  14  mil<:H 
ou  Kunuia-Bubotla  road,  wlipre  the  force  halted  for  tlie  midday  halt.  An 
issue  of  watec  was  made,  and  the  spore  camels,  with  empty  water-tina. 
Beat  back  to  Uohotle.  CoDtiaaed  march  at  2  p.m.,  ou  KurmiB-Bohotle  road, 
for  2mileB,  at  wliioh  point  the  column  strucli  oU  aouth-wect  by  west.  Halted 
6.30  p.m.     Cistanee  of  maruh,  20  miles. 

Three  mounted  Somali  suouts  were  sent  on  to  try  and  get  information 
whether  there  was  water  at  Donot,  or  if  any  water  in  the  balia  ahoad  of  the 
column.  These  men  missed  tbe  column  on  their  return,  and  arrived  at 
Bohotle. 

On  the  15th  April,  Ia03,  left  lariba  at  5.40  a.m.,  the  mounted  troops  ol 
the  flying  colunm,  streagth  as  below,  under  Major  Sharp,  caught  up  the 
infaotrj  column  and  continued  their  inarcli,  keeping  about  2  miles  ahead 
^rf  the  infantry. 

'^  tiee  page  32U, 


Offil'LTB. 

Mph. 

Followere. 

Cwnels 

Paniea. 

BikanirCamBl  Corps •! 

Somali  Camel  Corps           . .          . .          1 
SoraftU  Mounted  lalanttj  . .         . .          3 

BO 

50 
BO 

+          '       B5 
0         '      66 

e      1    86 

Total 6 

180 

16         I     200 

rUa  forte  left  Bohotle  at  i  p.m.  on  14tb  April,  starting  afttrthe  infaulry, 
in  order  to  aava  water,  as  owing  to  tliere  being  no  water  on  the  rond  every 
drop  had  to  be  carried  in  wafer-tins.  At  7.30  a.m.  tho  column  struck  the 
Bohotle-Ulik-Walwat  road,  and  continued  the  march  along  it.  Three 
hours  mid-daj  halt.  I^eft  again  at  3  p.m.,  the  mounted  infantry  ponies 
having  been  given  a  4  gallon  drink.     Diiftance  ot  march,  21  miles. 

On  the  10th  April,  1003,  m  no  news  of  water  either  at  Danot  or  neigh- 
boitfhood,  orders  were  given  to  the  mounted  troops  to  continue  On  the 
DHk-Walwal  road  for  20  milrR,  and  to  make  every  endeavour  to  capture 
a  prisoner,  and  to  look  out  well  for  any  balls  holding  water. 

It  no  news  o(  wal<>r  at  Danot  ohtained,  the  mounted  troops  to  make 
a.  raid  in  a  southerly  direction,  inflict  as  much  damagn  on  (he  encray  as 
possible,  and  then  to  fall  back  on  the  infantry  column,  who  would  remain 
at  Garrero  till  the  morning  of  ISth  April,  when  they  would  fall  back  ton^ards 
Bohotle  to  pick  up  a  water  convoy.  If  information  was  obtained  that  there 
wa«  water  at  Danot,  the  mounted  troops  were  to  seize  the  place  and  hold 
it  until  the  infantry  column  arrived. 

The  mounted  troops,  under  Major  Goilgb,  left  the  zariba  at  3,30  lum,, 
carrying  as  much  water  for  the  men  as  posaiblo  (i.e.,  camel  corps,  3  days ; 
and  mounted  infantry,  2  days). 

This  force  moved  20  miles  along  tho  lllik-Walwal  road,  and  at  11  a.m. 
the  Somali  Camel  Corjis  brought  in  two  prisoners,  who  stated  that  they  had 
met  some  of  the  Mullah's  scouts  3  days  previously,  who  had  told  them  that 
there  was  water  at  Danot,  and  that  the  place  was  held  by  a  few  of  the 
Mullah's  mounted  rificmen.  The  mounted  troojH,  therefore,  continued  their 
marchtoDanotfromBeitdali.undcrMaiorGough,  one  of  the  prisoners  being 
used  as  a  guide.  Captain  Rolland  with  the  oth?r  pr'soaer,  who  waa  taken 
on  as  a  guide  (or  tha  infaolrycolonio,  returned  to  the  infantry  columa  with 
orders  to  Major  Rowlands  to  continue  his  march  on  Danot,  but  if  he  reoeived 
no  further  instructions  he  was  to  turn  back  to  Bohotle  on  evening  of  ITth,  as 
otherwise  he  would  not  havo  enough  water  with  which  to  make  the  return 
journey,  and  until  the  mounted  troops  actually  held  Danot  it  was  impossible 
to  say  what  the  water  sopply  there  actually  waa. 

The  mounted  troops  halted  at  6,30  p.m.,  having  mar.^hed  32  miles.  It 
was  found  afterwards  that  this  force  waa  lad  considerably  out  of  the  direct 


^^H  me 


176 

On  the  ITth  April,  1003,  the  mounUd  troapa  coatinued  their  march  at 
3.30  a.m.,  and  met  the  Bohotle-Megsgjifa-Dimot  road  at  6  a-m.,  aoms 
14  miles  from  Megngjifa.  At  11.30  a.m.,  when  some  10  miles  from  Deaot, 
the  force  hailed,  as  tho  animals  were  very  dona  up  by  the  heat  and  want  of 
water.  Ten  of  the  best  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  ponies  were  picked  out,  and 
a  patrol  of  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  aent  on  to  Danot  to  reconnoitre  and 
report  on  the  water.  At  4  p.m.  two  of  this  patrol  returned  and  reported  aa 
follows : — 

"  Went  to  Danot  and  fonnd  Ifi  of  the  enemy's  horsemen,  thased  them, 

capturing  nine  ponies.     Water  there  only  sufficient  for  the  whole 

flying  column  for  three  days." 

On  this  information  orders  were  sent  out  by  mounted  measengEra  to 

Major  Rowlands  to  return  to  Bohotle,  as  there  was  not  enough  water  to  fill  up 

tins  for  tho  return  journey.      The  mounted  troops  continued  their  march 

to  Danot  to  water  up,  and  to  aot  on  any  further  information  that  might  be 

obtained. 

Arrived  Danot  5.4B  p.m.,  a  few  shots  being  fired  by  the  enemy  on  out 
left  flank.  Water  was  found  to  be  more  tlian  exjiected,  although  not  enough 
for  the  whole  flying  polumn.  Orders  «Tn-,  llicrFfore,  sent  to  Major  Rowlands 
at  n.30  p.m.,  cancelling  previous  orders,  and  ordering  up  100  2nd  Battalion 
King's  African  Rifles,  50  Sikhs,  2  MaiimH,  reserve  ammunition,  100  water 
tins,  and  all  available  rations,  tho  remainder  of  the  column  to  return  to 
Bobotle.     A  strong  zariba  was  made. 

On  the  18th  April,  1903,  patrols  of  l^omaH  Mounted  Infantry  were  sent  out 
west  and  south-west  at  G  a.m.  These  retunted  at  noon  with  400  loot  camels 
and  two  prisoners.  Tlie  latter  reported  three  days'  heavy  fighting  between 
Oaladi  and  Wardair,  and  that  the  Mullah  had  lost  many  men.  Zariba  was 
strengthened. 

At  5.30  p.m.  messengers  received  from  Major  Rowlands,  dated  noon  this 
day,  15  miles  east  of  Megagjifa,  sayiui{  that  up  to  the  time  of  wrifing  no 
messengera  from  flying  column  were  received  by  him,  and  that  ho  would 
have  to  return  unless  he  received  orders  by  early  morning  of  IDth.  Bis  men 
had  been  placed  on  a  half  issue  of  water  to  enable  Major  Rowlands  to  stay 

bock  at  once,  repeatmg  previous  orders  re  coming 

to  Danot 

An  Ibrahim  was  sent  to  Walwal  to  try  and  get  information,  and  camel 
neat  wan  issued  to  all  ranks  as  rations. 

On  the  19th  Ajuil,  1(103,  an  officers'  patrol,  under  Captain  Hughes, 
conaisling  of  30  Bikanu'  Camel  Corps  and  10  Somali  Mounted  Infantry,  were 
sent  out  on  Walwat  road.  Tliis  patro!  returned  at  5  p.m.,  having  gone 
15  miles  on  the  Wnlwalcoad  and  having  seen  notliiug.  At  12.30  p.m.  afewot 
the  enemy's  hocsfiraen  repotted  in  tho  bush  close  to  the  zariba.  Fifteen 
Somali  Mounted  Infantry  chased  them  out  of  it,  a  few  shots  being  exchanged. 

At  1.30  p.m.  a  letter  was  received  from  Major  Rowlands,  acknowledging 
leoeipt  of  yesterday's  orders,  and  saying  that  he  was  acting  on  tbfm.     Our 


two  previoii!'  messetiiiere  wi^re  afterwards  fmm<l  to  haye  eventually  fetcheil  up 
at  Bohotle, 

On  the  20th  April,  1903,  Major  RowlandR,  with  60  Bikha  and  30  2nd 
Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  arrived  at  our  zariba  at  1.30  a.m.,  having 
marohed  35  inilc-e,  the  convoy  being  zaribaed  at  dark  about  10  miles  from 
Danot  The  Eikauir  Cmnel  Corpa  were  Bent  out  at  daylight  to  meet  the 
convoy  and  escort  it  into  Daiiot  The  convoy  arrived  all  correct  at  9  a.m. 
A  false  alarm  occurred  at  noon.  The  zariba  was  strengthened  and  bush 
cleared. 

Ou  tbe  21st  April,  1I!03,  a  patrol  of  25  Somali  Mounted  Infitntry  was  sent 
out  at  4.30  a.m.  towards  Wardair  with  orders  to  go  on  till  they  met  the 
enemy  or  othecwixe  obtained  information  and  to  bring  hauk  a  prisoner,  if 

Another  patrol  of  Somali  Camel  Corps  was  sent  to  Masara  (7}  mites 
nouth-weat  by  weet)  to  report  on  water  there.  This  patrol  returned  at 
8.30  a.m.,  reporting  the  water  there  so  filthy  that  the  animaU  refused  to 
drink  it.  The  SomaU  Mounted  Infantry  patrol  returned  at  1  p.m.  with  two 
prisoners,  and  reported  having  met  42  of  the  enemy's  scoots  12  miles  from 
Danot ;  they  killed  IS  and  brought  back  2  prisoners.  The  priEoners  stated 
a£  toUowB : — 

"  Sent  out  from  Daratoleh  (2fi  miles  S.S.E,  from  Danot)  to  watch  the 
English  force  and  report  on  iCa  strength.  Enemy's  force  at  Daratoleh, 
50  mounted  riflemen  and  300  spearmen,  but  that  they  had  received  further 
reinforcements  yesterday."  Also  staled^i  that  there  hud  been  heavy 
fighting  at  Gumburu,  the  Mullah  losing  heavily  ;  also  that  there  was  a. 
fresh  rain  water  balli  at  Daratoleh. 

Tbe  Ibrahim  who  was  seat  out  on^lTth,  returned  at  2.30  p.m.  and 
coaoborated  the  above  story,  but  said  that  the  enemy  had  a  larjie  force  at 
Daratoleh,  and  that  (he  English  force  had  halted  at  Gumburu  and  was 
short  of  water. 

A  report  o£  tie  aliovB  was  sent  to  the  Office!'  Commanding  Lines  ot 
Ojuununicaliun,  Sohotle,  informing  him  that  the  mounted  troopa  would  go 
out  to  Daratoleh  to-moirow  (morning  of  22nd). 

On  the  22nd  April,  11)03,  aa  reported  in  my  letter  of  21st  to  Officer 
Commanding  Lines  of  Communication,  iiohotle,  I  Itft  Danot  at  4.30  a.m. 
with  following  force : — 

46  Bikanir  Camel  Corps,  2  ofBcora,  with  1  maxun  under  tjergeant  Gibb. 

64  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  "1  6th  BattaUon  King's  13  officers. 

60  SomaU  Camel  Corpa  /       African  RifleE       1 1  officer. 

30  2nd  liattalion  King's  African  Rifles.  2  officers  mounted  on  Bikanir 
riding  camels  (behind  the  camel  sowars). 

12  Indian  Conlingetit,  British  (Antral  Africa,  1  officei,  mounted  on 
ponies. 

Lieutenant  Horton,  I.M.S. 

At  7.30  a.m.  we  wcTo  tired  on  by  the  enemy's  soouta.  llie  Somali 
Mounted  Infantry  chaaed  and  killrd  iwo  men,  capturing  two  rifles  (Li>e- 
Eufielils}  and  three  ponies 


177 

We  lost  one  pony  sliol.     One  mounted  scout  of  the  enemy  got  away.     A  t 

B.lSa.m.  meagaiucameineontactwith  the  enemy's  scouts,  and  at  10.20  a.m. 

BCaptain  Howard  of  tlie  Somali  Hounted  Infantry  reported  a  large  force  of 

V«nemj  advancing  ta  meet,  lu:     The  force  was  dismounted  at  once,  aoimats 

■p>aced  in  centre,  and  the  men  lining  the  faces. 

At  10.30  a.m.  the  enemy  attacked  in  front,  almost  immediately  developing 
the  attack  on  all  .■'ides.  Owing  to  thick  buah  and  long  grasa  the  firing  n-aa  at 
very  close  range,  from  20  to  50  yards  being  the  average  range.  This  heavy 
attack  continued  till  2  p.m.,  out  men  teing  most  steady  and  firing  welL  The 
maidni  under  Sergeant  Gibb  was  moved  from  place  to  place  as  occasion  arose, 
and  the  enemy  always  giving  way  when  it  opened  fire.  The  enemy  attaoked 
in  a.  most  determined  way,  exposing  themselves  freely.  At  2  p.m.,  our 
ammunition  lacginning  to  run  short,  and  one  of  the  enemy  who  waa  captured 
by  the  Somali  Camel  Corpa  reporting  that  the  Mnllah  himself  waa  at  Dara- 
toleh,  and  it  therefore  being  highly  iraprobable  that  the  Obbia  force  were 
either  at  Wardair  or  oven  threatening  the  place,  I  had  to  decide  whether  to 
advance  further  or  return  to  camp.  Principally  owing  to  lack  al  ammunition 
for  further  big  fight,  I  decided  t«  return  t-o  Danot.  All  the  wounded  were 
put  on  riding  camels  or  ponies.  About  2. 15  p.m.  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  rein- 
forced and  firing  began  again,  and  at.  2.30  p.m.  the  front  faee  [Bikanir  Camel 
Corps)  under  Captain  Walter,  and  the  left  face  (IhidBattalion  King's  African 
Rifles)  under  Captain  Townaend,  charged  about  100  yards  info  tho  buah 
clearing  the  enemy,  who  were  still  keeping  up  a  desultory  fire  from  our 
immediate  neighbom'hood.  Directly  they  returned  the  rear  face  advanced 
"00  yards,  the  cnniels,  Ac,  closmg  on  mem,  and  the  front  and  side  faces 
retiring,  thus  forming  an  elastic  sq^uars  with  the  animals  in  the  centre.  The 
retirement  was  continued  in  this  formation  through  thick  buah  until  6,30  p.m. 
At  3  p.m.,  as  wo  were  short  of  ammunition  and  were  being  considerably 
pressed  on  flanks  and  rear  by  the  enemy,  who  had  brought  np  more  riflemen 
and  spearmen,  I  sent  four  SomaU  Mounted  Infantry  to  Officer  Commanding 
detachment  at  Danot  to  send  out  ammunition  to  meet  us.  (Thig  foroo, 
under  Captmn  Barolay.  met  ns  0  miles  from  Danot  about  11.30  p.m.,  and 
returned  to  Danot  with  the  mounted  troops.) 

Up  to  5.30  p.m.  the  rearguard  and  side  faces  were  heavily  engaged.     Our 
re  natra'aJly  slow  owing  to  our  having  to  load  the  wounded  on  to 


At  5.30  p.m.  I  mounted  the  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  (tho  then  leading 
■  laoe),  and  they  went  forward  imder  Captaia  Dickinson  and  Captain  Howard 
a  fan  shape  and  then  halted,  thus  clearing  the  enemy  from  our  aide  faces 
OQT  again  moving. 
1  deeply  regret  to  report  the  following  ofliuers  killed : — 

CaptM  C.  M.  Bruce,  R.F.A.,  Staff  Officer  to  flying  column. 
Captain   C.   Godfrey,   I.A.    [Indian   Contiagent,   British   Central 

The  following  oftioera  are  wounded : — 

Major  A.  Sharp,  Officer  Commending  Somnli  Mounted  Infanliy  and 
Somali  Camel  Corps. 
(8927)  M 


178 

_  •Major  H.  B,  RowlaodB,  2nd  Battalion  King's  A/rican  Rifles. 
Cnptain  E.  M.  Hiielips.  14th  Lincora,  (Bikamir  Camel  Corps). 
Captain  R.  E.  Townnend,  2nd  Battalion  King's  AJrican  Rifles. 
Also  the  following  rank  and  file  : — 
Killed— 

BiknuLT  Camel  Carps         , .         . .         . .  It 

iSoinali  Monnted  Infftntry . .         . .         . .  1 

'  SomaB  Camei  Corps  . .         . .         . .  4 

2nd  BnttaHon  King's  African  Kiflta       . .  4 

Indian  Cuntingent,  British  Central  Afrii'a  1 

Total  IS 

and  lilt-  following  wounded  ;^ 

Bikanjr  Camel  Corps         i 

Somali  Mounted  Iniantrj- 7 

Somali  Camp!  Corps  5 

2nd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles       . .  7 

Indian  Contingent,  Biitish  Central  Africa  2 

Total  ■J.'j 

We  also  lost  17  riding  oameln  killed  and  13  wounded,  alaoSponieakillBd 
nnd  B  wounded. 

During  tbc  attack  on  ua  between  10.30  a.m.  and  3  p.m.,  foor  bayonet 
ekarges  were  made,  two  by  the  2nd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  one  by 
(he  Somali  Camel  Corps,  and  one  by  tho  Bikaait  Camel  Corps  and  Indian 
Contingent,  BriliRh  Central  Africa.  TkesB  were  made  with  tlic  object  of 
clearing  the  bush,  and  in  all  cases  sucueeded. 

The  firing  ceased  at  about  5.45  p.m. 

The  force  returned  to  the  zariba  at  Dauot  at  K15  a.m.  All  wounded 
brought  in  and  moat  of  the  dead. 

In  conclu^on  I  cannot  spe-ak  too  highly  of  the  behaviour  of  all  ranks.  It 
fould  not  have  been  better,  the  Somaba  surprising  everyone  by  thefr  steadi- 
ness and  dash,  the  Sod  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles  having  both,  officers 
wounded  and  losing  1 1  men  killed  and  wounded  out  of  30,  and  yet  full  of 
dash  and  fight. 

At  some  future  time  I  hope  to  be  allon-ed  to  bring  forward  thP  names  of 
offiocTB  and  men  for  the  consideration  of  the  General  Officer  Commanding. 

It  is  of  eoiirse  difficult  to  estimate  the  force  against  lis,  but  1  think  there 
were  3O0  riflemen  and  probably  400  to  SOO  spearmen.  Tiieir  losses  must  havr 
been  very  heavy — 150  killed  would  probably  be  within  the  mark. 

We  picked  up  H  rifles  bolonging  to  tho  enemy,  none  of  ones  failing  into 
his  hand. 

On  the  23rd  April,  1003,  Captams  Bruce  and  Godfrey  ware  buried  close  to 
our  zariba  in  the  morning.     The  zariba  was  strengthened  and  all  water-tins 


179 


Utied.  A  letter  was  sent  to  the  Officer  Comiaanduig  Lioss  of  ComiuunicAt.inti , 
Bbbotte,  Mjrisg  that  the  £71113  oolomn  would  start  to  come  baok  an 
•25th  April,  unleBs  news  of  the  GaJadi  force  was  recpived  in  the  meantimf , 
and  anking  for  a  water  oonvoy  to  be  sent  out  to  meet  the  column. 

On  the  24th  April,  1903,  meaaengprs  were  received  from  OEScer  Com- 
manding Lines  of  Communiuation,  reporting  that  Coloael  Plimkett'a  form 
hod  been  cut  up  at  Gumburu,  and  the  probable  withdrawDil  of  our  forces  lo 
(ialadi.  Orders  were  at  once  issued  for  the  return  of  the  column  to  Bohotlp, 
and  letter  in  duplicato  was  sent  to  the  Officer  Commanding  Linc^  of  Hora- 
mimioation,  reporting  this  and  asking  for  water  a  daj-  earlier  if  possible. 
The  oolumn  marched  off  at  12.30  p.m.,  the  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  cover  in 
the  rear  and  right  flank  nome  3  to  6  miles  out.  Halted  7.30  p.m.  (IS  miles). 
On  the  25th  April,  1903,  left  camp  at  daybreak,  the  SomaU  Mounted 
Infantry  flrst  sending  pat^'ols  round  the  ?»riba  at  tbe  radius  of  ^  to  1  mile. 
JVIid-day  halt  in  tbe  open  for  odd  bour.  Zoribaed  at  3.30  p.m.  at  Bslihsliclo 
(21  miles  mBTub). 

On  tbe  26th  April,  1903,  left  soriba  at  S  a.m.  Same  formation.  .At 
7.30  a.m.  raefc  messenger  from  Captain  Byrne  saying  be  was  at  Kabri  with 
150  men,  140  water-tins  and  12  days'  raHons.  Captain  Byrne  had  met  my 
messengers  to  Officer  Commanding  Lines  of  Commnnication,  and  had  moved 
at  once  to  where  I  had  asked  tbe  water  to  meet  me.  Zaribaed  at  5  p.m., 
1  mile  from  Captain  Byrne  (20  miles  march). 

On  the  27th  April,  1903,  left  zariba  at  6  a,i 
Zaribaed  5  p.m.  The  mounted  infantry  pooies  w 
the  Somali  Camel  Corps  being  sent  straight  on 
camels.     (Distance  of  march  19  milos.) 

On  the  28th  April,  1903,  left  zariba  at  6  a.m.,  and  arrived  at  Bobotle 
10,30  a.pi.     All  woimded  doing  well.     (Distance  of  msjcb  11  miles.) 
1  have  the  honour  to  be,  Sir, 

Your  obedient  Servant, 

J.   E.   GOUGH,  Major. 
Officer  Cominanding  Flyiiig  Cotiimn. 
'torn  the  Officer  CommandiTig  Flging  Column,  to  IH  0/p,ef:r  Commutidiiuj 

Lines  of  ClmimitnieuiiDn,  BahcUe. 
ir,  Daaot,  23rd  April,  1903. 

I  should  like  to  bring  the  followbig  incident,  which  occurred  during  our 
•turn  tio  Danot  on.  the  afternoon  of  22nd  April,  to  the  notice  of  the  Oencrai 
I   Officer  Commanding,  Somaliland  Field  Force : — 

Owing  to  the  thick  bush  and  tha  rearguard  having  to  hold  their  groimfl 
while  wounded  men.  were  being  placed  on  camels,  the  reargiiori' 
hod  got  considerably  in  rear  of  the  column.  Captain  Bruce,  wlio 
was  with  the  rearguard,  was  shot  through  the  body  from  about. 
20  yards  and  fell  on  the  path,  unable  to  move.  With  bim  at  thi.> 
,  time  were  Captain  Walker,  4th  Gurkha  Eifles(Bikanir  Camel  Corp): 

Captain  Bolland,  Intelligence  Officer,  Flying  Column ;  two  men,  2nd 
Battalion    King's    Afr'cnn    Rines ;    one    Sikh  and    one  Somali  i.F 
(R927)  M    3 


.  Joined  Captun  Byme. 
;e  watered  (4  gallon  diink ), 
to  Bohotle  to  water  their 


ISO 


tliu  cttnol  corps-     In  the  muantioie  Uie  uolumn,  being  n 

of  what  had   happenm.   xrere   gettii^  fnTther  aw&y.    Captun 

Rolland  ran  back  tome  500  jsrd«  and  returned  witli  help  to  brin;: 

nff  Captain  Bmce,  while  CapUin  Walker  and  the  men  remaoned 

with  CaptMn  Bruce,  ketplng  oB  the  enemy,  who  win*  nil  roimd  in 

thethiek  bush.     This  they  Euccessfully  accomplished,  but  not  before 

Taptain  Bruce  was  hit  a  epcond  time  and  the  Sikh  wounded.     But 

for  their  gallant  conduct  Captun  Bruce  must  have  fallen  into  the 

hands  of  the  enemy. 

I  beg  to  submit  the  names  of  the  officers  for  the  Ticloria  Cios?,  and  the 

meu  of  the  2nd  Battalion  King's  African  RiAbs  and  flth  Battalion  King's 

African  Rifles  for  the  Distingmshed  Conduct  Medal  (names  of  men  attached} 

and  the  Sikh  for  the  Order  of  Merit. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be,  Sir, 

Yoai  obedient  Servant. 
J.  E.  GOUGH,  Major, 
Offitcr  Cotnmanding  Flying  Odnrnn. 
The  names  of  the  men  recommended  for  (he  Distinguished  Condnot 
Medal  and  Order  of  Merit  are  : — 

(1)  B.C.A.  No.   136  Regimental  Ko,   2376  Lfljice-Nuk  Maieya  Singh, 

24th  Baluchistan  Regiment. 

(2)  No.  60  Sergeant  Nderamani,  2nd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles, 

(3)  Ko.  87  Corporid  Sunnoni,  2nd  Battalion  King's  African  Biflea. 

(4)  Sowar  Umar  Ismail,  Somali  Camel  Corps. 

Tribe  Habr  Toljaala  (Abohr  Abdulla),  0th  Battalion  King's  African 
Bifles. 

J.  E.  GOUGH,  Major. 

Offtfer  Commanding  Flying  CUiiutn, 

His  Majesty  was  pleased  to  confer  upon  Captains  Walker 
and  Rolland*  the  Victoria  Cross,  while  the  Sikh  was  awarded 
the  Order  of  Merit,  and  the  men  of  the  King's  African  Kifies 
the  medal  for  Distiuguished  Conduct  in  the  Field.  At  a 
later  period  Gough'a  own  share  in  this  incident  was  brought 
to  notice  by  Brig.-Gteneral  Manning  and  he  also  received  the 
Victoria  Orosa.f 

On  the  24th  April  a  message  was  received  from 
the  Officer  Commanding  Lines  of  Communication,  giving  ati 
account  of  the  disaster  which  had  befallen  Plunkett  at 
Gumbuiu,  and  directing  Gough  to  withdraw  to  Bohotle.    A 

•  "London  Gaaelte,".7th  August,  1S03. 
t  "  Loudon  Gaiette,"  15th  January,  19(M. 


w 


m 

convoy  of  supplies  which  had  started  from  that  place  for  Galadi 
on  the  20th  was  also  recalled,  and  the  water  post  at  Lasakante 
withdrawn,  Gough  halted  at  Danot  till  midday  of  the 
24th,  when  he  resumed  his  retirement,  reaching  Bohotle  on  the 


■tavB  been  successively  described  above,  the  Abyssinians ' 
had  taken  no  direct  part,  but  it  seems  probable  that  their 
presence  on  the  Webi  Shebeli  deterred  the  Mullah  from  carry- 
ing out  any  intention,  which  he  may  have  harboured,  of 
retiring  across  that  river.  Their  advance  had  not  been 
remarkable  for  its  rapidity,  and  on  the  date  of  Plunkett'a 
disaster  they  had  reached  Mekunna,  a  spot  on  the  Webi 
ShebeU  some  170  miles  to  the  S.S.  West  of  Gumburu.  They 
had  met  with  no  opposition  except  at  BurhiUi,  30  miles  north 
of  Mekunna,  where  they  were  attacked  by  a  body  of  1,100 
dervishes  belonging  to  tribes  in  the  vicinity,  whom  they 
signally  routed,  with  small  loss.  In  his  Staif  Diary  RocLfort 
gives  the  following  account  of  the  action  :— 

Marched  nt  6.30  a.u.  (4th  April)  to  near  BurMlli,  distance  20  milesa 
Somo  resistunco  was  expected  during  thia  march,  hot  beyoiid  seeing  a  few 
tribesmen  in  tlie  hills  watching  us,  who  were  fired  at  by  the  AbyefiinianH, 
nothing  happened.  This,  however,  iodaced  Gabri  to  take  precautiooa  for 
Ilia  baggage,  and  he  detailed  a  chief  with  100  men  to  the  high  groimd  on  the 
left  to  see  it  saiel3-  through  ;  this  proved  cJtectQal,  About  11  a.m,,  before 
the  lariha  wat  [oiuied  but  after  the  arrival  of  the  mam  body  in  i 
which  is  situated  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  with  one  face  resimg 
and  in  fairly  thick  bush,  we  were  attacked  by  1,100  tribesmen  on  three  aides. 
One  of  their  wounded  who  waa  capttured  stH,tea  that  these  men  wh 
Dervishes  and  wear  as  such  dii^tinguiahing  bands  round  the  head  and  ami, 
mt  by  JluUah  Sheikhali  Sheneeleh,  a  man  of  considerable  influence 
n  Hiran  and  Mekunna.  These  Dervishes  belong  to  the  Mekunna  and 
iJerjele  tribes.  The  attack  came  as  a  surprise  and  severe  hand-to-hand 
fighting  ensued,  lasting  45  minutes,  when  the  tribeemon  were  beaten  off 
and  many  killed  in  the  water  while  trying  tjD  cross  the  river.  The  Pitaurari 
did  not  apparently  issue  any  orders  during  the  fight,  but  donned  his  lion 
akin  and  sat  outside  hia  tent  in  atate,  aurroimded  by  liis  staff.  What 
;tioa  there  was  during  the  action  was  canied  out  by  the  various  chiefs, 
e  was  a  great  deal  of  firing  and  considerable  nniae  end  confusion,  but 
jidaally  the  men  rushed  into  the  fight  in  tho  keenest  passible  way.  The 
Kwsult  was  satisfactory,  but  if  the  enemy  had  been  more  forniidnlile,  I  think 


182 

llie  Abyssinians  would  have  had  reason  to  dejilore  their  want  o!  jireiiaution, 
abscnoe  of  control  and  disciplme  ;  but,  on  tlie  othur  hand,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  a  long  Beriea  of  almost  nnbrokon  BucccBfiea  Binoe  1808  H^ainit 
Italians,  Egyptians  and  Derrishes  has  imbued  them  with  great  confldance, 
and  is  a  factor  to  he  reckoned  with.  They  are  too  excitable  t<i  be  good 
shots,  and  prefer  their  Hwords  to  their  rilles.  At  the  conclnfiion  of  the  fight 
those  who  had  killed  their  man  or  men  presented  theinselyca  individually 
before  the  Fitaurari,  dancing  a.  war  danco  and  proclniming  in  loud  and 
excited  tones  their  devotion  to  then'  Emperor  and  country,  then,  bowing  low 
in  obeisance,  they  exhibited  the  apear,  shield  and  bloodstained  clothes  of 
the  slain.  The  custom  of  firing  a  shot  in  the  au;  which  signifies  an  enemy 
slain  was  also  observed.  It  was  altogether  a  very  remarkable  sight.  The 
Abyssinians  pursued  al!  ilay.  The  casualties  are  reported  as  followi : — 
Abyssinians:     kUled,     21;     wounded,     10.       Dervishes;      tilled,    301 

woimded,  3, 
I  think  the  Xtervish  loss  is  much  exaggerated- 
Doctor  Martin  is  douig  all  that  is  possible  for  the  wounded. 

From  Mekninna  the  iorce  had  moved  nortli  and  the  news 
of  Plunkett's  disaster  had  reached  HooMort  at  Labbaba 
on  the  28th  April  during  a  raid  which  the  Abyssinians 
were  conducting  against  the  Bagheri  tribe.  Unfortunately 
absence  of  water  and  grass  on  the  Gerlogubi  route,  a  con- 
dition which  would  continue  until  a  fall  of  rain,  made  co- 
operation for  the  time  impossible,  and  the  Abyssinians  moved 
to  BuseU,  camping  there  until  their  march  on  Sheilaba  and 
Crerlogubi  should  become  practicable.  Rain  having  fallen, 
they  left  Euseli  on  the  15th  May,  reaching  lyaboh,  which  is 
north  of  Hahi  on  the  (Jerlogubi  route,  on  the  26th-  At  this 
place  two  men  who  had  been  present  at  Gumburu  with  the 
Mullah's  troops  on  the  17th  April  stated  that  their  leader  was 
now  at  Bur  and  that  the  British  were  concentrated  at  Galadi. 
In  consequence  the  Abyaainians  retraced  their  stepa  to  Hahi 
there  turning  eastward  and  making  Bur  their  objective.  Biya 
Ado  was  reached  on  the  30th  after  an  almost  waterless  march  of 
53  miles  through  thick  bush.  The  Abyssinian  leader, 
Fitaurari  Gabri,  now  decided  to  move  on  Jeyd  with  a  strong 
raiding  party  in  order  to  ascertain  if  it  would  be  possible 
thence  to  reach  Bur,  which,  on  account  of  the  lack  of  water,  was 
thought  to  be  improbable.     Should,  however,  water  be  reported 


183 


between  Jeyd  and  Bur,  the  remainder  of  tlie  Abyssuiians  would 
move  to  the  former  place  and  the  whole  force  would  continue 
the  advance  against  the  Mullah.  During  Gabri'a  absence 
a  captured  prisoner  stated  that  the  Mullah  hearing  of  the 
Abyssinian  advance  was  preparing  to  retreat  to  Gumburu. 
On  the  4th  June  Fitaurari  Gabri  returned  with  the  satis- 
factory report  that  he  had  engaged  the  Mullah's  followers  at 
Jeyd  oa  the  3lBt  May  and  lolled  1,000  of  their  spearmen. 
Regarding  this  raid.  Colonel  Rochiorfc  reported  ; — 

Gahti  rttumed  Biya  X,\o.  ITie  raiil  on  tlip  Bftgheri  at  Jeycl  was  very 
siicceastulatitl  tame  «3  nBurpriBe,  but  the  Bagheri  riflemen  who  were  present, 
numbering  about  40,  eacaped  with  the  exception  of  ono  of  tiieic  number. 
Raid  to  be  the  Mullah's  uncle,  who  was  killed.  His  rifle,  a  Martini- Enlield, 
was  captured.  The  enemy's  loss  ia  luported  as  about  1,000  epeaimen 
killed  belonging  tfl  Ave  9ub-Bcctions  at  the  Habr  Sutpiman  and  the  oapture 
of  all  the  remainder,  inGluding  families,  I'ameU  and  cattle.  Some  of  the 
Abfssiaians  have  not  jet  returned  bat  are  gradually  coming  in,  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  diatrict  within  a,  30  mile  radius  of  Jeyd  has  been 
thoroughly  cleared.  The  presence  of  an  Abyssinian  force  in  this  diatiict 
haE,  I  think,  proTed  eftectiye  ia  closing  the  watering  places  of  any  importancii 
south  of  the  Gerlogubi-Oolndi  line  to  the  Mullah. 

On  the  7th  the  Abyssinian  leaders  held  a  consultation  when 
it  was  decided  that  on  account  of  the  deficiency  of  water  on  the 
route  beyond  Jeyd  and  the  shortness  of  the  grain  supply,  it 
was  impossible  for  them  to  takf;  any  further  part  in  the 
present  operations.  Indeed  it  had  become  clear  that  miless 
they  were  provided  with  adequate  transport  and  a  sufficiency 
of  water  tanks  their  co-operation  must  necessarily  be  very 
restricted. 

As  Kochfort  was  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  general 
situation  in  Somaliland  and  as  the  Abyssinian  operations 
had  come  to  a  atandatill,  ho  decided  to  return  to  Harrar 
and  there  obtain  fresh  instructions. 

It  may  here  be  noted  that  on  the  26th  April,  after  the 
telegraphic  report  of  the  disaster  at  Gumburu  had  been 
received  from  General  Manning,  His  Majesty's  Government 
telegraphed  to  Rochfort,  informing  him  thereof  and  suggesting 
that  he  should  move  on  Wardair  and  strike  a  blow  at  the 


184 


MuUati  from  the  w«at.  This  telegram,  whicH  wat*  also  com- 
municated to  General  Maniung,  reached  its  destination  aome 
days  after  Rochfort  had  been  forced,  as  already  described,  to 
abandon  the  very  movement  which  the  message  suggested. 

The  history  of  the  third  expedition  against  the  Mullah 
has  now  reached  that  point  where  portions  of  the  Obbia, 
Berbera  and  Abyssinian  forces  had  severally  and  fieparately 
engaged  the  Mullah,  The  insurmountable  difficulty  of 
cstabhshing  communication  between  these  forces  had  pre- 
vented a  simultaneous  blow  from  being  struck,  whereby  the 
power  of  that  fanatical  leader  might  Lave  been  stamped 
out  and  his  following  destroyed.  Nevertheless,  the  losses 
which  lie  had  undergone,  more  particularly  at  the  hands  of 
ihe  Abyssinians,  had  not  been  without  efiect,  and  though 
at  the  time  when  General  Manning  withdrew  to  Galadi  the 
Mullah's  prestige  may  have  seemed  in  the  ascendant,  the 
future  will  reveal  that  be  had  even  then  suffered  considerably 
in  morale. 

We  have  followed  General  Manning  in  his  retirement  to 
Galadi,  which  place  he  garrisoned  with  a  force  under  Cobbe.* 
Then  leaving  posts  at  Dudub  and  Bera,  he  proceeded  to 
Galkayu,  where  he  arrived  on  the  25th  April.  His  Majesty's 
Goverimient  had,  in  a  telegram  dated  'iSrd  April,  expressed 
their  readiness  to  provide  reinforcements  if  required,  but  on 
the  26th  he  repHed  :— 

Position  as  follows :  Tliere  is  gairisou  at  Galadi  strouglj  entrenched 
and  BufBcient  to  keep  oS  enemy.  Garrison  at  Dudub  rIso  Btiongly  en- 
trenched. There  is  gnmson  at  Bera  withallthemoimtedinfantry,  tho  only 
place  grazing  ia  obtainable.  Balance  of  force  here  and  on  lines  of  cuumimieB- 
tion  to  the  north  of  Badnein,  to  the  south  towards  Obbia.     I  hope  to  close 


•  The  garrison  left  at  Galadi  under  Lieut. -Colonel  Cobbe  consisted  of  ;- 
Somali  Mounted  Infantry. . 


Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners 

Ist  Battalion  King's  AfricMi  Rifles 

■Jnd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles 

Urd  Battalion  King's  Africui  Bitles 

-'nil  ISattalion  King's  African  Eifles        . .     1  office 

'\Vith  oiip  month'.^  rations,  4C0  rounds  |ier  riHe  and 


1  officer  and  10  men. 
QoflicecB,  lijOuienandii 
3  offipera  and  100  men. 
I  officer,  CO  mt'D  and  2 


r,  .lO  rat 
1 ,500  u 


185 


linos  SOU tli  liy  the  l.'illi  May.  cxrcjit  Wacgallo,  which  place  it  may  b 
to  hold  Batnewliat  longer.  ReinfoFcemcnts  not  required,  as  rnj  foico  U 
strong  enough ;  and  as  soon  aa  troops  forming  linea  of  communication  BJTi^'<'. 
I  shall  be  in  position  to  udraace,  provided  transport  in  fit  and  rations  will 
lie  supplied  from  Bobotle.  lu  the  meantime,  Abye^niaiu  ai'c  advancing  tu 
Wordair  and  still  hold  Wchi  Shebeti.  Miillitli  must  go  cither  north  or  to 
country  which  the  complete  evacuation  of  Obbia  leavea  opon  to  him-  In 
Bay  caae  the  triboB  nenccr  to  me  can  bo  severely  punished  for  doing  this. 
I  can  co-operate  with  AbvBSinians  when  they  have  occupied  Wardair. 
There  is  no  reason  for  nnxiety.  MiEtori.iino  to  Phinkett's  dctechmont  ban 
not  aSscted  mocnJe  of  African  troops,  and  I  believe  Mullah's  force  has  suffcri'd 
BO  heavily  that  he  in  unlikely  to  iMime  near  our  posts. 


The  attack  on  17th  April  was  mairily  by  Adonis,  who  showed  re- 
markable bravery.  I  consider  retirement  would  be  very  inadviaabla.  I 
have  a  month's  rations  here  and  two  months'  in  Bohotle.  Boliotio  must 
be  able  to  ration  us  provided  transport  con  be  obtained.  Ajn,  asking 
.'Sivann  if  be  can  do  this.  A  garriaon  post  in  Mudug  district  will  probably 
require  to  be  stronger  than  I  estimated  at  first,  except  that  Abyssiitian.H 
may  inflict  heavy  loss  on  Mullah,  in  which  case  situation  will  be  improved. 
Dnderstand  that  Italiaua  have  wired  Rome  that  men  of  Mullah  have 
occupied  Obbia.  I  have  no  reason  to  behove  truth  of  statement.  Health 
of  troops  good,  in  »pite  of  hard  maicliing  and  extreme  heat. 

Twentj-tour  hours  later  he  again  telegraphed  ;— 

With  the  camels  at  present  at  my  disposal  and  coming  over  from 
Bohotle  in  a  few  days  I  hope  to  be  able  to  complete  the  rolling  up  of  the 
base  to  Galkayu  by  the  15th  May.  The  Obbia  rations  last  till  31st  May, 
and  I  shall  have  by  then  passed  certain  number  of  troops,  such  as  Burgher 
Contingent  and  aeetion  Moimtain  Battery,  over  to  Bohotle,  from  whom  I 
have  already  drawn  certain  amount  of  suppUea.  Net  result  is  that  force 
concentrated  here  on  loth  May  will  be  rationed  until  14th  Jane.  Makiny 
allowance  for  heavy  wastage  of  camels  I  shall  have  by  15th  May  some 
1 ,200  camels  available,  and  in  addition  a  somewhat  pro blematieal  600  camels 
which  Swann  is  frying  to  raise  for  me.  Two  months'  supplies  for  whole 
of  Obbia  force  have  been  collected  at  Bohotle,  with  exception  of  certain 
amount  of  grain  which  ia  being  pushed  up.  I  hear  from  Bohotle  that  hired 
transport  system  on  Berbera-Bohotlo  hne  appears  to  be  in  duiger  of 
breaking  down.  I  am  not  fully  informed  os  yet  in  the  matter,  but  should 
it  occur  our  posilion  both  here  and  at  Bohotle  would  be  very  serious.  In 
that  event  cainels  must  be  imported  from  India  or  Arabia  for  work  on  that 
side,  and  I  have  authorised  Swann  to  act  in  consultation  with  Cordoaux, 

Imported  camels  would  be  useless  on  this  side,  requiring  groin,  and  must 
be  watered  every  three  days.  Have  stated  already  in  my  Ko.  115  that 
if  you  think  it  impoaaible  under  present  conditions  to  reach  Wardair  in- 
dependently of  active  assistance  from  the  Abyssinians,  they  must  first 
occupy  that  place.     There  remain  four  principal  oantingencics.      Firstly, 


186 

[HMubilily  of  co.opecaling  «ilb  Abysfliniaus  iii  tho  event  of  llieir  having 
been  able  to  occupy  Waidait  and  WalwaL  Secondly,  poBaibUity  of  my 
remauuDg  in  my  prea^ut  position,  denying  the  Mudug  and  Galadi  to 
enemy's  force.  Thirdly,  poenbility  of  being  able  to  hold  Galkayu  or  aome 
place  in  neighbourhood  with  strong  force,  and  then  withdrawing  nmtinder 
of  trooiw.  Foutthly,  possibility  of  having  to  withdraw  all  my  farce  to 
bobotle. 

With  regard  to  first  coulingeucy  there  will  be  required  at  lea9t  2,000 
camels  for  my  advance  beyond  Galadi,  and  1,000  more  for  lines  of  com- 
muuication  between  that  place  and  GaJkayu.  .Vlfio  there  will  be  required 
monthly  reserve  of  fiOO  camels  to  rc|ilaco  cosuoltieB ;  that  is  to  aay,  that, 
in  addition  to  1,'^00  cameU,  there  will  be  reijuired  1,900  camels  and  a 
monthly  reflerve  of  600  camels.  So  far,  have  not  toached  on  question  of 
Iteeping  Galknyu  rationed.  To  do  tliis  at  rale  of  a  day's  supply  a  day 
Swann  would  require  at  least  1,500  camels  extra  for  his  present  requirements. 
together  with  monthly  supply  of  250  camels  tor  casoaltiefl.  Altogether 
tliere  will  be  required  by  Swann  3,300  camels  and  750  camels  each  month 
alter»ards.  In  order  that  I  might  start  from  hero  with  month's  supply  on 
hand,  motit  of  the  camels  will  be  required  to  bo  collected  at  Bohotle  before 
endofMay.  Tbisdcmandfareicecda  Swann'sresauroes,and  lean  therefore 
sa;  definitely  it  will  be  quite  impossible  to  advance  to  co-operate  with 
Abyssinians  when  the  base  is  rolled  up  under  present  conditions  of  transport. 

With  regard  t<i  second  contingency,  camels  which  I  shall  have  available 
would  be  suSicient  for  me  to  heep  Galadi  and  Dudub  rationed,  and,  if 
necessary,  sejid  reinforcements  to  these  places,  or  for  evacuation  of  them 
against  an  action  with  enemy's  force.  It  would  not  be,  however,  avulable 
For  ratitming  Gallcayu  ftom  BohoUe,  and  for  this  purpose  1,500  camels 
still  will  be  required  by  Swann  to  bo  collected  at  Bohotle  by  not  later  than 
1st  June,  a  date  which  would  only  allow  me  margin  of  rations  of  bread  and 
meat  for  one  week.  I  have  nOt  yet  had  time  for  receipt  of  reply  from  Swann 
tomyrequestformformationonthisbGad,  butfrom  previous  correspondence 
it  appears  to  me  that  I  will  not  be  able  to  obtain  full  numl>er  of  camels. 
I  have  directed  h™  to  reply  directly  to  jou  an  well  as  to  me  ;  but,  assuming 
that  his  reply  will  be  to  this  etfect.  I  am  of  opinion  it  is  quito  impossible  for 
me  to  continue  to  hold  Uudub  and  GaladL 

With  regard  to  third  and  fourth  contingencies,  total  number  of  camels 
which  I  shall  have  avsilable  on  15th  May  would  be  sufficient,  I  calculate, 
for  withdrawal  of  garrison  of  Dudub  and  Galadi,  and  transport  of  all  tha 
ttoopa  to  Bohotle  without  making  demands  upon  Swann,  which  he  will  be 
quite  unable  to  meet.  Water  supply,  Damot,  steady  decrease,  but  Swann 
has  been  directed  to  establish  water  posts  at  that  place  and  between  it  and 
Bohotle.  Could  concentrate  all  troops  to  Badwein,  and  could  hold  that 
place  with  strong  garrison  on  existing  rations  up  to  30th  June  or  lat«T.  1 
it  is  decided  to  completely  evacuate  the  posts  south  of  Bohotle,  I  can  do  a 
by  30th  June,  provided  that  movement  commenoes  directly  the  base  i 
roiled  up  aud  enemy's  force  will  not  be  active  along  that  line. 

Lastly,  OS  regards  holding  the   Mudug,  I  am  compelled   by  fact  that 


Mnllah  mtiat  have  gained  prestige  by  Qumburu,  and  fact  that  fighting  Titlue 
of  his  atmj  miiet  now  bo  cfstiniat^d  far  higher  than  formerly,  seriously  to 
modify  views  as  to  t.^^i«  point  which  I  have  hitherto  ejspressed.  I  do  not 
think  that  a  less  gamson  than  400  would  be  safe  even  in  a  strongly  entrenahed 
position.  The  garrison  wouldhave  to  be  Indiansoffightiugraces,  as  African 
troopE  suffer  in  health  by  prolonged  residence  in  garrison.  Tliis  garriBOii  ix 
separated  from  Bohotle  by  145  miles,  of  which  73  miles  between  Domot  and 
Badwein  are  waterlesa.  Parts  of  route  are  through  thick  bnsli.  If  left  at 
BadwBia,  which  would  bo  almost  sa  good  a  position  s IrategicsJly,  the  distance 
from  Bohotle  would  be  105  miles.  Aft^r  withdrawal  of  posts  at  Galadi  and 
Dudnh  fiuH  stretoh  of  country  would  be  completely  open  to  enemy's  force. 
Convoys  proceeding  frora  Uohotle  and  Mudug  would  have  to  be  apcom- 
paaied  by  very  large  parlies.  The  thing  is  feasible,  but  will  entail  lai^ 
iidditioa  t«  pcrmiment  garrison  of  Bohotle  for  piu^poae  of  providing  these 
esnorts.  On  the  whole,  I  am  not  in  favour  of  retention  of  the  Mudog  as 
far  as  military  situatiini  is  eoncemed.  So  fai,  I  havo  not  taken  into  con- 
aideration  action  of  Abyasinians.  The  first  two  continceucies  imder  dis- 
cussion are  entirely  dependent  on  our  own  wont  of  transport,  and  no  action 
of  Absysiuians,  whether  auccessful  or  unsuccessful,  affects  conclusion  arrived 
at-.  If  AbysBiuiauB  suffer  severe  defeat  the  Alullah  would  probably  move 
south-east,  but  he  may  possibly  penetrate  in  northerly  direction  into 
Protectorate,  in  which  case  withdrawal  of  all  our  troops  to  Bohotle,  as  far 
as  tranaport  admits,  of  easential  importance.  Northerly  direction,  rainy 
season  commenced  abundantly;  even  then  auchamurch  would  be  somewbab 
risky  for  him.  If  Mullah  snffera  severe  defeat  at  hands  of  Abysainioua, 
the  objection  to  holding  post  in  Mudug  wouM  be  greatly  moderated, 
and  sdongth  of  post  might  be  materially  reduced.  I  have  not  been 
able  yet  to  get  into  tonch  with  the  Abyssinians,  but  message  has  been  sent 
to  Kochfort,  via  Bohotle,  urging  importance  of  immediate  Abyssinian  ad- 
vance on  Wardair.  In  the  meantime  am  making  necessary  preparations 
for  passing  all  the  troops  to  Bohotle. 

On  tile  5tli  May  His  Majesty's  Government  intimated  toCoocBnir 
General  Manning  tbat  in  view  of  all  the  conaiderationa  put  jj^i, 'n^. 
forward  by  Mm,  they  thought  it  deaicable  that  he  should  con- 
centrate his  forces  at  Bohotle,  and  that  any  fiuther  opera- 
tions which  might  be  necessary  should  be  conducted  from  that 
base.     They  further  informed  hiTn  that  on  account  ot  the 
difficulty  of  transport  and  supply,  it  had  been  decided  not  to 
hold  the  Mudug.     A  few  days  later,  on  hia  reporting  that  a 
rumour  of  the  Abyssinian  advance  towards  Gerlogubi  had 
reached  him,  he  was  given  discretionary  powers  as  to  delaying 
the  retirement  from  Galadi. 
—Telegraphing  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  from 


Galkayu  on  thfi  12fch  May,  General  Manning  described  the 
situation  as  foilows  :— 
n.  Tliu  Obbio  liuci  of  ronmiiuiiiialioQ  will  be  completely  rolled  up  by 
IKIh  May.  Tliu  military  transport  gradually  avuilable  by  completion  of 
iihove  tor  couveyante  to  Bohotle  Imlii  of  mounted  infantry,  the  section 
mountain  battery,  and  all  African  troops  except  the  Somali  Moim.ted  Infantry 
imd  iufaulry  ab  Galiuli.  By  31st  Uay  all  the  troopa  will  liave  reached 
Bohotle  e.^i:ept  the  troopa  in  gaJTiBon  at  Galoda,  consisting  of  308  African 
■rirapg,  and  Dudub,  oonaiating  of  7S  2nd  Sikhs  and  thtiae  in  garrison  at  Bers. 
Badw«in  uul  Galkeyu,  consisting  of  550  '2iid  Sikhs  and  50  Uritiah  Mounted 
Infantry,  with  small  number  of  Bikanirs  and  sappers  and  miners.  Military 
transport  which  will  remain  to  mo  when  these  moves  are  oairied  out 
together  with  the  assistance  which  Swann  ia  able  to  promise  me,  will  enable 
me  to  ration  with  bread  and  meat  all  tho  troops  ia  giurisoa  at  above  posta 
until  30th  June.  After  15th  June  I  withdraw  troops  from  Galadi  and  Budub 
to  Galkayu,  and  shall  then  move  all  the  troops  to  Bohotle  in  a  single  mt 
ment  as  being  the  only  safe  raethod  after  the  evacuation  of  Galadi  and 
Dudub.  I  calculate  that  with  the  camels  which  I  shall  have  in  hcuid  and 
the  (issistajice  which  1  can  get  from  Swann,  and  by  utilising  the  camels  of 
the  Eohotla  flying  column,  I  sbaJI  have  just  enough  camela  to  carry  out  the 
foregoing  muvementa  and  transfer  of  all  the  troops  to  Bohotle.  I  have, 
however,  directed  Swann,  in  consultation  with  Cordeaux,  to  endeavour  to 
buy  onniclB  in  fresh  and  hitherto  nntricd  directions  recommended  by 
Cordeaui;,  for  I  have  not  a  large  margin  to  spare. 

By  holding  Ime  of  wells,  Badwein.  Galkayu,  Bera,  Dudub  and  Galadi 
until  30th  June  I  am  giving  Abysainionn  best  chance  of  complete  succees 
if  they  arc  able  to  attack  and  defeat  Mullah  next  month,  since,  in  deejato 
of  the  fall  of  a  certain  amount  of  rain,  water  pools  are  not  yet  sufficiently 
numerous  for  bulk  of  Mullah's  forces  to  scatter.  As  regards  transport  on 
the  Berbeia^Bohotle  line  of  conimunioationa  I  have  received  views  of 
t'ordeauK  and  Swann.  The  latter  has  aheady,  at  my  desire,  telegraphed  to 
you.  He  considers  that  if  f  he  force  is  to  be  kept  nt  Bohotle  beyond  31st  Jnly, 
lie  will  require  6,000  imported  camels  to  feed  it.  In  addition  to  tbeso  a  lal^ 
number  of  camels  would  be  required  for  any  offensive  movement  from 
Bohotle.  Imported  camels  require  grain  and  cannot  go  for  a  long  t 
without  water,  and  therefoic  useless  for  active  operations  from  Bohol 
consequently  SomaU  camels  would  have  to  be  employed.  As  we  are 
present  imable  to  procure  enough  SomaU  camels  to  replace  our  wastage,  it 
seems  useless  to  expoct  to  procure  the  number  which  we  should  require 
in  order  to  recommence  active  operations  from  Bohotle.  There  nee 
therefore,  no  object  ia  keeping  the  force  concentrated  at  Bohotle,  and  I 
would  suggest  that  bulk  of  force  should  be  distributed  down  line  of  com- 
luimiuations,  where  it  can  be  more  easily  rationed,  pending  reply  from  you 
aa  Jo  future  operations.  Such  a  distribution  of  troops  would  not  raquiro 
0,000  imported  camels,  but  stilt  it  would  require  2,000  or  3,000  comeU. 
have  directed  Swann  to  nakfor  1,000  cameU,  but  these  can  only  be  required 


189 

in  reserve,  and  uiilesB  tlic  whole  expeditinnary  force  is  to  bo  completely 
withdrawn  from  Siomaliland,  leaving  beliiiid  only  garrison*  Eerbrr.i- 
ItohnHe  lino  of  commiinicBlion.  Thptamele  to  thpniimtcrlhavo  indii'otcd 
nhoiild  be  imiiorted. 

Througliout  May,  coveiedby  the  posts  maintained  to  l,lio 
west  of  Galkayu,  frequent  convoys  carrying  surplus  stores 
crossed  the  Haud,  and  all  troops  beyond  those  actually  re- 
'luirej  as  garrisons  were  gradually  passed  into  Bohotle. 
These  niovementa  were  effected  without  interruption 
(HI  the  part  of  the  Mullah,  who  was  still  reported  to 
be  at  Walwal,  while  his  scouts  occasionally  met  and  ex- 
changed shots  with  our  own  Illalos  betoi-e  Galadi. 

During  May,  too,  the  Italian  Government  replaced  the 
former  sultan,  Yusuf  Ali,  of  Obbia  by  his  son,  Ali  Yusuf, 
whom  they  brought  back  from  banishment  in  Erythren, 
From  him  they  obtained  a  promise  that  he  would  maiutain 
order  both  at  Obbia  and  the  Mudug,  and  to  assist  Mm  in 
doing  BO  he  was  furnished  with  some  400  rifles.  The  question 
of  the  supply  of  camels  was  stiC  under  the  consideration  of 
His  Majesty's  Government,  who,  on  account  of  the  difficulty 
of  procuriug  a  sufficient  quantity  in  the  Protectorate,  had 
ordered  1,200*  to  be  sent  from  Aden  and  1,300  from  India. 

The  survey  of  the  Berbera-Bobotle  route  by  Major  S.  L. 
Craster,  K.E.,  originally  sent  by  the  Foreign  Office  to  Somali- 
land  in  connection  with  that  part  of  the  proposed  Berbera- 
Harrar  railway,  was  at  this  time  being  undertaken  in  order 
to  ascertain  how  far  it  could  be  made  practicable  for  mechani- 
cal road  transport  or  for  a    narrow   gauge   railway. 

On  the  6th  June  General  Manning,  as  a  preliminary  to  the 
withdrawal  to  Bohotle,  issued  eonlidential  orders  regarding 
the  concentration  at  Badwein  of  Cobbe's  force, 
which  held  the  three  posts  west  of  Galkayu.  Cobbe 
was  to  move  direct  on  Badwein,  picking  up  en  route  the 
garrisons  of  Dudub  and  Bera,  and  for  this  purpose  the  requisite 


n 


190 


the  8tli. 


transport  was  despatched  to  him  from  (Jalkayu  on  the  8th. 
Two  days  earlier  the  General  had  noted  in  hia  Intelligence 
Report  that  not  a  particle  of  reliable  evidence  had  been 
received  wliich  would  lead  him  to  the  belief  that  the 
Mullah  had  ehiited  his  quarters,  but  in  a,  despatch  dated  the 
29th  June  he  mentions  that  there  had  been  vague  rumours 
afloat  that  a  move  into  the  Nogal  Plain  was  in  ccntemplation. 
Little  importance  was,  however,  attached  by  hiiu  to  these 
rumours,  since  such  a  movement  was  not  possible  at  that 
season  unless  the  water  places,  then  in  our  posseasion,  had 
changed  hands,  or  unless  heavy  rains  had  filled  up  the  ballia 
or  water-holes.  Nevertheless,  this  very  movement  was  then 
in  progress.  Repulsed  by  the  Abyssinians  on  31st  May,  as 
already  stated,  and  doubtless  dreading  lest  the  blow  then 
i-eceived  should  he  followed  up  by  others,  the  Mullah  took 
advantage  of  a  heavy  rainfall,  and  forthwith  started  on  his 
flight  to  the  Nogal  Plain,  seeking  to  avoid  the  greater  danger 
by  exposing  himself,  as  he  rightly  conjectured,  to  the  less. 
The  Mullah  Evidence  of  this  daring  movement,  though  absent  to  the 

Kogsi.  Obbia  force,  was  yet  not  lacldcg  at  Bohotle.*    On  the  8th  June 

our  advanced  scouts  at  Hagerer  came  in  contact  with  150  of 
the  Mullah's  horsemen  ;  next  day  the  telegraph  line  was  cut 
at  four  points  between  Bohotle  and  Damot  and  six  miles  of 
wire  removed,  and  on  the  three  following  days  positive  in- 
formation came  in  that  the  Mullah  with  all  hia  followera,  their 
wives  and  stock,  was  heading  across  oar  communications 
35  miles  south-east  of  Bohotle. 

In  the  stafi  diary  of  the  lines  of  communication  it  is 
recorded  :^ 

Tlic  Somali  M.L  imtroU  siiit  outon  tlio  I  ttli  instant  retiimed  at  intetwls 
itiiring  the  moramg.  The  point  at  which  the  Mullah  is  effecting  tho 
iTossIng  over  of  bis  live-stock  is  about  15  milea  from  Bamot,  where  he 
has  a,  strong  guard  of  alioot  1,000  horapinen.  Ho  hns  posts  of  100  Iq 
200   men  at  all  the  water  holes  on  the  line — Loratai -Hagerer — Kudmas- 

•  It  ia  interosling  to  nolo  here  that  Lieut, -Colonel  Swann,  Commanding 
LineB  of  Commnnication,  Eerbera-Eohotle  force,  heard  as  early  as  29th  Marnh . 
I!)fl3,  from  prisoners  that  the  Mullah  intended  to  move  into  the  Nogal. 


191 

Las3,kBiito.  At  LasuljBn  he  iias  a  Strang  for^^e.  Hs  himsslf  is  evd  to  be 
waiting  at  Holi  Madu;  lie  hue  about  5,000  horsemen  in  all  rovering  the 
movement,  and  capuble  of  concentrBtlng  on  the  point  at  whioli  lis  is 
cTOBsing  within  34  boiira,  the  greater  part  boinsj  thera  in  halt  that  time. 
Ha  has  Ulaloa  and  small  patrola  watching  every  muvi'raent. 

The  opportunity  of  striking  a  blow  at  tlie  Mullah  while 
engaged  in  this  flank  inarch  was  a  tempting  one,  and  it  is 
probable  that  had  a  force  moved  against  him  from  Bohotle, 
he  would,  in  order  to  cover  hia  flocks  and  herds,  have  stood 
and  fought.  But  Swanii,  the  Officer  Commanding 
the  Berbera-Eohotle  lines  of  communication,  whose  head- 
quarters were  at  the  latter  place,  considered  that  the  number  of 
Iroopsatbis  disposal' was  insufficient  to  make  success  against 
the  Mullah  a  certainty,  and  that  with  the  Obbia  force  dependent 
for  auppliea  upon  the  maintenance  of  Bobotle,  he  would  not 
be  justified  in  accepting  the  risk.  Moreover,  although  the 
small  post  at  Damot,  cut  off  from  communication,  and  isolated 
in  the  midst  of  a  fanatical  enemy,  caused  anxiety,  it  was 
thought  that  if  seriously  attacked  it  must  have  already  fallen, 
and  that  a  relieving  force  could  not  arrive  in  time  to  avert 
disaster.  For  these  reasons.  Swarm,  on  the  11th  Jnne, 
resolved  merely  to  send  a  patrol  of  Somah  M.I.  to  reconnoitre 
the  Damot  road,  taking  with  it  linemen  to  repair  the 
telegraph.  On  the  13tb  the  patrol  returned  having  lost  16 
out  of  45  men  by  desertion.  It  had  gone  14  miles  towards 
Damot,  and  beyond  tracks  of  large  numbers  of  horsemen  and 
camels,  had  seen  no  signs  of  the  enemy.  Thereupon, 
Swann  decided  to  despatch  in  the  same  direction  the  flyii^ 
column,  made  up  to  a  strength  of  600  rifles.  This  movement 
was  not,  however,  carried  out,  as  a  letter  in  the  meantime 
arrived  from  Damot  stating  that  that  post  was  safe  having 
beaten  oil  several  dervish  attacks. t 


n  this  date,  oxcliisive  of  sick, 
082  transport  animals.    (Head- 


"  The  strength  of  tho  Bohotle  garrison  o 
was  1,132  all  ranka,  with  8  maxira  guns  and  1, 
quarters  StaB  Diax,v), 

t  On  the  19th  June,  Colonel  Strann  received  a  letter  in  Arabic  from  the 
Mallah.  of  which  the  following  m  n  translation : — 

B  Mahomed  Abdnllah  to  the  English  people : — 

l,BB7  liitra  to  my  words  nnd    mark    them.      Firac  I  st'iiil  lliiu  letter. 


192 

n  For  some  days  conrnmnication  with  the  Obbia  force  had 
been  interrupted,  but  on  the  18th  June  a  messenger  arrived 
and  reported  that  Getieral  Maniiii^  aud  his  force  were  oa  the 
march  to  Bohotle.  Leaving  Galkayu  on  the  16th,  Badwein 
was  reached  next  day,  and  there  headquarters  were  joined  by 
the  column  under  Cobbe  from  Galadi.  From  Badwein 
the  force  (consisting  of  1,47'i  combatants,  1,561  foUowera  and 
3,627  animals)  moved  northwards,  and  croBsing  the  Haud, 

this  is  the  IJL'st  letter !  I  svrite  about  the  toroiBr  and  present  doings.  We 
KsTO  fought  tor  a  year.  I  wish  to  rule  my  own  country  and  protect  my 
"wn  religion.  If  you  wish  Eend  me  a  letter  if  there  is  to  bo  peapB  or  war. 
Von  do  not  listen  to  lay  words.  Liiiton  now  and  (MinBidcr,  Before  thia 
I  have  Bent  letterB  whioh  yoa  have  not  li^lened  to.  We  hnvo  both  mSered 
oonsiderably  in  battle  with  one  anothor.  You  hflve  heard  that  the  dor- 
rishea  have  run  away.  They  have  not  done  50,  I  h.ive  Tuoseil  my  oamp,- 
but  I  have  not  run  away.  I  have  got  hors.-^.  camels  and  eatt.If.  When 
I  get  news  of  goad  grazing  I  will  go  to  that  place.  You  aio  in  Bohotla 
now  and  before  that  you  went  to  the  Ogailens'  country.  Before  our  fights 
I  was  at  Harrardig^it,  and  have  been  moviug  about  according  to  where 
there  was  good  gracing,  from  Miidug  to  Sludug  and  frora  Dank  to  Danla 
up  to  the  present  time.  I  intend  to  go  from  Burao  to  Berbera.  I  warn 
you  of  this.  I  wish  to  fight  with  you.  I  like  war,  but  you  do  not.  I  hBve 
nnth  roe  camels  and  gonta  and  nheep  in  plenty.  Lost  year  I  fought  with 
you  and  Moosa  (Musa  Farah  T)  woa  with  you.  Cod  willing  I  witt  take 
many  rifles  bom  you,  but  yon  won't  get  any  rifles  or  nmmimition  from  me. 
and  I  will  not  take  yonr  eountry.  I  have  no  forts,  no  houses,  00  country, 
I  have  no  cultivated  fields,  no  silver  or  ROld  for  you  to  take.  I  have  no 
HftJScprs,  Afonsa  (Musa  Farah  ?)  has  guined  no  benefit  by  killing  mj  mm 
iind  my  country  is  of  no  good  to  you.  If  the  country  was  cultivated  or 
oontaioed  houses  or  property  it  would  be  worth  your  while  to  fight,  Tbo 
country  is  all  jungle  and  that  is  no  use  to  yon,  1£  you  want  wood  and  stone 
you  can  get  them  in  plenty.  There  are  also  many  ant  heaps.  The  aun  is 
very  hot.  .Ml  you  can  get  from  me  is  war,  nothing  else.  I  have  met  your 
men  in  battle  and  have  kQled  them.  We  are  greatly  pleased  at  this.  Our 
men  who  have  fallen  in  battle  have  gained  poiadias.  God  fights  tor  ua. 
We  kill,  and  yoa  kill.  We  fight  by  God's  order.  That  is  the  truth.  We 
ask  for  God's  blessing.  Ood  is  with  (ue  when  I  write  this.  If  you  wish 
war  I  am  linppy,  if  you  wish  peace  I  am  also  content.  But  if  you  wish 
peace  go  away  Irom  my  country  to  your  own.  If  yon  wish  war  stay  where 
ycm  are.  Listen  to  my  words,  I  wish  to  eichange  a  machine  gun  tor 
ammunition.  If  you  do  not  want  it  I  will  sell  it  to  someone  else.  Send 
lue  a  letter  saying  whether  you  want  war  or  peaoe. 

(Signed)      MAHOUED.I.BIN-AEDLT,LAH. 


1D3 

reached  Bohotle  on  the  26th,  The  transference  of  the 
Obbia  force  to  the  Berbera-Bohotle  line  had  been  efiected 
without  opposition  and  with  the  loss  of  one  sepoy  of  the  2nd 
Sikha  missing,  and  another  of  the  same  corps  severely  wounded. 
In  describing  this  operation  General  Manning  reported  : — 


Tlie  in 


I  hiwl  rcpcived.  troiu  Hia  MBJt-sty'a  yetTftary  of   State 
contrato  at  Bohotle  in  view  of  further  operations  fcom 


for  War  ■ 
that  plaoi 

I  hod  oaloulatftl  tljBt  I  eliould  have  sufficient  tranF^port  to  carry  n 
tliis  moveinent  by  cooceutratiug  the  Hera,  Dudu  b  and  Galadi  garrisons 
Badwein  aiioiit  tlio  IStli  Jimc,  and  bringing  up  the  Galkayu  garriBou. 
Iludwein  to  joia  there  on  the  Bame  date,  then  moving  acroaa  the  Haud 

Theconceulratioaat  Badwein  was  effeotetl  on  the  ITtli  June,  the  reti 
ment  from  the  variouK  posts  being  utunolested. 


Mounted  troopa — 

British  Mounted  Infantry 
Rom  ah  Mounted  Infantry 
Bikanir  Camel  Corps 

Infantry— 

2nd  Sifeha        

lat  Battalion  King's  African  Biflea         .   . 
2nd  BsttahoD  King's  African  Rifies 
3rd  Battalion  Ring's  African  BiRes 
5th  Battalion  King  a  African  Rifles 
r>etaelmient,  Bombay  Sap]iers  and  Jlincn 


BiHes. 


1,150 


1,295 


nod   for   the  n 


water  for  uicii  anil  ni 
across  the  Hand. 

Before  leaymg  Caikayu,  on  the  15th  June,  I  received  infonnation 
from  Daniot  that  the  telegraph  line  had  been  cut  in  several  ulaces  north  and 
east  of  Bohotle  on  the  7tb  and  8th  Juno,  and  that  bo.iieR  of  the  Uullnh's 
horsoinen  were  active  roiuid  Bohotle,  and  also  that  Damot  had  been  fiicd 
into  by  Dervish  horsemen,  and  that  a  number  of  horsemen  were  tp  that 
neighbourhood.  Bpies  sent  out  from  Pamot  had  brought  in  the  news 
that  the  Mullah,  with  his  fighting  men  and  his  livc-stoeU,  had  passed  between 
Damot  and  Bohotle  on  Ihe  way  into  the  Kogal  Valley. 

The  defences  of  Dajiiot  had  been  eotL'^tdored  sufficient  for  a  post  so  far 
removed  from  the  theatre  of  operations,  hut  were  insufficient  for  any  [lOBt 
wherever  situated.  Major  Hoskins  who  lOuimondEd  ut  Damot,  howevpr, 
in  the  intervals  of  Dervish  activity,  placed  tlie  poet  in  a  thorough  state   of 


[Ipfeni^c,  and  tlii-  safety  a  thi:  jiOBt  and  the  water  supply  there,  uptm  irhMl  t 
large  force  croeaingthe  Uaud  depended,  was  due  to  bis  resource 


I  decided  to  moTe  out  of  Badwein  on  the  18th  Juae  to  cross  the  Haud ; 
I  WHB  not  Giirc  whether  the  DcrvieheEi  had  made  prcparatione  to  attack  the 
forue  on  its  way  to  Damot  in  the  thick  bunh  of  the  waterlees  Hand,  but  the 
scouting  ahead  proved,  as  the  force  entered  the  Haud,  that  the  Mullah's 
horsemen  had  neglected  (he  precaution  of  watching  the  Galkayu  rood. 

The  march  from  Badwein  to  DamotoccupiedfourdByK,  the  only  casualty 
bring  one  man  of  the  2nd  Sikhs  tnissing  and  one  man  Beverely  wounded  of  the 
aa,me  regiment,  the  latter  bring  shot  by  one  of  the  enemy's  mounted  spies. 

The  arrival  of  the  Ohbia  force  at  Damot  must.  I  think,have  been  quite 
unexjiccted.  Mounted  scouts  of  the  Dervishes  rode  up  during  the  night  o[ 
tbo  6th  June,  close  to  the  Caladi  post,  and  rode  off  agnin  on  being  challenged 
by  the  sentrieH. 

These  scouts,  no  doubt,  reported  that  Galadi  was  still  held,  and  the 
DervisheB  did  not  again  visit  Galadi  up  to  thetinio  nf  its  evacuation.  Hence 
the  news  of  mir  concentration  at  Badwein  and  march  at-ross  tlie  Uaud  to 
Damot  [lid  not  probably  reach  the  Mullah  until  the  force  was  within  a  day'a 
march  of  Damot- 

I  halted  one  day  in  Damot  and  reinforced  the  garriHon  there  with  260 
rifles  and  four  maxims.  I  should  have  brought  this  garrison  into  Bohotle, 
since  it  now  served  no  useful  piirposo,  but  traQBjx)rt  sufficient  for  the  supplies 
collected  there  was  not  available.  The  remainder  of  the  column  marched 
into  Bohotle,  arriving  at  that  place  on  the  26th  -Tune, 

The  whole  of  the  Mullah's  live-stock  had  not,  on  the  24th  June,  crosawd 
our  line,  and  during  the  march  some  400  camels  and  2,000  sheep  and  goats 
were  captured,  and  oonsiderahle  loss  was  inSicted  npon  parties  of  the 
enemy  mot  with. 

On  the  9tlth  June  I  despatched  a  column  of  700  rifles  and  two  guns 
to  bring  in  the  Damot  garrison,  which  returned  to  Bohotle  on  the  3rd  July, 
bringing  in  the  Damot  garrison  and  meeting  with  no  signs  of  the  enemy  OD 
the  road  to  and  back  from  Damot. 

Owing  to  the  movement  of  the  Mullah  hito  the  Nogal  it  became 
necessary  to  strengthen  all  (he  posts  on  the  Eerbera- Bohotle  line  of  com- 
municaljon.     I  therefore  detailed  the  following  garrisons ; — 

Bohotk  (400  Tiflxa). 
Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners. 
Ist  Bombay  Grenadiers. 
3rd  Battalion  King  s  African  Rifles. 
5th  Battalion  Kin^  s  African  Rifles. 
Indian  Contingent,  British  Central  Africa. 


^nd  Battalion  King  a  African  KiHcs. 
*  uO  Somali  Mounted  Infan  tyr. 


r 


Bnttalioo  King's  African  BiHfs. 


2nd  Sikhs. 

The  Rarritfou  foe  tlie  posts  moved,  out  from  Bohotle  in  l.wo  oolnmnB  nn 
the  3rd  and  (ith  July  rea]>eclively. 

On  mv  way  from  Daraot  to  Bohotle  on  tha  "iSth  June  I  received  a, 
telegram  £rotii  His  Mftjeaty's  Secretary  of  State  tor  War  infocming  me  of  the 
appointment  of  Major-General  Sir  C,  C.  Egerton,  K.C.B.,  D.S.O.,  to  iwmmand 
the  Somalilond  Field  Force.  I  infonned  Major-Generftl  Egerton  of  my 
dispositions  and  received  Ws  concurrence  in  tboro.  Pconi  Oarrero  I  pro- 
teeiled  to  Sheikh  and  handed  over  command  of  the  Souialiland  Field  Force 
to  Major-Ceneral  Sir  t.  C.  Egerton.  who  arrived  in  Bcrbera  on  the  3rd  Jnly 
and  assumed  command. 

The  day  before   he   reached  Bohotle,  Gfenuml  Manning  Api>iiiiii.iniii 
received  a  telegram  dated  22nd  June  from  the  Secretary  o£  "f  *'."''5''^- 
State  for   War  cor^ratulating   him   upon  the   approaching  c.  7i;gertoii. 
concentration  of  hia  force,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  and  the 
troops  under  him  had  overcome  the  great  difficulties  incident 
to  the  expedition.     He  was,  at  the  same  time,  informed  that  aa 
the  recent  movement  of  the  Mullah  had  brought  the  operations 
into  closer  proximity  to  the  posts  in  the  British  sphere,  and 
as  it  had  been  thought  desirable  to  send  reinforcements  from 
India  and  Aden,  H.M.  Government  had  decided  to  appoint 
Major-General  Sir  C.  Egerton,  K.C.B.,  D.S.O,,  to  command 
the  whole  force.    General  Manning  was  further  instructed  that 
Iiis  operations,  until  the  transfer  of  the  command  had  taken 
place,  should    be    confined   to  the  protection  of  the  poste 
between  Bohotle  and  Berbera. 

On  the  3rd  July,  the  third  expedition  against  the  Mullah 
may  be  said  to  have  terminated. 

In  his  final  report  on  the  operations.  General  Manning  aenerai 
tumiahed  the  foUowing  general  remarks  :—  Mtmnmg'a 

1.  It  would  hardly  be  possible  to  exaggerate  the  difEcultJes  connected  ^  ~^-.- 
with  the  landing  of  stores  at  Obbia,  and  their  traiXBport  from  t'le  beach  to  the     *P*"'   '"'• 
anpply  dep6t.  a  distance  of  over  f  of  a  mile. 

No  transport  animals  oould  be  ppared  for  this  week,  and  the  tioopa  were 
tramcquentiy  eniploycd  incessantly  for  six  weeks  from  moniing  till  nights 
b  The  Somali  hss  proved  himself  a  Htat  rata  transport  attendant  wlicij 

"  m7)  »  2 


properly  treated  and  fed.  The  Transport  Depurtmeiit  was  very  fortunate  in 
the  ofllcers  setected  and  sent  out  for  this  duty.  They  looked  coiofully  after 
their  men  and  watched  over  their  inlcrestn,  the  resalt  being  that  a  very 
cffieient  Transport  Department  was  organiBcd  frgm  what  appeared,  at  first 
sight,  very  unpromising  material. 

The  forrc  landed  at  Obbia  with  nothing  in  the  way  af  a  Transport 
Department,  tmating  to  the  report  o!  the  ability  of  Vueiif  All  to  provide 
camels  and  attendants.  When  it  was  realised  tlmt  this  promiBo  was 
likely  to  be  fulfilled,  the  raising  and  cquipmeat  of  a  Transport  Department 
had  at  once  to  be  commenced,  and  that  sueh  im  efficient  tcattsport  could  bo 
improvieed  in  a  few  weeks  speaks  voluniea  for  the  skill  and  energy  of  those 
entrusted  with  this  important  duty. 

3.  The  general  plan  of  the  late  operations  may  he  briefly  described  as 
follows ; — 

To  prevent  the  Mullah  from  breaking  away  to  the  Wehi  Shebcli. 

To  endeavour  to  confine  him  to  the  north  and  between  the  British  and 
Abyssioian  forces,  where  an  attack  made  by  cither  would  drive  him  ii 
eoiitact  with  one  or  the  other  forces. 

The  Abyssinians  occupied  the  Wehi  Shebeli  and  moved  up  later  trjwards 
Gerlogubi,  but  failed,  from  reasons  I  have  already  eipluned,  to  ciml 
contact  with,  the  Mullah  near  Wardair,  where  he  had  fallen  back  cousequent 
upon  our  advuico  from  Galkayu  to  flaladi  and  Gumbuni. 

Owing  to  transport  diilicultica  and  the  distance  to  be  traversed  acre 
walerlesH  bush  country,  the  British  force  could  not  again  come  up  with  the 
Mullah  by  pushing  on  to  Wald^  from  Galadi,  but  held  the  eastern  and 
northernlineof  water,  thereby  effectively  imcring  the  Mullah's  egtessineithn 
direction,  uolesa  heavy  rain  fell  sufficient  to  render  him  entirely  independent 
of  the  wells  which  were  in  our  hands,  and  filling  up  the  bailie. 

Before  this  could  happen  I  had  hoped  that  the  Abyssinians  would  bava 
occupied  Gerlogubi,  which  ifl  only  26  miles  from  Wardair  and  WalwaL 
This,  however,  they  failed  to  do  ;  but  the  pressure  of  their  advance  from  the 
south,  and  our  hold  on  the  Mudugregiun,  compelled  the  Mullah  to  endeavour 
to  eacape  ^m  bis  conGned  situation. 

Heavy  rain  fell  late  in  May  and  early  in  June,  and  filled  the  line  of 
waterholea  from  south  of  Bohotle  towards  the  Nogal,  This  enabled 
the  Midlah  to  carry  into  execution  his  only  way  of  escaping  by  the  daring 
eipedient  of  passing  through  our  lines  of  communication.  The  great 
fiuperiorityinniunbera  of  Dervish  horsemen  rendered  this  movement  likely  to 
be  successful 

The  flight  into  the  Nogal  was  covered  hy  a  screen  of  horsemen,  who 
operated  north  and  sooth  of  Bohotle,  with  the  object  of  obscuring  the  actual 
direction  of  the  Mullah's  flight. 

Had  the  garrison  of  Bohotle  been  strong  enough  to  have  moved  out  a 
force  of  1,000  rifles  with  a  considerable  mounted  force,  the  Dervishea  wonld 
have  had  the  alternative  of  fighting  to  gain  a  passags  for  their  live,at«ck,  o 
giving  up  the  attempt  and  retiring  upon  Walwal  and  Wardair. 

It  is  my  opinion  that  the  attempt  would  have  been  abandoned,  since 


197 


Dervislica  wen.'  not  in  a  ponil-on  to  fight ;  shiirdices  of  ammunition  ar.d  tlieir 
recent  loises  at  Gumburu  Mid  Docaloieh  Iwing  tlw  mftin  causes  ol  their 
unwillingness  to  come  in  contact  witli  our  troopB  again. 

The  Mullnli,  however,  through  bia  spieB,  was  no  doubt  well  aware  of  the 
strength  of  the  BohotJe  garriBon,  and  decided  that  it  wns  safe  to  cross,  having 
aatinGed  himself  that  the  troops  on  the  Mudug  side  were  still  in  occupation 
of  their  poets. 

The  DerviahcH,  however,  executed  their  move  while  the  troops  on  the 
Mudug  side  of  the  Haud  were  actually  in  procejiB  of  conrtntration  at 
Badwein  preparatory  to  the  more  acrosa  the  Haud  to  Damot,  and  I  heard 
from  priiionera  captured  on  the  mai'cb  of  the  force  from  Damot  to  Bohotle 
that  the  sudden  and  unexpected  arrival  of  the  troops  from  Mudug  had 
completely  disconcerted  the  Derviahei. 

The  late  operations  have  been  carried  out  under  conditions  of  extreme 
difficulty.;  the  arid  and  watsrleas  nature  of  the  country  traverBcd  has,  of 
necessity,  uiiposed  upon  the  troops  hardships  prohably  not  incidental  to 
campaigning  in  any  other  country,  and  this,  added  to  the  extreme  heat  and 
the  necessity  for  long  marches  to  economiflc  the  issue  of  or  to  reach  water,  ha« 
Bulijeeted  the  discipline  aad  training  of  the  troops  employed  to  a  very  high 

It  is  a  pleasiu^  to  me  to  be  able  to  bear  testimony  to  the  excellent 
discipline  maintaiaed  aad  to  the  cheierful  manner  in  which  all  ranks  havu 
carr'ed  out  their  duties  under  very  tryinK  conditions. 

4.  I  regict  that  tLie  wireless  telegraphy  sections  did  noc  succeed  in 
obt-air.ing  any  very  tangible  results. 

This  aystem  would  have  been  of  great  use  ia  many  jiarts  of  the  country, 
whero  visual  signalling  is  impossible  owing  to  dense  bush  or  to  the  flatness  of 
the  country. 

Q.  The  storage  of  water  in  canvas  tanks  was  very  extensively  made  uia 
of  throughout  the  late  operations,  and  proved  the  only  means  of  watering 
large  bodies  of  troops  and  animals  at  one  lime,  and  the  only  system  which 
permitted  the  concentration  of  any  large  body  of  troops  at  any  one  time  at 
places  where  the  water  supply  was  limited  to  one  or  two  wells. 

C.  The  lift  and  force  pumps,  with  wired  hose,  were  of  groat  service. 

7.  The  carriage  of  sick  and  wounded  was,  to  a  certain  extent,  solved  by 
the  introduction  of  the  new  pattern  camel  Utter  for  Bomah  camels. 

The  carriage  of  severely  wounded  or  serious  oa?es  of  sickness,  except  in 
dhoolis,  ia,  however,  a  problem  yet  l«  be  solved. 

8.  I  have  already,  in  despatches,  referred  to  the  eicellent  aervicea 
rendered  by  the  Burgher  Mounted  Infantry ;  thcu"  knowledge  ot  country, 
and  their  adaptahiUty  to  the  conditions  of  service  in  Somaliland,  made  the 
corps  a  very  valuahle  addition  to  the  force.  I  have  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Milnermy  high  appreciation  of  thescrvicesof  the  Burgher  Mounted  Infantry. 

5.  The  Bikouir  Camel  Corps  have  hkowise  been  of  the  greatest  service. 
Moat  ot  the  early  reconnaissances  towards  Galkayu  were  carried  out  by  thli 


198 


Casualties. 


The  keenness  and  excellent  spirit  shown  by  the  native  ranks  of  the  corps 
are  deserving  of  high  commendation. 

I  trust  it  may  be  possible  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  Maharajah  of 
Bikanir  my  high  appreciation  of  the  services  rendered  by  the  Bikanir  Camel 
(Jorps  while  imder  my  command  in  Somaliland. 

10.  The  press  correspondents  were  a  source  of  some  embarrassment, 
owing  to  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  a  censorship  over  telegrams  sent  to 
and  despatched  from  Aden. 

The  number  of  casualties  in  action  of  the  Field  Force  up 
to  the  3id  July,  1903,  was  reported  as  foUows : — 


KiUed. 

Wounded. 

4* 
1 
6 
35 

13 
1 

Missing. 

1 

1 

Remarks. 

British  Officers           .,'     12 

„      rank  and  file  :      2 

Indian  rank  and  file  . .      56 

Central  African  rank     123 

and  file 
Scxnali  rank  and  file  . . '       5 
African  followers        . .      14 

•  • 

1 

•  • 

•  • 

•  • 

• 

*  1  since  dead.* 
■  Private  Schwartz, 
Burgher  Contingent. 

212 

60                   2 

1 

1 
1 

CHAPTER   VL* 


THE   FOURTH  EXPEDITION   1903-04. 


)J3;bisfobobment  op  the  Field  Force. — Appointment  op 
■  Uajor-Gexbral  Sir  C.  Egerton  as  General  Opficeb 
■  Commanding. — Correspondence  Regardinq  Plans 
H  AND  Military  Policy. — Transport  Requirements. — 
H  Organization  of  the  Field  Force. — Abyssinian 
W  Co-operation. — Concentration  of  Field  Force.— 
Fortified  Post  Established  at  Galadi. — Naval 
Demonstration    at    Obbia.— Formation    of    Tribal 

I  Horse. — Colonel  Kenna's  Reconnaissance.— Battle 
op  Jidbali. — Advance  into  the  Southern  Nogal.— 
Concentration  op  Field  Force  on  the  Line  Gaolo  - 
Halin.  —  Mullah  Retreats  Northwards.  ■ — Fresh 
Plan  of  Operations. — Pursuit  of  Mullah  into  the 
Northern  Haud. — Capture  of  Illig. — Failure  op 
the  mljjabten  co- ope  ration.— termination  of 
Active  Operations. 
The  deciaioo  of  His  Majeaty's  Government  to  increase  the 
force  in  Somaliland,  and  despatch  thither  an  officer  of  higher 
tank  than  the  Inspector-General  of  the  King's  African  Rifles 
had  been  taken  noon  the  advice  of  the  Commander- in-Cluef, 
Field  Marshal  Earl  Roberts,  who  felt  considerable  anxiety 
regarding  the  Obbia  force,  when  the  news  of  the  MuUah's 
march  into  the  Nogal  was  received  in  London,  on  the 
13th  June,  1903. 

On  the  15th  June  the  following  further  action,  to  meet  Eeinforee. 
possible  eventualities,  waa  taken : —  menu. 


*  See  Map  II- 


200 

1,500  camels,  in  addition  to  1,300  already  ordered, 
were  to  be  prepared  for  early  embarkation  from  India 
for  Berbera. 

2  Native  Infantry  Battalions.  ~1   with  obli- 

tOO  Mounted  Infantry  {half  to   be  [      gatoiy 
British).  i        mule 

2  Bectiona  28th  Mountain  Battery.     J  transport. 
IJ  Field  Hospitals, 
were  ordered  to  be  warned  in  India  for  service  in 
Somaliland. 
300  British  infantry  and  300  native  infantry  were  to  be 

sent  forthwith  from  Aden  to  Berbera. 
Three  months'  supplies  for  men  and  animals  were  to  be 

provided. 
The  troops  ordered  from  Aden  reached  Berbera  between 
the  21st  and  30th  June,  and  on  the  foimer  date,  the  Viceroy 
of  India  was  desired  to  send  at  once  to  Berbera  one  native 
infantry  battalion  and  500  mounted  infantry,  and  to  arrange 
for  Major-General  Sir  C.  Egerton  and  his  staff  to  proceed  as 
soon  as  possible  to  the  seat  of  war. 

The  departure  of  the  Buighei  contingent  for  South  Africa 
on  the  12th  June,  on  the  termination  of  their  six  months' 
engagement,  and  the  itumber  of  non-effectives  among  the 
mounted  troops  in  Somaliland  had  made  it  desirable  to  reinforce 
that  arm  ffithout  delay,  and  the  presence  of  an  additional 
battalion  upon  the  lines  of  communication  was  deemed 
advisable. 

On  the  27th  June  the  newly  appointed  C'ommauder  sailed 
from  Bombay,  and  on  that  date  a  telegram  was  despatched  to 
him  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  directing  him,  after 
conferring  with  General  Manning,  to  report  upon  the  military 
and  political  situation  in  SomaUland  and  subnut  proposals 
regarding  certain  points,  which  were  amplified  in  a  letter 
of  the  same  dat«,  to  the  following  effect : — 

I.  In  confirmation  of  tho  tulegrara  deepatohed  to  you  tliia  day  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  War,  I  am  directed  by  the   Commaiider- in -Chief  to 


201 


reiiuost  that  on  assuming  the  command  of  tlir;  troops  in  Snmaliland,  y'lii 
ivill  confer  witJi  Brig.-Geucral  Majmiiig,  and,  after  fully  satisfy  ini; 
yourself  oa  to  the  position  of  affairs  by  iiiqiiiiy  and  inspection,  you  will 
report  by  telegram  to  the  Sesrstary  o£  State  for  War  oa  tbo   following 

(I]  What  posti  should  be  hold  for  the  defence  of  the  ProtBctorate  T 

(2)  What  (oree  is  needed  to  jjarriaon  theae  posts,  and  what  eUoold  be 

its  distribution  I 

(3)  TMiHt  mobile  force  is  required  in  addition  to  the  garrisons  of  the 

posts,  and  what  shoiild  be  its  composition  T 
(4}  Is  it  desirable  to  modify  in  any  way  the  oom.po3itica  of  the  force 
now  in  tha  ProtEctorata  T 

(5)  What  are  your  requirements  in  transport,  supplies  and  stores  I 

(6)  How  Hoou  wili   the    Berbera  to    Bohotic    road   be  coinpleted  tor 

wheeled  transport  t 

(7)  The  following  alternative  railivay  schemea  have  been  proposed:  — 
^^^      (o)  A  line  from  Berbera  to  Bohotle. 

^^^^^      (&)  A  line  from   Berbera  to  Haigeisa,  vid  Adadleh,  and  tJianee  on  to 

^^^^H    (r)  A  combination  of   (a)  and  (b)  by  a  branch  line  from   Adadleh, 
^^^^V  vid  Burao,  to  Bohotle.     Preliminary  reports  as  to  these  sohetnes 

^^^^B  have  been    received  from  the  Acting  Consul-Guneral  of  Pro- 

^^^B  toctorate  and  Major  Craster,  R.E.,  but  His  Majesty's  Govern- 

^^^r  ment  deeires  to  bo  in  possenflioa  of  your  personal  views  as  to  the 

feasibility,  relative  advsuit^e  and  cost  of  the  threo  lines. 

(8)  What  steps  do  you  propose  to  take  to'  improve  the  water  siipjiUBS 

on  your  liiL^  of  com^niuiicatioa  T 
•JO)  You  should  report  fully  and  frankly  on  the  gErnoral  situation  in 
Somaliland,  both  poUtical  and  military,  and  on  the  eHect  of  the 
operations  agiunst  the  Mullah  up  to  the  present  date. 
L  The  Commander- in -Chiet  further  desires  to  be  informed  whether 
tbe  Reld  Intelligence  Department  in  Somaliland  is  organised  on  a  satis- 
fictory  footing,  and  whether  proper  provision  of  scouts,  guides  and  inter- 
preters has  been  made.  If  defects  exist,  you  should  itate  whether  you  require 
any  further  start  or  othei'  personnel  to  remedy  them. 

3-  Yon  should  consider  and  report  in  what  way  the  foroa,  whioh  has 
been  placed  in  the  field  by  the  Kmpiror  of  Abyssinia,  canassiat  your  opera- 
tions, eommunicating  also  your  views  to  Colonel  .lochtoct,  C,B.,  who  is 
thn  senior  British  officer  attached  to  that  force. 

As  the  Abys"iniBn  troops  ate  understood  to  be  very  deficisni:  in  com- 
missariat arrangements,  and  to  live  on  the  country  nhich  they  traverse, 
tbe  Commander-in-Chief  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  not  desirable  that  tb!*y 
should  be  invited  to  cnti^r  the  British  Protettorate. 

On  the  29th  June,  of  the  remfoccements  which  had  arrived 
from  Aden,   the   detachment  of   the   Hampshire   Regiment 


^Umm 


202 

was  ordered  to  halt  at  Sheikh,  while  the  101st  Grenadiers, 
except  50  men  sent  to  Las  Diireh,  remained  at  Berbera.  This 
course  was  rendered  necessary  since  the  supply  of  water  upon 
the  lines  of  communication  was  found  inadequate  for  the 
increased  number  of  troops, 
r  On  the  3rd  July,  Sir  Charles  Egerton  disembarked  at 
'  Berbera,  and  two  days  later,  before  he  had  had  an  opportunity 
of  conferring  witii  either  General  Manning  or  the  Political 
Officer,  wrote  a  despatch,  iu  which  he  expressed  liis  views  as 
follows : — 

i.  Having  so  roceatly  laniled.  in  the  country,  it  will,  1  tliink,  be  imder- 
stood  that  uot  having  as  yet  bad  tbe  advantage  o[  personal  conference 
with  either  the  Consul-Generni  ot  witli  Brig.-Geaeral  Manning,  my 
a|)preciatiOB  gf  the  aituatioo  is  neeeasarily  somewhat  erode,  and  ia  Lable  to 
i^iilueiiuent  nLodJficatiun, 

The  situatioLi,  aa  it  appears  to  iiic  from  the  Uin>ted  aoiurceH  of  informa- 
tion at  present  available,  is  as  followc  : — 

The  Mullah,  whose  prestige  appears  to  have  been  very  greatly  ahalieii 
by  the  heavy  losses  he  has  sustained  iu  his  encouaters  with  Plimkett  and 
Gougli  and  the  Abyssiaiaiii,  has  retired  into  the  Wadi  Nogal  for  the  double 
purpose  of  repleniihiog  hia  store  of  arms  and  aimuunition  and  of  gathering 
fresh  reeruits  to  his  standard.  He  and  his  foUomitg  oro  reported  to  be  at  a 
very  low  ebb.  both  in  equipment  and  morale,  and.  were  it  only  posaible  to 
strike  a  blow  at  hiui  before  he  lias  time  to  reuover,  in  all  human  probability 
hit)  whole  power  would  i^oUapse. 

It.  Unfortunately,  owing  to  the  enfeebled  contUtion  of  the  transport 
animals  with  General  Manning,  it  is  impossible  to  undertake  a  fresh  series 
of  operations  until  the  broken-down  transport  has  been  rolleved  irom 
lierbera  by  camels  from  India.  Of  these  about  1,000  have  already  arrived 
and  1,800  more  are  expected  in  tbe  course  of  the  next  few  days.  After 
to  days  on  boai'd  ship,  during  the  monsoon,  these  antmaia  wi!l  naturally 
require  a  few  days'  lest  to  recover,  and  it  is  unlikely  that  the  gieat«r  portion 
of  theiu  could  leave  Berbera  much  before  the  15th  uf  the  month,  by  which 
time,  too,  the  expected  reinforcements  wiU  hqve  arrived  front  India. 

4.  In  tbe  meantime.  General  Manning  having  left  a  gai'rison  of  400 
men  at  Bobotle,  is  concentrating  the  bulk  of  hia  force  at  Buroo,  which  is 
indicated  as  being  the  best  advanced  base  of  operations  against  the  Wa^ 
Nogul.  It  is  probable  that  those  troops,  .wme  of  whom  are  reported  to  be 
suffering  from  scurvy,  will  need  a  rest,  and  it  may  possibly  be  fciond  necessary 
to  reheve  some  of  them  altogether.  It  is  improbable,  therefore,  that  Hctive 
operations  can  be  resiuntil  very  much  before  the  beginning  of  August,  if 
BO  soon.  However  greatly  such  inaction  is  to  be  deplored,  it  appears  to  me 
to  Ih'  lUiBvoidable.     I  urn,  iu  tbe  uieantime,  diret-ting  my  uttention  to  the 


203 


better  orgmiuution  ol  the  supply  aad  transport  arrangeuienta,  tne  iniproTe- 
ment  of  the  water  supply  uu  the  liueit  oF  comiuuiucation,  and  the  general 
organization  of  the  furce  under  my  command. 

5.  As  regards  tlie  nature  and  scope  of  tlie  operation)!,  they  may  be 
briefly  summed  op  oa  (oHows ; — 

(n)  The  re-occupation  of  Daaiot  and  Mudug. 

(6)  The  advance  of  a  atrong  column  from  Bm'oo  into  the  Wadi  Nogai. 

TbG  ceafOna  for  adopting  tbis  plan  of  operations  are  based  ou  the  Mullah's 
probable  course  of  action  On  finding  himself  opposed  by  a  strong  column 
from  Eurao.  Diaheartened  as  his  following  U  reported  to  be  from  their 
heavy  losses,  it  is  likely  that  tho  MiUlob  would  deaire,  if  possible,  to  avoid 
dghting,  and  would  eadeavoiu'  to  escape  to  the  south  to  Mndug  or  Ogaden. 
iij  anticipating  liirn  at  Damot  and  Mudug  both  these  lines  of  retreat 
would  be  denied  to  him,  and  be  would  find  himself  hemmed  in  between 
these  forces,  with  one  or  other  of  which  he  would  be  compelled  to  Bght  iu 
order  to  aecnre  his  retreat.  Both  the  Dainot  and  Mudug  forces  would  te 
aufficiontly  atrong  to  resist  attack,  and  as  I  propose  to  platH  them  iu  tele- 
graphic communication  with  each  other,  and  to  connect  the  Burao  column 
with  its  base  by  a  field  telegraph  line,  all  three  columua  would  be  in  communi- 
cation, and  could  work  together  to  the  common  end,  which  would  be  to 
bring  the  Mullah  to  bay  and  compel  him  to  fight.  Could  we  succeed  in 
giving  him  one  crnshing  defeat  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  his 
own  adherents  would  surrender  him,  as  it  is  reported  they  had  mode  up  their 
minds  to  do  ao  on  the  day  of  Piunbett's  light,  had  not  they  discovered  that 
his  forces  had  exhausted  their  ammunition. 

6.  It  will  be  seen  that  in  the  above  I  have  not  taken  into  account  the 
possibility  of  co-operation  with  the  Abyssinian  forces.  I  understand,  how- 
ever, that  these  have  been  withdrawn  to  Harror,  and,  not  knowing  how  far 
any  further  co-operation  on  their  pfkrt  is  to  bo  relied  on,  I  have  not  take 
its  posaibility  into  consideration,  although  it  would  be  a  most  valuable 
factar  in  the  general  scheme. 

7.  The  above  plaJlof  operations  is  ba<jed  on  military  oonsiderations  only, 
and  it  is  possible,  as  I  have  ^aid  above,  that  there  may  be  political  considera- 
tiCHis  which  would  nocessitate  its  modification.  I  am  proceeding  to-morrow 
to  Sheikh,  where  I  shall  be  able  to  discuss  the  situation  with  the  Commis- 
sioner and  Consul-General,  but  us  a  mail  is  leaving  Berliera  te-day,  I  have 
thought  it  better  to  communicate  my  personal  views  on  the  situation  without 

On  the  10th  July,  General  Egertou  telegraphed  from 
Sheikh  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  :  — 

In  reply  to  the  nine  questions  iu  your  telegrniu.  No.  -285  (sec  page  201), 
I  have  conferred  with  Manning  and  Cordeaux.  The  effect  of  operations 
to  date  is,  genejally,  that  the  Mullah's  followers  have  received  very  Hevoro 
pimiahmont,  and,  by  tlie  good  fortune  of  timely  heavy  Taiixe,  the  remainder, 
including  the  Mullah  with  his  immediate  surrouudiogs  and  pergonal  pruperty, 


20t 

h&TB  eBcdped  with  some  loss  of  prestige  to  the  Nogni  Plain  from  the  pre- 
dicament they  were  in.  between  Manning  uid  the  AbyBBiniaas.  Ha  lias  been 
reported  to  be  orgoniHing  convoys  of  arma  and  ammunition  from  tlie  northern 
porta  in  the  Italian  Protectorate  to  join  him  in  the  Nogal  Plwn. 

In  the  abxeniM!  of  detinito  inslructiuna  regarding  the  Govemment 
policy,  the  following  alternative  flchcmcs  are  proposed  r — 

Should  the  death  or  capture  of  the  Mullah  be  eaaentially  necessary, 
I  propose  he  bo  not  attacked  until  the  diapoaitiona  made  fltop  bia  »ci»«s  to 
Ubbia,  Mudug,  Ward»r.  When  accompUahed,  this  practically  confines 
the  sphere  of  operations  to  the  Italian  Protectorate,  and  I  moit  strongly 
urge  that  negotiations  be  entered  into  by  His  Maieat^a  Qovemment  to 
make  tbe  Protectorate  available  for  operation?  by  ouraelves  and  our  allies. 

An  Abyssinian  occupation  in  force  of  Galadi  and  Wardair  would  efiect 
the  purpose  of  stopping  the  Mullah's  access  to  the  south  and  HOutb-west ; 
and  for  this  proposal  I  urge  that  the  Emperor  Menelek  be  moved  to  co-operate 
with  me  to  that  end,  while  I  proviaion  my  conununicationa,  organise  my 
force,  and  prepare  to  atrike  in  the  Nogal  Pla'n.  In  order  to  secure  their 
hearty  co-operation  it  is  most  desirable  to  suhatdise  the  Abyftainiaa  force 
and  meet  its  requirements  in  such  matters  as  rations,  camel  water-tanks. 
On  the  other  hand,  should  the  policy  of  the  Govemment  be  to  exclude  the 
Mullah  from,  the  Protectorate,  to  atrengthen  our  own  [loaition  and  effeotivBly 
adminiater  the  aouth  portion,  I  advocate  the  eraploynient  of  a  mobile 
force  in  the  Nogal  Hain  and  the  establishment  of  connecting  posts  and 
communicationa  from  Burao  to  whatever  position  may  be  eventually  decided 
upon  from  which  to  dominat«^  the  valley. 

The  Berbera-Bohotle  line  would  be  strongly  held  by  poata,  combined 
with  a  mobile  force  probably  located  at  Burao,  I  would  also  link  up  the 
Nogal  position  with  a  line  of  posts  Hargeiaa^Aik-Garrero,  or  (should  the 
present  reconnaiaaance  not  lind  auffii^ient  water  at  Oadweina)  Burao  The 
west  of  the  Protectorate  may  beconsidsre.ito  be  covered  from  outaide  attack 
by  Abysainians.  The  north  eaat  portion  ia  almost  unexplored,  but  the  left 
bank  waterahed  of  the  Nogal  basin  would  seem  to  offer  a  convenient  barrier 
against  attack  from  the  north-eaat. 

This  second  proposal  would  involve  the  reorgonizitioo  and  reinforce- 
mant  of  the  Abysainians'  proacnt  force  and  not  require  the  active  uo-opora- 
tion  of  the  Italians  or  Abysainians.  Ita  probable  effect  on  the  Mullah 
would  be  to  drive  him  south  and  to  relieve  the  Protectorate  tribea  of  his 
immediate  influence.  Probably  many  waverera  amongst  the  tcibea  would 
immsdiately  join  us  ;  others  would  follow  when  convinced  that  our  occupa- 
tion is  permanent.  When  effected,  the  regular  forces  might  ba  gradually 
replaced  by  locol  corpa  under  British  officers,  with  a  backing  of  one  or  two 
Indian  regiments,* 

♦  In  a  despatch  dated  14th  July,  1003,  General  Egerton  amplified  his 
vit'ws  on  these  and  other  points  as  follows  :— 

In  my  last  despatch.  No.  S.A,  28,  dated  Berbsca,  5th  July,  liM)3,  I 
submitted  for  your  information  a  rough  appreciation  of  the  situatjon  in 


205 

Two  days  later  General  Egerton  reiterated  hia  request 
for  one  company  of  Sappers  and  Miners  and  two  Indian 
battalions,  and  also  asked  for  : — 

A  regiment  of  British  cavalry. 

An  increase  of  Somali  mounted  infantry  from  150  to  500 
rifles,  besides  other  nunor  requirements. 

the  Protectorate,  aa  it  appeared  to  me,  and  of  tlie  mea^iirea  which  I  ooQ- 
Bidered  necessary  for  a  auccMaful  campaign,  having  for  its  miiiQ  objective 
the  death  or  capture  of  the  Mullah. 

2.  Since  writing  that  despatch  I  have  bad  the  advantage  of  coiinullmg 
with  General  Manning,  Captain  Cordenux  and  other  officers  of  local 
experience. 

3.  The  conclusions  I  have  arrived  at,  after  con.iultation  with  these 
officers,  aie,  that  i£  we  are  to  continue  to  hold  the  Protectorate  there  are 
only  two  couraea  open  to  us,  viz.,  the  death  or  capture  of  the  Mullah,  or  his 
final  expulsion  from  Britiah  territory. 

4.  The  ftirmer  of  these  two  cournea  is  the  moat  Fiatisfactory,  but  iu 
order  to  render  it  probable,  or  oven  posiiMe,  it  would  appear  to  be  iieceasary 
to  bar  his  {loasagQ  Huuth  by  prd,etically  holding  all  the  wfUs  from  Obbia 
westwards  to  Gerlogubi,  by  either  British  or  Abysfliniau  forces,  or  a  combina- 
tion of  the  two.  This  ciiiiTBe,  however,  presents  the  politifal  or  diplouiafic 
diflicnlty  that  may  ari.ie  as  regai'ds  the  nse  of  Italian  territory  by  ouraelves 
or  ou.-  allies,  though  apparently  there  is  no  let  or  hindiauce  oiTered  iu  the 
case  of  the  Mullah,  who  is  not  hamppred  by  political  conniderations. 

5.  It  Ims  hccn  suggeatod  to  me,  however,  that  if  the  line  Oerlogubi- 
Wardair-Galadi  were  held  in  force  by  tho  Abyssinians,  and  they  were 
prepared  to  strike  eastwards  in  the  Obbia  direction,  it  would  not  be  necessary, 
in  the  llrat  instauco,  to  encroach  directly  oa  the  Italian  Protectorate.  It 
ia  believed  that  for  personal  reasons  the  Mullah  would  not  willingly  make 
use  of  the  country  between  Obbia  and  Mudug  aa  hia  line  of  retirement,  owing 
to  the  hostility  of  loeal  tribesmen.  The  necessity  of  holding  the  Obbia- 
Mndug  line  would  therefore  be  limited  to  the  single  contingency  of  positive 
information  being  received  that  the  Mullah  was  actvially  using  that  line  of 
rutirement. 

6.  I  propose,  therefore,  that  the  line  to  Galadi  only  should  be  occupied 
by  the  Abyssiniana,  a  aubaidy  baing  granted  to  them  to  ensure  their  ready 
co-operation.  It  might  also  be  neceasary  for  us  to  supply  them  with  food 
and  wator-tin.1  to  enable  them  to  keep  theficldand  to  cover  long  waterless 
tracts  between  the  varioiia  wells.  > 

7.  They  might  arrange  to  take  such  supplies  over  at  cither  }Iargeisa  or 
Bohotle,  preferably  the  formei,  bb  not  interfering  with  our  own  main  line  of 
oommuni cations.  I  am  convinced  that  whatever  expense  this  migh^.  entail 
would  be  money  well  laid  out,  jirovided  that  the  death  or  capture  uf  the 
Mullah  ii  cousiJiTcd  to  bt  Biisenlial  to  the  pacification  of  the  counfrj'. 


The  first  of  his  supplementary  demands  he  later  withdrew. 
(See  para.  14  of  his  despatch  of  14th  July.) 

On  the  13th  July  His  Majeaty's  Government  replied  as 
follows  to  the  several  proposals  which  had  been  received  from 
General  Egerton. 


}<.  1'liD  sEM-ond  )<ulieme  tdian  at  the  expulsion  of  the  Mulli^  from  tlio 
Pratoctorato  and  proventing  his  return  to  it  by  means  of  a  I'hain  of  posts 
from  HB^KCisa  rid  Aik-Garrero  to  some  point  not  jet  decided  in  the  Nogtd 
Valla;.     Bohotlc  would  continue  to  be  beld  oa  at  pcoBcnt. 

0.  To  ensure  the  suoeesa  of  this  scheme,  however,  it  would  be  neeeBBsry 
to  detach  the  sections  of  the  DolbahEintii  tribmi,  who  are  now  the  Mullah's 
men,  from  their  allegiance  ;  and  the  only  way  to  do  this  is  by  a  declaration 
ott  tho  part  of  the  Government  of  their  intuntion  to  hold  and  administer  the 
coimtry.  UnleHS  this  is  done  I  can  Hce  no  prospect  of  iinality  so  long  as 
the  Mullah  remains  alive;  and  oven  were  he  to  die  it  is  jirobable  that  a 
Bucccsaor  would  arise  in  liis  place,  who  would  continue  tluj  rpign  of  terror 
established  by  Haji  Maborapd  Abdullah. 

10.  All  tho  local  authorities  whom  I  have  conaulted  are  agreed  that  tho 
Mullah  is  hated  and  feared  by  tho  tribesmeu,  and  that  wore  we  to  maJte  our 
Proteotorato  a  reality  by  espelling  Idra  and  regularly  administering  tho 
tountry  they  would  willingly  take  the  opportunity  of  shaking  off  his  yoke, 
and  co-operate  with  us  in  keepuig  him  out  of  tlio  Protectorate. 

11.  To  carry  out  either  oE  these  two  schemes  the  following  measures 
seem  to  me  necessary  : — 

(1)  The  cotistrootion  of  a  toad  suitable  for  wheeled  traffic  from  Berbcra 

to  Bohotle. 
(\!)  The  improvement  of  the  water  supply. 
(31  The  eirly  resumption  of  hoetilitiaa  agiinat  the  MldUli. 

12.  To  this  ejid  I  have  asked  for  tlio  following  additions  to  the  forces 
now  at  my  disposal  or  r.n  route  from  India,  vii. : — 

A  company  of  Sappers  and  Miners, 
.\  Pioncpr  ri'gimeut. 

jV  battalion  of  infantry.  I 

Ali  from  India. 

13.  My  reasons  for  asking  for  these  additions  an  as  follows ;  — 
Sappers  ajul  Minem. — The  whole  of  the  Sappers  and  Miners  I  propos"! 

to  employ,  in  the  first  instance,  on  the  improvement  of  the  » 
supply  along  the  main  Lne  of  cojnmunioations.  and  flubaequeatly 
on  such  lateral  line  of  outposts  as  it  may  be  deuided  to  occupy. 
All  authorities  are  agreed  that  much  water  is  habitually  wasted 
by  influfficient  storage  facilities  and  watering  arrangementa :  and 
it  is  holieved,  too,  that  tho  exiating  supply  is  capable  of  very 
great  developmeDt. 


207 

They  stated  that  they  were  opposed  to  a  re-occupation  of 
the  Mudiig,  as  lying  heyond  the  British  sphere  of  respoiwihility, 
but  wished  to  be  informed  whether,  in  view  of  the  reports  of 
General  Manning  and  others,  as  to  the  demoralised  condition 
of  the  MuUah's  forces  and  his  want  of  ammunition,  it 
would  not  be  possible,  with  the  troopa  now  in  Somaliland 
and  those  shortly  expected,  to  organise  a  sufficient   force 


— The  oKtrn   Piimcer  regimeat  ia  tor  work  o]i  thp   Rscb^rtv- 

Bohotl»  Toad.     At  present  t!iere   ia  only  one  Pioneer  regiment 

1  construct  the  whole  201  miles,  including  tho  heai-y  work  on 

the   Sheikh   Paaa,      It   should    be   iiot»d    that    luoal   labour    ia 

practically  iinprocuralilp. 

^it/antry. — The  additional   infantry  regiment   is  required   to  uomplote 

my  proponed  organization  o£  tho  force  into  two  brignde*  and  to 

provide  an  adequate  general  -reBcrve   tar   evejitiialitieH.     It  has 

lieea  remarked  that  meat-esting  claasos  o[  Indian  Irooja  preserve 

their  health  and  resist  eciirry  to  a,  greater  extent  that  arni-mt<at- 

eatoTB,  and  I  would  suggest  that  a  regiment  should  be  sent  having 

a  considerable  Mahomedan  (and  preferably  Pathaii)  element,  aa 

having  fewer  scru^iles  about  tlieir  food  and  water  Uiiui  men  of 

other  classes.    A  regiment  of  the  stamp  of  the  1  st,  2nd.  4th,  Sth, 

20th,  24th,  26th,  or  29tli  Punjab  Infantry  is  what  is  required. 

It.  1  had  also  asked  for   a  British  eavalry  regiment,  but  have  Hinco 

somewhat  reluctantly  cancelled  this  request,  an  I  found  that  uonsi derations 

of  supply,  transport  and  water  made  its  expediency  somewhat  doubtful, 

useful  though  it  would  be  in  other  respecta. 

15.  Beside  my  request  for  mure  troops,  I  regret  that  I  have  had  to 
mslie  heavy  additional  demands  for  transport,  for  remounts  for  moimted« 
infantryand  camel  corps,  for  a  cooUccorps,andfor'faeilitiesforunKliipping 
and  landing  stores  at  Berbera. 

10.  As  regards  transport,  it  may  bo  asHumed  that  the  Somali  transport 
with  General  Manning'e  force,  is  for  the  present  non-existent  so  far  aa  its 
carrjing  power  ia  concerned,  though  unfortunately  its  capacity  for  incurring 
eost  still  cem^s.  It  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  reserve,  on  which  to  draw 
]nt«r  on,  but  a  reserve  that  will  not  be  available  for  two  or  three  months  to 


17-  The  Director  of  iSupply  and  Transpirt  eBtiiuatca  the  number  of 
additional  camels  that  wiil  be  required  in  order  to  fidly  equip  the  mobile 
columns  with  carriage — water  and  supply  camela,  and  to  maintain  a  rsserva 
of  three  months'  supplies  at  posts  on  the  linos  of  communicatjoa,  to  bo 
about  8,000,  of  which  it  ii  desiriihio  that,  if  possible,  some  2,000  more  oamcU  ' 
vhouhl  be  sLip)ilicd  from  India,  It  should  be  iiotrd  that  tho  Iiidiui  camel 
It  doublo  the  luod  of  the  SomaU  camel,  and  will  work  continuously, 


to  enable  a  damagmg  blow  to  be  struck  at  bim  in  the  Nogal 
Plain.  To  assist  in  carrying  out  sucb  a  movement,  the 
Abyasinians  were  being  asked  whether  they  would  undertake 
to  make  an  advance  in  the  direction  of  thu  Mudug. 

Ilia  Majesty's  Government  pointed  out  that  they  were 
adverse  to  any  considerable  increase  of  force,  in  face  of  General 
JUanning's  warning  regarding  water  supply  difficulties  on  the 
lines  of  communication,  but  that  the  Viceroy  of  India  was 
being  asked  to  send  an  additional  company  of  sappers  and 
miners. 

Lastly,  General  Egerton  was  desired  to  bear  in  mind  in 
forming  future  plans  that  the  Goverrmient  did  not  intend 
to  maintain  a  large  permanent  garrison  in  Somaliland,  and 
that  they  wished  that  the  Berbera-Bohotle  road  should  he 
made  suitable  for  wheeled  traffic. 

On    the    19th    July   General    Egerton   repEed   that  he 


whereas  the  Somali  camel  breaks  down  under  continuoua  work,  which  he  is 
not,  accustomed  to.  Hid  great  advantage  is  that  ho  docs  not  require  to  bo 
watered  more  than  once  Li  from  three  to  five  days.     I  abauld,  thErefore. 


propose  t 


;  Indian  cornels  on  the  hnes  of  communication,  and  to 


equip  the  mobile  columns  with  SomB'i,  Arab,  or  Egyptian  camola. 

18.  I  am  endeavouring  to  arrange  for  the  local  purchase  of  Somali 
camels,  and  I  am  addressing  jou  on  tho  subject  of  mule  cadres  and  additional 
camel  corps  from  India.  Thu  moles  ore  wanted  for  work  over  the  Sheikh 
Patis,  which  is  unauited,  (or  camels,  owing  to  its  Hteepnes*.     This  objection 

'will  disappear  when  the  new  road  is  completed  in  about  two  months'  time. 

19.  MiM^laneous  requiremcjitg. — My  other  requirements  ore  s  coolie 
corps  and  a  short  tramway,  to  facilitate  unloading  of  ntores  at  Berbeco,  ami 
alno  a  atcom  laiuich  and  a  couple  of  lighters  for  the  sa-tatf  purpose.  Ai 
present  we  are  di'pendent  un  Somali  labour,  which  is  uncpttain  and  ospensive. 
There  is  only  one  narrow  jetty,  on  which  all  stores  and  animals  have  to  he 
landed,  and.  consequently,  there  is  much  congestion.  What  is  required  is  ft 
tramway  and  trucks  to  convey  all  stores  to  the  beach  above  high-watt<r 
mark,  where  they  could  remain  until  removed  to  the  ordnance  and  snpply 
dopAta.  At  present  there  is  great  confusion  owing  to  animals  having  to  be 
li  ud  d  oa  the  j^Hy- 

■20.  Should  either  of  iny  proposed  schemes-  be  aonctioncd,  and  should 
our  efforts  to  Secure  suillcicnt  transport  bo  succeasful,  T  think  we  might 
very  well  reueiv  active  nnfrations  almut  the  end  of  Ainnist  or  licgiiuiinx  o( 
September. 


deprecated  the  movement  of  a  small  force  into  the  Nogal 

as  inconclusive,  and  proposed  ultimately  to  operate  towards 
Halin  and  GeiTowei  with  two  columns,  based  respec- 
tively on  Burao  and  Bohotle.  He  hoped  to  be  able  to  advance 
by  the  end  of  August,  when  the  Abyssiniana  might  be  in  a 
position  to  co-operate.  He  withdrew  his  request  that  two 
Indian  battalions  should  be  added  to  his  force,  but  requested 
authority  to  raise  1,000  local  mounted  levies.  This  request 
was  granted. 

On  the  22nd  July  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  pointed 
out  by  telegram  to  General  Egerton  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  were  unwilling  to  commit  themselves  to  a  costly 
campaign  without  some  assurance  that  the  MuUah'a  power 
would  thereby  be  permanently  shattered. 

On  the  26th  July  General  Egerton  replied  that  he  could 
not  positively  assert  that  the  result  of  his  operations  would 
finally  dispose  of  the  Mullah,  and  that,  although  the  plan 
proposed  by  bim  offered  the  greatest  chance  of  success, 
everything  would  depend  on  the  subsequent  policy  of  His 
Majesty's  Government.  The  General  then  went  on  to  urge 
that  the  Dolbahanta  tribe  should  be  given  unmistakable 
signs  that  we  intended  to  remain  and  support  them  by  means 
of  permanent  posts. 

On  the  31st  July  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  replied 
that  the  Dolbahanta  were  not  among  the  tribes  with  whom 
His  Majesty's  Government  had  treaties,  and  to  put  into  effect 
the  poKcy  proposed  by  General  Egerton  would  involve 
assurances  of  protection  which  would  still  further  add  to  our 
liability  in  the  direction  which  had  already  coat  so  much. 
The  Secretary  of  State  for  War  then  reiterated  the  view  con- 
tained in  his  telegram  of  the  22nd  instant,  pointing  out 
the  expense  which  had  akeady  been  incurred  and  the  still 
greater  prospective  cost  of  the  proposed  operations. 

On  the  7th  August  General  Egerton,  by  despatch,  and  on 
the  9th  August  by  telegram,  urged  the  necessity  of  assuming 
a  protectorate  over  the  Dolbahanta,  and  again  requested 
127)  0 


that    auotlier    battalion    and    additional     transport     miglit 
be  sent. 

Tbe  following  extracts  from  the  despatch  explain  the 
situation  as  it  presented  itself  at  the  time  to  the   General 

Commanding : — 

Raorgnmiu.  4.  Oa  my  arrival  I  fauad  a  miied  body  of  troops,  many  of  thotn  in  a 

lion  of  the        mucli  exhausted  ooudition,  without  ftn  a4equat«  staS,  and  without  trans- 
force,  port.     It  haa  been  my  endeavour  to  remedy  those  defoots  oa  far  as  poaaible 
tore-equip  the  troops  that  were  in  need  of  it,  and  to  prepare  a  plan  of  opera- 
liona  which  aUould  be  effective  in  eecuring  the  peace  of  the  Proteotorate. 
Q.  Being  unaware   of  the  ultimate  policy  of  Govemmeat  ia  the  Pru- 
PoliticiU  coo-   lectorate,  but  seeing  that  a  main  road  from  Berbera  to  Bobotle  waa  imdur 
jideratioDB  at   oonsjderation,  that  a  nurvey  for  a  railway  was  in  iirogresa,  and  that  jt  was 
effecting  plan  ^ireaAy  in  tontcraplation  to  send  out  plant  for  its  construction,  I  oonolnded 
or  operatioin.  ^^^^^  .j.  ^^  ^^^  lateuliou  of  the  Government  to  eitend  ita  inflneace  and 
adminiatration  to  the  interior  of  the  country.     To  effect  Uiia  and  to  restore 
order,  the  firat  essential  is  the  final  expuleiou  of  the  Mullah  and  the  destiuc- 
tioD  of  bis  influence  within  the  Protectorate,  and  to  this  end  I  have  framed 
my  plan  of  operations. 

6.  The  plan  of  operationa  ia  briefly  to  attack  the  Mullah  with  two 
columns,  to  crush  those  tribes  of  the  Doibabauta,  who  have  willingly  and 
tiersistently  BsaiaUd  him,  and  to  detach  those  who  ivould  othcrwisB  be  coerced 
luto  joining  him  ;  which  latter  object  can  only  be  effeuted  by  assurances  of 
future  protection.  The  outwsj'd  and  visible  signs  of  this  would  be  the 
establishuient  of  pgata  in  their  midst. 

7.  The  map  which  accompanies  this  'despatch,  on  which  the  Dolbahanta 
country  has  been  marked  out  in  blue  poncd,  will  show  what  a  threatening 
{HKiition  they  occupy,  not  only  with  reference  to  the  Berbera-BohOtte  line, 
but  also  towards  the  coast.  In  the  hands  of  the  Mullah  they  are  a  constant 
meaace  to  the  [leace  of  the  country ;  without  them  the  Mullah  ia  poweileeB. 
The  actual  death  or  capture  of  the  Mullah  is  so  very  problemalicat  that  it  oaa 
hardly  be  taken  into  consideration ;  but  to  drive  him  out  of  the  Prot«otM'bte 
is  comparatively  easy,  as  also  it  wouid  be  to  keep  him  out  permanently  with 
the  (^-operation  of  the  Dolbahanta. 

B.  It  must  not  he  supposed  that  in  advocating  the  cstabliahment  of 
posts  1  in  any  way  contemplate  a  prolonged  mihtary  ocuupation.  On  the 
contrary,  1  consider  it  alfords  the  best  means  of  avoiding  it.  lb  is  not 
iateoded  that  these  posts  should  be  largely  garrisoned  with  a  view  to 
offensive,  or  even  defensive,  operations.  They  would  rather  be  the  emblems 
of  our  supremacy,  and  form  rallying  places  for  the  tribesmen,  in  what  would 
then  be  the  very  remote  oontingeni'y  of  the  Mullah  ag^  attempting  to 
enter  the  Protectorate.  The  important  points  to  hold  are  Gerrowei,  las 
Anod  and  Badwein  (marked  on  the  map*  with  a  red  ring),  these  being  tlM 
water  centres  in  the  traet  of  couulry  known  as  Kogal,  which  forme  the 
•Map  seat  with  the  deapati^h. 


211 

princi)Hj  summer  grazing  groimdof  tlie  Dolbahauta,  and  tlie  Mullah's  base  oi 
operations  agaiaat  the  western  and  north-eaatem  tribes  of  the  Protectorate. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  Dolbabanta  tribe  are  adbBTouts  of  tile  Mullah,  more 
throii|{h  feur  of  him  than  BJly  attachment  to  hia  person  or  fanatical  religious 
Rpiritu  They  are  tired  of  hia  cruelljes  and  exautione,  and  in  the  belief  of 
those  who  best  know  the  country,  vouid  speedily  troosfBr  their  aUogianoe 
to  u>t.  Shouldlhey  do  eo,  we  shall  have  obtained  the  best  pOBsible  guarantee 
for  the  future  peace  of  the  Proteotorate.  An  essential  preliminary,  however, 
to  all  negotiations  ivith  the  tribesmen  must  be  the  tactical  defeat  of  tlie 
Mullah  and  disperaal  of  his  foUowiog,  or,  should  ho  refuse  to  tight,  his 
exiiulflion  from  the  Protectorate.  In  these  operations  the  Dolbahaata  will  bo 
the  chief  safferers  In  both  life  and  property,  which  will  give  them,  it  is  hoped, 
a,  more  wholeeoiiie  respeel<  fur  our  power. 

9.  luow  come,  to  the  means  whereby  I  hope  to  uSeut  tbia  object,  and  my  Pisn  ol' 
reasons  for  aaldng  for  more  troops  and  ti"onsport.  My  inteotiou  is  to  ojiorate  operatioiii. 
in  two  I'olomna,  du'ected  on  Halinand  GerroweiresfiectiTely.  1  had  at  first 
intended  to  base  these  columns  on  liurao  and  Bohotte,  but  considerations 
of  water  and  transport  have  decided  me  to  base  them  both  upon  Olesan, 
about  half-way  between  the  two,  whence  they  will  both  follow  tho  flame  route 
as  far  as  Dariali  iu  the  Las  Anod,  wiiere  it  will  be  nnoesaary  to  eatabliah 
a  strong  iati'rmi^diatu  post.  The  strength  of  each  column  from  this  point 
should  not  be  less  than  300  mounted  troops  and  1,000  infantry,  while  the 
iatermediate  [>ost  should  not  be  less  than  400  rifles,  making  a  total  of  3,400, 
or,  with  fiomo  sappers  and  mmers,  say  3,500. 

10.  Now  the  total  number  of  troo{iB  at  my  dis])oaal,  British  and  native,  Troops 
including  SomaU  Mounted  Infantry,  is  just  U,000  (when  brought  up  to  field  na-esaary. 
KDTviFD  Btrength),  From  these  must  be  deducted  725  Pioneers  otkd  300 
Sappers,  who  ore  employed  on  special  work  and  are  not  available  for  garrisons 
or  convoy  duties,  and  say  another  200  for  sick  and  inuffeetives  and  men 
on  special  employ  {only  3  per  cant.,  a  very  small  percentage),  giving  a  total 
of  some  1,200  mm,  which  leaves  4,800  available  for  all  purposes.  Of  thew 
the  oolumns  tokc  3,500,  leaving  only  1 ,300  for  garrisona  and  convoy  duties. 
Now  Berbero,  Bura,a,  Garrero  and  Bobotlo  will  absorb  some  SOO  of  these, 
Hargeisa  and  Las  Dureh  100  more,  Upper  Sheikli  150,  luBiVing  only  250  men 
available  for  the  smaller  poets  and  for  the  movable  columns  which  I  propose 
to  form  at  Olesan  or  Badwuiu  to  escort  supphos  from  thenoe  to  Las  Ajiod, 
and  to  form  agBnernireaerve.  My  calculationa  regarding  the  strength  of  tho 
coliunns  are  based  on  the  opinions  of  General  Manning,  Colonel  Ffldkon,  and 
other  o&icers  of  recent  experience  as  to  the  minimum  fighting  residuum  that 
should  bo  left  after  establishing  connecting  posts,  &,c.,  along  the  line  of 
advance,  and  I  do  not  think  they  are  eitravagant.  An  additional  battalion 
would  just  give  me  that  margin  of  troops  in  hand  which  would providefor  all 
contiageocies.  I  would  further  point  out  that  Berbera  itself  is  unfortified 
and  not  too  strongly  garrisoned,  considering  that  it  is  our  only  base  of 
supplies,  and  would  !k!  vulnerable  to  a  raid  from  the  Mahmud  Oerad  country 
(this  tribe  is  an  off-shoot  of  Dolbahanta,  and  they  are  adherents  of  the  Mullah), 
e  Mullah  lidvc-  tht  hardihood  lo  alltrnpt  it.     The  onlv  stop  we  have 

|:(8927)  ■      o  2 


ion  Is  tbe  emnU  post  of  La?  Dureb.  105  luiIeK  from  BBrbera,  with 
iLf  garrison  of  50  men.     I  might  dispense  with  the  eitra  battalion  by  utilising 
which  would  of  courae  stop  all  work  on  the 
operations  maj  last,  and  this  I  am  prepared 


the  Pionpere  as  a  fighting 
road  during  the  the  time  e 


w  come  to  the  moat  important  question  that  confranta  ne,  v 


I.     II.  I 

that  of  aupptiea  and  transport,  and  in  order  to  make  my  requiiements  under' 
stood,  I  will  briefly  reca{iitulate  what  that  supply  and  transport  has  to 
undertake.  It  has  to  provide  for  the  d^tily  requirements  of  all  the  troops 
distributed  over  a  line  of  201  miles  in  length,  and  to  maintain  one  month's 
reserve  for  th<^  garrisons  at  each  of  the  posts.  It  also  has  to  provide  carriage 
for  the  movable  column  at  present  covering  the  lines  of  communication,  and 
over  and  above  all  this  to  place  in  readiness  two  months'  supplies  at  an 
advanced  base,  which  ia  situated  135  miles  from  Berbera,  for  the  3,600  men 
and  a  large  nimiber  of  followers  who  will  accompany  the  (columns,  and  to 
convEj  al!  military  stores  and  equipment  to  any  required  point.  It  will 
then  have  to  provide  oairiago  for  tho  baggage,  nm munition  and  a  month's 
supplies  with  three  days'  water  for  men  and  two  for  ahiihhIh  for  that  force, 
and  keep  up  a  month's  reserves  for  tho  whole  force  including  the  columns. 
To  fulfil  all  these  objects  I  have  at  present  2.800  Indian  camels  and  3,53A 
Homali  camels,  of  which  latter  half  arc  sick,  and  not  likely  to  be  available 
for  the  next  three  months.  So  short  of  carriage  am  I,  that  the  mere  main- 
tenance of  the  small  movable  column  of  500  men  most  seriously  hampers 
and  delays  the  work  of  pushing  up  au[iplies.  I  may  mention  that  while 
tbe  Indian  camels  carry  full  loads  of  400  lbs.  each,  the  Somali  camels  at 
present  only  carry  160  lbs.  In  addition  I  have  the  two  Army  Service  Corps 
companies  which  are  not  yet  disembarked,  and  whose  practical  utility 
imtil  the  road  Is  completed  is  more  than  doubtful.  What  I  reqiure,  and 
most  urgently  require,  ore  more  camels.  Local  purchases  are  proceeding 
but  slowly,  and  the  prompt  addition  of  four  more  organized  and  equipped 
cornel  corps,  viz.,  :3,80O  camels  (not  3,500  as  you  stale)  from  India  would 
be  of  infinite  value  to  me,  and  by  hastening  my  advance  and  consequent 
conclusion  of  operations  would  be  an  indii'cct  saving  to  Qovernment. 

12.  Ah  regards  the  co-operation  of  the  Abyssiaions.  it  no  doubt  would 
'■   be  effective,  could  it  be  organiaed  in  tiiue,  but  of  this  I  am  very  doubtful. 

The  telegram  of  the  9th  August  from  Sir  C.  Egerton  was 
answered  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  13th  August,  who 
indicated  the  objections  to  assuming  responsibility  over  the 
Dolbahanta  tribe,  the  desirabihty  of  strildng  a  blow  at  the 
Mullah  while  more  or  lesa  disorganized,  before  he  should 
become  aware  of  the  intention  to  do  so  through  more  ex- 
tensive preparations,  and  the  impossibility  of  procuring  more 
camels.  Lord  Roberts  further  stated  his  opinion  that  an 
additional  battaHon  was  unnecessary,  and  that  it  seemed 


213 


important   to   latse   at   once  a  corps  of   selected  mounted 
Somalia. 

On  the  20th  August  General  Egerton  replied  that  he 
trusted  that  a  request  which  he  had  made  for  1,000  etkas 
and  ponies  from  India  would  be  met,  that  he  proposed  to  raise 
a  corps  of  mounted  Somalis  under  British  officers,  and  was 
submitting  a  fresh  scheme  of  operations. 

On  the  1-ith  September  he  wrote  that  the  general  idea  of 
the  plan  was  to  confine  the  Mullah  to  the  north.  This  would 
(should  the  Mulkh  remain  in  his  present  position)  be  effected  by 
a  raid  of  mounted  men,  who  would  endeavour  to  seize  Qerrowei 
and  Kallis,  while  the  infantry  columns,  under  Manning  and 
Fasken  respectively,  were  moving  to  their  respective  positions, 
namely  Damot  and  Dariali ;  the  latter  being  the  advanced 
supply  depot.  A  report  of  an  Abyssinian  advance  on 
Wardair  and  Galadi  would  be  spread,  and  a  movable 
column  maintained  in  the  Upper  Nogal  to  protect  the 
advanced  base  at  Kirrit. 

On  the  19th  September  Gfeneral  Egerton  further  tele- 
graphed : — 

I  now  nntLoipate  that  the  equipment  of  force  will  enable  rae  to  oommenDs 
nctive  operationa  in  the  south-east  of  Frotectoriite  between  Uth  imd  16th 
October.  I  am  making  all  prepajHtiona  to  this  end,  including  stock  ol 
advanced  base,  concentration  of  troops,  and,  in  anticipation  of  sanction, 
raising  tribal  horse.  To  take  advantage  of  the  season,  and  the  present 
position  of  enemy,  any  delay  after  15th  October  is  to  be  deprecated  as  liable 
to  modify  strategical  situation  and  diminish  chances  of  effectual  blow 
being  struck  by  tbe  force  na  at  present  constituted  and  equipped. 

My  objective  must  necessarily  depend  on  news  I  receive  of  the  enemy's 
movemeats. 

My  dispositions  will  all  point  to  an  occupation  of  Mudng  by  my 
force  in  co-operation  with  Abysninians  if  tiey  advance. 

I  also  propose  to  request  Senior  Kaval  Officer  at  Aden  to  emphasiio 
this  by  a  demonstration  m  concert  w:th  Italian  gunboat  towards  Obbia. 

According  to  my  present  plans,  the  13th  October  is  the  latest  date  on 
which  my  actual  line  of  advance  must  ha  disclosed,  and  in  any  case  I  shall 
be  able  to  make  considerable  capital  out  of  any  advance  Abyssinians  may 
hare  ordered  or  commenced.  The  Ogaden  have  offered  assistance  to  the 
south  of  the  Protectorate.  This  and  the  Abyssinians  in  the  south-weflt 
will  greatly  facilitate  my  eubpcquent  operotions.  Before  advancing  from 
Irtwra-Bohotle  line  I  await  orders  of  His  Majesty's  Government. 


2U 


■e  to  be  m 


,  And  on  23rd  September : — 
I  find  my  pUijs  and  probftble  course  operationa,  if  they  sj 
fol,  aro  ranch  hampered  by  iiiovementB  being  reB(riated  to  limiW,  Pro- 
tectorale.  I  do  ntit  undcrstjind  that  I  am  to  wait  development  Abyssinian 
movement  towarda  Gaiadi,  whigh  will  probably  take  from  two  to  three 
months.  MnUah  will  hear  of  thoae  movements  within  three  or  four  days 
of  their  eommeocement.  My  stral«gical  pOHition  after  contentrfttion, 
combined  with  naval  doroonstration  at  Obhia,  the  Biipportof  Ogaden  in  their 
own  country,  the  dry  atato  Haud,  and  the  Imowledge  AbysBinJ.in  move- 
ment, will  be  fluch  as  to  afford  renaonablo  prospect  oblige  Mullah  to  remain 
north,  in  which  case  I  can  deal  with  bim  from  Nogal  if  restriction  r^aniiog 
my  purauing  him  into  Italian  territory  be  removed.  Mullah  has  recently 
coercoi  Mijjarten,  near  lUig,  and  is  himself  reported  to  be  at  Adadero,  in 
Italian  territory.  On  nceount  of  the  unavoidable  delays  in  stocking  base, 
my  advance  must  be  delayed  kter  anticipated  in  my  previoua  telegram. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  War  replied  on  3rd  October, 
finally  sanctiotiing  General  Egerton's  advance  in  tbe 
following  terms : —  .  .       -  _ 

Reading  your  telegrams  No.  C81  and  No.  720  of  19th  nnd  23rd  September 
teapBotiveiy,  with  paragraiJi  H  of  your  despatch  of  7th  August,  we  under- 
stand yoar  plan  of  operalions  to  bo  to  move  one  column  baaed  On  OleSan 
di^tly  against  Halin,  Bstablish  posts  on  the  Nogal  Valley,  and  to  move 
a  second  column  first  eastward  from  Olesan  io  the  direction  of  Gerrowei, 
and  Bubsequpntly  to  the  south,  re-occupying  Mudiig.  His  Majeity's 
Goverament,  for  reasons  explained  to  you,  have  greatly  desired  to  avoid 
re-oocu  pyitig  Miidiig  with  British  forces,  and  bad  hojxKl  that  the  advonno 
of  the  Abyssinians,  ot  which,  as  you  say,  the  Mullah  would  hear  diKctly, 
would  prevent  his  moving  sonth.  The  Commander-in-Chief  doubts  the 
expediency  of  re-occupying  and  aubflequently  vacating  Mudilg,  Wa  do 
not,  bowevor,  desire  to  confine  your  action  to  the  limits  of  the  Irtish 
Protectorate,  if  for  military  reasons  you  think  It  ueuessary  to  go  beyond 
them.  Full  discretion  is  left  to  you  as  M  the  date  of  advance  and  the 
dirrctinn  to  bo  taken  by  your  columns,  bnt  any  assurances  of  protection 
to  tribes  not  now  under  Britixh  protection,  or  any  arrongementa  (or  flsCab- 
lishing  permanent  posts  must  be  submitted  to  the  (Jovenunont  before 
action  ia  taken.  The  recommendations  ns  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
Abyssinian  toroe  have  been  concurred  in.  Yoo  aro  no  doubt  in  direct 
communioation  with  Colonel  Boohfort. 
To  wbich  General  Egerton  replied  on  Ctli  October : — 

Your  telpgrnm  of  the  3rd  October  received  and  understood.  I  had 
not  intended  actual  occupation  of  Mudug  with  British  forces,  but  by  oocnpa- 
tiim  of  Damot  to  induce  Mullah  to  believe  that  Mndug  was  our  objective, 
and  asRumins:  that  he  remains  in  present  yiosition,  to  place  a  portion  of 
my  forcBH  on  interior  lines  with  respect  to  Miidiig  iu  order  b>  indnee  him 


215 


I  thank  ITiB  Majesty's  Goveramont  for  the  free  hand  I  have  bem  given 
rpnarding  operations  outsido  Protectorato.  InHtriii^tious  regarding  eatal)- 
lifhmeTit  of  pcrmunDnt  [losta  and  assiirancB  to  tribes  undi^rutoorL  Am  ill 
direct  cODiiniinioation  with  Roohfott  throngh  Aden  and  Jibuti,  but  it  U 
s'ow  and  somewhat  oncertain.  So  Ear  I  have  heard  nothing  of  Abysoiniaos' 
moveracntfi  or  when  they  will  be  ready  to  adYttiice.  AU  supply  will  be 
complete  at  Kirrit  by  28th,  and  the  concentration  o£  troops  will  commence 
as  soon  as  carriage  ia  avaQable  after  completion  of  supplies. 

I  shall  then  be  in  position  not  only  to  advance,  but,  so  far  an  supplies 
are  oonceined,  to  keep  the  fietd  for  aoy  period  (he  operatioof  may  demand. 
HtB  Majesty's  (lOTemmcnt  will  understand  propoaad  plan  of  operationB 
muntbeof  necessity Isrgclymlliicnced  byMidlah'i!  own  movementa  ood  by 
oonsiderations  of  water  au  pjily. 

Having  thua  briefly  explained  the  correspondence  between 
the  General  Officer  Commanding  and  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment upon  the  military  policy  to  be  adopted  in  Somaliland, 
the  preparations  undertaken  to  carry  that  policy  into  effect 
will  next  be  reviewed. 

The  difficulty  of  procuring  camel  transport  in  Somahland  Xra^ 
has  been  mentioned  before  as  a  factor  ruling  to  a  great  extent 
any  operations  in  that  country.  An  ample  supply,  on  the 
hired  system,  had  in  the  early  days  of  General  Manning's  ex- 
pedition been  forthcoming,  but  some  time  before  his  arrival 
at  Bohotle,  on  the  approach  of  the  hot  weather,  the  nomad 
tribes  of  the  Protectorate  had  begun  their  periodical  move 
from  the  coast  to  the  grazing  grounds  in  the  interior,  and  in 
conflequence  were  unwilling  any  longer  to  ply  for  hire.  The 
deficiency  had  to  some  extent  been  met  by  sending  700  Arab 
camels  from  Aden,  and  Hia  Majesty's  Government  had  made 
inquiries  whether  help  in  this  respect  could  be  obtained  from 
Egypt ;  but  there,  however,  from  causes  somewhat  analogous 
to  those  existing  in  Somaiilaiid,  the  available  supply  promised 
to  be  both  insufficient  and  costly.  In  view,  therefore,  of  the 
urgent  necessity  of  placing  the  field  force  on  a  mobile  footing, 
and  famishing  with  supplies  the  various  posts  on  the  lines  of 
communication,  it  was  decided  to  make  a  trial  of  the  Indian 
camel,  which,  onhke  his  representative  in  Somahland,  was 
not  deemed  capable  of  working  several  days  without  water. 
BWas  beheved,  however,  that  the  wells  upon  the  lines  of 


216 

communication  would  suffice  for  tis  needs,  and,  as  previously 
stated,  2,800  were  ordered  from  India  before  General  Egerton 
arrived  to  assume  command.  It  was  further  decided 
to  send  two  Army  Service  Corps  companies,  with  80  buck 
wagons,  from  South  Africa.  These  reached  Berbera  on  the 
31st  July,  and  after  some  delay,  necessary  for  carrying  out 
road  improvements,  were  brought  into  use, 

Aiter  General  Egerton  had  made  a  close  examination 
of  the  transport  requirements  necessary  to  carry  out  his  plan 
of  operations,  he  urged  that  100  camel-carts  might  be  sent  from 
Aden  and  India,  and  in  addition  four  Silladar  Camel  Corps* 
These  carts  were  despatched  to  Berbera,  but  the  Indian  Govern- 
ment, having  already  provided  five  out  of  nine  camel  corps, 
were  unable  to  meet  that  demand.  Thereupon,  aa  before 
mentioned,  General  Egerton  suggested  that  he  should  he 
furnished  with  1,000  ekkas*  and  poniea  from  the  Punjab 
and  North-west  Provinces  of  India,  as  well  as  1,000  hired 
camels  from  that  country.  These  camels  reached  Berbera 
by  the  13th  and  the  ekkas  and  ponies  by  the  28th  October, 
By  the  beginning  of  that  month,  the  Director  of  Supply  and 
Transport  was  able  to  report  that  since  the  4th  July, 
2,362  Somali  and  Arab  and  338  Abyssinian  camels  had 
been  purchased ;  that  these  and  the  balance  left  from 
Manning's  operations  had  been  formed  into  three  Somali 
and  one  Arab  camel  corps  and  that  three  more  camel  corps 
were  being  raised.  The  numbers  purchased  rose  steadily 
during  November,  and  by  the  Slst  of  that  month  reached 
6,384,  when  seven  came!  corps  were  actually  in  working  order, 
and  an  eighth  in  course  of  organization. 

No  steps  were  omitted  by  His  Majesty's  Government  to 
provide  the  field  force  with  ample  transport,  but  the 
exigencies  of  the  water  supply  made  impracticable  such 
devices  as  the  mono-rail  system  or  traction  engines  or  motor 
lorries,  all  of  which  came  under  consideration. 


The  Base  at  Berbera  was,  however,  equipped  with  a  tram- 
way and  rolling  stock,  while  a  coolie  corps  of  500  men  was 
sent  from  India,  and  another  of  200  from  Aden. 

The  survey  of  a  projected  railway  line  direct  from  Berbera 
to  Bohotle  had  been  undertaken  some  time  previous  to 
General  Egerton's  arrival  in  Somaliland,  and  when  the  scheme 
for  connecting  Berbera  and  Harrar  by  rail  was  taken  up  by  the 
Foreign  Office  the  officer  conducting  the  survey  was  directed 
to  carry  out  an  examination  of  a  possible  branch  line 
to  Bohotle  by  Adadleh,  so  aa  to  avoid    the    more  difficult 


of  this  railway 
led  out  in   time   to 
under  General 


route  by  the  Sheikh  Pass.  The  conatructio 
couid  not  in  any  case  have  been  carrie 
be  of  assistance  to  the  military  operatio 
Egerton. 

AjB  the  normal  supply  of  water  was  likely  to  prove 
inadequate  for  the  large  increase  of  troops  and  transport, 
water  supply  plant  was  shipped  from  England  and  was 
installed  with  satisfactory  results  at  the  various  posts  on  the 
line  of  communication. 

Aa    already  stated,    General    Egerton    reached   Berbera  Orpinin 
on  the  3rd  July,  and  on  the  14th  orders  providing  for  a  distribu-  potos. 
tion  of  the  field  force  into  two  brigades,  with  divisional  nnd 
line  of  communication  troops,  were  issued  by  him* : — 

DivisioNAi,  Troops, 

1st  Corps. 

Uoanted        Troops    British    Mounted    Infantry,    Nos.    1, 

(Lt.-Col.     P.      A.        King's  Royal  Rifle  Corps,  2  and  3 

K  Q  n  n  a ,      V.C.,        Companies  t      {attached       to      2nd 

D.8.O.,  2Ist  Lan-        Brigade).   Somali  Mounted  Infantry, 

cers).  two     companies    (attached    to     1st 

Brigade). 

*  For  strength  of  the  tcri'e  whon  reorganized,  me  Chapter  IX  Field 
Statei. 

t  Two  companies  Britiah  Mounted  Infaatry  arrived  firoro  RmnbgLy  oa 
1.1tU  July. 


2nd  Corps. 

Mounted     Troops        Indian   Mounted  Infantry,  Nos,  1  and 
(continued)  2    Companies*    (attached    to    2nd 

Brigade). 
Bikanir    Camel    Corps    (attached   to 
2nd  Brigade). 

. .  One  sectionf  28th  Mountain  Battery 

(attached  to    lines    of    commiuiica- 

tion). 
..  Nos.  17  and  19   Companiest   Sappers 

and    Miners    (attached   to  lines  of 

c  ommunication ) . 

Ilnfantiy         ..         .,   107th  Pioneers  (attached  to  lines  of 
communication). 
; 


Artillery 


1«(  Brigade  Headquarters,  Burao. 

(Brig. -General  W,  H.  Manning,  CB.,  Indian  Army.) 

27th  Punjabis.g 

1st,  2nd,  and  detachments  of  the  3rd  and  5th  Battalions. 

King's  African  Rifles. 

Indian  Contingent,  British  Cfentral  Africa. 

2nd  Brigade  Headquarters,  Lower  Sheikh. 

(Brig.-General  C.  G.  M,  Fasken,  Indian  Army.) 
Ist  Battalion  Hampshire  Regiment  (300  men). 
62nd  Sikhs. 


*  Two  oomponteB  Indian  Mounted  Infantry  aniTed  frcim  Bombay  oi 
13th  July. 

t  This  section  wfta  auhspqiieiitly,  on  Mttjor-Oener«l  Egerton'a  reoom 

mendation,  provided  with  oomolH  uid  camel  equipment,  and  anued  nit 

o  7-pr.,  B.M.K  guna  of  200  lb.  weight  (see  Chapter  XIII). 

X  Arrived  from  Aden  on  1 1th  AugnaL 

5'Arrived  from  Bombay  on  0th  July. 


219 


I  Lines  of  Communication  {Berbsra  to  Bokotle). 
(Colonel  J.  C.  Swanii,  Indian  Army.) 
'elegraph  Section,  Royal  Engiueers,* 
01st  Grenadiers. 

bth  Battalion,  King's  African  Rifles, 
As  the  Mullah  was  still  reported  to  be  near  Halin,  with  his 
haroun  at  Gmnbum,  some  20  mUea  east  of  Laa  Anod,  orders 
were  given  for  a  movable  column  from  the  1st  Brigade, 
numbering  about  450  men.f  to  be  placed  under  the 
command  of  Lieut. -Colonel  A.  Wallace,  27th  Punjabis, 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Wiidamago,  so  aa  to  protect  from 
raiding  parties,  the  lines  of  communication  between,  Bohotle 
and  Burao.  The  reconnaissances  effected  by  this  force  con- 
firmed the  reports  of  the  absence  of  any  of  the  Mullah's 
karias  west  of  Eil  Dab,  and  in  consequence  it  became  possible 
to  reduce  the  garrisons  upon  the  lines  of  eommunicatiou 
south  and  east  of  Burao,  thereby  minimising  the  strain  upon 
the  supply  and  transport  department,  and  at  the  same  time 
increasing  the  number  of  men  available  for  carrying  out  road 
improvements  nearer  Berbera. 

This  redistribution  enabled  stores  to  he  collected  at  the 
advanced  base,  at  Kirrit,  while  great  progress  was  made  in  the 
strengthening  of  posts  on  the  commmiications,  and  on  the 
road  from  Berbera  over  the  Sheikh  pass.f 

"  Aiinnniited  from  England  on  ISth  August. 

ti.R. — In  additica  to  the  troops  ehonn  above  drafts  were  tent  from 
India  to  CQmileto  the  lOlst  Grenadiers,  the  I07th  Pioneera  and  tlie  Blknnir 
raniol  t'or]  B,  and  a  Field  Park,  Rojal  Engineers  was  also  sent. 

t  One  tniniiauy  Britisb  Mounted  Infantry,  30  Somali  Mounted  Infantry, 
4  Gom[iajiies  '27tli  Punjab  Infantry,  20  (to  be  raised  to  30)  lilaloa  ;  15  days' 
aupplies  to  be  maintEuned  by  column,  transport  for  &vj  days'  supplias  and 
two  days'  water  to  be  kept  with  column, 

i  It  may  l)e  briefly  stated  tbat  the  months  of  July,  Angust,  September 
and  October  were  entirely  taken  up  with  the  work  of  organiiation  of  the  field 
force,  landing  stores  aad  supplies,  the  purchase  of  transport  and  Temoonte, 
Miring  native  levies,  making  roads,  developing  the  water  aoppiy  and  storing 
g.  Rid  pushing  up  sii|)plinH  to  the  advanced  base  at  Kirrit,  ISOmUes  from 


On  the  13tli  July,  General  Egerton  liad  been  infonued 
that  co-operatioQ  by  the  Abyssinians  was  in  course  of 
arrangement  with  the  Emperor  Menelek,  and,  in  order  that 
full  advantage  of  it  might  be  taken.  Colonel  A-  N.  Rochfort, 
R.A.,  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Berbera  to  confer  with  him. 
In  the  meantime,  as  the  Abyssinian  contingent  most 
necessarily  ent«r  Italian  Somaliland  in  order  to  reach  the 
Mudug,  the  consent  of  the  Italian  Government  was  asked 
for  and  given,  on  condition  that  the  force  should  be 
accompanied  by  their  representative  and  withdraw  to  its  own 
borders  on  conclusion  of  the  operations. 

On  the  21st  August,  after  conferring  with  Rochfort, 
General  Egerton  telegraphed  that  the  timely  co-operatioii 
of  the  Abyasinians  appeared  doubtful,  but  that,  if  it 
was  considered  desirable,  he  recommended  that  all  necessary 
arrangements  should  be  left  in  the  hands  of  Ras  Makonnenin 
return  for  a  subsidy,  and  that  the  only  supply  in  kind  should 
consist  of  1,000  wat«r  tanlra,  the  necessity  for  which  had 
already  been  pointed  out  by  Colonel  Rochfort. 

His  Majesty's  Government,  who,  through  the  Britisli 
Agent  at  Adis  Ababa  had  been  informed  that  a  fresh  con- 
tingent would  be  furnished  in  order  to  take  part  in  the  coming 
operations,  decided  to  reimburse  the  Emperor  Meuelek  on 
account  of  the  expense  to  which  he  would  be  put  in  mobilizing 
the  force.  A  sum  of  15,000/.  was  therefore  remitted  to  hint 
and  his  consent  obtained  for  seven  other  officers  to  accom- 
pany   Rochfort,    viz. : — two    pohtical   officers,    one     officer 

Berbera.  This  lost  was  a,  tedious  process,  as,  owing  to  the  deficiency  cl 
trsllsport,  it  was  not  for  a  long  white  that  the  balances  mode  bcsdwaj  ags^'t 
thp  daily  conBumption,  notwithstanding  the  line  ot  commiinieatioina  from 
Shrikli  to  Bohotle  having  been  denuded  of  every  man  that  could  prudeatlf 
be  willidraun.  It  was  not  until  the  end  of  October  that  the  colleclion  of 
supplies  had  sufficiently  far  advanced  to  justify  any  forward  movtment.  Tliei 
onlymobilisid  force  between  Berbera  and  Bohotle  at  this  period  was  B  small 
luovftblo  column  of  mounted  infantry  and  infantry,  which  was  placfl 
tirstly  at  Wadamago  and  aubeecjuently  at  EilDabto  cover  tbeadv-ancid  btin 
at  Kirrit.     (Extract  from  General  Egerton'a  despatch  of  5th  April,  IB04.) 


221 


interpreter,  one  Royal  Engineer  Officer,  and  three  medical 
officers.  In  addition  to  the  subsidy,  1,030  tanks,  5,000 
water  bottles,  several  pumps  and  other  water  appliances  were 
provided,  in  order  that  arcang^msnts  might  be  made  for 
obtaining,  storing  and  tranaporting  water  before  crossing 
the  considerable  stretches  of  waterless  country  which 
would  have  to  be  passed  over  on  the  southward  march, 
Despite  the  efforts  of  Bochfort,  and  of  the  British 
agent  at  the  Abyssinian  capital,  the  progiesa  in  mobilization 
was  slower  than  anticipated,  the  delay  being  partly  due 
to  the  prevalence  of  high  prices  for  transport  camels  and 
partly  to  the  jealousy  which  existed  between  the  Emperor 
Menelek  and  Raa  Makonnen.  On  the  1st  December, 
therefore,  in  order  to  stimulate  the  latter  to  greater  efforts, 
authority  was  telegraphed  to  Rochfort  that  he  was  at  liberty 
to  expend  a  sum  o£  7,500i.  in  payment  by  results,  and  on  the 
3rd  of  that  month,  he  was  able  to  report  that  the  contingent 
had,  on  that  day,  marched  south  from  Babili  {see  page  251). 

On  the  22nd  September  General  Egerton  received 
intimation  that  the  Emperor  Menelel;  had  been  asked  to  co- 
operate by  sending  a  force  to  occupy  Walwal,  Wardair,  and 
Galadi.  He  had  gathered  from  Rochfort  that  he  was  not 
sanguine  about  the  AbyBsinians  being  able  to  teach  Galadi 
much  before  Christmas,  and  as  he  was  then  hoping  that  the 
British  force  would  be  able  to  advance  early  in  October, 
he  did  not  set  much  count  on  their  assistance.  When,  how- 
ever, the  General  realised  that  there  was  no  chance  of  his  own 
advance  taking  place  before  the  end  of  October  at  the 
earliest,  and  being  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  a  stop  being 
placed  in  the  south  if  any  decisive  result  was  to  be  expected 
from  the  campaign,  he  determined  to  establish  a  strong  post  at 
Galadi,  with  the  double  object  of  denying  the  wells  there  to 
the  Mullah,  and  of  encouraging  the  Abyssinians  to  cross  the 
waterless  tract  of  80  miles  between  Wardair  and  Galadi 
which  it  was  certain  they  would  never  attempt  if  there  were 

Ldaceer  of  finding  the  wells  occupied  by  the  Dervishes. 


TtieiB  was  also  the  hope  that  our  oocupation  of  Galadi  would 
encourage  Ali  Yusuf,  the  Saltan  of  Obbia,  to  occupy  the 
Galkayu  welJa. 
"        On  the  26th  October,*  therefore,  ordets  were  issued  tor 


.    attached    ftom 


•Extract  Sroro.  Operation  Orders: — 
Upper  Bheilch,  26iA  Oetoba;  1903.— 

14. — 1.  When  the  garrisons  of  the  lines  of  conunimication  have  bAMi 
posted  as  in  Operation  Orders  10,  11,  and  12,  the  remainder  of  the  foice 
will  coQoenttate  by  8th  NoiFember  as  follows  ; — 
At  Bohotle. — lal  Brigade  : — 
Staff. 

lat  King's  African  BilleB, 
2Dd  King's  African  Rifles. 
3rd  King's  Africiui  Rifles. 
No.    6    Company,    Somali    Mounted    Infantry. 

mounted  troops. 
King'a  Afrioan  Rifles,  Mountain  Battery,  2  guns,  attached  froru 

diyiaiooal  troops. 
Detftohment  No.  I  Company,  3rd  Sappers  and  Minora,  ailscliiil 
from  diyit^onal  troops. 
At  Garrero  ! — 

No.  4  Company,  Somali  Moiinti'd  Infantry,  of  mountpd  troopa. 
Al  Wadamago. — 'Znd  Brigade  : — 
Staff. 

let  Hants,  3  companies. 
52nd  Sikhs. 

27th  Punjaliis,  5  romymiiieB. 
Movaile  Column. 

Qommandii^,     Liont-Golonel    Wallace,    37th     Punjiibis,    StsS 

Officer  to  bo  appointed  from  column. 
27th  Pnnjabi.'*,  3  companies. 
107th  Pioneers,  2  companies. 
At  Kirrit  :— 

Headquarter  staff. 

Section,  2Sth  Mountain  Uattory,  attached  let  Brigade. 
No  19  Company,  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners  (half  company  al  & 
Bab)  atUched  to  lat  BHgode. 
At  Oleaan  (with  detajihment  at  Dabr  Ualol). — Mimnltd  Troi/pt ; — 
Staff. 
No.  I  Corps,  Mounted  Infantry  (less  4  and  S  companies,  SomaU 

Mounted  Infantry]. 
No.  II  Corps,  MoDiit«d  Infantry, 


Manning's  Brigade  to  concentrate  at  Bohotle,  and  the  2nd 
Brigade  at  £il  Dab  and  Wadamago.  A  naval  demoast ration 
was  arranged  foe  at  Obbia,  and  armi  were  issaed  by  the 
Italian  authorities  to  Ah  Yusuf  to  strengthen  his  occupation 
ol  Galkayu  (see  Chapter   VII).     At  the  eame  time,  secret 


At  Her.—iloanied  Troapa  .■— 

No.  m  Corps.  Tribal  Horee. 
No.  IV  Corps,  Tribal  Horse. 

2.  Comtnandt. — Nos.  HI  and  IV.  Corps,  Tribal  Horse,  will  come 
undnr  the  oommind  o£  Officer  Commaading  Mounted  Troopa  witii  uSect 
from  5tli  November. 

3.  Momiae.nts. — Will  lie  carrind  out  on  Boalsa  of  bf^gago  and  pro- 
grammeH  notified  to  General  Officera  Commanding  and  OIBcbch  Commanding 
Mounted  Troopa  and  Tribal  Horne. 

4.  Wattt. — Water  tanks  will  bo  snpplied  by  the  Director,  Supply 
and  Transport,  at  Blkudalanleb,  for  troops  moving  thence  to  Kirrit  and 
Oleson. 

Upper  Sheikh,  31ri  Oetober,  Ii>03. 

16.— I.  In   ooQtinnation  of    OpiTatioa    Order  Nu,    \i.  the    lat  Briyadi: 
at  Bohotle  will  be  reinforted  aa  folluiva  ;  — 
I  By  8«t  November.— 

^^^^^L      (a)  To  rejoin  No.  I  Corps  Mounted  Infantry  :^ 
^^^^H      Half  Company  British  Mounted  Infantry  from  Eil  Dab. 
^^^^^     No.  4  Company  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  from  Qarrero. 
^^^^^)  Officer  Commanding  Mounted  Troops  and  Staff. 

The  reKt  of  No  I  Corps,  Mounted  Infantry  (1  company  Somali 
Mountisd  Infantry  to  be  detailed  to  to-inforce  the  Bohotle 
garrison). 
Telegraph  section,  with  100  miles  of  cable. 
1  Section,  No.  17  Company,  3rd  {tappers  and  miner.''. 

2.  No.  11  Corps,  Mounted  Infantry,  will  proceed  vifi  Kirrit,  to  re- 
inforce the  Bohotle  garrison,  arriving  there  10th  November. 

3.  The  General  OOicet'  Commanding  and  Staff,  2Dd  Brigade,  will 
accompany  the  1st  Hants  to  Wadamagu, 

4.  The  following  alteration  will  be  made  in  the  disposition  of  the 
2Qd  Brigade  :— 

lat  Hanta,  3  companies,  to  Kil  Dab  on  9th  November. 
52nd  Sikhs  at  Lower  Sheikh  1   To  nt 

Section,  28th  Mountain  Battery  at  Upper       >      ,  ' 

,rr^., ,  ""^        I       further  orders. 

Sheikh  J 

5.  No.  IV  Corps,  Tribal  Horse,  will  eoncentrate  at  Gubalu  instead 
of  »t  Bar. 


orden  were  ixeued  to  Manning  for  the  march  to  Oaladi,  ftll  the 
details  of  which,  as  regards  troops,  transport,  water,  &e.,  had 
been  carefuJIy  worked  out  at  headquarters,  so  that  there  should 


fl.  Command*  : — 

(a)  Tba  General  OfGc«r  Commioding  Ut  Brigade  will  dsUil 
Lieul.-Oalonel  A.  8.  Cobbe,  X.C,  D.aO.,  Ist  King's  Afiicu 
Rlfleii,  to  commtttid  the  Bohotle  garrisoD.  From  d&te  of 
his  taking  over  the  duties,  this  irill  fonn  a  detached  comrnud 
under  the  direct  ordcn  of  the  General  Officer  ConunaodiDg. 
Somali  Field  Force .• 

(6)  The  movoblo  column  will  be  almrhpd  to  the  2nd  Brigade. 

(«)  NoH.  in  and  IV  Corps,  Tribal  Hotsp,  will  be  attachfd  I" 
Iho  2nd  Brigade  with  effect  from  6th  Soreniber. 

7  aupjiiu.— 

(a)  No.   II    Corps.  Mounted   Infantry,  will    be    rationed   up  lo 

30th  NOTcmbor  from  Klrrit. 
(6)  The  lit  Hantc  will   be  rationed  up  to  30th  November  from 
Kirrit. 
t/ppw  SAwH.  3lrf  Otiober,  1803. 

JO,_l,  The  iBt  Brigade  will  march  from  Bohotle  on  lltPi   Xovcniher, 
ordT  to  oBtahliah  a  post  at  Gal  ad  i. 
•i.  Tmopi.— 

(a)    General  Officer  Connaanding,  ist  Brigade  and  Slafl. 

nUicor  Commanding.  Mounted  Troopa  and  Staff. 

X'o.  1  Corps,  Mounted  Infantry  (leas  1  company,  Somali  Mountcii 

Infantry,  with  Bohotle  garrison). 
No,  IT  Company,  3rd  Sappora  and  Miners,  2  sections. 
King'n  African  Rifles,  Mountain  Battery,  2  guns. 
Ut  King's  African  Rifles. 
Qnd  King's  African  Rifles. 
;lrd  King's  African  Rifles, 
ntabs. 

'(6)  To  be  detailed  for  garrison  of  Galadi : — 

Commanding,    BrBvet  Major  J.    R.    M.   Matsb, 

LincolaBhiro  Regiment. 
Staff  Officer,  from  the  garrison. 
Brilish  Mounted  Infantry,  1  company. 
King's  African  Rifles,  Momitain  Battery.  2  guns, 
tiomali  Mounted  Infantry,  1  section  (25  rifles). 
King's  African  Bifles,  250  rifles  and  2  manms. 
Illalos. 


Command  anil 
componitioa  ut 
diKirotion  of 
Q.O.C.,    Ist 

SrigndadlTa 

e.A.,of  iT.ii.oa 


"  Sniioqucntly  L'.eut.-Co'ouel   Cobbe  b 
a^neral  Uanuiiis  and  Major  Biooke  was  left 


ba  no  (lelay,  auil  uo  ohaiioe  of  the  deatiaatiun.  of  the  brigade 
leaking  out  prematurely.  So  carefully  waa  the  secret  kept, 
that  even  the  troopa  themselves  were  ignorant  ot  their  destina- 
tion, while  the  rest  of  the  force  knew  nothing  of  it  nntil  it  was 
an  accompHshed  fact. 

Manning's  orders  were  to  march  to  Galadi,  establish  there 
a  strong  fortified  post,  anA,  having  done  so,  to  rptnrn  with  all 
despatch  to  Bohotlc. 

The  concentrations  ordered  (with  the  exception  that  the 
section,  No.  28  Mountain  Battery,  and  the  52nd  Sikhs,  had 
been  directed  to  stand  fast  tor  the  present,  so  aa  to  minimise 
supply  difEculticH)  were  completed  on  the  Uth  November, 
the  1st  Brigade  being  at  Bohotle  and  the  2nd  at  Ed  Dab  and 


(c)  The  Officer  Commanding,  Bohotle,  will  arrange  for  an  eaeort 
for  the  empty  tranaport,  retiirniag  from  the  third  stage. 

3.  Sliig.— Commander    Cnroy,    Royal    NilTy,    Proviot    SrarsliBl.    will 
aceom.pany  1st  Brigade. 

4.  Amtnunitioa. —  ■( 

(o)  Por  the  garrison :— 

Per  rifle,  Kegukra 500  rounds. 

L  Pet  rifle,  Dlalos 100       „ 


(()  For  the  remainder  of  the  Brigade : — 

Per  rifle,  Regialarfl 400  n 

Per  rifle,  Haloa  100 

Per  maxim  10,400 


^ 


S.  Supplite. — For  men  and  animals  :■ — 

(a)  For  the  Qaladi  garrison,  till  lat  January,  1004. 

(6)  For  the  remainder  of  the  Brigade,  20  days  from  1 1th  November. 
0.   Water.— 

(n)  Tor  six  days  at  1  gallon  per  i 
other  than  oamcla. 


(6)  Watei    equipment  to  be  left  at  Gakdi 
days'  water  for  men. 


and  2  gallons  per  animal, 
carry  at  least  two 


7.  TraMpori.— 

(a)  Operation   scale,   e:(cept  that  officers  will   take   one   servant 
and  one  riding  animal  only,  Boldien  being  made  available 
batmen,  or  grooma,  if  neooa-iary. 


'22{i 

Wadamago  wUli  the  headquartora  of  tliu  brigade  at  the  latter 
place.  On  the  11th  November,  Manning  advanced  with  the 
following  force : — 

General  OfScec  Commanding  Ist  Brigade  and  Staff. 

Headquarters,  mounted  troops  and  Staff. 

Nob.  1,  2  and  3  Companies,  British  Mounted  Infantry. 

One  company,  Somali  Mounted  Infantry. 

Two  guns.  King's  African  Rifles,  Mountain  Batterj-. 

1st,  2nd  and  3rd  Battalions,  King's  African  Rifles. 

68  Illalos  (native  scouta). 

Galadi  was  reached  on  the  15th  November  without  opposi- 
tion, but  after  a  most  trying  march,  owing  to  the  great  heat, 
the  density  of  the  bush,  the  scanty  allowance  of  water,  which 

(6)  I«t  and  2nd  linu  tiunsport,  as  in  Operation  Standing  Ordtrs, 
No.  29. 

Post  ammunition  and  Snpply  Colunm— Oamela. 
(c)  Empty  transport  and  water  tsnka  to  be  returned  to  Bolwile 
front  third  stage. 
At  diBoretion  of     f  (rf)  To  bo  left  with  Galadi  garrison  : — 

G.O.C.,  Ist  First  and    second    line  transport   to   carry  M 

Brigade  (1175      J  days'  supplies  and  aopplemtinted  by  camelB  to 

8.A.,  dated        I  carry  post  ammunitiou,  and  the  water  eqvp- 

17JI.03.)  t  Jnent  in  !>ara-  6. 

8.  Medial. — Medical  arrangements  will  Lo  for  the  same  periods  f 
Boppliea. 

Upper  Sheiiih,  30tA  November,  1903. 
23.— Reference  Operation  Order,  No.  16. 

1.  Diatribvlion.—K)a  return  of  the  Ist  Brigade  the  tioopa  at  Bulw''° 
will  be  distributed  as  foUowH  : — 

At  Bohotle.— 

Iflt    Brigade   and    Nub.   4  and    5    Conipaniee,   Somali    Mount™ 
Infantry,  attached  from  Mounted  Troops. 
At  Wadamago,  Ain  Abo.  Eil  Dab,  and  Oleeon. — 
Headquarterfl,  Mounted  Troopa. 

No.  1  Corps,  Mounted  Infantry  (less  Nob.  4  and  6   CompMi"'' 
Somali  Slomited  Infantry)  and  No.  2  Corps,  Mounted  InfanU)'' 

2.  MoBenmds. — The  Mounted  Troopa  to  be  in  position  by  I'"' 
1st  Decembei. 

3.  jSujJjrfie*.— The  Mounted  Itoopa  will  draw  supplies  from  liio  Jirigjul" 
Supply  and  Transpiirt  Offiisr,  2nd  Brigade, 


Iiad  to  bo  larried  fot  both  men  and  animals,  and  liie  almost 
total  absence  of  grazing.* 

While  this  movement  was  in  progress  orders  had  also  been 
given  for  the  occupation  of  Damot,  but  it  was  found  this  could 
not  be  effected  owing  to  the  deficiency  of  water.  Damot 
was,  however,  aeveral  times  reconnoitred  by  mounted  men,  so 
aa  to  keep  oar  troops  en  evidence  in  that  direction,  as  it,  to  a 
certain  extent,  covered  Manning's  exposed  flank. 

Manning  remained  three  days  at  Galadi,  where  a  strong 
post  was  established.  Dudub  was  reconnoitred  by  the 
mounted  troops,  and  found  clear  of  the  enemy.  Our  Illalos 
also  recoimoitred  Galkayu,  where  a  small  post  of  Ali  Ytiauf's 
men  was  found.  Having  watered  his  camels  and  refilled  his 
water  tins,  Manning  commenced  his  return  march  on   the 

■Estrai-t  froiu  Staff  Diary,  1st  Brigade: ; — 

liith  November. — At  daybreak  lollowinfT  ttoops  undBc  Ci>loiiel  Kciiriii 
wPrD  ordered  to  puab  on  and  occupy  the  wella  at  Ualadi : — 

British  Mounted  lufuntry  'Ml 

^^M                Iith  SoniiLh  Mounted  Infantry,  oua  section       S(t 
^^  Illalos      41) 


Following  ioatnictiona  elao  given  lo  Colonel  Kenna  : — 

■      1.  To    send    Liitk    information    to   meet    tlie   column  regarding 
occupation  of  Galadi. 
2.  To  despatch  on  tbo  morning  of  the  16th  instant  a  patrol  of 
50  SoniBll  Slouol^d  lufantry  and  20  Ulalua,  in  direotioii  of 
Dudub,  to  search  fur  tracks  and  signs  of  the  enemy. 
The  cohmin  marched  at  5,25  a.m.,  and  raid-day  camp  was  formed  in 
the  Taloli  Plain  at  10.18  a.ji.     The  match  waa  resumed  at  3  p.u.     For 
the  first  part  the  country  was  fairly  open,  then  dense  bush  and  elony  gt«und 
was  paased. 

Coloimi  halted  for  the  night  at  camp   SG  miles  south  of  Bohotle,  at 

At  8.25  P.M.  a  letter  from  Colonel  Kenna  was  received,  reporting 
occupation  of  Galadi  at  1  p.m.  to-day. 

He  reported  that  he  has  seen  no  signs  of  enemy  or  stock  en  rovie  or 
of  any  at  Yegalio  oc  Galadi.  Galadi  was  deserted,  aave  for  two  wandering 
(8927)  P  2 


i 


iiftcriioon  of  the  i8th  November,  Icavbig  tte  following  garrisun 
with  rations  up  to  the  end  of  the  year  in  Qaladi : — 

Commanding— Brevet  Major  J.  R.  M.  Marsh,  Lincolnshire 
Itegiment. 

Ko.  2  Company,  British  Moiuited  Infantry. 

25  rifles,  SomaH  Mounted  Infantry. 

Two  gUDs,  King's  African  Rifles,  Mountain  Battery. 

250  rifles,  King's  African  Rifles. 

25  Dlalos  (native  scouts). 

Manning  returned  to  Bohotle  on  the  2ith  November.  On 
the  way,  his  mounted  troops  fell  in  with  a  raiding  party  oi 
the  Mullah  returning  to  the  Haroun  with  hve-stock  captured 
from  the  Ogaden.     A  skirmish  ensued  between  the  Somali 

OgadenB  who  were  taken  prieoaors.  Tliose  mea  stated  thej  had  left  tha 
Mullah  three  niontha'  ago  in  the  Nogal,  that  the  nearest  Somali  karias 
are  two  days'  march  south  and  south-west  of  Galadi,  and  these  water  ^t 
Walwal  and  Wardair  ;  thattbeMullah  and  his  Haroun  are  north  of  Haud  ; 
that  thera  is  no  one  at  Dudub,  and  Yuauf  Ali'a  Illalos  hold  Galkayu. 

Colonel  Kenna  also  reports  that  the  shallow  or  sweet  water  Wfllla 
appear  dry,  and  that  some  of  the  others  appear  to  have  wat«r  in  them, 
but  the  water  is  very  foul.  He  further  reports  the  country  tor  several 
miles  round  Galadi  is  as  dry  as  a  bone,  and  grazing  animals  will  be  very 
difficult,  if  possible ;  he  reports  that  the  fort  is  intact,  and  neither  Galadi 
or  Yegallo  appear  to  have  been  visited  since  our  departure  last  Juno. 

16th  November. — Column  left  camp  at  5.20  A.si.,  and  at  oneo  came  oc 
to  tho  stony  gromid  which  surrounds  Yegallo. 

Yegallo  was  reatbed  at  8.45  a.m.  Old  packing  eases  were  lying 
about  and  shelter  points  standing  as  apparently  we  had  left  it  in  June  last- 
There  was  no  water  in  the  wells  and  no  graiiog. 

Betwfien  Yegallo   and   Galadi   the   going  mau  very  bad,   the   gcound 
being  strewn  with  stones  and  large  bouldcra,  and  the  hush  was  very  thick. 
Galadi  was  reached  in  the  evening,  and  a  zariba  viae  formed  on  tbc 
south  aide  of  the  well  area. 

As  reported  by  Colonel  Kenna,  the  fort  was  intact,  and  had  the  appear 
aacc  of  not  having  been  visited  sinco  wo  Isst  occupied  it.  The  heat  wi» 
intense,  and  tho  glare  from  tho  white  ground  blinding.  The  fort  ia  squaw- 
ahnped,  with  sides  about  70  yards,  with  massive  stono  walls  and  stone  head 
cover.     It  has  a  double  zariba. 

On  inapeoting  tho  fort  in  the  evening  it  was  decided  to  build  on  ti 
t«o  zaribas  for  the  British  Mounted  Infantry  ponies  and  SomaU  Mounted 
Infantry  aud  transjujtt ;  also  io  erect  a  barbed  wire  fencing  roimd  the  tort. 


229 


Mounted  Infantry  and  the  Mullah's  party.  The  British 
Mounted  Infantry  moved  to  the  sound  of  the  firing,  on  whioh 
the  Mullah's  men  made  off,  leaving  some  four  or  five  dead  on 
the  ground.  Owing  to  the  density  of  the  bush  it  was  impossible 
to  follow  them  up,  but  38;j  camels  and  a  large  quantity  ot 
sheep  and  goata  fell  into  our  hands.  The  camels  were  subse- 
quently returned  to  the  sections  of  the  Ogaden  from  which 
they  had  been  taken. 

As  an  additional  measure  of  precaution,  and  in  order  to  N 
induce  an  impression  that  we  were  landing  a  force  at  Obbia  o 
simultaneouF.Iy  with  our  occupation  of  Galadi,  General 
Egerton  arranged  with  the  Senior  Naval  Officer,  and  through 
him  with  the  Senior  Naval  Officer,  Italian  Navy,  for  a  com- 
bined naval  demonstration  at  Obbia.  This  took  place  between 
the  14th  and  18th  November,  when  Commander  Pears,  R.N., 
appeared  before  Obbia  with  H.M.  ships  "Perseus,"  "Por- 
poise "  and  "  Merlin,"  and  H.I.M.  ship  "  Galileo."  The 
Sultan  showed  himself  very  friendly  disposed  and  anxious  to 
assist  to  the  best  of  hia  power,  though  he  pleaded  that  he  had 
not  sufficient  rifles  to  occupy  Galkayn.  He  was  afterwards 
given  arms  for  this  purpose,  and  at  Captain  Pears'  suggestion, 
he  was  also  supplied  with  a  monthly  ration  of  rice  and  dates 
conditionally  on  his  continuing  to  hold  the  Galkayu  wells. 
This  the  Sultan  effected  without  opposition  on  the  12th 
December. 

Early  in  September  offejs  had  been  made  by  some  Ogaden  u 
headmen  who  had  come  into  Burao  to  assist  the  British  by  ^ 
raids,  conducted  on  tribal  methods,  as  soon  as  active  opera- 
tions had  begun.  The  offer  was  accepted  after  reference 
to  TTi.q  Majesty's  Government  and  to  the  Government  of 
Abyssinia,  the  latter,  under  whose  suzerainty  the  Ogaden 
tribes  nominally  are,  consent.ing,  but  stipulating  that  no  arms 
should  be  issued  to  them.  Having  been  assured  on  this 
point.  Captain  R.  G.  Mimn,  3Gth  Sikhs,  was  deputed  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  Ogaden  country  in  order  to  give  the  movement 
ita  proper  direction,  and  to  prevent  raids  being  conducted 


against  friernUy  tribes.  He  was  accompanied  by  a  small  armed 
escort,  and  was  subsequently  joined  by  Lieutenant  I.  S,  C. 
Rose,  King's  Royal  Rifles,  as  an  assistant.  Although  Muim, 
who  seems  to  have  acted  with  great  tact  and  judgment,  could 
never  persuade  these  people,  in  spite  of  their  promises,  tfl 
attack  any  of  the  Mullah's  raiding  parties,  his  presence  Lad  a 
distinctly  deterring  effect  on  the  latter,  and  gave  confidence  to 
the  tribesmen  in  his  immediate  neighbourhood.  He  remabed 
with  them  until  the  middle  of  December,  when,  finding  it 
hopeless  to  get  them  to  do  anything  likely  to  be  of  use,  he  left 
them,  rejoining  headquarters  at  Eil  Dab  on  the  8tb  February. 
His  departure  was  the  signal  for  a  general  migration  westward 
of  the  people  among  whom  he  had  been  living,  showing 
confidence  his  presence  had  given  them.  Lieutenant  R086 
subsequently  joined  Colonel  Rochfort  with  the  Abyssinians. 
■ropr.scil  In-order  to  complete  the  barrier  against  a  southern  move- 

irrlig'""  inent  of  the  Mullah,*  General  Egerton  telegraphed  on  the 
ITth  December  requesting  that,  when  the  naval  demonstra- 
tion against  Illig,  which  formed  part  of  his  plan,  took  place,, 
a  garrison,  from  Aden,  of  350  rifles  with  one  month's  provisions 

"  During  all  this  time  the  Mullnli  and  tiie  majority  of  his  karias  (trilMji 
encampments)  had  remained  in.  the  Eastern  Nogal,  in  the  area  known  a 
Kobo,  roughly  comprised  in  the  triangle  Halin,  Gerrowei,  Kallis.  IDt 
strategical  position  hero  was  a  very  strong  one.  It  was  secure  flora  aaf 
possible  danger  of  siuprieE!,  and  he  nommanded  the  main  toutes  to  the  wnitb^' 
there  being  notliing  to  prevent  him  moving  to  the  Mndng,  to  the  Hawiyk. 
or  to  Itio  Webi  Shebeli,  if  the  rains  gave  him  a  favourable  opportun 
'if  croBsing  the  Maud,  while  his  seizure  of  the  Italian  port  of  Illig  gftf^ 
liim  H  footing  on  the  coasts  which  would  enable  him  to  obtain  supplies  ai 
I>OKBibly,  ann.8  and  ammunition.  Moreover,  an  advance  against 
the  west  left  the  option  of  fighting  entirely  in  bis  own  hands.  It  was  obvious, 
therefore,  that  om'  stra(j?gy  mliat  be  directed  to  keeping  him  up  north,  ^thor 
hy  occupying,  or  inducing  him  to  behove  we  hod  occupied,  the  lina  of  wi 
vbicb  stretch  aurose  the  Southern  Haud  from  Oerlogubi  on  (he  Abyssini 
liorder  to  Obbia  on  the  sea,  or  by  getting  the  Sultan  of  Obbia  and  ther 
Abyssiniana  to  occupy  them  in  our  interests.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  ■ 
actually  happened  was  a  compromise  between  these  alternalivps.  whieh, 
however,  Bueceeded  almost  beyond  espcitnlinii.  [Extract  [mm  General, 
Ejerton's  dpspofeh  of  nth  April,  IStM.* 


miglit  be  sent  to  occupy  that  place  temporarily.  Illig,  whicli 
lies  near  the  mouth  of  the  Wadi  Nogal  and  some  200  milea 
up  the  coast  from  Obbia,  was  reported  to  be  held  by  the 
Mullah's  followers,  and  although  it  seemed  possible  that  ho 
might  retire  thither  when  our  force  advanced,  the  project 
of  placing  a  garrison  there  had  to  be  renounced  on  account 
of  the  impTacticability  of  landing  them  at  a  time  of  year 
when  the  north-east  Monsoon  is  at  its  height. 

While  the  net  was  being  thus  gradually  drawn  round  the  M 
Mullah,  he,  with  his  Haroun  and  the  karias  still  remained  in  "' 
the  Northern  Haud,  whither,  as  already  described,  owii^  to 
the  heavy  rainfall  of  the  previous  June,  he  had  been  enabled  to 
proceed.  Hut  the  autumn  rains  had  failed,  leaving  many  of  the 
wells  dry  and  grazing  scarce,  and  to  recro.?s  the  Southern  Haud, 
except  in  small  and  mobile  parties,  was  now  impossible.  This 
circumstance  favoured  the  British  Commander,  as  it  prac- 
tically relegated  the  Mnllah  and  his  hordes  to  the  North  and 
gave  the  Abyssinian  force  time  to  block  the  route  which 
he  would  most  probably  follow  should  he  eventually  fly  to  the 
south-west. 

These  precautionary  measures  having  been  described,  it  p 
ia  necessary  to  resume  the  history  of  the  preparations  for 
advance   of   the   force   destined   to  deal   directly  with  the 
Mullah. 

In  order  to  open  up  more  rapid  comnmnication  with  the 
Abyssinians,  the  telegraph  line  was  extended  from  Ecrbera 
to  Hargeisa,  and  a  branch  line  constructed  from  Kirrit  to  Eil 
Dab,  a  point  in  the  Nogal  Plain  to  which  the  movable  column 
had  moved  on  the  8th  October. 

The  raisii^  and  organization  of  the  Tribal  Horse  into  two 
corps,  the  3rd  and  4th,  had  been  completed  early  in  November, 
when  they  had  come  under  the  orders  of  the  Officer  Command- 
ing Motmted  Troops.  In  addition,  a  levy  of  280  Miisa  Abukr 
was  raised  by  the  Consul- General  and  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  Brevet  Lieut. -Colonel  C.  J.  Melliss,  V.C.,  101st 
Grenadiers.     .A.  certain  number  of  rifles  were  also  distributed 


^ 


to  this  tribe,  whicli  hail  suffered  sev(irely  at  the  hands  of  tlie 
Mullah'a  raiding  parties. 

The  general  advance  waa  not  yet,  however,  to  begin, 
Consequent  on  the  diversion  of  such  a  large  amount  of  trans- 
port to  Galadi,  and  to  the  fact  that  the  General  had  under- 
taken to  supply  the  Abyssinians  on  arrival  there  with  a 
month's  grain,  which  was  now  being  pushed  up  the  line,  the 
work  of  stocking  the  advanced  base  waa  falling  somewhat  in 
arrears,  the  demands  temporarily  exceeding  the  supply, 
There  was,  therefore,  an  imavoidable  delay  before  a  further 
advance  could  take  place  and,  tliis  being  the  case,  General 
Egerton  decided  to  postpone  the  advance  until  the  arrival  of 
the  Abyssinians  at  Galadi  where  they  were  expected  at  the  end 
of  the  year.  In  the  meantime  several  reconnaissances  were 
undertaken  from  Bohotle  and  Eil  Dab,  in  the  course  of  which 
several  minor  collisions  occurred  between  our  mounted  inen 
and  the  enemy's  Illalos,  who  had  now  become  very  active. 
Our  information,  too,  regarding  the  Mullah's  own  movements 
began  to  be  more  definite.  A  strong  reconnaissance,  under 
Lieut. -Colonel  A.  Wallace,  27th  Punjabis,  had  fixed  upon 
Taguri  as  the  best  intermediate  post  between  Eil  Dab  and 
Dariah,  which  latt«r  waa  then  regarded  as  the  first  objective. 
An  outpost  had  already  been  established  at  Badwein  to  cover 
Eil  Dab  and  give  timely  notice  of  any  movements  from  east- 
wards. 

Early  in  December  it  became  known  that  the  Mullah  had 
established  a  strong  outpost  at  JidbaU,  some  50  miles  east  of 
Eil  Dab,  and  towards  the  middle  of  December  our  scouts 
repotted  that  it  was  being  reinforced.  Easken  was  accordingly- 
directed  to  send  a  recormaissance  of  mounted  troops  to  Jidbali, 
with  an  infantry  support  halfway  between  that  place  and 
ISadwein,  the  whole  under  the  command  of  Kenna,  com- 
manding mounted  troops.  Hia  general  instructions  were  to 
endeavour  to  ascertain  the  numbers  and  position  of  the  enemy, 
but  not  to  commit  himself  seriously  should  they  appear  to 
be  in  force,  in  which  case  he  was  to  fall  back  on  the  Infantry 
and  return  with  the  whole  force  to  Badwein. 


In  pursuance  of  these  instructiona,  Kenna  left  Bailwebi  E«MoiinBU- 
on  the  evening  of  the  18th  December  with  the  force  noted  LU^t.-CoI. 
below,*  and  pushing  on  with  the  mounted  troops,  he  arrived  Kanna. 
close  to  Jidbali  before  daylight  on  the  19th.  Numerous  fires 
showed  the  enemy  to  be  in  considerable  strength,  and  Kenna 
distributed  hia  force  so  as  to  threaten  the  front  and  both 
flanks.  At  daylight  a  heavy  fire  was  opened  by  our  troops, 
which  the  enemy  lost  no  time  in  returning,  occnpying  a  lino 
of  bushes  near  their  zariba,  beyoud  which  they  coufd  not  bo 
drawn.  Kenna  estimated  their  munbers  at  1,'WO  footmen 
and  200  horsemen,  the  majority  being  armed  with  rifles. 
After  some  three  hours'  desultory  fighting,  reinforcements  for 
the  enemy  were  seen  coming  from  the  north  and  east,  and 
Keima,  in  view  of  liis  general  instructions,  fell  back  upon  his 
infantry  support  which,  at  that  time,  8.30  a.m.,  was  only 
some  9  miles  away  from  Jidbali,  having  marched  28  miles 
since  the  previous  evening.  In  the  evening  the  force  marched 
for  Badwein  where  the  momited  troops  arrived  at  9  a.m. 
and  the  infantry  at  11.4.5  a.m.  on  the  20th  December. 

Writing  from  Jidbali.  19th  December,  10.1.")  a.m.,  Kenna 
reported  :- 


I  ( 


itli  I 


if.1  I 


>"F 


.i'r  A.M.  to-duy  at  Jidbali,  wlicro 
emy.  A  lieavy  firo  opened  on  them 
I,  most  df  wiiom  had  riHes,  including 
bo  drawn  on  beyond  aonio  scattered 


numerous  &ica  Indicated  large  forco  of 
aL  6.30  a.m.,  brought  out  aoiae  3,000  a 
200  horsemen.  The  footmen  declined 
)>Bsbes  close  to  their  main  zariba. 

2.  During  three  hours'  desultory  fighting  the  enemy  frequently 
offered  a  good  target  of  which  full  advantage  was  taken,  at  ranges  down 
to  400  and  300  yards. 

3.  In  view  of  aitualion  and  successful  result  I  did  not  feel  justified 
in  pushing  home  the  attack.  I  am  therefore  retiring  to  Badwein  which  the 
mounted  troops  will  reach  by  dawn  Ki-morrow  and  the  infantry  a  few  houm 
later.  I  am  sending  out  Home  fresh  Tribal  Horse  from  Badwein  to  see  the 
infantry  into  that  plate. 

•  Moimtcd  troops :  Ilritish  Mounted  Infantry,  OB ;  Indian  Mountnl 
Infunlry,  97  ;  Tribal  Horse.  200  :  Biknnir  Came!  Cflrpfl,  fiO. 

Support :     1st  Battalion  Hampshire  Regunent,.  100 ;    27th  Punjabis, 

Rutions  for  eight  days  for  men  and  animals.  Water  for  two  days  toi 
infantry  supporl:,     Ammiinition  :  400  rounds  per  rifle,  12,600  per  maxim. 


^^^^H  I.  iScvcral  jirisonrrs  were  taLcn,  but  die<l  before  renohing  me.     Two 

^^^^H  of  these  stated  that  tha  force  at  Jidbali  was  on  itn  way  to  attAok  Badwtiti 

^^^H  which  tho  Hiillab  Baid  was  weakly  hold. 

^^^^B  C.  Two  men  of  British  Moaii1«d  Infantry  are  wounded,  a**  per  attachnl 

^^^H  return,  and  a  few  Tribal  Horsemen  ore  at  present  misung. 

^^^^1  G.  The  enemy  eecm   to   have   plenty  of   ammunit-ion,  of   whidi  they 

^^^^1  were  very  lavish,  and  full  of  fight.     It  is  impossible  to  accurately  eBtimato 

^^^^1  their  loiH,  but  men  were  repeatedly  knocked  over  at  fihort  range  and  ods 

^^^^1  officer  alone  ttounted  3.')  bodies. 

^^^H  Owing  to  the  wildnesa  of  the  enemy's  fire  our  casualties* 

^^^1  were  very  slight.     The  enemy's  loss  was  believed  to  be  con- 

^^^1  Biderable,  and  w)»  subsequently  reported  as  about  180  kilted 

^^^B  and  wounded.f 

^^^1  The  reiionnaissance  was  admirably  carried  out,  the  in- 

^^^1  formation   acquired   was   found   most   valuable,    while   the 

^^^1  marching  of  the  infantry  (5G  miles  in  44  hours)  was  a  vpry 

^^^1  satisfactory  feature  of  the  performance. 

^^^1  The  result  of  this  reconnaissance  reached  General  Egerton 

^^^1  at  Kirrit  on  the  21st  December,  and  on  the  same  day  he 

^^^1  received  a  letter  from  Rochfort,  from  which  he  gathered 

^^^1  that,  owing  to  the  great  difficulties  they  were  experiencing 

^^^1  in  the  matter  of  water  and  transport,  it  was  hopeless  to  expect 

^^^B  the  Abyssinians  to  arrive  at  Galadi  within  the  time  calculated, 

^^^1  or  to  defer  the  advance  any  longer  on  their  account.     The 

^^^P  Mullah  was  known  to  have  moved  from  Adadero  about  the 

end  of  November,  and  the  Haroun  was  now  reported  to  be  at 

Hansoga, 

Witlidrawiil  This  fact,  and  the  presence  of  the  hostile  force  at  Jidbali, 

KarriBon  and  secmed  to  point  to  a  resolve  on  the  Mullah's  part  to  move 

con<»nt.rB(ion  northwards,  the  Jidbali  force  being  to  cover  the  passace  of 


•  Uritiah  Mounted  Infantry,  2  men  wounded,  1  miaaing ;  Tribal  Hor^e, 
2  killed,  2  wounded. 

+  Lieut.  H.  A.  Carter,  lolst  Grer.adiers,  wm  awarded  the  D.S.O,  for  Ma 
gallajitry  on  this  occasion,  but  Bubeequently  this  award  wan  cancelled  and 
IJeut.  Carter  was  awarded  tho  V.C.  ("Ijondoa  Gazette,"  Dec.  9(h,  1004). 
He  had  sared  the  life  of  Private  Jai  Singh,  and  hix  act  was  described  by 
Liont-Col.  Kenna  ait  "  the  finest  and  mifflt  brilliant  individual  act  of  valour 
performed  in  iJie  Somali  campaign."  Subndnr  Uliniro  (li7i(ir  wn.^  also 
awarded  the  Order  of  Merit  on  tljis  gccnsion. 


236 


liis  kariaa.  On  the  other  liand,  however,  the  bulk  of  his 
camels  and  a  large  number  of  other  hvestock  were  known  to 
be  still  in  the  Southern  Haud.  General  Egerton  resolved, 
therefore,  to  recall  the  Galadi  garrison,  which  had  practically 
fulfilled  its  object  and  which  was  running  short  of  supplies, 
to  concentrate  the  remainder  of  Fasken'a  Brigade  and  Keona's 
mounted  troops  at  Eil  Dab  with  a  ■\'iew  of  attacking  the 
Mullah's  force  at  Jidbali,  and  to  move  Manning's  force  into 
the  Southern  Nogal.  Orders  were  issued  accordingly.  Eil  Dab 
forming  the  advanced  base  for  the  Nogal,  and  Wadamago  that 
for  Bohotle. 

In  order  to  withdraw  the  Galadi  garrison  a  convoy  had  to 
be  sent  from  Bohotle  to  take  down  carriage,  water-tins  and 
supplies  for  their  return  journey.  On  the  30th  December 
the  troops  noted  below*,  with  the  convoy,  left  Bohotle,  and 
reached  Galadi  unopposed  on  the  4th  January,  1904.  The 
whole  force,  including  the  garrison,  then  returned  tiO  Bohotle, 
which  it  reached  on  the  10th  January.  After  filling  up 
water-tins  it  proceede<l  to  Eil  Dab,  where  it  arrived  on  the 
loth  January. 

Owing  to  the  absence  of  the  Galadi  garrison  and  convoy, 
Manning's  command  had  been  reduced  to  one  company 
Somali  Mounted  Infantry ;  550  rifles,  King's  African  Rifles, 
30  Sappers  and  Miners,  and  100  Illalos.  With  these  he  was 
directed  to  movef,  under    secret    orders,  from  Bohotle,  vi£ 

•  Coininanding :  Major  L'.  W.  O'Urj-cn.  i!7th  Punjiillis.  'J'rooiffl  ;  27th 
Pimjabia,  100  riflea  ;  No.  4  Ccmpany,  Komaii  Mounted  Infantry;  Indian 
t'ontingpnt,  British  Central  Afrira  and  5th  Ealtnlion  King's  Afritan  Eifles, 
1.^)0  riflw;  Illalos, -25:  2  maxims. 

t  Extract  trora.  Operation  OrdtrB  : — 

ES  Dah,  \at  Jau'wry,  1004. 

32. — Marcli  Orders. — 1st  Brigade. 

1.  The  1st  Brigade  wiU  leovo  Bohotle,  vis  LisRadpr,  on  liic  .Wi  .Tftnnnrv, 
to  uporato  in  the  Southern  NogaL 

2.  Troops.^ 
No.  5  Company,  Somali  Mounted  Infantry. 
King's  African  Rifles  Infantry,  am  rifles. 
ZnaloB,  100  nfles. 

M,  No.  17  Company,  3rd  Sappers  and  Itinprs. 


LasBatlcr.  to  Yaguri,  where  a  post  was  to  bo  pstabliHlied  ami 
wht-rc  he  would  meet  reinforcement  and  supplies.  In  the 
meantime  a  careful  watch  was  being  kept  upon  the  enemy's 
force  at  Jidbali,  which  was  reported  to  be  daily  increasing  in 

TliD  CTiiiToy  (Operation  Order,  No.  31)  will  eomo  undw  tlip  oidcre 
oE  Uio  General  Officer  Commanditig.  let  Brigade,  on  Birival  at  Higloli. 

3.  A  post  of  100  rillos,  27th  Pimjabifl.  will  be  pstabliahed  at  yagiipi 
Mipplemenfcd  liy  IlialoB,  dctaJlEd  by  the  .^Bflislont  Qiiarfermast^r-Gpntral, 
liitclligcni^e, 

4.  The  telegraph  will  be  laid  from  "EW  Dnb  to  Yaguri,  and  40  miles 
of  line  will  bo  at  the  diaposai  of  the  GJeneral  Ofiifer  Conimanding,  lat  Brigadr. 

5.  Water. — Two  days'  wafer  in  tanks  tor  men. 
33.— March  Orders. — 2nd  Drigado. 

1.  The    2nd   Brigade,   aecompaiiird    by    HcadfiuarterB,   Somali    Field 
Forcf,  will  advance  from  Badwein  on  the  8lh  January  (or  opcratioua  in 
Korthem  Nogal. 
3.  Troopa.—      : 

ilounlnd  Troops. 
Headquarters. 

No.  I  Corps,  Nob.  1  and  .1  Companies. 

No.  n  Corps,  Nob.  0  and  7  CompnnicH,  and  Bikauir  Camel  Corps. 
No.  in  Carps,  Tribal  Horae. 

ArliHtTij. 
2Stli  AFoiintain  Battfiy,  2  gun-i. 

/ii/aij/rt/. 
Hants  R«giment,  half  battalion. 
■     No.  19  Company,  3rd  Sappers  and  Minera. 
27th  Punjabis,  halt  battalion. 
52nd  Sikhs. 

2  Mosim  detachmonls,    lOTtli    Pioneers   (to    he   deffliled    from 
BoLotle  garrison). 

3.  Sapjilies. — Rations  to  22nd  Janiiary. 

4.  Water. — One  day  in  tanks  for  animals,  olhcr  than  cainnls,  two 
days  in  tanks  for  men, 

5.  Engineers. — fln  arrival  at  Jidbali,  the  Sappers  and  Minora  will  bo 
placed  at  tho  disposal  of  the  Commanding  Royal  Engineer,  for  work. 

a.  Tdegraph.— Tho  line  will  bo  laid  to  Jidbali,  and  36  miles  of  lin.. 
will  bo  placpd  nt  the  disposal  of  tho  General  Officer  Commanding,  2nd 
Brigade. 

34. — Lines  of  Commimicntioa  Orders. — Bobotle  will  come  nndec  the 
orders  of  the  Offieei  Commanding,  I.iiies  of  Communication,  with  effect 
from  (he  5th  January,  1904, 


minibers,  bo  muuli  so  aa  to  iudiioc  Gluiiyi'iil  Egurtoii  to  siippusu 
that  he  would  probably  be  opposed  by  the  Mullah's  main  fighting 
force.  On  the  6tli,  therefore,  he  directed  Manning  to  drop  the 
bulk  of  his  supplies  at  Yaguri  and  to  meet  him  on  the  9th  at  a 
point  20  miles  east  of  Badwein,  with  the  troops  given  below,* 
with  5  days'  supplies  and  2  da.ys'  water  for  men.  On  the  'Jth 
January  General  Egerton  Icfb  Badwein  witli  tlio  foUowiug 
troops,  and  met  Manning  at  the  rendezvous  about  noon  :^ 


*  On  the  Gtli  January  the  following  operalLOD  ordi^r  was  Issued : — 
The  QeuL'rat  ORicec  CommandiiLg  has  rcaKon  to  bclirvo  that  llie  MuiUh 
ia  holding  Jidbali  in  considerable  strength. 

2.  Tho  1st  and  2nd  Brigades  will  rendoiTOus  at  the  20th  mile  from 
Badwein,  on  the  road  to  Jidbali  (3  miles  west  of  Turgol,  and  about  12  miles 
west  of  Jidbolij  by  5  F.u.,  on  the  9th  January. 

The  force  will  be  prepared  to  advance  within  striking  distance  nf 
JidbaU  during  the  night  of  tlie  Uth,  parking  all  iinpedimcnla  at  the 
rendeZTOus. 

3.  The  1st  Brigade  will  aoncentrale  at  Yaguri  on  the  7th  January 
and  bivouac  within  4  miles  of  the  rendezvous  during  the  Qth  January. 

(o)  Troops:— 

King'fl  African  Eiflea. ,         . ,     550  rifles  and  <i  maxims. 

Somali  Mounted  Infantry     , .     125  rifles. 

Gadabursi  Horse        . .         , .     SOO  rifles, 
(li)  Suppiies, — For  five  dayd,  for  men  and  auimols. 
(c)  Water. — Two  days  for  men,  in  tins, 
(rf)  The  remainder  of  the  1st  Brigade  supplies  to   be   left  at  f  agori, 

under  200  rides  of  the  27th  Punjabis. 

4.  Tho  2nd  Brigade  will  leave  Badwein  on  the  evening  of  the  8lh 
January  and  reach  the  rendezvous  in  the  early  morning  of  the  fith  Jiuiiary, 
the  mounted  troops  following  the  infantry. 

(a)  Svpjiies. — Five  days. 

(6)  Water. — Two  days  for  men  and  for  animals  mth  infantry ;  one  day 
for  men  and  for  animals  with  mounted  troopd. 

5.  On  arrival  at  the  rendezvous  the  moiinled  troops  of  llio  2iid  Brigade 
will  become  a  separate  command. 

0.  The  General  .Officers  Coounanding  1st  and  2iid  Brigailes  and  Officer 
Commanding  mounted  troops  will  meet  the  General  Officer  Commanding 
Somftliland  Field  Porca  at  the  rendeivoufl  at  G  p.m.  on  tho  9th  January. 

U  The  General  Ofioec  Commanding  will  accompany  tho  2nd  Brigade, 


:;38 


Mounted  Tboofs. 
Lieut. -Colonel  Kenna,  V.C,  D.S.O-,  Commanding. 
No,  1  Corps,  Noa.  1  and  3  Companies,  '■ 

British  Mounted  Infantry      .,       201  | 
No.  2  Corps,  Nob.  t)  and  7  Companies, 


[-1,180    rifles. 


Indian  Mounted  Infantry  and 

Bikanir  Camel  Corps   . .         . .  445  j 

No.  i  Corps,  Tribal  Horse           . .  45i  I 

Illalos            SOJ 

2nd    Brigade. 
Brigadier -General  Fasken,  Commanding. 
ArtiUery. 
No.  28  Mountain  Battery,  1  section. 

Infantry. 
Hampshire  Kegiment,  ^  battalion, .       237 "| 
27th  Punjabis,  ^  battalion 

52nd  Sikhs 578  j- 1,222   rifles. 

ird  Sapfers  and  Miners.  I 

No.  19  Company looj 


;i 


Maxims. 


Six. 


Orders  were  then  issued  for  the  next  day  and  arrangement: 
made  for  the  protection  of  the  baggage  and  supplies,  which 
would  remain  at  the  bivouac  until  sent  for. 

At  5  a.in.  on  the  lOth  January  the  force  moved  off  in  double 
echelon  formation  as  under,  the  front  and  right  flanks  being 
covered  by  No.  5  Company,  Somali  Mounted  Infantry,  and  the 
Gadabiirsi  Horse,  the  left  flank  by  the  Tribal  Horae  : — * 

•  Eitract  £foiQ  Operatioo  Orders  ; — 
Camp,  '■JO  milet  cast  of  Badxein,  SIh  January,  IfltM. 
40.— March    Ordcca.— 1.  The     1st   and    2nd    Brigades    and    Wuu 
Troopa  will  advaiiue  on  Jidhali  od  10th  January. 
Eonse. — To  be  sounded  by  1st  Brigade,  4  a.m. 
M«rch. — ■'  Advance  "  to  be  toucded  by  1st  Brigade,  6  A.a. 


iB 

saml  SlUw. 
Maxim.,  a. 

|l 

K^tb  MounWIn  Il«lt*rj',  a  i:..iin, 
BesBiA'c  utiiiiuiiitloii. 

*■  Max'iL,6.' 

H.Lm£«hlr«. 

3"lhPmg 

M 

I 

1 

3:ni  I'mijihw. 

K.A.H. 

All  baggage,  water-tius  and  other  impedimenta  were  left 
behind  in  the  bivouac  under  a  strong  guard,  consisting  of 
two  sections.  Mounted  Infantry ;  210  rifles  o£  various  corps, 
and  two  maxims,  the  whole  under  the  command  of  Major 
W.  B.  MuUins,  27th  Punjabis. 


,  the   head    at 


2.  The   Moimted   Troops   of  lat  Brigade  wiU   in 

iand  cover  the  front  and  Saoks  of  the  force. 
3.  The  force  will  be  formed  at  4.45  a.u. 
(a)  Iiifaiitry   in   double  echelon  from  the 
tho  ocbclon  200  yards  east  uf  cainp. 
H  (b)  2ijd   Brigado   Moimted   Troops,  under   Officer   Commandiiig, 

V  Mounted  Troops,  ou  the  left  flank, 

■■k  (a)  The  echelon  will  be  guided  by  Q2od  Sikhs,  adtancing  by  the 
^K  right  on  Jidbali. 

^M  (6)  DirectioQ  to  bo  given  by  Coiptaui  Haol«r,  Royal  Engiooers. 

Hft  The  force  wdl  halt  foe  10  minutes  at  the  end  of  each  hour's  marchiog. 
^tQ-  Anmimtiiion. — 
^F  lat  Brigade.— All   animimttion   in   unit   charges  will  accompany 

^V  Snd  Brigade  and  Mounted  Troops.  ^ — First  reserve  with  units. 
^H  Second  rcacrvo  will  move  in  the  centre  of  the  echelon,  under 

^H  Brigade  arrangemcnta. 

^^  7.  Hospital  equipment  and  all  transport  of  unit^,  other  thaji  anununi- 
tion  detailed  above,  will  move  in  the  centre  of  the  echelon  under  Brigade 
urrangements, 

1st  Brigade  on  the   right,  2nd  Brigade   in   the  centre,  and   Alounted 
Troops  on  the  left. 


210 

At  8.30  a.m.  the  advanced  scouts  reported  the  eiiemy  ii 
force  at  Jidbali,  occupying  the  neac  edge  of  a  depression  in 
the  ground,  and  forming,  roughly  speaking,  a  large 
circle  of  some  2i  miles  circumference. 

The  General  then  sent  for  Kenna  and  instructed  him  to 
make  a  wide  turning  movement  to  the  north,  so  as  to  threaten 
the  enemy's  right  flank  and  rear  and  cut  off  his  retreat. 

The  echelon  continued  to  advance  imtil  within  800  yards 
of  the  position  when  it  halted.  The  enemy  could  now  be  seen 
lying  down  in  the  grass  or  amongst  the  scattered  bushes  to  the 
north.  In  the  meantime  the  mounted  troops  had  come  into 
contact  with  the  enemy  who  stretched  a  good  way  to  the  north, 
in  the  scattered  bush,  and  heavy  firing  was  heard  from  that 
directior. 

The  enemy  lay  perfectly  still  until,  just  as  the  B^uare 
halted  and  the  men  were  told  to  kneel  or  lie  down,  they 
opened  a  heavy,  though  ill-directed  fire.  The  guns  now  came 
into  action  shelling  the  enemy's  main  zariba  and  also  firing 
case  into  the  bushes  on  our  left  front  which  were  only  some 


.  Cainp  Guard, — 

(a)  Commanding,  Major  W.  B.  Mullins,  27th  Punjabis. 
(6)  Trooju.— 

I  section,  Britiah  Mounted  Infantry         In  j- 

1  section,  Indian  Momited  Infantry         I  .  ■       ..... 

J  Mounted   Infantry- 
60  rifles.  Sappers  and  Miners  "[Detailed     by     2nd 

I  niatiirt  and  100  riiieB,  27th  Punjabis]   J      Brigade. 
1  maxim.  King's  African  Bifles    ..         ..Detailed      by      1st 
Brigade. 

Ill  addition  to  the  above,  a  sufBcient  party  from  each  unit,  for 
charge  of  unit  baggnge. 

(c)  The  camp  will  be  ready  to  march  an€  join  tbe  force  when- 
ever ordered  up. 

9.  Water  in  cbaguls  and  one  day's   rations  will   be  carried  with  tho 
echelon  under  Brigade  arrangements. 

10.  Telegraph  cable  will  accompany  the  Headquarters  of  each  Brigade. 

11.  The  General  Officer  Commanding,  Somali  Field  Force,  will  move 
in  rear  of  52nd  Sikhs. 

13.  Ligbta  out  oa  9th  January,  at  10  p.m. 


ItlX)  or  (iOO  yards  distant.     The  Hampshires  and  27th  Punjabis 

^^sre  then  thrown  forward  so  as  to  bring  their  fire  on  them. 

"lie  Dervishes  then  hegan  to  advance  in  regular  skirmishing 

Carrier,  making  short  rushes  from  cover  to  cover  and  there 

r^y^ng  down.     A  few  got  up  to  within  400  yards  of  the  square, 

■^ut  were  unable  to  face  the  heavy  rifle  and  maxim  fire  that  met 

j^-liem,  and  this  attack  died  away.  In  the  meanwhile  the  Somali 

•^"flounted  Infantry  and  the  Gadabursi  Horse  on  the  right 

-*iad  got  too  close  np  to  a  body  of  the  enemy  by  whom  they 

"^were  suddenly  rushed  while  dismounted,  and  a  good  deal  of 

^i^onfusion  ensued,  in  the  course  of  which  Captain  J.  R.  Welland, 

'    -^.A.M.C,  was  killed  while  attending  to  a  wounded  hoapitai 

^aaaiatant.* 

When  the  attack  on  the  left  front  failed,  two  determined 
aniahes  were  made  on  the  front  and  right  flank  of  the  square, 
Taut  they  were  met  with  such  a  terrific  fire  from  rifles  and 
^Maxims  that  the  charging  enemy  could  not  face  it,  and  at 
10  a.m.  the  whole  mass  broke  and  fled  pursued  by  a  hot  fire, 
until  it  was  masked  by  the  mounted  troops  who  were  advancing 
across  our  front  to  take  up  the  pursuit.  This  was  carried  on 
with  great  vigour  by  Kenna,  over  about  18  miles  of  country, 
until  both  his  ammunition  and  horses  were  exhausted,  when  he 
rejoined  the  infantry  which  had  advanced  to  a  point  about 
900  yards  beyond  the  Jidbali  wells. 

The  enemy  numbered  from  6,000  to  8,000  men,  probably 
representing  the  pick  of  the  Mullah's  fighting  dervishes,  and 
their  losses,  from  reports  subsequently  received  from  prisoners 
and  deserters,  were  far  heavier  than  were  originally  reported, 
possibly  double  the  number.  There  were  668  bodies  counted 
on  and  near  the  position  on  the  second  day  after  the  fight, 
while  those  killed  in  the  pursuit  were  probably  in  exceas  of 
this,  but  the  number  could  only  be  roughly  estimated. 
Owing  ti)  the  men  on  the  faces  of  the  square  lying  down, 


1 


awHrticul  Ihc  V.C  for  hiR  gil 
7th  June.  15)04). 


1 

A 


242 

and  to  the  Hgh  fire  of  the  enemy,  our  casualties  were  slight, 
except  in  officers,  of  whom  three  were  killed  and  nine  wounded 
oat  of  a  total  of  27  killed  and  37  wounded  of  all  ranka. 
Biualties  The  casualties  were  : — 

Killed. 
Captain  Hon.  T.  Lister,  10th  HusRars. 
liieutenant  C.  H.  Bowden-Smith,  let  Battalion  Hampshire 

Regiment. 
Captain  J.  R.  Welland,  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps. 
G  Native  rank  and  file  (Indian  Regulars). 
14  ,,  „  (SomaK  Irregulars). 

1  Indian  follower. 


Wounded  Officers  {severely). 
Captain  and  Local  Major  P.  B.  Young,  Commanding  2nd 

Battalion  King's  African  Rifles. 
Brevet-Major  G.  T.  M.  Bridges,  R.A.,  Commanding  Tribal 
'        Horae 
Captain  G.  C.  Shakerley,  King's  Royal  Rifles,  Commanding 

No.  1  Corps,  Mounted  Infantry. 
Captain  E.  H,  Llewellyn,  2nd  Battalion,  King's  African 

Rifles,  Adjutant, 
Lieutenant  H.  H.  R.  White,  King's  Royal  Rifles,  Adjutant, 

No.  1  Corps,  Mounted  Infantry. 
Lieutenant  H.  E.  Eeinhold,  27th  Punjabis. 
Lieutenant   A.   E.    Andrews,    1st   Battalion,    Hampshire 
Regiment. 

Wounded.  Officers  (slightly). 
Majot  and  Local  Lieut. -Colonel  G.  1.  Forestier-Walker, 

Assistant  Quartermaster-General,  Intelligence. 
Lieutenant  and  Local  Captain  G.  R.  Breading,  3rd  Battalion 
p  King's  African  Rifles. 

Wounded  {other  rmtks). 


Rafive  ranks— Rei 


'  Native  Officers,  13  rank  and 


Trregulai 


Followers,  2. 


The  force  bivouacked  at  a  well  about  2  miles  bey  ondJidbali." 
Owing  to  water  difficulties,  and  to  the  necessity  of  waiting 
for  Manning's  supplies  from  Yaguri,  and  for  the  2nd  Brigade 
supplies  from  Badwein,  it  was  found  impossible  to  follow  up  the 
enemy  next  day.  Indeed,  at  one  time  the  water  prospects 
seemed  so  gloomy,  owing  to  the  wells  being  choked  with 
rubbish  and  with  dead  Dervishes,  that  it  seemed  questionable 
whether  the  force  could  continue  the  advance  in  this  direction, 
tlie  country  oeyond  being  reported  waterless  for  many  miles. 
Owing  to  the  great  exertions  of  the  Engineer  staff  five  wells 
at  Jidbali  and  Adur  were  cleaned  out,  and  by  midnight 
all  the  horses  and  ponies  had  had  a  drink,  though  not  a 
full  one. 

On  the  12th  and  13th  January,  Manning,  with  the  mounted 
troops  and  King's  African  Eifles,  marched  to  Dumodleh  where 

•  The  following  is  aii  e.xlract  from  the  Rtaff  Diary,  Int  Brigade,  regarding 
the  action  at  Jidbali  : — 

•Jth  jMinary.  Colujnn  left  camp  lit  5.10  a.m.,  heading  for  a  point 
20  milea  east  uf  Badwein,  oa  the  -TidbMi  road,  and  led  by  the  Brigade 
Survey  Officer,  Captain  Hunter,  E.E. 

At  a  quarter  to  8  a.m.  tlie  dust  of  the  2nd  Brigade  advancing  to  the 
tendezvoua  from  Badwein  vs^  seen,  and  Illalos  were  snnt  out  in  that  direction 
to  get  in  touch  with  them.  At  0  o'clock  we  croaacd  the  trocka  of  the  former 
reconnoitring  party  to  Jidbali  (Colonel  Kenna's  force),  and  the  column 
wheeled  to  the  right  astride  the  tracks  and  halted,  forming  mid-day  camp- 
Shortly  after,  the  2nd  Brigade,  with  which  were  General  Egerton  and 
Headquarters  Stefi,  passed  our  camp  about  a,  mile  north  of  iia  and  halted. 
Doling  the  evening  we  moved  over  to  the  hcadquaiters  and  2nd  Brigade 
romp,  occupying  front  (east)  portion  of  zariba.  Here  we  got  our  English 
uiail,  aiid  orders  were  issued  for  attack  on  Jidbali  the  following  day. 

ArrangCTuenta  matle  for  leaving  all  irape'Uraenta  in  Turgol  camp  to 
follow  us  in  the  evening,  and  one  masim  and  deta/!hment  3rd  Battalion  King' » 
.\£ricaa,Itiflea  detailed  for  camp  defence. 

Sunday,   lOth  January.      At  4.30  a.m.,   tlie   front    and  fiwikB  were 

scouted  by  the  flth  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  (front)  and  Gadaburai  Uorso 

(Hank^l.  and  were  reported  clear.      Kleanwiiile  the  division  formed  up    in 

(8927)  Q  2 


244 


AdTuioo  into 
(lie  EouUiern 
Nugal. 


abundant  water  was  iound,  and  on  the  14th  Hudin  was 
reconnoitred.  No  traces  of  the  enemy,  except  dead  bodies, 
were  met  with.  Deserters  stated  that  on  receipt  of  the 
news  of  Jidbali,  the  Mullah  fled  to  Halin  where  he  had  ordered 
all  his  karias  to  join  him.  This  might  be  with  a  view  to 
going  north,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  it  might  indicate  a  move 
towards  Kallis  and  lUig,  or  the  Southern  Haud,  In  either 
ca.se  it  appeared  to  General  Egerton  that  his  best  plan  would  be 
to  endeavour  to  anticipate  the  Mullah  by  seizing  Gerrowei  and 
Dariali  in  the  Southern  Nogal,  a  procedure  which  would  place 
his  force  strategically  on  interior  hnes  as  regards  KaUis  and 
Illig,  and  between  the  enemy  and  his  kariaa  in  the  Southern 
Haud. 

Orders  were  issued  accordingly.  The  mounted  troops 
were  directed  to  push  on  to  Adadero  by  forced  marchee, 
supported  by  Manning's  Infantry.  The  2nd  Brigade,  accom- 
panied by  the  General  and  his  staff,  was  directed  on  Dariali. 
The  sick  and  wounded  were  sent  back  to  Eil  Dab,  and  the 

double  echelon,  the  52mi  Bitha  leading,  the  Hampsliiro  Rpgimeat  and 
27th  Punjabis  oa  the  left,  the  iHt  Brigade  on  the  right  and  retir.  In 
the  centre  the  field  hospitals  and  transport  animals  (except  luiit  hoalritol 
and  ammunition  camels  which  Bccorapanied  units). 

The  5th  Somsli  Houuted  Infantry  then  beoame  the  advancetl  E00Dt«  of 
the  diTision,  and  the  Gadabursi  Morse  the  right  and  left  flankitig  paiUes. 
The  remainder  of  the  mounted  troops  were  massed  in  rewervo  on  tlie  left 
fiank  of  the  infantry. 

Tlie  distribution  of  (he  1st  Brigade  was  as  follows  : — 

(In  the    right    Hank, — Detachment   3rd   Sappera    and    MiuerB,   under 

lieulenant  Bovel,  B.E, ;   the  lat  Battahon  King's  African  SiOtt 

and  two  maxims,  commanded  by  Colonel  Cobbe ;    and  the  Srd 

<  Battalian  King's  African  Hiflas  (T5  riBea),  and  one  maxim,  under 

Captain  Brea^ng. 

On  rear   guard. — The  iJod  Battalion  King's  African  Kifles  with  twi> 

maxijiiB,  tomraonded  by  Major  Young. 
Till-  fiirce  moved  off  at  5.10  a.m.,  over  a  «ide,  open  and  imdulating 
plam.  At  S.4C  A.M.  the  advanced  scoula  reported  tie  enemy  in  strcaigliL 
in  JidbaU,\their  advanced  line  occupying  the  ridge  on  the  west  (near)  side 
nt  the  donga.  Tlie  mounted  trooi>s,  undsr  Colonel  Kenna,  were  now  Kent 
lorwa-d,  and  formed  up  about  a,  mile  to  the  left  front  of  the  infantry  Bad 
<■!!  the  rij^bt  Houk  of  the  enemy.     At  i>.21  heavy  fire  van  opene<l  by  the 


245 


telegraph  cable,  which  had  been  laid  as  far  as  Dumodleh  was 
roiled  up  as  far  as  Badwein,  whence  it  was  to  be  brought  along, 
via  Yaguri  and  Dariali,  to  Headquarters.  In  the  meantime 
a  detachment  was  sent  to  Yaguri,  with  aU  spare  cable,  to  link 
up  Yaguri  and  Dariali.  This  was  accomplished  by  thd  18tli, 
Dariah  being  ociidpied  on  the  17th  January,  and  the  lines  of 
communication  established  through  Dariali  and  Yaguri  to 
Eil  Dab-Kirrit  and  Burao, 

General  Egerton,  telegraphing  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War  on  the  ISth  January  from  Dariali  described  tho 
situation  as  foUows  ; — "  Manning,  with  King's  African  Rifles, 
proceeds  by  forced  marches  to  Gerrowei ;  Kenna,  with  mounted 
troops,  to  Adadero,  thus  forming  column  along  southeru 
Nogal.  I  hope  to  anticipate  Mullah  should  he  try  to  get  south. 
We  are  already  between  him  and  a  large  portion  of  his  karias. 
Our  only  anxiety  is  whether  supplies  will  hold  out,  but  no 
effort  will  be  spared  to  make  them  do  so." 

mounted  troopa  on  tlio  Bovcral  lines  of  DerviBhes  wMeh.  oould  he  aeen  by 
them  Uolding  the  far  ridga  of  the  donga  or  advoneing  a.ctoaa  the  balli. 

Heoawhile  the  troopa  closed  up  iato  square  tonaaUoa  and  graduall,* 
advsnoed  to  within  800  yards  of  the  Decrish  position,  when  tho  heads  of 
their  riflemen  extcaded  along  the  ridge  could  be  plainly  .-leBii-  Here  tho 
square  halted  and  tho  fight  began  at  about  a  quaj'ter  to  10  a.m.  Although 
the  enemy's  front  line  *a9  continually  reinforced,  they  were  unable  to 
advance  in  fscB  of  the  terriSc  fusitade  from  the  front  face  of  the  square. 
Much  execution  was  done  by  the  maxim  worked  in  Ihe  right  corner  of  the 
square  by  Sergeant  Gibbs.  let  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles.  On  the 
groups  of  DervishcB  taking  uovcr  behind  the  acatttred  cliiuips  of  bushes 
aurroiinding  the  square. 

One  entiro  group  of  nine  meji  was  wiped  out  in  a  moment  by  this 
maxim  (their  bodies  were  counted  afterwards  lying  in  a  heap  behind  tlio 
bash). 

Finding  they  were  beaten  in  front,  the  DsTTishcs  then  made  a  ileier- 
mined  advance  on  the  right  face  of  the  square,  which  became  hcivily 
engaged,  and  Captain  Breading,  3rd  Battalion  King's  African  Rifles,  and 
BBTeral  men  were  hit.  The  firing  of  the  enemy  was  high,  but,  while  missing 
the  front  and  right  faces,  the  rear  face,  which  wan  not  firing  at  all,  was  gettirg 
thtir  fire,  both  tho  Commanding  Officer  and  tho  Adjutant  of  Ihe  2inl  Bat- 
talion King's  African  Kifles  getting  wounded. 

'llie  enemy  were  now  repulsed  on  all  sides  and  were  In  full  flight. 
The  mounted  troops  now  swept  down  on  them  and  the  straggling  mass  of 
fugitives  closely  pursued  were  lost  to  view. 


JO  As  information  pointed  to  the  {act  of  the  Mullah  being  Btill 
";°nWTT°i;n  in  ^^^  neighbourhood  of  Halin,  orderB  were  issued  on  the  20th 
January  for  the  Ist  and  2nd  Brigades  and  mount-cd  troops  to 
concentrate  on  the  line  Gaolo-Halin  on  25th  January.  In 
accordance  with  these  orders  the  Ist  Brigade  occupied  Halin 
on  the  25th  having  marched  by  Gerrowei,  Biyo  Maddu,  and  EI 
Gorreyu.  Communication  betweentlie  two  forces  was  estab- 
lished on  the  24th,  the  2nd  Brigade  and  headquarters  having 
reached  Lanle  on  the  23rd  via  Arde  JifHfta.  The  1st  Brigade 
had  a  slight  sMrinish  near  Halln  on  the  25th  capturing  a 
leading  chieftain  of  the  Dolbahanta.  During  the  following 
week  the  1st  Brigade  advanced  through  the  Bosaso  Pass  and 
the  2nd  Brigade  through  the  Anatie  Pass  and  joined  hands 
on  the  Northern  Hand,  no  signs  of  the  enemy  being  seen.* 


•Eitractfl  from  Oporaticin  OrdiTa  ;— 
DarUUi,  20(ft  Janmiry,  IBO*. 
83.— Oreratlon  Orders.— 

1.  The  lat   and   2iid   Brigades  and   Mounted  Troops  t' 
ia  the  neighbourdood  oE  Qaulo-Halin  on  the  25tli  Jauuary. 

2.  The  Ist  Brigade  and  Mounted  Troops  moving  bj  Adadero  (undra 
Hpecinl  inBtrui'tions)  will  reaoli  Kambsyti  on  the  24th  January  aod  gsin 
touch  with  2nd  Brigade. 

3.  (a)  The  Qud  Brigade  joined  by  00  rifles,  Bikanir  Oamel  Corps  (now 
at  Dorisli),  will  gain  touch  with  Ut  Brigade  on  the  24th  January. 

Ift]  Boiii^ — 

Slat  January,  evonijig,  to  Kurtinio. 
2and  „  „        Arde  Jiffiftft. 

23rd  „  „        I^anle. 

24th  „  „         Tagaboi. 

(f.)  Suppliim. — In   Brigade   iliargo   to  Slst  January,  a£    in    Opei'ation 
Order,  No.  79.     The  50  rifles,  Bikonir  Camel  Corps,  in  (a)  rationed  by 
Advanced  Supply  Dop6t,     The  eurplus  rations  in  Advanced  Supply  Depfit 
in  charge  oF  a  Supply  and  Traaspart  subordinate 
Id)  Watff.—ln  tanks,  one  day  for  men. 

4.  The  General  Officer  Commanding,  Somali  Field  Force,  will  aeeom- 
pany  2nd  Brigade. 

84.— March  Orders.- The  '011011™!,'  Moiuiicd  Troops  will  join  2nd 
Brig.ide;  — 

(a)  Cominanding,  Jlnjor  J,  E,  M.  Marali,  lintoln  Regiment. 


m 


General  Egcrlon  being  now  convinced  from  the  indications  ilullali 
round  Halin  and  from  information  received,  that  the  Mullah  ^^Hiwardi 
had    retired    northwaraa,    determined    upon    the    following 
couKe : — 


~1 


To  concentrate  the  whole  of  the  1st  Brigade  at  HaJin  to  Plan  of 

^^^L  hold  the  Northern  Kogal.  modiOei!. 


(6)  Troops.— 

■  2  Company,  BcitiHli 

Mouatod  Infantry 
.  i  Company,  Somali 

Mounted  Infantry 

(less  25  rifles)  J 

I.  5  Company,  Somali   Mounted  Infantry,  50  rides,  now  ai 


Dariali,    21st 
Janun^,  from 


(c)  JtoiUe. — 22nd  January,  join  the  2Qd  Brigade, 

(d)  Sv-pjiiea. — Rationa  up  to  and  for  the  22nd  January,  from 
Advanced  Depat,  From  23rd  January,  rations  to  be  drawn  ftom  surplui 
rations  accompanying  2nd  Brigade. 

{e)  WaUr.—la  tanks,  1  day  for  men. 
85, — Convoy   Orders. — 3,200    mannda    of    suppUoa  will    Yie    fcntnyed 
from  Dariaii  on  Soth  January,  to  reach  Gaolo  on  2Sth  idpni. 

100  rifles,  Hmts- 
100     „    27th  Punjabia 
100      „      63nd  Siklis. 

26     „      No.  fi  Company,  Somali  Mounted  Infantry. 
Suppliei. — As  required. 
Water, — In  tanks,  one  day  for  men. 

80. — Advancai   Linos    of   Corainnnioation    Orders. — Reforenco   Opera- 
tion Orders,  Noa.  37  and  B4.     The  advanced  Lines  of  Commnnication  is  at 
it  constituted  as  follows  : — 
||)  Staff.— 

Officer  Commanding,  Advanced  Lines  of  Communication,  Mnjor 

W.  B.  Mullina,  27th  Punjabis. 
Section  Staff  Officer,  Captain  H.  H.  F.  Turner,  2nd  Lanceri'. 

EU  Dnb. 
Li    No.  3  Company,  British  Mounted  Infantry,  halt  company. 
52nd  Sikhs,  100  rides. 

King's  African  Eillea,  Mountain  Battery,  2  (P'"*. 
King's  African  Bitlc^s  SO  liaoa. 


'24» 


To  withdraw  the  2nd  Brigade  and  mounted  troops  viu 
Haisamo  and  Hudiii  to  Eil  Dab,  and  thence  to 
Sheikh,  where  a  column  was  to  be  organised  to  ad- 
vance via  Las  Dureh  towards  Jid  Ali  and  Tag  Gebi. 

No.  3  Company,  BritiBh  Mounted  Infantry,  half  company. 
Sappera  and  Miaera,  detBcbment. 
King's  African  Rifles,  200  rifles. 
Bariidi. 
Sappers  and  Miners,  15  rifles. 
27tb  Punjabis,  50  rifles. 
G2nd  Sikhs,  SO  rillex. 

No.  4  Company,  Somali  Mounted  Infantry.  25  riHos,  en  route. 
Tribal  Horso,  168  rifles,  en  roviB, 
Camp  Danan  Qaolo,  27£i  JnaTinry.  1904. 

100,— March  OrderB.— 1.  (a)  The  1st  Brigade  will  march  on  llii- 
following  programme : — 

28th  January,  to  foot  of  Bosaso  Pasa. 
30th  January,  reach  Anane  Pass  via  the  Sorl 
(6)  Impedimenta  of   1st  Brigade  will  be  left  in  the  neighbourhood  ol 
Halin. 

(c)  Spare  water  carriaga  and  any  other  spare  tranaport  will  be  sent 
at  once  \o  Danan  Gaolo  accompanied  by  all  Bikanlr  rifles  not  required  tnr 
garrison  duty  at  Halin. 

2.  (u)  The  2nd  Brigade  will  march  on  the  following  programme : — 

28th   January. — Reinforced    by    I    Company,  Mounted  Infantry 
(detailed  by  Officer  Commanding,  Mounted  Troops),  to  Tain. 
29th  January. — Reconnoitre  the  Anana  Pass. 
29th  or  30th  January.— Join  hands  with  1st  Brigade. 
(6)  Sujyptia.—To  4th  February. 

3.  (a)  The  Mounted  Troops,  less  1  company  with  2nd  Brigade  and 
dismounted  man,  will  march  from  Danan  Gaolo  to  Kansoga  on  29th  January 
and  reconnoitre  Haisimo  district  on  the  following  days. 

(6)  Sttpjiiis.—Ta  Sth  February. 

4.  Signallijig. — Communication     will     be     maintained     l^etween 
Brigade,  2ud  Brigade,  and  Mounted  Troops,  also  with  Field  Force  Head- 
quarters at  Danan  Gaolo. 

|j.  Field  Force  Headquarters  will  be  at  Danan  Gaolo. 
101. — Advanced  Linea  of  Communication  Orders, 
(a)  A  post  will  be  eatabhshed  at  Danan  Oaolo. 

(A)  Oarriuon 100     rifles   {detailed   by   2nd    Brigade)    and    the 

balance  of  the  Bikanir  rifles,  returning  from  Halin  (Operation 
Order,  No.  100  (1)  (c)). 
2.  A  telegraph  office  will  be  opened  at  Danan  Gaolo  on  2Slh  instant. 


9!o  form  a  movable  column  at  Eil  Dab. 

To  roil  up   the   telegraph  line  and  evacuate  all  posts  In 
the  Southern  Nogai. 
JTo  eetablifih  a  signalling  post   in   the   neighbourhood  of 
Hudin. 

Orders  to  the  above  effect  were  therefore  issued  to  the 
troops  on  the  29th  January.*  The  Ist  Brigade,  reinforced 
by  400  rifles  and  2  gims,  King's  African  Rifles,  returned  to 
Halin,  with  orders  to  deny  the  Nogal  to  the  enemy  and  inflict 
all  possible  loss  on  him  by  raiding  Dervish  stock. 

The  2nd  Brigade  preceded  by  the  moimt«d  troops,  marched 
^lia  Hansoga,  Hiidin,  Badwein,  and  Burao  to  Sheikh,  after 
estabhshing  a  signaUing  post  at  Bur  Anod,  near  Hudin. 

All  these  movements  were  completed  by  the  22nd  February. 
while  headquarters  were  estabhshed  at  Berbera  on  the  18th 
of  the  same  month,  by  which  date  the  first  phase  of  active 
operations  may  be  said  to  have  terminated. 

'Eitrttut  from.  Operation  Orders  ; — 
Camp  Danan.  Oaolo,  29(A  JanuuTj/,  1B04. 

103. — Operation  Orders.— When  the  Ist  and  Sod  Brigadea  have 
joined  lianda  at  the  Aoane  Paaa  (Operation  Order,  No.  100),  the  lat  Brigade, 
including  45  rig©s,  SappocB  and  Miners,  and  Nos.  4  and  6  Companies.  Somali 
Mounted  Infantry,  and  IHalos,  will  remain  in  the  Nogal  Valley.  The  2nd 
Brigade,  prei^eded  by  Monntod  Troops,  lesa  No.  4  and  5  companies,  Somali 
Hoanted  Infantry,  and  50  rides  Bikanir  L'ameL  Corp,  will  march  to  Eil 
Dab  through  the  Haisimo  district,  with  a  view  to  fntiico  operalions. 

104. — let  Brigade  Orders. — I.  The  lat  Brigade  will  reUeye  the  Danan 
Gaolo  garrison  with  Somali  Mounted  Infantry  by  2  p.m.,  on  the  31st  Jannary. 
2.  AmmunUion.— For    [at    Brigade,     500    ronnda     per    rifle.      30.400 
rounds  per  itimifti 

Suppiiea.— Por  1st  Brigade,  till  29th  February. 

Transport. — For  Ist  Brigade,  for   seven   days'  auppliea   for   men    and 
uoiniaJa  and  one  day'.?  water  in  tonka  for  men. 
L  Seinforeemtttt^. — For  Ist  Brigade. 

((*)  The  King's  .-Urfean  Rilles  Moimtain  Battery  and  detach- 
ments of  King's  Afrifan  Rifles  and  Somali  Mounted  Infantry 
at  Wadamago,  Eil  Dab,  Yaguri,  and  Dariali  will,  under  the 
orders  of  the  Officer  Commanding,  Lines  of  Communication, 
and  Advanced  Lines  of  Communication  assemble  as  soon  as 
possible  at  Dariali  and  proceed  at  once  to  join  the  1st  Brigade 
via  Arde  Jiffifta. 


Ihs  Mulish 
for  fichling 
■t  Jidbdi. 


25i> 

It  may  not  here  be  out  of  place  to  consider  why  the  Mi 
made  s  staad  at  Jidbali.  The  seasoa  had  been  a  very 
on?,  and  there  ivas  graB.'i  only  at  Halin  and  in  the 
Nogal.  The  Mullali  had  therefore  roncentrate.d  his  foroetf 
ill  the  North  Eastern  Nogal  and  had  estahliahcd  a  strong; 
ontpost  at  Jidbali  covering  Halin.  He  was  aware  that  it  bs 
was  driven  out  of  Halin  his  only  possible  line  of  retreat 
across  the  Northern  Haud,  towards  Jid  Ali  or  the  Tug  Qeln. 
There  was  no  grazing  in  the  Southern  Nogal,  and  south  o£ 
that  was  the  waterless  and  difficult  country  of  the  Southern 
Hand.  It  was  therefore  of  special  importance  to  him  to  preserve, 
his  poMtion  at  Halin.  Ho  apparently  considered  the 
open  country  round  Jidbali  more  favourable  to  his  forces  tha)t> 
the  Halin  country  which  was  much  more  broken.  Should  H 
be  defeated  at  Jidbali  he  would,  at  any  rate,  have  time  to  pr 
pare  for  his  flight  northwards. 

Probably  the  above  comprise  some  of  the  reasons  wl 
led  to  the  fight  at  Jidbali,  and  the  Mullah,  now  realising  th 


{!•)  AmiiiimilioH.—^m  rounds  ppr  rifle. 

(«)  Traiuport.^Far  seven  days'  supplies  foe   uipti   i 

and  DUO  day's  naler  in  tanks  for  men. 
{d)  Convoy. — Post   amnmnitton   to   raise    that    on    lat    Briga) 
tliargo  to  500  rounda  per  rifle  (eicopt  Illaloa}  nnd  30,100  ro 
Iier  maxim. 
(t)  Supplies.— For  wliolo  of  Ist  Drigado  to  20th  February, 
lOT). — 2nd   Brigade    and    lloiinted    Troo]ja    Ordera. — 1.  Tho 
Officer  Commanding,  2nd  Brigade,  in  communication  with  Officer  0 
manding,  Mounted  Troopa,  will  leave  Hansoga  on  Ist  February  and  ml 
via  Hudin,  to  roach  Eil  Dab  on  or  alxiut  the  10th  February. 

3,  Tha  Officer  Cominanding.  Mounted  Troopa,  in  communication  1 
General  Officer  Cominanding,  2nd  Brigade,  will  preeede  the  2nd  Bi 
and  will  reconnoitre  the  nortli  of  BiLr  Anod,  reaching  Eil  Dab 
the  10th  February. 

3.  The  Company  of  Mounted  Infantry  noiv  with  the  2n(i  Brigade 
rejoin  the  Mounted  Troops  at  Eansoga. 

4.  S^pplieg. — To  10th  February,  the  balance  being  drawn  from  Di 
Gnolo,  under  Brigade  and  Mounted  Troopa  arrangements. 

5.  Trmi»poH. — For   10  days'  rations  for   men   and   animals,  and 
day's  water  in  tanka  for  men. 


251 


I  must  leave  the  Nngal,  nitidc  preparatinns  for  his  flight 
nortliwa  rda. 

The  Tfisults  of  the  operations  were — tactically,  the  defeat  RMultof  Hib 
and  rout  of  the  enemy  at  Jidbah — materially,  his  Josses  in  "'*"' 
men  and  rifles  and  the  losses  that  he  and  his  people  have 
suffered  in  live  Btock— and  morally,  the  loss  of  prestige  of 
the  Mullah  himself,  and  the  d5raorahsation  of  his  fighting 
dervishes — while  strategically,  he  was  hemmed  in  between 
our  column  and  the  Mijjarten,  who  were  professedly  hostile  to 
him  and  his  cause. 

Before  proceeding  to  describe  the.  second  and  last  phase  of 
the  operations,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  briefly  to  the  events 
which  took  place  outside  the  operations  from  the  time  of  the 
battle  of  Jidbah  to  the  termination  of  the  campaign. 

During  January  the  progress  of  the  Abyssiniana  had  been  Abjeain 
slow.     On  the  18th  of  the  month,   Rochfort  had  reported 
that  the  Abyssinian  force  had  reached  Wardair  on  the  14th, 
but  had  been  obliged  to  withdraw  to  Gerlogubi  for  want  of 

108.  Advanced  Lines  of  Communication  Orders. — (a)  The  Genera! 
Officer  CommBading,  3nd  Bdgade'i  will  leave  a,  post  in  the  neighbourhood  oE 

(6)  Troops.— 

1  Royal  Engineer  OffiriT  and  10  riHcs,  Ssppirs  and  Miners 
150  rifles,  Infantry. 
Signalling  party. 
20IIM0S. 

(c)  SujFpiiej.— To  29tli  February. 

(d)  Trattsporl. — For  spvt'n  days'  supplies  for  nioji  and  animula,  and 
for  one  day's  water  in  tanks  for  men. 

107. — iSiynoHinf?. — The  General  Offlu^er  Cominandrng,  And  Brigade, 
will  fix  the  post  near  Hudin  with  a.  view  to  maintain  communication  with 
tliB  lat  Brigade  and  with  Eil  Dab. 

The  General  Officer  Commanding,  Ist  BriKOde,  will  open  communica- 
(ioa  with  Hiidin  by  helio,  if  possible,  oatabliahing  an  interniadioto  post  i£ 
necessary. 

The  General  Officer  Commanding,  Ist  aod  2nd  Brigades,  will  fix  tho.10 
l>o8ts  in  consnitation  with  the  Survey  Officer. 

The  Officer  Corf  nvanding,  Advanced  Lines  of  Comtaunicatron,  will 
open  comniimii^fttion  with  Hiidiii  from  Eii  Dab. 


Saval  demo 
Uratiun  at 


fiupjiliea.  From  the  latter  place,  Rochfort  telegraphed  to 
Uenerttl  Egerton  on  the  3l8t  that  the  Abyssiniana  were  retiring 
to  tlie  Fafan  on  the  following  ciay,  and  thence  to  Hilowen  on 
the  Webi  Shebeli.  Aa  they  would  thus  for  the  present  be 
outtiide  the  zone  of  any  possible  co-operatdon,  Rochfort 
aaked  for  the  General's  instructions.  These  were  to  the  eSect 
that,  j>ending  further  development  of  the  operations  about  to 
be  undertaken  by  our  troops,  the  General  hoped  the 
Abyaainians  would  remain  at  Gerlogubi  or  on  the  Fafan  so  as 
to  deter  the  Mullah  from  planning  a  move  to  the  south.  Accord- 
ingly, the  Abyasjniana  concentrated  at  Gorahai  on  the  Fafan 
on  the  7th  February.  Here  they  kept  the  field  until  the  24tli 
March,  when,  in  view  of  the  retreat  of  the  Mullah  across  the 
Northern  Hand,  the  force  returned  to  Harrar. 

The  Mullah,  after  crossing  the  Northern  Haud,  was 
believed  to  have  established  his  headquarters  at 
Jid  All.  He  and  his  people  having  suffered  so  severely 
in  their  flight  across  the  waterless  tract  of  the  Northern 
Haud,  it  was  considered  unlikely  that  he  would  attempt 
to  retrace  his  steps  until  the  rainy  season  set  in,  whicl* 
it  might  be  expected  to  do  about  the  middle  of  April* 
The  coast  tribes,  viz.,  the  Habr  Toljaala,  the  Habr  Gerhajia, 
the  Vv'araangti  of  our  own  Protectorate,  and  the  Mijiarten. 
tribes  of  the  ItaUan  Protectorate  were  all  professedly  hostile 
to  the  Mullah,  and  Sultan  Osman  Mahmud,  the  most  in- 
influential  man  of  the  Northern  Mijjarten,  was  understood 
to  be  willing  to  co-operate  actively  by  preventing  the  Mullah 
from  entering  the  Mijjarten  territory.  There  seemed,  therefore, 
a  fair  chance  of  General  Egerton  being  able  to  compel  the 
Mullah  again  to  risk  a  battle  or  to  surrender  without  fighting, 
provided  he  was  denied  an  asylum  in  the  Italian  Protectorate, 
and  measures  to  this  end  were  taken. 

Between  the  10th  and  IJth  a  naval  demonstration  at  lUig 
had  been  made  by  His  Majesty's  ships,  but  in  the  absence  of 
an  Itahan  ship  no  bombardment  took  place.  The  Senior 
Naval  Officer  proposed  to  land  a  naval  brigade  at  Illig,  but  thia 


i^-d 


253 


proposal  was  postponed  until  General  Egerton  had  conferred 
with  the  Naval  Commander-in-Chief. 

Early  in  February  the  question  of  offering  terms  to  the 
Midlah  was  considered,  and  after  obtaining  the  views  of  the 
Government,  a  letter  was  forwarded  by  General  Egerton 
to  the  Mullah  on  the  20th  February  informing  him  of  the  terms 
on  which  his  surrender  would  be  accepted.  These  were  that  it 
the  Mullah  surrendered  with  two  maxims  and  1,400  good 
rifles.  Ilia  lite  and  the  Uves  of  his  family  would  be  spared, 
his  future  residence  being  appointed  by  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment. It  is,  howeverj  doubtful  whether  the  General's  letter 
ever  reached  the  Mullah, 

During  February  the  Naval  C'ommander-in -Chief  was  asked 
to  leconnoitre  Las  Khorai  on  the  coast  east  of  Eerbera,  witii  a 
view  to  ascertaining  whether  that  place  was  suitable  for  the 
embarkation  and  disembarkation  ot  troops  and  stores. 
Favourable  replies  being  received  on  this  point.  General 
Egerton  and  Admiral  Atkins  on -Willes  conferred  together  at 
Berbera  on  18th  Febiiiary,  and  arrangements  were  made  for 
the  estabhshment  of  a  garrison  at  Las  Khorai. 

On  February  8th,  General  Egerton  telegraphed  from  Eil 
Dab  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  his  future  plan  of 
operations.  He  proposed  to  send  a  strong  colunm  under 
Fasken  from  Las  Dureh  to  work  through  the  north-eastern 
portion  of  the  Mahmud  Gerad  country,  east  of  Jid  Ah,  and 
thence  to  operate  in  the  Warsangh  country,  while  another 
column,  under  Brooke,  was  to  operate  from  Eil  Dab.  On 
completion  of  Fasken's  work  his  force  was  to  embark  at  Las 
Khorai  and  return  to  Berbera  about  the  end  of  March.  As 
the  Nogal  was  held  by  one  brigade,  he  considered  that  the 
probable  effect  of  these  operations  would  be  to  drive  the 
Mullah  out  ot  the  British  Protectorate  when,  if  Osman 
Mahmud  acted  up  to  his  promises,  the  Mullah  might  be 
captured  or  his  force  destroyed. 

As  preliminary  measures  to  this  plan,  the  General  arranged 
with  the  Consul -General  to  call  upon   the  Warsangli   Sultan 


Lan  Khorai. 


to  hold  out  &^aJQSt  the  Mullah  and  thus  prevent  supplies 
naching  him  from  that  direction.  The  Protectorate  coast 
was  to  be  watched  by  His  Majesty's  ships,  and  the  Italian 
naval  authorities  requested  to  co-operate  hy  preventing 
supplies  reaching  the  Mullah  through  Italian  ports.  But  ou 
the  30th  Januari'  the  captmn  of  the  Italian  ship  "  Voltumo" 
had  bombarded  the  Sultan's  houses  at  Ras  Hafun.  south  of 
Cape  Gardafui.  This  was  done  without  the  authorisation  of 
the  Italian  Government  and  the  captain  of  the  "  Voltumo  " 
was  recalled.  This  action,  however,  interrupted  our  com- 
munications with  Osman  Mahmud,  made  his  attitude  doubtful, 
and  caused  the  Government  to  prohibit  the  crossing  of  the 
border. 
;  As  it  was  also  necessarj'  tor  the  complete  sucoeas  of  the 
operations  that  the  troops  should  be  free  to  cross  tlw 
Italian  border  and  operate  in  Italian  territory,  the  consent 
of  the  Italian  Govemment  was  duly  sought  and  sub- 
sequently obtained,  although  too  late  to  effect  the  success  of 
the  operations. 

On  the  23rd February  H.M.S.  "Perseus"  was  placed  at  th» 
disposal  of  the  General  Officer  Commanding  with  the  view  of 
communicating  with  Las  Khorai  and  establishing  a  temporary*' 
]X)3t  at  that  place.  Consequently  on  the  27th  February  » 
detachment  of  90  rifles  under  the  command  of  Captain  P.  G. 
Grant,  R.E.,  with  Lieutenant  W.  H.  Evans  ua  Intelligence 
Officer,  embarked  for  Las  Khorai,  where  a  fortified  post  was 
formed. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  2nd  Brigade  and  the  mounted  troops 
at  Eil  Dab  on  the  8th  Februarj-,  consequent  on  the  orders  issued 
at  the  end  of  January,  a  movable  column  was  formed,  to  be 
under  the  direct  orders  of  tlie  General  Officer  Commanding^ 
the  Somaliland  Field  Force.  The  column  coiiaiated  of : — 
'^    Commanding. — Major  R.  G.  Brooke,  D.S.O.,  7th  Hussars, 

Staff  Ca plain. —C&ptaln   C.   G.   W'oodhouse,  12(ith  Ealu 
chistan  Infantry 


255 

Troops :—  ■  ■  : 

Headquarters  No.  II  Corps         "  j 

Mounted  Troops,  Nos.  6  and  7    I  To  be  detailed  by  the 

Companies  Indian  Mounted  In-  !»     Officer  Commanding 

fontry.  i       Mounted  Troops. 

Bikanir  Camel  Corps,  .50  rifles.  J 
Detachment,  No.  17  Company  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners. 

t27t!i Punjabis,  1  Double-,  400  rifles  to  be  detailed  by 
Company.  >    General  Officer  Commanding 

52nd  Sikhs,  1  Wiiig.       J    2nd  Brigade, 
_,  ,  .,  ,  ,  rTo  be  detailed  by  As.si8taiit 

Ulalos,  as  available  up  „  .      r,  it 

<     Ouartermaater-Oeneral,  in- 
to 100  nfles.  1     r^„- 
L    telligence. 

Amtmtniiion.SOO  rounds  per  rifle  in  regimental  charge. 
Transpori.—'Foi  7  days'  supplies,  men  and  animals,  and  3 
days'  water  for  men. 


On  the  26th  February  the  ]jaa  Dureh  Column  was  ordered  Liin  Durch 
to  concentrate  at  that  place  on  the  8th  March.     It  was  com-    °  "°"'* 
poaed  as  follows  : — 


^^EWit 


mtandijig. — Brig. -General  C.  (i.  M.  Fiisken,  Command- 
ing 2nd  Brigade. 

f. — ^Headquarters  Stail,  2nd  Brigade,  joined  by  Com- 
mander E,  S.  Carey,  R-N.,  Provost  Marshal,  and 
Lieutenant  L.  W.  D.  Everett,  6th  King's  African 
Bifles,  Intelligence  Officer. 

ed  Troops  (from  Berbera) : 
Headquarters,  Mounted  Troop 
PKo.  I  Corps,  Headquarters  and  250  rifles. 
T'  British  Mounted  Infantry,  with  15  per  cent,  spare  ponies, 
r  Ko.  II  Corps.— Bikanir  Camel  Corps,  except  those  with 
movable  column. 
Mounted  Levy,  100  rifles. 


25« 

Infotlry  (from  Sheikh)  :— 

Commanding. — Lieut. -Colonel  A.  Wallace,  37tli  Punjabis. 
Staff  Officer.—Ftom  the  Command. 
Frmn  2nd  Brigade  : — 

Hants  Regiment,  250  rides  (dismounted). 
27th  Punjabis,  350  rifles  and  2  Maxima. 
u2nd  Sikhs,  250  rifles  and  2  Maxims. 
Fnym  Lines  of  Communication  :— 
lOlet  Grenadiers,  2  Maxims. 
107th  Pioneers,  150  rifles  and  2  Maxims. 
Sappers  and  Miners,  50  rifles. 
Delated    bij    Assistant    Quarter m/isler -General, 
gence  :— 

Illaloa,  100  rifle.8  and  CO  ponies. 
Ammuniiion. : — 
;J00  rounds  per  rifle  (except  le\-ies  aud  Illalos). 
i2,tiOO  rounds  pe.r  maxim. 
Poet  Reserve :    100  rounds  per  ritlt   at   l-as   Dureh  ; 
balance  at  Berbera  and  Sheikh. 
Transport : — 

Mounted  Troops. — For  4  days'  rations  and  2  days'  water 

for  men. 
Infantry.— For  4  days'  rations  and  1  day's  water  for  men. 
Supplies. — To  5th  April. 
Water  Tanks.~To  complete  equipment  for  2  days'  water 

for  men  throughout. 
Transport. — Camels,  as  required,  for  supplies  and  water 

tanks. 
On  the  loth  March  both  the  above  columns  advan«rcd,  with 
El  Afweina  as  their  common  objective,  which  they  reached  on 
the  16th  March,  having  seen  no  trace  of  the  enemy  on  the  way. 
It  was  then  arranged  that  Brooke's  Column  should  move  viit 
Daringahiye  towards  Danaii  blocking  the  routes  to  the  south 
and  south-west,  while  Fasken  should  operate  northwards  to 
Jid  Ah,  and  then   eastwards   and  aOSlJle6iBt  JSj  the   Giebi. 


257 


Colonel  Melliss,  V.C,  who,  with  250  (Musa  Abukr)  levies," 
was  at  this  time  in  oommunication  with  Faeken,  having 
moved  from  Dubbatad  when  the  column  left  Las  Dureh, 
received  orders  to  move  round  on  the  left  flank  of  the  column 
to  the  north  of  Jid  Ah, 

It  was  not  till  the  17th  March  that  information  was  received 
regarding  the  Mullah's  movements.  Many  of  his  karias 
were  reported  to  have  been  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Jid 
Ali,  but  he  himself,  with  the  Harounf,  had  been  at  Kalgoraf, 
near  Danan.  It  was  only  on  the  15th  that  he  received  news 
of  our  advance,  when  he  precipitately  retreated,  sending 
messages  to  his  outlying  karias  to  follow  liiin  to  Baran,  which 
is  on  the  borders  of  our  Protectorate,  in  the  angle  between 
the  49th  meridian  and  the  10th  parallel  of  north  latitude. 

On  the  19th  March  Fasken's  Infantry  came  across  a  raiding  u 


The  raiding  party,  who  fied  on  the  approach  of  our  troops, 
subsequently  fell  into  the  hands  of  Major  Beresford  with  the 
Tribal  Horse,  and  Captain  Shakerley's  company  of  British 
Mounted  Infantry,  who  handled  them  roughly,  killing  53 
Dervishes  and  capturing  four  prisoners,  23  rifles,  500  rounds  of 
ammunition,  and  27  camels,  our  only  casualty  being  one 
horse  killed. 

All  reports  of  prisoners  and  deserters  confirmed  the  news 
previously  received  of  the  Mullah's  hurried  flight  from  Kalgoraf 
towards  Baran,  and  that  his  intention  was,  if  still  pursued, 
to  make  for  IlHg,  via  Earmadobe.  This  seemed  to  show 
that  he  was  uncertain  of  the  attitude  of  the  Mijjarten,  and  that 
he  was  not  aware  of  the  presence  of  the  1st  Brigade  in  the 
Eastern  Nogal. 

Fasken  arrived  at  Jid  Ah  on  the  :ilst  March,  his 
mounted   troops   having   reached   there   the   previous   day. 

•  TliEse  levies  had  been  raised  by  the  Consul- General  in  conaultation 
with  General  Egerlon  tot  political  reasons.  They  were  cafabliBheii  abojit 
100  miles  east  of  Borbern,  near  TJnbbatad,     (See  pitge  4-£f>), 

t  Headquailers  enennipment  of  the  Mallah. 

»27)  E 


^V  358 

^^H  The  Infantry  had  averaged  17  miles  a  day  since  leaving  Sheikh 

^^H  on  the  7th  of  the  month.     Leaving  Melliss  to  hold  Jid  All  with 

^^1  his  levies,  Faeken  pushed  on,  vi'i  Bihen,  Habera,  and  Domo, 

^^H  to  Ausaneh,  preceded  by  the  mounted  troops,  who  reached 

^^H  Higli  Gab  on  the  2!>th.     The  latter  had  now  struck  upon  the 

^^H  direct  line  of  the  Mullah's  flight,  which  was  marked  by  a  trail 

^^H  of  dead  men,  women,  and  children,  camels  and  stock,  aban- 

^^H  doned  water-vessels  and  household  utensils  ;   all  testifying  to 

^^H  the  hurried  nature  of  his  flight  and  the  desperate  condition 

^^H  to  which  his  following  was  reduced. 

^^H  From  Higli  Gab  the  Tribal  Horse  and  Illalos  reconnoitred  in 

^^H  a  westerly  direction,  coming  across  some  belated  Dervish 

^^H  karias  which  had  not  been  able  to  join  the  Mullah,  and  killing 

^^H  some  40  or  50  spearmen,  from  whom  they  captured  500  camels 

^^"  and  800  sheep.     The  mounted  troops  rejoined  the  main  column 

Fftiluro  of       at  Ausaneh  on  the  29th  March.     There  was  now  nothing  more 

to  m»-op«raS!  ^  ^^  done,  operations  across  the  Italian  border  having  been 

prohibited.     There  were  no  signs  of  Mijjarten  or  Warsangli 

co-operation.     On  the  contrary,  there  was  reason  to  believe 

that  supphes  had  been  sent  to  the  Mullah  from  nearly  all  the 

coast  ports  between  Wakhderai  and  Bosaso,  Fasken's  transport 

was  weak,  the  road  to  Las  Khorai,  to  which  place  he  had  been 

ordered  to  send  the  bulk  of  his  infantry  and  dismounted  men, 

was  known  to  be  exceedingly  difficult,  and  there  were  already 

signs  of  the  rains  setting  in,  which  would  hamper  movements, 

if   not   render  them   impossible.     Under  the   circumstances 

there  seemed  nothing  for  him  but  to  withdraw.     On  the  4th 

April  the  whole  column  was  therefore  concentrated  at  Baran, 

whence,  on  the  5th  April,  the  force  separated,  the  infantry 

marching  to  Las  Khorai  to  embark  there  for  Berbera,  while 

the  motmted  troops,  with  all  surplus  carriage,  retraced  their 

steps  via  Jid  Ali,  El  Afweina,  and  Las  Dureh,  Baran  being 

held  by  Melliss's  levies. 

Manning's  Though,  owing  to  the  conditions  of  their  relative  positions, 

opera  ions.      ^^^  inunediate  pursuit  of  the  Mullah  devolved  on  the  troops 

of  the  3nd  Brigade  and  the  Eil  Dab  column,  Manning's  troops 


J 


had  been  by  no  means  idle  or  stationary.  A  strong  fort  had 
been  constructed  at  Halin,  patrols  and  reconnaissances  had 
been  sent  in  all  directions,  and  Kallis  and  Gerrowei  visited. 
Signalling  communication  was  established  between  Eil  Dab 
and  Hudin  and  El  Afweina,  the  latter  enabling  Manning  to 
keep  in  touch  with  Brooke's  Column,  and,  through  him, 
with  Fasken.  In  the  course  of  these  movements  the  Somali 
Moimted  Infantry  and  Ulalos  succeeded  in  rounding  up  some 
10,000  head  of  live  stock,  captured  11  rifles,  and  accounted  for 
over  200  Dervishes,  our  losses  being  slight. 

Manning's  disposition  of  his  troops  was  skilfully  made, 
so  that  notwithstanding  the  long  line  he  was  watching — 
which  extended  from  Hudin  on  the  west  to  Kallis  on  the  east — 
strong  movable  columns  were  available  at  Dumodleh  and  Halin 
to  operate  in  any  given  direction,  while  a  system  of  permanent 
patrols  insured  timely  notice  being  obtained  of  any  Dervish 
movements. 

On  the  7th  April  GeneralEgertonreceived  a  telegram  from  Italj 
the  War  Office  conveying  the  consentof  theltalian  Government  atroHThe 
to  operations  being  continued  into  Italian  territory,  subject  to  border, 
certain  conditions,  and  directing  him  to  continue  offensive 
operations.  Instructions  were  according  issued  on  the  8th  to 
Fasken  to  remain  at  Las  Khorai  until  further  orders,  and  to 
Brooke  to  concentrate  his  column  at  E I  Afweina  and  to  send  out 
orders  to  the  mounted  troops  to  stand  fast  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Jid  Ali,  where  he  was  to  join  them  after  concentration. 
Orders  were  also  issued  to  the  Ist  Brigade  to  maintain  their 
position  jn  the  Eastern  Nogal  as  long  as  possible.  At  the  same 
time,  owing  to  the  emaciated  condition  of  the  transport,  the 
imminence  of  the  rains,  and  the  difficulty  of  pushing  up 
Bupphes,  the  General  Officer  Commanding  Ist  Brigade  was 
given  discretionary  powers  to  withdraw  to  Eil  Dab  should  the 
difficulties  of  maintaining  himself  prove  insuperable.  These 
were  indeed  already  very  great,  all  supplies  being  short,  and, 
thongh  large  captures  of  stock  had  been  effected,  an  epidemic 
(probably  plenro-pneumonia)  had  attacked  the  sheep  and  goats, 
(8927J  K  3 


so  that  for  meat  rations  even  the  officers  had  to  rely  npon 
amela'  flesh  and  such  game  (very  little}  as  they  could  shoot. 
However,  by  utilizing  all  carriage— a  meaeure  which  rendered 
the  brigade  temporarily  immobile — the  troops  were  re-supplied, 
but  at  immense  cost  in  transport,  and  consequent  deterioration 
in  mobility. 

On  the  9th  April  the  mounted  troops  of  the  Las  Dureh 
column  and  the  Eil  Dab  movable  column  were  placed 
under  the  command  of  Kenna  (who  had  returned  from 
Berbcra),  and  directed  to  proceed  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
Bat  with  Las  Khorai  as  a  base.  The  strength  of  the  force  was 
IWO  mounted  troops,  500  infantry  and  150  Somali  irregularB, 
with  rations  up  to  and  for  the  2nd  May,  After  sending 
back  all  the  surplus  carriage  under  escort  to  Las  Dureh,  the 
Eil  Dab  Column  linked  up  with  the  mounted  troops  at  Baran 
on  the  19th  April,  and  halted  to  await  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments  and  supplies  from  Laa  Khorai.  At  this  time  tBe 
Mullah's  movements  were  imknown.  The  latest  authentic 
news  of  him  was  that  he  was  at  Bilbilo,  in  the  Italian  Pro- 
tectorate, a  watering  place  about  70  miles  south  and  by  east  of 
Bosaso  (Bandar  Kaaim),  from  which  point  he  was  known  to 
have  received  a  certain  amount  of  suppHes  (dates,  rice,  and 
tobes)  for  the  Haroun.  His  karias  were  scattered  about 
wherever  they  could  obtain  water  and  grazing.  Large 
numbers  had  deserted  him,  and  had  sought  refuge  with  the 
coast  tribes.  The  Ogadens,  Marehan  and  Mahmud  Gerad 
had  fallen  under  the  Mullah's  displeasure,  and,  after  killing 
munbers  of  them  and  looting  the  remainder  of  such  stock  as 
they  possessed,  he  had  turned  them  adrift  in  a  starving  and 
destitute  condition.  Many  of  these  had  surrendered  them- 
selves at  our  posts,  asking  for  safe  conduct  to  their  own  country 
and  demanding  food. 

It  was  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  Mullah's  army  was  no 
longer  formidable  from  mere  force  of  numbers,  while  its 
morale  as  a  fighting  body  had  been  utterly  destroyed  at 


Jidbali.  Informatioa  had  also  been  received  that,  under 
instructions  from  the  Italian  Government,  Osman  Mahmud 
and  the  Mij  jarteoa  were  taking  the  offensive  against  the  Mullah, 
and  a  letter  was  received  from  Osman  Mahmuil  to  aay  that  he 
would  attack  the  Dervishes  if  our  column  was  not  withdrawn ■ 
Rain  having  fallen  generally  enabled  the  Mullah  to  move  pretty 
well  where  he  chose,  and  it  seemed  probable  that  he  would 
either  move  into  the  Northern  Hand  and  remain  there  until  he 
saw  an  opportunity  of  getting  across  the  Nogal,  and  into  the 
Southern  Haud,  or  that  he  would  move  towards  lUig.  The 
instructions  to  Kenna  were  "  to  endeavour  by  every  means  to 
locate  the  position  of  the  Haroun,  and  having  done  so,  to  try 
and  surprise  it  by  long-diatance  marching  with  his  mounted 
troops." 

On  the  25th  April,  after  establishing  a  post  of  180  rifles  at 
Gharra,  Kenna  marched  to  Lojipahu  {9  miles  south-east  of 
Baran),  Here  some  scouting  parties  which  had  been  sent  out 
some  days  previously  were  met  with,  and  they  reported  that  a 
portion  of  the  Haroun  was  at  Biliyu,  some  28  miles  distant. 
This  was  reached  next  morning  at  dayhght  after  a  troublesome 
night  march,  owing  to  heavy  rain,  boggy  ground,  and  swollen 
watercourses.  Here  a  few  footmen  only  were  found,  who 
reported  that  considerable  numbers  of  the  enemy's  horses  and 
camels  had  moved  south-west  from  there  on  the  previous 
night ;  that  the  main  portion  of  the  Haroun  (and  presumably 
the  Mullah)  had  been  at  a  place  15  miles  W.S.W.  of  Baran, 
but  had  moved  south  on  the  2ith  or  possibly  earher.  After 
proceeding  some  10  miles  further  on  the  tracks  of  the  camels 
without  finding  any  of  the  enemy's  riflemen,  Kenna  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  on  a  false  trail,  and  turned 
off  to  Baran,  leaving  the  SomaU  irregulars  to  round  up  stock. 
On  the  27th  he  rejoined  the  Infantry  and  convoy  at  Biliyu. 
These  had  marched  46  miles  in  two  days,  over  very  bad  and 
heavy  ground. 

It  now  became  apparent  to  Kenna  that  the  state  of  his 
supplies  and  transport  would  not  admit  of  more  than  one  final 


effort,  with  mounted  ttoopa  only,  to  find  and  strike  the  enemy 
on  the  Northern  Haad.  There  was  no  certain  information  u 
to  tha  looaSity  of  the  Haroun,  or  even  of  the  direction  which  it 
had  gone,  but  prevailing  opinion  was  that  the  most  probable 
place  was  Kheman,  50  mOes  S.S.W.  of  Biliyu,  where  there  was 
said  to  be  abundance  of  water.  Should  there  prove  to  be 
water  there,  it  would  at  any  rate  enable  the  troops  to  push  on 
further,  even  if  no  enemy  were  discovered. 

Accordingly,  at  6.30  p.m.,  on  the  30th  April,  Kenna  started 
with  240  Mounted  Infantry,  40  irregulars,  and  160  Bikanir 
Camel  Corps,  arriving  at  Kheman  next  morning.  Hew 
there  were  a  few  stragglers  from  the  Haroun,  who  stated  that 
the  Mullah,  with  the  main  portion  of  the  Haroun,  had  kept  a 
more  easterly  course,  at  first  towards  Halin,  but  hearing  tb»' 
our  troops  were  still  there  he  had  turned  towards  Illig,  Tl*' 
water  holes  at  Kheman  were  all  dried  up,  though  there  we*^ 
signs  of  camels  having  watered  there  some  two  or  three  day 
previously. 

No  water  being  available,  and  no  certain  news  of  any  beinj 
found  nearer  than  HaKn,  there  was  nothing  for  Kenna  but  tf^ 
return  to  Biliyu,  which  he  reached  at  8  a.m.  on  the  2nd  May, 
the  troops  having  accomplished  100  nules  in  38  hours,  with  only 
one  gallon  of  water  per  man  and  none  for  animals.* 

In  the  meantime,  the  scouts  and  Tribal  Horse,  who  had 
been  sent  out  on  the  27th  April  to  round  up  stock,  had  sent  back 
on  the  28th  to  Biliyu  to  ask  for  assistance.  100  Mounted  In- 
fantry started  at  once  and  joined  them  at  dawn  on  the  29th  at 
EIHaga,  30  miles  west  of  Bihyu.  Only  a  few  of  the  enemy's 
spearmen  were  found,  and  some  800  camels  were  rounded  up. 
These  men  subsequently  turned  out  to  be  Waraangti  who 
had  been  out  with  the  Mullah,  but  not  wishing  to  follow  him 
southwards,  had  broken  away  with  the  intention  of  getting 
back  to  their  own  country.  Notwithstanding  their  having 
been  MuUah'a  men,  the  Warsangli  Sultan,  with   true  Somali 

*  It  should,  bowerer,  be  noted  tliat  Uiei'e  wua  pleuti/  of  greea  grailag. 


effrontery,  aubBequenfcly  put  in  a  claim  tor  the  800  camels, 
on  the  ground  of  their  being  tribal  property. 

On  arrival  at  Biliyu,  Eenna  received  orders  of  recall  and 
accordingly  started  on  the  3rd  for  Laa  Khorai,  which  place 
he  reached  on  the  11th  May  and  embarked  for  Berbera.  In 
the  meantime  the  2nd  Brigade  had  returned  to  Beibera, 
while  the  1st  Brigade,  after  evacuating  Halin  and  Dumodleh, 
reached  Burao  on  the  23rd  May.  With  the  return  of  Kenna's 
Column  active  operations  ceased,  and  the  e^iediticHL  of  1903-Oi 
came  to  an  end.* 

*  Extracts  from  Operation  OrderB : — 
Berbtra,  21th  AprS,  1904. 

132. — Diatribution  Order. — The  Ist  Brigade  are  eipectod  to  reaoh 
Ei]  Dab  about  the  8th  May. 

The  Headqamler?  and  all  available  details  of  the  King's  Afrioau 
Riflea  will  proceed  to  Boroo.  The  King's  African  Rifles  depat  irill  be 
moved  to  Bnroo  from  Garrero,  which  post  will  be  abandoned, 

133.— Morable   Column.— (o)  On   the   nrriyal    of  tho   lat   Brigade   at 
Eil  Dab  a  movable  column  will  be  formed  there. 
(6)  Commanding,  Major  P.  B.  Osbom,  D.a.O- 

Staff  Officer,  from  the  column. 
(c)  Troopi.— 

Nos.  4  and  6  Companies,  Somali  Mounted' 
Infantry 
^^^  300  rifles,  Ist  King's  AMoan  lUfles 

^^^L  2  gaaa.  King's  African  Rifles,  Mountain 

^^^^B  Battejy  in  charge  of  Ist  King's  African 


Detailed   by   Officer 
Commanding,    Ist 

3d    by  Officer  Coru- 


100   rifles  of   the  Eil  Dab  garrison,  detail) 
mending,  Lines  of  Communication. 

[tt)  The    Officer    Commanding,  Movable    Column, 

of  Communication  garrison  at  Eil  Dab  at  a  strongtli  of  50  rifles  and 
should  the  column  move  out,  these  will  be  relieved  at  once  by  60  rifles 
from  Wadamago." 

Berbtra,  2SiA  AprU,  IB04. 

134.— Embarkation  Order. — (o)  Lieut. -Colonel  P.  A.  Kenna,  V.C, 
D.S.O.,  will,  in  communication  with  the  General  Officer  Commanding.  2nd 
Brigade,  return  at  once  all  surplus  transport  to  Las  Khorai,  and  concentrate 
his  force  there  not  later  than  14th  May,  with  a  view  to  its  embarkation  for 
Berbera  acoompanied  by  the  Las  Khorai  garrison. 

{b)  The  General  Officer  Commanding,  2nd  Brigade,  will  arrange  for 
the  embarkation  of  hia  force  with  all  surplus  transport  and  withdraw  it  to 
Berbera.  leaving  La-t  Khorai  before  the  arrival  of  Lieut. -Colonel  Kenna'a 


'eriuluktion 
f  utlra 
pcmtion*. 


Sir  Charles  Egeiton,  telegraphing  on  the  9th  April,  Iiad 
informed  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  that  he  could  not 
tnfuntatn  Manning  In  the  Eastern  Nogal  beyond  the  end  of 
April.  This  was  due  to  the  weaknass  and  the  broken  dovn 
state  of  the  transport,  and  owing  to  the  fact  that,  after  tie 
beginning  of  the  rains,  the  country  would  become  very  difficult 
for  camel  transport. 

On  the  12th  April  he  further  telegraphed  to  the  Secretarj 
of  State  as  follows  : — 

"  Reports  from  both  Fasken  and  Manning  as  to  the  state  ot 
both  troops  and  transport  confirm  me  in  my  opinion  th»* 
further   operations   at  this   season   are   impossible.     If  tU^ 
rain  sets  in  in  the  Nogal  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  ther*' 
will  become  an  impossibility  on  account  of  the  deep  nature  c^-^ 
the  soil,  as  also  will  be  the  supplying  of  them  in  the  presen 
advanced  position.     The  conditions  attached  to  the  tardy^ 
consent    of    the   Italian   Government  to   operations    being^ 
conducted  in  their  territory  could  not  be  complied  with    j 
without  active  co-operation  of    the  Mijjarten,  which  to  be 
cfTective  should  have  been  undertaken  sooner,   some  three 
weeks  ago. 

"  Under  the  circumstances  I  strongly  urge  withdrawal  of 
the  troops  from  the  advanced  position.  The  Mullah  haa  been 
outmanoeuvred  and  forced  north.  His  military  power  was 
broken  by  the  decisive  defeat  at  Jidbali.  Subsequent 
operations  in  the  Nogal  and  pursuit  in  the  Northern  Hand 
have  completed  bis  rout,  driven  bim  out  of  the  Protectorate, 
and  dispersed  his  followers.  The  Dolbahantas  are  scattered 
and  are  at  present  without  proper  and  tribal  organization 
and  are,  to  a  large  extent,  disorganised  refugees  among  the 
Protectorate  tribes The  Mullah,  with  practi- 
cally only  his  Ali  Gheri  following,  is  a  discredited  refugee  in  the 
Mijiarten  territory,  at  the  mercy  of  Osman  Mahmud.  His 
actual  capture  by  the  field  force  is,  under  present  conditions, 
in  my  opinion  impracticable 

"  It  is  under  these  conditions  that  I  advocate  the  cessation 


^^ 


of  operations,  the  reduction  of  the  field  force,  and  the  early 
relief  of  the  units  required  for  the  support  of  the  civil  admiiua- 
tratioQ,  to  enable  it  to  take  advantage  of  this  present  lavourable 

state  of  aSairs." 

In  reply  to  this  telegram  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
telegraphed  on  the  I5th  April  that  he  concurred  in  the  views  of 
Gieneral  Egerton  as  expressed  in  his  telegram  of  the  12th,  but 
*'  the  operations  already  ordered  for  the  capture  of  Illig  and 
dealing  a  last  blow  at  the  Mullah  are  to  be  carried  out." 

Throughout  the  second  phase  of  the  operationa,  the  reports  Eipeditioi 
of  prisoners  and  others  were  moat  consistent  iu  pointing  out '"  '*' 
Illig  as  the  Mullah's  first  objective  should  he  be  driven  from 
the  north  of  the  Northern  Hand,  He  was  known  to  have  left  a 
garrison  of  some  200  riflemen  and  500  spearmen  there,  and  to 
have  fortified  it  against  attack  by  land  or  sea.  It  was  beyond 
striking  distance  from  the  Nogal  Plain,  from  which  it  is  sepa- 
rated by  very  difficult  country,  and  by  a  belt  of  dense  waterless 
bush,  extending  from  Kallis  almost  to  the  coast.  It  formed, 
therefore,  a  safe  and  convenient  rallying  point  for  the  Mullah 
and  his  people,  and  for  this  reason  General  Egerton  had  more 
than  once  urged  its  destruction  by  a  mixed  naval  and  military 
landing  party  covered  by  war  ships.  On  the  3Ist  March 
General  Egerton  having  again  pointed  out  that  he  considered 
Illig  should  be  definitely  denied  to  the  Mullah,  the  consent  of 
the  Italian  Government  was  finally  obtained,  and  a  combined 
naval  and  military  operation  was  decided  upon  for  the  capture 
of  the  village,  an  account  of  which  is  given  in  Chapter  VII. 

Though  the  capture  of  the  Mullah  or  his  surrender  was  not 
achieved,  the  great  and  continued  exertions  demanded  from, 
and  moat  cheerfully  undergone  by  all  the  troops — British, 
Indian,  and  African— formed  a  striking  feature  of  the 
operationa- 


CHAPTER  VII. 

NAVAL    AND    COMBINED    NAVAL    AND    MILITARY 

OPERATIONS, 
Blockade  of  thb  Coast.— Eeconnalssance  op  Iluq  and 

Obbu.— Naval  Operations. — Captoee  of  Iluq. 
A  HiSTOHY  of  the  campaigns  in  Somaliland  would  be  incom- 
plete  without  mention  being  made  of  the  asBistance  which  was 
afforded  by  the  Navy. 

During  the  first  and  second  expeditions  naval  co-operation 
in  connection  with  the  mihtary  operations  was  mainly  con- 
fined to  the  presence  of  one  of  His  Majesty's  ships,  which  was 
stationed  oft  Berbera  for  the  protection  of  that  town  and  lor 
occasionally  visiting  the  ports  along  the  Protectorate  coast. 
In  the  early  part  of  1902,  Lieut. -Colonel  Swayne  represented 
to  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  Mullah  was  receiving  consider- 
able augmentation  of  strength  from  the  supply  of  arms  and 
anmaunition  through  the  coast  ports  east  of  Berbera.  Con- 
sequently, steps  were  taken  by  the  Admiralty  to  exercise 
control  at  British  ports  over  the  movements  of  local  craft  by 
occasional  patrols, while  the  Italian  Government  were  requested 
to  do  the  same  along  the  coast  of  the  Italian  protectorate. 
4  L^  These  measurtis  were  carried  into  effect  by  H.M.S. "  Cossack  " 
\A£iinJi*y^  ft  and  the  Italian  ship  "  Govemolo "  respectively,  between 
*M**y-ij.    '    Bandar  Kasim  and  Kas    Alula.     The    Commander  of    the 

f"  Cossack"  reported  that  arms  could  easily  be  landed  from 
dhows   between    Karam  and  Cape  Gardafui,  a  distance  ol 
some  350  miles,  and  suggested  that  more  effective  measures 
should  be  adopted. 
Blookade  of  In   April,   1902,   instructions   were  issued  to   the  naval 

commanders    to  take  such  pohce  and   punitive   action  ia 


267 


co-operation  with  the  Italian  authorities  as  they  nught 
oousider  Qeceasary  to  prevent  the  impoitatiou  of  mimitioiia 
of  war  to  the  Mullah.  In  compliance  with  these  orders, 
H.U.S.  "  Perseus "  and  "  Cossack,"  assisted  by  the 
"  Govemolo  "  estabhahed  a  blockade  of  the  coast,  with  aview 
to  searching  and  capturing  any  dhows  which  might  be 
trafficking  in  arms  on  behalf  of  the  enemy.  In  one  of  these 
expeditions  an  important  capture  was  made,  of  which  the 
following  account  is  given  by  Commander  E  K.  Pears, 
H.M.S.  "  Perseus  "  :— 

Commander  Pairs  io  Rfnr-Admiral  Boaanqiiel, 

"  Peraeua,"  at  Berbera, 
Sit,  5th  June,  1902. 

In  cantiauatioQ  of  my  general  letter  of  tke  ^^ad  Maj  laat,  I  have  the 
oonotir  to  report  that  I  left  Berbera  at  G  F.u.  on  the  2Tth  May,  first  em- 
harkmg,  at  Captain  Cordeaux'a  lequeat,  the  Sultan  of  Laa  Khorai  and  hia 
suite,  and  proceeded  to  Hais,  where,  next  morning,  I  met  Lienteoant 
liudeaj'B  dhow,  which  had  completed  its  cruise  to  the  eastirard  and  had 
returned  to  Hais  to  meet  me  i  all  dhowa  met  with  had  boon  boarded,  but 
no  caiue  was  found  to  detain  any  of  them. 

2.  Taking  the  crow,  gun  and  Btores  of  this  dbow  on  board  the  ship,  I 
left  her  at  Haia  in  charge  of  her  oativo  crew  and  proceeded  eastward,  meeting 
Ijeutenant  Bevan'a  dhow  which  had  also  complete  its  cruise  without 
results,  near  Bandar  Hashau.  1  removed  the  crew,  gun  and  stores  from 
this  dhow  also,  and  ordered  her  native  master  to  take  her  to  Haia  and  await 
my  arrival  there. 

3.  I  thi'D  proceeded  to  Las  Khorai,  arriving  at  7  P.U.,  and  there 
diaem-barked  the  Sultan  and  hia  attendants.  The  Sultan  having  made  hix 
Bubmisaion  at  Berbera  to  the  Conaul-GcQural,  the  blockade  of  the  Waraangli 
porta  haa  now  ceased-  It  is  iatetestiog  to  note  the  success  of  this  measure, 
which  brought  the  Sultan  to  hia  knees  far  more  eEFttctively  than  any  bom- 
bardments could  have  donii.  He  returned  to  his  territory  on  excellent 
t«rmB  with  thu  Uonsul- General,  and  it  ia  quite  posalble  that  before  long  he 
will  request  that  a  customs  station  may  ha  established  at  Laa  Khorai. 

4.  I  left  LasKhocaiat  9  P.M.  on  the  28th,  and  returned  to  Haia,  where  I 
arrived  nest  morning,  meeting  there  the  two  hired  dhows.  The  ahip 
having  now  cruised  thcee  times  each  way  along  the  coast,  and  the  two 
armed  dhowa  having  cniiaed  independently  for  nearly  a  fortnight,  every 
dhow  mat  with  being  searched  in  vain,  I  am  convinced  that  for  a  time  at 
leaat  the  traffia  in'arms  baa  ceased  as  far  as  the  British  Somali  coast  is 
ooncarned ;  a  wholeaoma  fear  seema  to  have  been  established  locally, 
though  I  have  infurmaUon  that  Arabs  at  Jibuti  are  still  aa  ansiuua  to  supply 

a  the  Mullah  is  to  obtain  thaui. 


S.  I  therefore  determined,  ptsadiog  ray  retuni  to  Berbera  »□  the  7th  June 
(in  uoordanoe  with  Colonel  Swavae'i  verbal  reqaest  that  I  should  be  at 
that  port  from  the  Tth  lo  the  I4th  June  to  protect  the  tora  from  any 
ooiiQler- attack  by  the  UuUab),  to  diBraJM  one  of  the  hired  dhowa  and  try 
the  effect  of  a  cruise  on  the  Arabian  coast  with  the  other  oae.  I  thought 
it  advisable  to  communicate  first  with  the  Political  ReBidont  'at  Aden,  and 
also  to  ageertain  news  of  the  eipocted  Italian  mao-of-wat  "  Galileo." 

0.  I  accordingly  loft  Hais  at  8  A.U.  on  the  20th  May,  with  the  larger 
hired  dhow  in  tow,  and  pro[«eded  to  Aden,  where  I  arrived  at  4.30  4.H.  oa 
the  30th.  I  communicatod  wit)i  the  Resident,  who  concurred  in  my  pro- 
{■osed  programme,  and  with  the  ItaUan  Coiisul*Qeneral  who  informed  me 
that  the  "  Qalilec  "  hod  been  detained  owing  t«  an  infectious  disease  on 
board,  and  would  probably  not  anive  before  the  4th  June,  This  delay  is 
unfortunate,  for  Colonel  Swayne  is  counting  upon  the  "  Galileo  "  to  convey 
iSuttau  Yueuf  Ah  to  the  east  coast  in  time  to  co-operate  with  him  against 
the  Mullah,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  Sultan  will  now  be  too  late. 

7.  At  7  P.M.  on  the  30th  May  I  left  Aden  with  the  armed  dhow  and 
proceeded  along  the  Arabian  coast  to  the  westward.  Off  Haura,  at  6  p.m. 
on  the  31st  May,  I  dropped  the  dhow,  with  Lieutenant  Beran  in  oommand, 
with  orders  to  proceed  to  Haura  and  Irka,  and  thence  eastward  along  the 
coast  to  Shukra,  searching  all  dhows  met  with.  I  then  proceeded  in  the 
ship  to  Ash  Sheyt  (Shahar),  arriving  there  at  8  a.m.  on  the  ist  June  and 
searching  all  dhows  there  ;  thenoe  proceeding  to  Hokalla,  where  T  anchored 
at  1.30  P.M,  the  same  day.  All  dhowa  here  were  searched,  and  I  delivered 
to  the  Medical  OtSt^r  o(  the  town  [a  native  of  India)  some  disinfectants 
sent  by  the  Resident  at  Aden  on  account  ot  the  recent  outbreak  of  pb^ic 
in  this  place ;  he  informed  me,  however,  that  it  is  now  free  of  the  disease. 

8.  Leaving  Makalla  at  4.30  p.m.,  I  proceeded  to  Balahaf,  where  I  arrived 
at  C  A.u.  on  Monday  the  2nd  June,  and  found  no  dhows ;  thenoe  along  the 
coast  to  the  westward  to  meet  Lieutenant  Sevan's  dhow.  She  was  sighted 
at  4  P.M.  with  another  dhow  in  tow,  which  she  had  captured.  The  sea 
was  too  heavy  to  allow  the  dhows  to  coma  alongside,  so  I  took  them  in  tow, 
while  Lieutenant  Bevan  came  on  board  to  report  the  oircorastanCBfl.  The 
captured  dhow,  which  was  bound  from  Jibuti  to  Bir  Ali — a  small  harbour 
near  Balahaf— was  found  to  be  carrying  ; — 

03  rifles  (Graa  and  Martini-Henry). 
8,325  rounds  of  rifle  ammtinition. 

2G  rounds  of  Wincho6l«r  ammunition. 
2S  rounds  of  pistol  ammimition. 
20  casks  (about  1  cwt.  each)  of  sulphm'. 
A  number  of  pigs  of  lead.  _ 

9.  A  copy  of  Lieutenant  Sevan's  report  of  the  capture  is  attaohed.  I 
regret  the  loss  of  life,  hot  it  seems  to  have  been  unavoidable  in  order  to  prevent 
the  dhow  from  escaping,  and  Lieutenant  Bevan  appears  to  have  acted  with 
forbearance  and  judgment,  I  beg  to  bring  to  your  favourable  notice  the 
Bervicea  o£  this  officer,  who  has  carried  out  with  mifls^ging  zeal  |and  energy 


i 


an  armed  dhow,  and  who  uaptured  alao  the  suspicious  dhow 
ia  Somali  coast  reported  in  my  last  letter. 

I.  I  had  intended  to  go  on  to  Sliiikra,  but  being  hampered  by  the  two 
n  low,  a  strong  south-westerly  breeze  and  considerable  sea,  I  decided 
d  direct  to  Aden,  where  I  arrived  in  the  outer  anchorage  at  7.30  p.m. 
A  3rd  June. 
ft,  Oa  the  morning  at  the  4th  I  proceeded  into  the  inner  harbour  and 
ir  the  dhow  and  stores  and  the  two  wounded  men  (who  had  been 
IT  the  doctor's  care)  to  the  proper  autboritioB.  I  had  ordered  coal  to  bo 
alongside  early  the  neit  morning;,  but,  on  receiving  a  letter,  dated  the 
30th  May,  (com  Captain  Cordeaui,  urgently  requesting  me  to  go  over  at- 
■oon  as  possible  to  Berbera  For  the  protection  of  that  town,  I  completed  with 
GO&I  at  once  and  left  Aden  at  S  p.m.,  arriving  at  Berbers  at  1 1  A.u,  on  the  5th. 
I  12.  I  found  all  quiet  at  Berbera,  No  news  had  been  received  from 
Colonel  Bwayne  since  the  29th  May,  when  Captain  Cordeaux  heard  that  he 
and  the  whole  corps  left  Burao  on  the  Siith,  the  MuUah  with  7,000  horse 
and  7,000  foot  and  1,600  rifles  then  being  at  Baran,  120  miles  south-west  of 
Burao.  Colonel  Swayne  added  (hat  the  Mnllah  might  mid  north  to  Berbera, 
a  movement  that  he  would  be  unable  to  prevent.  Berbera  being  now 
absolutely  denuded  of  troops,  and  the  Muilah  being  liJtoly,  if  he  intended  to 
attack  the  place  at  ail,  to  attack  before  Colonel  Swayne  could  get  up  U>  hhn, 
Captain  Corduaux  had  requested  the  presence  of  the  ship. 

It  is  very  unhkely  that  the  Mullah  will  attack  Berbera  while  a  man-of-war 
is  iiero,  one  of  his  chief  advisers  being  an  ex-naval  interpreter.  Sinee 
writing  to  me,  Captain  Cordeaux  has  received  500  rifles  from  Aden,  and 
intends  organizing  a  native  militia,  whit^h  should  be  capable  of  defending 
the  place  unaaeisted.  I  propose  to  remain  here  until  the  IGth  instant,  by 
which  time  I  hope  the  situation  will  be  clearer. 

13.  lam  sending  directions  to  the  Commanding  Officer,  H.M.S.  "  Dryad  " 
(on  h:tT  arrival)  to  cruise  along  the  Arabian  coast  and  search  all  dhows, 
after  conferring  with  the  Reaident  as  to  which  ports  to  visit.  With  reference 
to  jour  telegram  of  the  3rd  June,  which  I  answered  by  telegraph  on  the 
4  th  June,  I  do  not  think  another  ship  is  requited  for  this  service,  as  pracUoally 
all  local  traffic  east  of  Aden  ceasea  soon  after  the  soiitb-west  monsoon  com- 
uiesces,  and  I  find  many  dhows  already  preparing  to  haul  up.  But  our 
CBpture  of  a  dhow  with  arms  on  the  2nd  June  shows  that  the  traffic  is  not 
over  yet,  and  the  "  Dryad's  "  presence  on  the  Arabian  coast,  tor  a  few  weeks 
at  least,  is  desirable. 

=.  The  health  of  the  ship's  company  is  rccy  good. 

I  havD,  &o. 
(Signed)  E.   R.   PEABfi, 

CotmnandeT  and  Senior  Navid  Offica;  Aden  Divifion. 

Lieutenant  Bevan  to  CommandeT  Peart. 

"  Perseus,"  3rd  June,  1Q02. 
fun  the  hraioiir  to  report  that  at  I  f.u.  oa  Monday  the  2nd  June, 
fc  omfsbig  in  the  armed  dhow  undpr  my  command  off  Ras  Aulaki 


^^^H  (Arabian  coast),  a  dhow  wa.s  Bight(<d  about  1|  milea  fium  tLe  sbore.    When 

^^^H  I  got  withm  about  200  yards  from  hor,  I  hailed  and  ordered  her  to  tovet  bet 

^^^1  sail,  at  the  sama  time  hoUtiug  the  white  ensign ;    be  immediately  altered 

^^^1  course  for  the  ebare,  aad  I  then  Bred  a  blank  charge,  and  he  at  once  retutDcd 

^^^1  tbe  fire  witb  rifles,  at  least  three  men  firing,  and  some  ot  the  bullets  hit  the 

^^^H  dbonr.    After  another  blank  charge  bad  been  fired  with  no  result,  I  gave 

^^^H  the  order  to  fire  shell  from  tbe  3-pr.,  endeavouring  to  bring  down  his  mast ; 

^^^H  but,  aa  she  still  continued  firing,  I  gave  the  order  to  Sre  at  her.     After  firing 

^^^H  a  few  ahats  her  sail  came  down.     I  then  ordered  cease  firing  ajid  ran  along- 

^^^1  side  of  her,  when  one  of  her  orew  again  fired  at  one  of  my  men. 
^^^H  We  found  her  loaded  with  arms,  ammunition  and  barrels  of  sulphur. 

^^^1  I  regret  to  say  two  oF  her  crow  wore  killed  by  3-pr.  shell  and  two  wounded 

^^H  by  our  dfie  fire  ;  these  were  tbe  only  men  in  the  dhow  at  the  time  ol  capture, 

^^^H  but  Charles  Alderton  states  that  he  saw  some  men  j  ump  overboard  after  her 

^^^1  nail  came  down.     I  attended  to  the  wounded  men,  transhipped  her  cargo, 

^^^1  and  took  her  in  tow  ;    lay  native  crew  buried  the  dead  men   at  sea.    At 

^^^H  4.20  p.u.  we  sighted  H.M.S.  "  Perseus,"  who  took  both  dhows  in  tow,  the 

^^^H  two  wounded  men  were  taken  on  board  and  attended  to  by  the  Staff  Surgeon- 
^^^H  All  the  bluejackets  worked  hard  and  well,  and  I  would  specially  mention 

^^H  Wright   HaUtead,   Petty   Officer,    1st  Class ;     Charles   Alderton,   leading 

^^^H  seaman  ;  and  James  Bnssell,  A.B.,  who  manned  the  3-pr.  and  were  expoied 

^^H  to  the  enemy's  fire. 

^^^^^  I  have,  Ac. 

^^H  tSigned)  GEORGE   HOPE   BEVAN. 

Ber^nnais-  1"  October,  1002,  the  villages  of  Dlig  and  Obbia  were 

"1"^.".^-^"'^  reconnoitreii  by  H.M.S.   "Pomone,"  witli  a.  view  to  ascer- 
Bud  Obbift.  ■' 

taining  the  capabihties  of  thoee  places  as  a  base  for  military 

operations. 

l)L.i,».i,siru-  During  November,   1903,  H.M.S.   "Perseus,"   "Merlin" 

■  '  and  "Porpoise,"  accompanied  by  the  Italian  ship  "Galileo," 

carried  out  a  demonstration  at  Obbia  in  order  to  co-operate 
with  the  land  forces  under  General  Egerton  by  maintmning 
the  idea  that  operations  were  also  projected  from  the  coast. 
Xaval  openi-         The  following  extracts  from  official  despatches  give  an 
interesting  account  of  the  naval  operations  which  were  con- 

L ducted  during  this  period  under  the  direction  o!  the  Naval 


*  The  disembarkation  at  Obbia  during  January,   1903,   under    naval 
rangements  is  described  in  Chapter  XIV,  4. 


^  ' 


Commawitr  6'ijiiHi  to  Kear-Aittntrai  Alhnum-Willef. 
"  Mohawk,"  »»  Aden, 
\    (Telegtaphic.)  Tth  December,  1903. 

On  amval  at    Bandar    Kasim  on  5th  December,  learned  mordcr  (of) 
Liontenant  Carlo  Oraban,  Italian  Navy,  at  Durbo.     Ptocoedod  thither. 

Id  the  sbBmce  of  Italian  man-of-war,  landed  70  men  with  anna  and 
demanded  satisfaction  (on)  behalf  (of)  Italian  GoFeroment. 

Being  unauccessfid,  bombarded,  attacked,  and  partially  burnt  village, 
tilling  approximately  20  natives. 

Caanalties :     Commander    dangerously    woimded,    one   marine    killed. 
Admiralty  have  been  informed. 


Rfor-Admirai  Alkinton-Willes  to  Commander  Pear), 
(Telegraphic.)  11th  December,  lOOa. 

Investigate  and  report  fully  by  telegraph  all  ciroumstonaes  connected 
with  death  oE  Italian  officers  at  Durbo  ajid  subsequent  attack  on  tliis  place 
by  "  Mohawk." 


Commander  Pears  to  Rear-Admi-al  Atkineon-WiUes. 
(Telegraphic.)  Aden,  Uth  December,  1903. 

With  reference  to  your  telegram  No.  29,  following  information  has  been 
obtained  from  Commander  Gaunt  in  hospital : — 

No  man-of-war  here  when  "  Mohawt"  arrived,  bat  understand  official 
report  has  been  forwarded- 

Italian  Lieutenant  at  Dvirbo,  3rd  December,  in  armed  dhow,  ordered 
cativee  to  hoist  flag  (obstructions  removed) ;  refused;  opened  fire  on  tbem. 

Natives  returned  heavy  fire  on  dhow  leaving.  Lieutenant  was  killed  and 
four  men  wounded. 

"Mohawk"  called  at  Bandar  Kaaim  for  news  on  the  lith  Deoeiuber, 
Hearing  above  report,  and  having  communicated  vith  Kultan  and  warrnnt 
ofBcer  oE  dhow,  who  acquiesced,  and  having  embarked  one  of  the  crew  of 
armed  dhow,  with  Italian  flag,  proceeded  with  despatch  to  Durbo,  arriving 
2  4.M.,  6th  December. 

Landing  party  landed  at  dawn.  Commander  Gaunt  iotervi6w[ed]  four 
Chiefs  and  demanded  100  rifles  and  two  Chiefs  should  be  dealt  with  by 
Italians,  and  threatened  in  case  of  refusal  to  burn  village. 

Preparations  had   been   made  for   lighting,   and   Chiefs    refused  any 


After  one  warning  shot,  six  Q.F.  3-pr.  ehelU  were  lired  into  village  and 
landing  party  advanoed.  Natives  fired  on  tne  landing  party  but  were 
driven  oS  with  considerable  loss. 

Commander  Gaunt  was  dangerously  hurt  io  the  Qiigh,  and  Private 
Stanton,  Boyal  Marine  Light  Itifantry,~{dlled  early. 

Village  waa  then  [t  burned]  and  landing  parties  re.embarked,  and 
"  Uobawk"  procaeded  to  Aden. 


CommandtT  Ttn\ 


0  Rcar-Adntirai  AtkinMn-WiUe.1. 


"  Perseus, "  at  Ad^i, 
Sir,  13th  December,  1903. 

In  continuation  of  my  gancrft!  letter,  dated  the  28tli  NoTeraber,  1903,  1 
hnve  tho  banonr  to  report  that  I  left  Bfind&r  Alula  on  the  2Sth.  November, 
at  3  F.n.  (the  "  Porpoise"  leaving  shortly  afteriFarda  for  Aden),  and  pro- 
L-Dodod  to  Bos  HaCua,  South  Bay,  where  I  anivod  at  7  AM.  on  the  29tU, 
finding  there  the  Italian  cruiser  "  Oidtleo." 

'2.  The  Captain  of  the  "  Galileo  "  came  on  iioard  and  informed  me  that 
he  had  been  obligeid  to  raise  steam  at  Obbia  on  accooat  o[  tbe  bad  weivtber, 
nod  that,  being  short  of  ooal  as  well  aa  provisions  (with  lome  of  which  ho 
had  been  anpplied  by  the  "  Porpoise"),  he  was  compelled  to  proceed  to  sea 
and  return  to  Aden. 

3.  As  for  the  anme  reason  ho  was  miable  to  return  to  Obbia,  and  as  I  felt 
sure,  though  I  had  no  direct  iostriictions  on  the  anbject,  that  General 
Kgarton  desired  that  Ali  Yuaiif  should  havo  the  230  Italian  rifles  for  tlio 
defence  of  Oftlkayu  without  delay,"  I  asked  the  Captain  of  the  "  Galileo" 
to  let  me  take  one  of  his  officers  to  Obbia  to  act  as  Itahan  Gepceeentattva 
and  see  to  tho  issue  of  the  rifles.  This  he  agreed  to  do  (coirespondencc 
on  tho  subJRct  is  attached), t  and,  after  receiving  Sub -Lieutenant  Ferrari 
on  board,  I  sailed  at  11  a.m.  for  Obbia,  where  I  arrived  at  5.30  a.m.  on  the 
1st  December,  tinding  there  H.M.S.  "  &lerlin." 

4.  I  lauded  at  6.30  a.m.,  with  Signer  Ferrari  and  lieutenant  Evans,  R.E., 
tbe  Military  Intelligence  Offlcer  (whom  I  received  on  board  this  ship  on 
arrival),  and  called  on  the  Sultan  Ali  Yuauf.  Thelatl<?r  immediately  agreed  to 
accept  the  250  rifles  on  the  condition  of  occupying  and  defending  tho  GEdkayu 
Wells,  and  promised  to  send  a  force  there  at  once.  The  rifles  and  ammunition 
were  landed  the  next  day,  and  on  the  3rd  December  a  force  of  320  rifles 
(tho  Sultan  having  added  70  of  his  own)  started  from  Obbia  tor  Galkayii, 
the  Sultan  sending  word  also  to  Hurrounding  tribes  to  join  this  force,  the 
command  of  which  was  entrusted  to  Ism  an  Shannarkar,  the  Sultan's 

fl.  On  the  8th  instant,  messengers  arrived  from  Isman  Shannarkar,  who 
hail  reached  the  Mudug  district,  saying  that  large  numbers  of  tho  Mullah's 
lloeks  had  arrived  at  tho  Mudug  Wells  and  were  accompanied  by  an  armed 
cKcort.  His  owik  force  had  now  increased  to  170  riflcfl  and  1,000  spearmen, 
and  ho  was  going  to  attack  the  enemy  at  once,  and  occupy,  if  possible,  tho 
Galkayu  Wellf . 

0.  Tho  arrival  of  tha  Mullah's  flocks  at  Mudug  indicated  with  so 
certainty  an  early  move  of  the  Mullah  himself  in.  that  direction ;  eo  (after 
waiting  a  day  for  the  "  Mohawk,"  nhich  I  expected  at  Obbia  on  the  8th) 
I  sailed  on  the  9th  foe  Berbera,  to  inform  the  General  OfRcet  Commanding, 
Somaliland,  leaving  the  "  Merlin  "  at  Obbia. 


•  See  page  Z23. 1    fJSoi  jrinted. 


7-  Having  been  ossutmI,  boUi  at  Rns  Uafim  and  Liy  Ali  Yusuf  at  Ubbia 
Uie,t  Illig  had  been  abandoned  by  the  Mullah,  I  decided  to  call  there  on  my 
way  and  maJte  certidn  of  the  facts,  if  possible.  Ali  Yusuf,  at  my  request, 
had,  an  the  'ind  December,  sent  meBsengers  to  Uli^  tu  tell  the  people  there. 
if  friendly,  to  hoist  a  white  cloth  and  send  a,  aurf  boat  out  on  the  approach 
of  a  BritiEb  or  Italian  maD-of-war.  On  my  arrival  at  Illig  on  the  10th, 
however,  these  things  were  not  done ;  an  the  oontj'ary,  considerable  niimbera 
of  riflemen  were  seen  to  be  taking  up  positiana  behind  the  rock«  on  each  side 
of  the  beach,  with  the  evident  intention  of  resisting  any  attempts  to  land 
a  party.  This  action,  and  the  large  niunher  of  armed  m.en  seen  in  lUig 
(the  iKinual  population  of  which  consiata  of  30  to  40  families  engaged  in 
fishing),  convinced  mo  that  the  place  is  still  held  by  the  Mullah.  A  large 
stone  xartba,  at  least  200  yards  in  length  and  6  feet  in  height,  sunuouuta  the 
cMa.  It  is  viable  from  the  aca  and  shell  conU  bo  thrown  into  it  by  ahije ; 
but  the  only  effective  way  to  eotnpcl  the  enemy  to  evacuate  the  place  would 
be  to  leave  a,  blockading  ship  at  the  anchorage,  thus  defeating  the  object 
of  the  enemy  in  holding  the  place,  i.e.,  to  obtain  supplies  and  Hjumuoition 
by  aea.  Landing  at  Illig  by  ships'  boats  is  at  present  out  of  the  question, 
owing  to  the  heavy  sea  now  prevailing. 

8.  llaviug  reconnoitred  Ulig,  where  I  did  not  anchor,  I  proceeded  on 
my  way  to  Berbera.  Oil  Gardafoi,  on  the  1 1th  instnnt,  I  met  H.M.S. 
"  Mohawk  "  nnder  the  command  of  her  First  Lieutenant,  who  come  on  board 
and  informed  mo  of  the  cause  of  the  delay  in  her  arrival  at  Obbia,  viz., 
the  action  taken  at  Durbo  in  consequence  of  the  murder  of  the  Italian  officer 
oonunanding  the  armed  dhows,  and  the  woundmg  of  Commander  Gaunt, 
necessitating  the  "  Mohawk's"  return  to  Aden.  I  ordered  the  "  Mohawk" 
to  proceed  to  Obbia  and  await  rehef  there,  to  enable  the  "  Merlin  "  to  bring 
any  further  news  up  to  Berbera  without  delay  if  neecasury.  "  Mohawk's" 
letter  of  proceedings  is  attached, 

S.  Carrying  out  a  quarterly  passage  trial  between  Gardaf  ui  ant)  Berbers, 
I  arrived  at  the  latter  place  at  lOp.u.  on  the  12th,  and  telegraphed  a  summary 
of  news  to  the  General  Officer  Commaading,  to  whom  I  also  forwarded  a 
letter  practically  identical  with  paragraphs  1  to  7  above.     I  left  Berbera 

111.15  F.H.,  and  arrived  at  Aden  at  '2  P.M.  on  the  IStb,  finding  here 
i£.  "Pomone"  and  the  Italian  cruisers  "  Voltumo"  and  "  lAimbardia." 
K  I  have,  S;c. 

I  (Signed)  E.  R.  PEARS, 

K  Commander  and  Senior  Nufol  Officer,  Aden  Divieion. 


SaUiiig  Orders. 


(Memo.) 

Having  can'ied  out  your  pros 
traffic  on  the  SomoU  cOiL^t,  you  i 
than  the  30(h  instant. 
(8927) 


,t  Las  Khorai, 


SIst  NovcmLer,  1903. 
nt  cruise  for  the  prevention  of  the  nmis 
■e  to  proceed  to  Aden,  arriving  not  later 


374 

'2.  On  Ihu  arrival  at  Adcii  af  HiM.S.  "  P(ir|N>ige."  you  trill  traaaCor  the 
iluttua  and  MuTMpondenoe  relating  la  the  omiEt  ttaffio  to  Commajider 
llutliom,  and  after  receiving  as  much  coal  as  yoM  con  carry  with  safety,  you 
•re  lo  leave  Aden  c»i  the  3rd  December  luid  proceed  to  Raa  Hafun  (South 
Lay),  wh*tp  I  iUall  nieet  yoo  on  the  6th  l>ecBmbM. 

'.I.  I  have  informed  the  General  OiBcm  Commanding  the  Somaliland 
Field  Force  of  your  proposed  moveraents.  and  re<|ueated  him  to  send  to  mo 
by  you  hia  latest  wishes  as  to  the  oo-oporation  of  His  Majeaty'H  ahipa  in  his 
plans.  ¥(ni  should,  therefore,  not  leave  Adeii  until  after  the  arrfval  of  the 
B.LM.  steamer  from  Berbers,  due  at  Aden  the  3rd  December.  Should  no 
oomuimication  from  the  Ocnoral  OfRoec  Commanding  reach  you  by  her, 
you  are  to  frooeed  to  sea  without  wwting  further. 

4,  You  are  to  bring  the  Rua  Hufnn  mailfl  for  "  Perseus"  and  "  Merlin." 

fi.  letters  of  proceedings  nre  to  lie  forwarded  to  me. 

(Utgncd)  E.  B.  FEARS, 

Voimimndfr  and  Haaor  Naval  O^err.  Airn  Divmoa. 
Coiiiiiinndec  Ernest  F.  A.  IJaiiut,  C.M.tl., 
H,M.S.  '■  Mohuwk." 


Alternlinii  to  Sailing  Orders. 

'■  Persons,"  at  8ea, 
(Mcn.o.)  •nth  November,  1903. 

With  rcforoDfo  to  your  sailing  orders  dat<>d  the  2ist  November,  1903,  the 
General  Officer  Commanding  Somaliland  Field  Force  having  requested  that 
the  concentration  at  Shg  may  be  deferred  and  the  demonstration  at  Obbiit  ' 
onntinued,  I  shall  not  meet  you  at  Ras  Hafun  as  liefore  arranged  but  remain 
it  Obhia,  to  which  place  yon  are  to  proceed  on  your  deportore  from  Aden 
on  the  3rd  December. 

You  should  arrange,  however,  to  call  at  Rbb  Hafun  ou  your  way,  and 
obtain  there  any  information  aa  to  the  Mullah's  movemcnls  nnd  action  of 
the  neighbouring  tribes,  and  ascertain,  if  possible,  the  cxisling  state  of 
aftairs  at  JUig. 

(Signed)  E.  R.  PEARS, 

Commander  and  Senior  Naval  Officer,  Aden  Division. 
Commander  Ecaeet  F.  A.  Gaunt,  C.M.Ci., 
H.M.S.  "  Mohawk." 


dl  to  Commattder  Pears. 

"  Mobawk,"  at  Aden, 
^,  Sth  December,  1903. 

'■-   In  accordance  with  your  Memorandums  of  the  2Ut  and  U7tb  November, 
[  have  the  honour  to  report : — 

1.  Alter  receipt  of  urgent  tek'grotns  from  General  UScer  Commanding, 
Somaliland  Field  Force,  H.M.S.  "  Slobiiwk  "  left  Uoibora  the  iflJth  November, 


276 


arrivmg  at  Aden  the  following  day.     During  the  passage  carried  out  half  a 
quBrtOT's  torpedo  pracWoe. 

3,  At  Aden  reoeiTed  194  tona  at  ooal,  including  upper  deck  cargo.  While 
*t  anchor  aiming  practice  was  completed  for  the  quarter. 

3.  On  the  3rd  inetant,  the  "  Dalhoi;aie"  having  arrived,  and  mails  for 
"  PetaeuB  "  and  "  Merlin  "  and  summary  of  intelligeute  trom  General  Officer 
Commanding  having  been  received,  giroceeded. 

4.  In  compliance  with  wish  of  General  Officer  Commanding,  menlioued 
in  his  telegram  of  the  27th  ultimo  (copy  attached),  ciiUed  at  Bandar  Ka^ioi. 
Notliiug  could  bo  ascertained  regarding  the  riflea  said  to  Iki  received  by  the 
Mullah. 

At  Jlandar  Kasim,  Imving  becu  informed  that  lieuteuoiit  Carloa  Grabun 
of  the  Italinn  dhows  had  been  murdered  at  Diirbo,  proceeded  on  behalf  of 
the  Italian  Government,  arriving  there  at  1  i.>i.  on  the  Gth  instant.  At 
6.30  A.lt.  on  the  Ttb  [I  Qtb]  instant,  representatives  of  village  wore  sent  for 
to  hold  consultation.  'E'wo  Oilofa  arrived  on  board  and  asked  for  con^ 
sultation  to  be  held  on  shore.  75  officers  and  men  were  landed,  and  two 
Chiefs  and  100  rilles  demanded.  After  a  lengthy  consultation  this  waa 
refused,  saying  thoy  would  rather  iight.  Accordingly  two  shells  were 
fired  over  the  village.  The  enemy  thep  commenced  ride-fire.  Three- 
pounders  were  then  ordered  to  fire  on  the  village  and  rifle-fire  commenced. 

5.  The  engagement  lasted  two  hours. 


asnaltiea : — 
p  Killed— 

Private  John  Stanton,  R.M.L.L,  Ch  1253 
kDangeronsly  wounded^ 

Commander  E.  F.  A.  Gai 


t,  C.M.C;. 


^^LKill 
^B      ^ 

■1° 

^^^^Km  easualties  of  the  onejn;  were  approximately  20  killed. 
^^^^K  On  Commnjider  Gaunt  t>eing  wounded  I  took  command,  and,  havmg 
^^^mied  the  enemy  und  pattially  destroyed  the  village,  returned  on  board 
nt  10.3S  A.M. 

7.  Owing  to  the  heavy  surf  the  boat  containing  the  body  of  Private 
Stanton  was  capsized  and  the  body  sank.  I  sent  two  boats  tu  recover 
body,  but  at  12.30  p.m.,  liotldng  having  been  seen  of  the  body,  and  owing 
to  the  critical  condition  of  Commander  Gaunt,  after  reading  burial  service, 
I  proceeded  at  25  speed  for  Aden,  which  waa  reached  at  0  P.M.  on  the  7Ui. 
S.  I  immediately  landed  Commaodor  Gatmt,  and  completed  with  coal. 


iving  Dl  tons. 

9.  I  propi^B  leaving  for  Obbia  at  9  A.u.  t 
k  The  health  of  the  ship's  company  ia 


r,  calling  at  Raa  HaE  u 


I  have,  &-!., 
(For  Commander,  sick), 
(Signed)  FRANK   POWELL. 


270 

I'rvm  Amiiiliiid  Qiuirler'iiastcr-Ueneral  jur  InU^ij/utcc  to    Cuitinaiuhr  Pavs. 
(TolegraphiD.)  27tli  Novambur,  W03. 

lliraliim  duaecters  to  Bohotle  from  Uultah  utsert  that  Mullah  ajid  OEiaan 
Mnhmud  have  patched  up  their  quarcol,  and  arms  have  commenced  to 
arrive  again.  Ten  rifles  arrived  at  Haroun  from  Bosaeo  on  18th  November. 
I  don't  believe  it;  but  It  nuuld  be  moat  valuable  if  jou  could  ascertain 
whetlier  tboro  is  anything  in  it.  Latest  infonnatioa  from  same  source 
places  Mullah  still  at  Adadero  on  the  IRth  instant. 


Comiruiivkr  Pears  to  Bear- Admiral  Athittiton-Wiliee. 
"  Peraeiis,"  at  Aden, 
Sir,  IDth  Dcoerabar,  1903. 

I  have  the  honour  to  report  aa  follows  on  the  reuetit  disturbances  at 
Durbo,  the  main  facts  of  which  wore  reported  hy  tulegraph  to  yourself  on 
tlio  7th  iiifltant.  I  have  obtained  the  particulars  from,  the  Italian  Senior 
Naval  Officer  and  Commander  Gaunt. 

2.  On  the  3rd  Decumbor  an  Italian  armed  dhow  was  at  Durbo,  nnder  the 
cioniuiaDd  of  Lieutenant  Grabau,  of  tho  Italian  Navy.  This  oSicer  caUed 
upon  the  chief  men  to  hoist  the  Italian  flag.  This  they  refuse  to  do 
without  first  consulting  the  Sultau,  which  would  have  involved  a  delay  of 
Bumc  days,  lieutenant  Graban  insisted  on  immediate  compliance,  mider 
pain  of  bombardment.  As  tiko  Chiefs  persisted,  the  armed  dhow  opened 
fice  on  tho  viilagt.  After  this  a<;tiun  Lieutenant  Graban  niade  sail  on  the 
dhow  in  order  to  depart,  and,  in  doing  so.  tiie  dhow  canie  mthin  about 
250  yards  of  the  beach.  The  natives  now  emerged  from  cover  and  opened 
fire  on  the  dhow  with  rifles,  killing  Lieutenant  Grabon  instantly  and  wounding 
four  men.  The  petty  officer  in  charge  proceeded  to  Bandar  Kosim  and 
reported  the  occurrence  to  the  armed  dhow  there,  and  then  went  on  to 
Aden  with  the  body  of  Lieutenant  Graban. 

3.  On  tho  5th  December  the  "  Mohawk,"  on  her  way  to  Obbiu,  called  at 
Bandar  Kasim  for  news  desired  by  the  General  Ofilcor  Commanding,  5omaIi- 
land  ;  the  Officer  of  the  Guard  heard  of  the  above  affair  and  reported  it  to 
Oommander  Gavmt,  who  proceeded  to  interview  the  petty  officer  m  charge 
of  the  Italian  armed  dhow  statione<[  there,  and^lso  the  Native  Governor 
of  Bandar  Kasiin.  The  latt«r  refused  any  assistance ;  the  Italian  petty 
officer  concurred  that  immediate  action  was  desirable,  and  lent  to  Com- 
mander Gaunt  one  of  bis  Somali  crew  with  an  Italian  flag,  so  that  Italy 
might  be  represented  in  any  aotion  taken  in  her  territory.  Commander 
Gaimt  then  jsoceeded  in  the  "  Mohawk"  to  Durbo,  arriving  at  1  A.U.  ou 
the  0th.  A  boat  ouiue  off  at  dayhght  with  a  Somali  trader  not  belongiog 
lo  the  place,  who  acted  at  intermediary  between  Commander  Gaunt  and  the 
Ohiefa.  Tho  latter  declined  to  come  on  board  tho  ship,  but  suggested  a 
eonferenue  on  shore.  A  number  of  armed  natives  being  on  the  beach — 
gome  being  seen  in  a  rifle  pit  commanding  it,  which  points  to  previous 
pieparations  for  resistance — Commander  Gaunt  landed  with  a  party  of 


ntl,  Scaving  them  on  the  beach,  selected  an  open  piece  ot  ground 
close  by  for  the  coofecent-e,  where  the  Chiefa  agreed  to  meet  him.  Com- 
mBnder  (3aunt  statt-d  to  them  that  ho  wna  unting  on  behalf  of  the  Italian 
Government,  who  were  in  friaodly  co-ope mtioa  with  the  British,  and 
demanded,  in  conaeqiienco  of  the  altnpk  on  the  Italian  armed  dhow,  that 
two  Chiefs  ghoidd  como  on  board,  to  he  taken  Imfore  the  Italian  nvithorities 
and  that  100  rifles  should  bo  handed  over. 

4.  The  Chiefs'  only  reply  was  to  offer  la  ■submit  these  demands  totbeir 
Sultan,  from  whom  a  reply  would  be  roceived  in  six  days.  The  women 
had  been  removed  from  the  village,  and  men  armed  with  rifles  were  arriving 
every  raoment.  Commander  Gaunt  therefore  said  :  "  I  will  now  fire  a  hig 
gun  over  your  village  as  a  warning :  it  you  then  offer  no  terms,  I  -shall  firo 
fix  S-pounder  common  shell  into  your  village  and  advance  and  bum  it ; 
yon  will  not  be  attaekcd  unless  you  first  attack  ray  party."  Shelter  was 
then  taken  by  both  sides ;  the  heavy  gnns  having  been  fired,  the  landing 
(lai-lv,  having  wfuted  tor  the  time  agreed  and  for  the  light  gims  to  be  fired, 
advanced  and  were  nttaoked  by  rifle  fire,  which  was  replied  to. 

Commander  Gaunt  was  shortly  afterwards  severely  wounded  in  the 
thigh,  and  ordered  Lieutenant  Powell  to  continns  the  atlaolt.  The  nativei 
were  driven  from  the  place,  the  village  partly  destroyed,  and  the  party 
rc.embarked,  witli  the  loss  of  Private  Stanton,  R.M.L.I.,  killed.  Com- 
mander Gaunt's  condition  being  dougerous.  Lieutenant  Powell,  after 
searching  without  success  toi  the  liody  of  the  marine  who  had  been  Ullod, 
whioh  had  fiillen  into  the  sea  owing  to  the  capsizing  ot  the  boat  in  which  it 


"til  December,  and 
I   the   l-^opean  Gpnoral 


■-  to  till'  Adjuiralty  iiud 
reply,  proeeeded 


had  been  placed,  returned  to  Aden,  a 
landed  Commander  Ciaiint,  who  won  ceoei. 
HoBpit^. 

.').  The  "  Moiiawk  "  having  reported  the  oi 
Commander-in-Chief,  and  waited  until  the  9th  ii 

to  Obbia,  in  accordance  with  her  sailing  orders.  I  met  her  off  Cape  Gardofui 
on  the  1  Ith  and  received  her  letter  of  proceedings,  wliicli  I  forwarded  to  you 
on  my  arrival  at  Aden  on  the  I3th. 

8,  Commander  Gaont's  wound  is  a  very  serious  one,  the  ijone  of  the  thigh 
lieing  smoJ^hed ;  he  has  snftored  considerable  pain  but  is  progriosing 
favourably.     It  is  unlikely  that  be  can  be  moved  for  at  least  two  months. 

7.  The  Italian  Senior  Naval  Officer  at  Aden  jnd  the  Captain  of  the 
Italian  cruiser  "Voltumo"  have  in  conversation  espressed  to  me  their 
high  appreciation  of  Commander  Gaunt's  gallant  and  prompt  behaviour  in  bo 
rapidly  and  vigorously  avenging  the  death  of  the  Italian  oflioer.  I  think 
that  the  efiect  upon  the  natives  along  the  entire  coast  will  be  a  good  one. 
impressing  upon  them  the  reality  of  British  aiid  Italian  co.operation  in  the 
present  campaign  against  the  Mullah  and  in  the  measures  being  carried  out 
fot  the  suppression  of  the  arms  traSic  and  maintenance  of  order  on  11ie 
Somtdi  coast. 

I  have,  lic, 
(Signed)  E.  R.   PEARS. 

CowmiivJcr  and  Saiior  Naval  Officer,  Aden  Division. 


Lieiitetumt  PoimB  to  Commando'  Pfan. 

"  Mohawk,"  at  Aden. 
Sir,  .^th  Jamiurj.  1004, 

la  coinpliauce  with  jo\a  MomaraDdiim  of  the  itth  loHtcuit,  I  havo  tlie 
tonouc  to  report : — 

ThepartylandedatDaibodnthoethuitimuaoosiatedofCsptainE.  F.  A. 
Gannt,  C.M.G.,  Ijeatenanta  Frank  Powell  and  Motria  E.  CochcsDe,  Staff. 
SorgeoQ  Charlea  S.  Faoey,  and  7'2  men,  viz. :  — 
42  rifles. 

1  petty  officer  of  a  company. 

2  eiploflive  party. 
2si| 
I 

1  sick  berth  steward. 
4  stretcher  party. 
I  bugler. 

1  Captain's  coxswain  and  17  raannes. 

The  morinea  were  commanded  by  Sergeant  John  Byrne,  R.M.L.I.,  who  is 
included  in  the  number  landed. 

On  the  Captain  returning  from  tlie  conference  with  the  Sheitlia  to  liis  own 
forces  he  ordered  me  to  open  the  men  into  skinilisMug  order.  1  placed  the 
mftrinea  under  Sergeant  Byrne  on  the  right,  Lieutenant  Coohranu  with 
maxim  and  about  10  rifles  in  centre,  and  I  took  the  remainder  of  the  riHeinen 
uii  the  left ;   this  formed  the  party  into  a  continuoii.'!  line. 

Immediately  the  first  shot  went  into  the  village  the  natives,  who  had 
moanwldle  taken  good  cover  in  a  nuUah,  opened  fire  at  a  distance  of  between 
80  and  100  yards;  I  had  previously  charged  magazines  and  immediately 
returned  their  fire.  Within  the  first  five  minutes  of  opening  fire  Captain 
Gaunt  was  wounded ;  personally  I  did  not  see  him  fall,  as  1  had  extended 
to  the  left  with,  about  20  men  as  I  saw  soma  rifle  pita,  and  with  that  a 
the  cover  afforded  by  the  houses  on  the  extreme  end  of  the  village  was  able 
to  enfilade  the  enemy. 

After  seeing  my  men  on  the  left  well  posted  in  good  cover  I  returned 
along  the  lino,  which  hod  previooaly  made  three  or  four  sharp  short  rushes, 
and  from  Lieutenant  Cochrane  leamod  of  Captain  Gaunt  being  wounded 
and  earned  to  the  rear,  where  he  was  being  attended  Ut  by  Slaff-Surgeon 

I  knew  the  Captain's  wishes,  so  kept  the  men  in  their  position  until  after 
about  half.an-hoiir,  when  the  firing,  which  had  been  very  heavy,  begnn  to 
Hlaeken  ;  I  then  ordered  the  men  on  the  left  to  burn  and  destroy  aa  much 
of  the  Ttlliige  as  possible. 

I  advanced  the  fightmg  Une  a  little,  but  not  far,  as  by  thLi  timo  the  amoke 
which  was  dense,  was  blowing  along  our  line  from  the  village,  which  bad  in 
several  places  been  set  on  Are  by  shells  as  well  as  by  the  men  I  bad  ordered. 
Porttires  were  used,  hut  with  little  effect,  the  ordinary  mateh  being  fonnd 
more  useful. 


The  enemy  hod  by  thia  timo  practicallj  disappeared,  soatteriQg  nmong 
thp  hills  in  their  rear  ;  I  did  not  advaooe  to  pursue  them,  it  being  inadrisoblo 
owing  to  our  Isfk  of  knowledge  of  the  country,  and  therefore  signalled  to 
the  boats  to  close,  as  by  this  time  the  village  was  burning  lieroely  and  we 
had  killeil  and  wounded  a  good  many. 

I  estimated  about  20  to  30,  but  have  lately  heard  at  Bander  Ka!<im  tliab 
ST  were  Idlled,  presumably  ineluding  the  bombardment  by  Italians. 

i  signalled  to  ship  to  keep  up  heavy  shelling  into  the  village  t 
heads  while  men  vece  embarking.  I  tltea  returned  towiuds  the  booch,  but 
kept  B  good  number  behind  whilst  cutter,  which  had  masim,  was  beinglooded 
with  our  men.  I  ordered  this  cutter  to  lay  off  and  cover  the  remainder  of 
did  embarkation  with  her  maxim  in  caae  of  a  rush. 

The  aea  hod  risen  conaidetably,  and  tliere  was  muoh  more  difficulty  iu 
embarking,  but  the  galley  was  the  only  boat  swamped  and  at  the  time  liad 

Whilst  towiug  IiBT  oB  she  ca)iaized,  aud  I  regret  to  say  tlio  body  of 
Piival^  Slauton  sank. 

On  returning  l«  the  ship  I  sent  two  boats  to  try  and  find  the  body,  but 
after  two  hours  recalled  them  and  read  burial  service ;  I  then  proceeded 
(or  Aden. 

Private  tjtanton  was  shot  Ihrough  the  liead  aad  killed  instantly,  within 
five  minutes  ot  ojiening  fire. 

I  have,  &o., 
(Sipied)  FRANK   POWELL, 

LieuleaaHl  in  Artiny  Comtaaiul. 

From  the  lOth  to  13th  of  January,  1W)4,  a  uaval  demon- 
stration was  made  off  Illig,  but  in  the  absence  of  an  Italian 
ship,  no  bombardment  took  place. 

During  February,  1904,  in  connection  with  the  iinal 
phase  of  General  Egerton's  operations.  Commander  M.  Hill, 
H.M.S.  "  Perseus,"  was  engaged  in  arranging  for  tho 
establishment  of  a  military  post  at  Las  Khorai,  mention 
ot  which  is  made  on  page  475. 

In  the  meantime,  Eear-Admiral  G.  L.  Atkinson-Willes, 
Naval  Comjnander-in-Chief,  East  Indies  Station,  who  had 
arrived  on  the  coast,  concentrated  the  ships  of  the  Aden 
division  at  Bcrbera  and  other  ports  of  the  British  Protec- 
torate, with  a  view  to  co-operating  with  Sir  Charles  Egerton 
in  bringing  the  fourth  expedition  to  a  close ;  and,  so  fat 
as  the  combined  action  of  the  two  services  was  concerned, 

a  waa  effected  by  the  capture  of  Illig. 


It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  account  of  the  second 
'  phase  of  the  fourth  expedition,  given  in  Chapter  VI,  the 
Mullah  was  driven  out  of  the  British  Protectorate  and  fled  into 
Itahan  territory,  abandoning  eveiyihing  that  might  impede 
his  retreat.  The  Mijjartens,  who  dwell  in  this  part  of  the 
country,  were  reputed  to  be  hostile  to  the  Mullah,  and  they 
had  undertaken  to  harass  oui  common  enemy  should  he  seek 
refuge  in  their  midst.  They,'  however,  had  no  power  of  com- 
bination and  lacked  the  necessary  initiative  to  stiike  a  decisive 
blow,  and  so  long  as  our  troops  were  prevented  from  opeiating 
in  Italian  territory,  the  elusive  prophet  had  a  aafe  line  of 
retreat  open  to  him.  Sir  Charles  Egecton,  who  had 
often  urged  the  destruction  of  lUig  by  means  of  a  combined 
naval  and  military  operation,  represented  the  situation  to 
the  home  authorities,  and  sanction  was  obtained  from  the 
Itahan  Government  for  a  British  force  to  land  at  IlHg,  in  the 
presence  of  an  Italian  warship,  and  drive  out  the  Dervishes 
at  that  place. 

The  force  was  under  the  command  of  Rear -Admiral  G.  L. 
Atkinson-Willea,  Naval  Commander-in-Chief,  East  Indies 
Station,  and  comprised  H.M.S.  second-class  cruisers 
"  Hyacinth  "  (flag-ship)  and  "  Fox,"  the  third-class  cruiser 
"  Mohawk,"  125  men  of  the  1st  Battahon  Hampshire  Regi- 
ment, under  Major  S.  C.  F.  Jackson,  D.S.O.,  and  a  sraaH 
■  field  park  under  Captain  W.  B.  Lesslie,  R.E.  Captain  R.  G. 
Munn  accompanied  the  force  as  military  staff  officer  to  the 
Admiral,  and  Major  F.  Cunliffe  Owen,  R.A.,  and  Lieutenant 
W.  H,  Evans,  R.E.,  were  detailed  as  intelligence  officers. 

On  the  15th  April  Bear-Admiral  Atkinaon-WiHes  con- 
ferred with  General  Egerton  at  Berbera,  and  125  rank  and 
file  of  the  1st  Battahon  Hampshire  Regiment  were  embarked 
under  the  command  of  Major  S.  C.  F.  Jackson,  D.S.O.,  to 
garrison  Illig  when  captured.  The  troops  were  distributed  as 
follows  : — 25  in  the  "  Mohawk,"  and  100  in  the  "  Hyacinth," 
with  their  followers,  and  eight  military  officers.  On  meeting 
the  "  Fox,"  50  of  the  troops  in  the  "  Hyacinth  "  were  trans- 
ferred to  the  former  ship. 


281 

On  the  IGth  April  the  "  Mohawk  "  left  Berbera  at  5  p.m., 
with  orders  to  anchor  ofE  the  Gallule  River*  at  5.30  p.m.  on  the 
2()th,  displaying  lights  after  dark,  so  as  'to  enable  the  other 
ships  to  anchor  on  her,  and  to  serve  as  a  blind  to  prevent 
the  Dervish  garrison  at  Illig  becoming  aware  of  their  arrival. 

The  "  Hyacinth  "  and  the  "  Fox  "  arrived  ofE  Cape  Bowen 
at  6.20  P.M.  on  the  20th,  and  without  displaying  any  lights 
anchored  at  9.52  p.m.  in  5J  fathoms  close  to  the  "  Mohawk  " 
and  opposite  the  landing  place,  which  had  been  previously 
reconnoitred  by  Commander  H.  Jones,  H.M.S.  "Pomone," 
and  whose  sketch  enabled  the  Admiral  to  anchor  his  ships  in 
the  position  selected. 

On  aniving  at  the  anchorage,  the  Admiral  issued  the  follow-  landing 
ing  orders  and  instructions  for  the  operations  next  day  : —         orders 

"  Hyacinth,"  at  Illig, 
_;  20th  April,  1904. 

No.  49.     Memorandum. 

The  following  arrangements  in  connection  with  the  operations  at  Illig 
to-morrow  are  communicated  for  information  and  guidance : — 

2.  The  second  division  of  the  landing  party  will  form  up  in  column 
quickly  and  silently  in  the  following  order  : — 

(1)  Seaman  battalion. 

(2)  Medical  party. 

(3)  Guns  and  escort. 

(4)  Marines. 

(5)  Hampshires  (as  rear  guard). 

3.  On  overtaldng  the  advanced  party  and  reaching  the  Plateau,  the 
following  formation  will  be  assumed,  on  the  order  being  given  by  the 
Admiral : — 


On  the  right    . .     Seamen,  with  reserves  and  supports  in  rear. 

In  the  centre 

On  the  left      . .     Hampshires        „  „  „ 

In  the  rear  of  centre. 

Between  the  line  and  the  reserves,  flanked  by  their  escort. 

4.  The  foioe  will  move  in  an  extended  square,  with  its  left  flank  on  the 
cliffs.     The  left  will  direct. 


Medical  party 
Guns     .. 


*  See  plates  13  and  14. 


Supfwts 


GEORGE   L.  ATKINSON-WILLES,  Sear-Admiral. 

Comnander-in-ChKf. 
The  OffitfTB  Commanding  H.M.  Ships  ireterU,  and 

Officers  Commanding  Units  of  Landing  Party, 

Landitig  Arrang.^meiita. 
Subject  to  111 odiB cation  on  the  spot,  the  following  aro  the  proposed 
arrangemenfs  ; — 

1.  At  early  dawQ — soon  after  4.30  a.oi.^ — tho  "  Hyucintli' b  "  uilvan<ie 
party  in  charge  of  Flag  Captaiu  will  lanil  and  ouiiupy  the  ndjaoent  ridge. 

2.  The  remainder  of  tho  force  will  land  at  dawn  and  aasemhle  on  the 
boacli  under  Commander  Phillimore. 

3.  When  diBembarkation  is  complete,  all  wilt  march  and  join  np  with 
advance  party,  the  Flag  Captain  joining  the  Admiral. 

4.  Or  the  beach  the  following  will  be  done  (under  lieutenant  Allen) : — 
{<[)  Boats  will  lae  towed  to  within  30  yards  of  the  beach,  then  ateainboat 

slips  tow  and  boats  turn,  and  when  in  position  let  go  the  anchor 
and  back  in  on  to  the  beach,  and  the  troops  land. 
The  boats  will  at  once  haul  out  to  the  anchor,  and  the  steamboat  will 
get  them  in  tow  and  take  them  back  to  the  Bliips. 

(b)  If  there  is  any  difficulty  in  gBtting  a  boat  off  the  beach,  it  is  1^  duty 

of  the  party  who  landed  in  that  boat  to  shove  her  off  into  deep 
water,  even  it  they  get  wet  in  Bo  doing. 

(c)  Boots  and  socks  may,  if  desired,  be  carried  round  the  men's  necks 

aad  put  on  on  the  beach ;    this  does  not  apply  to  the  advance 
party. 

5.  When  disembarkation  is  ooroplote,  lieutenant  Allen  will  retura  to 
"  Hyacinth,"  boats  return  to  their  ships,  and  will  either  be  hoisted  or  towed 
by  the  ships  to  the  anchorage  off  Illig. 

6.  Boats  are  then  to  take  in  filled  water -breakers  and  cases  of  rifle 
ammunition  ready  to  replenish  the  brigade. 

7.  "  Hyacinth"  will  detail  a  steamboat  and  cutter  especially  for  the 
wounded,  who  will  betaken  to  "  Hyacinth"  and  hoisted  carefully  on  board — 
derrick  to  be  ready. 

N.B. — All  the  water-breakcTB  in  every  ship  ore  to  be  thoroughly  rinsed 
out  before  Thursday. 


n 


an 
pa 
bei 
ad 


"I 
by 

am 


W01 

der 
out 


/•: 


Plate   I3.y 


To  Face  ps^e    283. 


'.  IV  zejss  ZBfio. 


Wi'fflZ  ATTangrmcfUa  jitr  Landing  at  ISiij. 


.iiageon   Draper   of   H.M-8.    "  Foi;,"^and   Sii.^w—   u>—    -. 
*tj'ai:'mtli,"   with  the  first  line  of  uttock  and  three  Siok  Berth 
_.      '^'"ith  sbi  Btretohera  sad  six  beorors  to  eaoh. 

r^^*«i»  McCarthy,   K.A.M.C.,   and  hia   Asaiatant  Surgeon   with  tlie 
J^^*"^  Regiment ;   he  hta  with  him  two  Btrctchors  and  bcarerB. 

a-  man  falls  out  wouniod,  ho  will  be  conveyed,  after  reoeiving 
_^^*^,"  to  the  reserve  line,  and  transferred  on  board  H.M.S.  "  Hyacinth" 
.   ^^*  jioaaible  (probably  after  arrival  at  second  anchorage). 

outter  with  awnings  spread,  in  tow  of  a  atoam  pinnace  and  flying 
Sag  with  a  red  cross,  will  be  in  roadinpaa  for  that  purpose  alougsido 
to  be  sent  in  when  retjiiired. 

stretcher  party  will  carry  10  pounds — equivalent  to  one  gallon — 
water,  tor  medical  purposes,  in  canvas  bags. 
woimded  men  will  be  transferred  to  H.M.S.  "  Hyacinth,"  and  the 
th  the  forecastle  will  be  reserved  and  fitted  temporarily  as  a 

BT  the  charge  of  the  Senior  Medical  Officer,  H.M.S.  "  Hyacinth," 

i^ek  Berth  Steward.     The  Medical  Officer  of  H.M.S.  "  Mohawk" 
OB  tnard  his  ship  for  hospital  work  when  required. 
Imats  will  carry  a  plentiful  supply  of  water,  aa  in  all  probahilily 
utter  the  work  ia  done,  will  be  eshaiisted. 

I  will  be  worn  over  the  straw  iiata  as  ailditiuua  prol-oi  tion 

whether  water  ia  carried  in  boats  or  by  men  on  shore  or 

K  fareolKTs,  a  tin  pannikin  in  to  be  attached  to  each  breaker,  nnil 

yt  ihonid  have  one  in  the  proportion  of  one  to  each  strctuher  or 

d  off  to  carry  water ;   said  water  is  only  to  be  drunk  out  of  these 

A  not  out  of  the  water  bags  and  chaguls. 

Illig. 
ll  apytaraitaa  of  tht  coant. — Cliffs,  150  feet  high,  rise  abruptly  fi'oni 
L  Bseept  at  nilg  village  and  at  Middle  Beach,  where  there  are  narrow 
d  in  front  of  the  cliSs. 
a  Qallule  River  (3^  mileij  from  Qlig  Bi\  the  crow  fUea)  the  cliffs  are 
vby  the  ravine  down  which  the  river  runs. 

i  the  cliffs  is  an  immense  undulating  plateau,  but  it  is  doubtfiLl 
C  It  filla,  risea  or  is  more  or  less  level 

The  OaUiUe  nifer." 
ie  landing  takes  place  at  tfie  month  of  the  Gallule  River,  where  the 
k  ia  sandy  but  there  are  rocka  and  a  bar,  and  probably  surf  will  be 
I    wnnitlg.     The  guides  aay  they  know  the  best  landmg  place. 

The  aides  of  the  ravine  are  of  white  honey-corabed  rook  and  100  feet  high, 
tml  tliey  can  be  climbed  at  the  south  or  DJig  side,  though  apparently  with 
ks  difficulty. 


The  path  is  o£  griTel  and  rather  rough  but  withniit  big  ptoncs  in  it. 
It  ia  Btraight  with  a.  gradunl  rise. 

There  are  deep  pools  near  tho  mouth  of  the  river,  tmd  it  is  neeeaBary 
in  pluneB  to  wade  through  about  a  foot  of  water. 

Beyond  half  a  mile  from  the  mouth,  the  river  has  to  be  continiiHlly 
oroBsed,  for  it  Bpreads  itself  into  many  amall  streams. 

At  1,000  yardH  from  the  month  (the  guides  say  "  after  »ot  more  than  an 
hour's  walk"}  a  natural  road  leada  up  to  the  aotith  (or  tOig)  side  of  the 
raviae  to  the  platoau  abore. 

The  road  is  of  aolid  roclt,  10  yards  H-ide.  Mounted  poiiiea  or  loaded 
oamele  caa  go  up  it  easily. 

The  Plal^u. 

Tho  guides  say  that  one  can  see  the  Blup  on  reaching  the  platesii,  and 
tliat  the  ahip  is  kept  in  Eight  all  along  to  the  zariba  above  the  yiUago.  At 
any  rate,  it  scema  clear  that  a  man  c«n  keep  up  commuiiioation  by  walking 
along  the  top  nf  the  cliifa. 

The  zariba  can  also  be  seen  from  the  place  where  the  plateau  ia  reacbed 
on  emerging  from  the  Gallule  Eiver. 

The  road  from  the  river  to  the  cliffs  above  llltg  is  of  fina  sand,  witli  small 


lUig  ViUagt. 

At  tho  head  of  tho  clifta,  above  the  Tillage  of  lllig,  are  aomo  worka  wliere 
the  enemy  may  be  expected  to  be  found. 

It  i9  not  clear  whether  these  works  consist  merely  of  a  wall  of  loose  st^nea, 
about  6  feet  high,  fronting  the  sea ;  or  (1)  such  a  wail  with  two  or  throe 
others  at  right  angles  to  it,  but  with  thtf  back  left  open ;  or  (2)  one  or  more 
encloBorea  surrounded  by  walls  of  the  above  description.  One  of  the 
guidos  lately  formed  part  of  the  Mullah's  garrison  in  lllig,  and  he  states 
that  two  enoloaiirea  weJ^  at  that  time  being  built. 

The  walk  are  said  to  bo  not  loop-holed,  and  the  riflemen  show  their 
heads  above  when  firing. 

The  village  of  Ulig  lies  on  the  beach  150  feet  below  these  works.  A 
steep  path  down  the  cliff  leads  from  them  to  the  tillage. 

In  the  clia  the  riflemen  are  sMd  to  station  themselves  inside  four  or 
five  caves,  which  they  use  as  rifle  pits.  Tho  largest  cave  is  in  the  face  of  tho 
clifTs,  some  distance  up,  and  oommunicates  by  a  passage  with  the  zariba 
above.     A  path  leads  from  it  down  tho  face  of  the  cliff  to  the  village. 

The  Oarriaon. 
The  garrison  is  said  to  consist  of  200  or  more  men,  most  of  whom  are 
probahly  armed  with  riHes. 

FrobMe  Movemenls  of  the  Enemj/  vfhen  Beaten. 
Some  of  t^e  guides  say  that  the  enemy  will  probably  get  away  to  a  high 


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O  tlui  BUutlt-WLIiL  lit  Ulig,   IJ 

a  awa;  on  the  iiUteau  ti 
«3^ver  for  lliem  there, 

Mudah'f  Proj^rli/. 
There  13  said  to  be  a  Urgi;  stock,  of  sidas  and  wliiili;.^'  blubber  bclaDging 
t-o  the  Mullah  stored  in  lUig,  [irobablj  hidden  in  the  caves. 

G.  L.  ATKINSON-WILLES.  Rmr-Admiral. 

Comma-ader-in-Ckief. 
I9th  April,  1904. 
TAe  Commandinj  Officer  of  ea:k  unit,  for  iT.fonnatioii. 

At  4.30  A.M.  on  the  2l8t  April*  the  boats  of  the  "Mohawk" 

X3iade  a  feint  to  land  on  Middle  Beach  (a  little  strip  of  sand 

^bout    hali  a  mile  to  the  north-west  of  lllig  village),  as  a 

Dervish  picquet  was  observed  there,  and  it  was  desirable  to 

divert  their  attention  from  the  real  landing  place  near  the 

entrance  of  the  GaUule  Rivet.     At  dawn,  about  5  a.m.,  Captain 

Son.  Horace  Hood,  R.N.  (Flag  Captain),  in  charge  of  the 

advance  party  of  100  seamen  and  marines  of  the  "  Hyaeinth," 

and  one  maxim  gun,  landed  with  his  men  on  the  beach, 

covered  by  boats  mounting  field  guns  and  maxims.     The  party 

was  towed  ashore  by  steam  laimches,  which,  on  account  of  the 

shallow  water,  bad  to  shp  boats  when  about  30  yards  from 

the  shore.     The  boats  were  then  backed  in  and  anchored  up 

to  within  about  20  yards,  from  which  point  the  men  had  to 

wade.    Proceeding  unopposed,  the  party  seized  the  plateau 

above  the  south  bank  of  the  river  at  about  5.25  a.m.     To  do 

this,  it  marched  up   the    gorge   formed  by  the   liver    and 

took  up  a  position  on  the  plateau  at  1,000  yards  from  the 

landing  place.     At  this  point  the  enemy  was  first  seen,  some 

20  of  his  scouts  being  observed  in  the  distance.     An  advanced 

picquet  was  now  thrown  out  to  an  eminence  on  the  right, 

communication  with  the  flag-sliip  established  by  signal,  and 

the  remaindei  of  the  force  awaited.t 


Commodore  T.  Bisio,  Italiaji  Senior  Navul  Officer  at  Aden,  arrived  off 

lllig  at  daylight  on  the  2Ut,  and,  as  req^neeted  by  the  Admiral,  anohoied 

ulT  lllig  otter  watching  our  force  disembark. 

+  SeeplitoU. 


The  disembarkation  of  the  landing  party  now  pro- 
ceeded as  rapidly  as  possible,  the  boats  returning  for  the 
rest  ot  the  men  as  soon  as  each  was  cleared.  Owing  to  an 
increasing  suit,  none  but  the  advanced  party  got  on  shore 
without  getting  wet  up  to  their  waists,  and  some  up  to  their 
necks.  The  landing,*  therefore,  took  two  horns,  being  accom- 
plished without  accident,  except  that  the  "  Fox'a "  cutter 
was  temporarily  swamped.  Admiral  Atkinson -Willea  landed 
at  about  5.45  d.M.,  and  at  once  climbed  the  cliffs,  followed  by 
the  remaindei  o(  the  troops.  On  arrival  at  the  plateau,  the 
Admiral  established  himseli  on  the  left,  while  Hood  with 
his  party  held  the  right.  As  the  men  came  up,  they  took 
up  their  positions  as  previously  ordered,  and  as  soon  as  all 
were  disposed  as  indicated  in  the  accompanying  Bketch,f 
the  order  to  advance  was  given  at  about  7.40  a.m.  The 
troops  moved  on  a  front  of  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile. 
Hood  assuming  command  of  the  seamen  and  marines,  and 
Jackson  that  of  the  Hampshire  detachment.  The  plate-au, 
upon  which  the  advance  was  made,  was  very  hard,  rocky  and 
generally  level,  and  the  ground  sloped  away  from  the  cUffs. 
The  sun  was  very  hot.  A  few  Dervish  scouts  were  observed 
to  be  watching  our  movements,  but  on  finding  u^  in  strength 

'Lanjling  Stale. 


£ 

,; 

Ship. 

1 

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1 

1 

1 

1 

■'llvapinth"     .. 

17 

11 

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118 

HnmpfibirfB       .  . 

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128 

Total 

762 

Somali  Fitld  Force  Staff 

3 

r 
Plate  15. 


Dervi 


AIC£3  50 


*liey  retired  bo  their  works  on  the  heights  above  Illig  village,  ■' 
-Alter  marching  about  3^  milea  some  rising  ground  was  reached, 
^nd  at  about  9  a.m.  oui  scuuLs  repurted  that  the  enemy  had 
retired  £rom  his  outlying  "  gurgis  "  to  hia  zaribas  and  stone 
forts  or  towers,  which  soon  afterwards  appeared  in  sight. 
The  Hanipshires  were  ordered  to  halt,  whilst  Hood  was 
ejected  to  move  to  the  right,  reinforcing  the  fighting  line 
iwitb  thu  reserves,  and  then  to  throw  his  right  forward, 
AVheii  this  movement  waa  completed,  the  Hampshiies  with  one 
maxim,  were  on  the  enemy's  tight  flank,  and  the  Hue  extended 
across  the  enemy's  rear  and  oveilapped  his  works.  The 
force  was  now  halted  for  a  short  rest,  and  during  this  interval 
the  Dervishes,  iti  their  position,  began  to  blow  horns  and 
Bhout  defiance,  while  their  women  and  children  were  seen 
fieeing  to  safety.  On  the  force  advancing,  the  enemy  opened 
Cre,  and  as  the  troops  got  within  250  yards  of  the  works  the 
firing  became  very  brisk.  In  addition  to  the  rifle  fire  the 
enemy  used  an  old  gun,  which  discharged  canister  at  the 
advancing  line,  which  continued  to  move  in  splendid  order. 
By  now  the  fire  had  become  very  hot  on  both  sides,  but  the 
men  were  not  to  be  denied,  and  continued  to  advance 
in  short  rushes.  When  about  100  yards  from  the  enemy's 
defences.  Hood,  who  had  previously  closed  in  and  wheeled  round 
his  men  so  as  to  take  the  works  end-on,  gave  the  order  t«  charge 
when  the  Hampshires  and  the  whole  body  of  seamen  and 
marines  dashed  at  the  zaribas  and  turned  out  the  enemy  in 
gallant  style.  The  Hampshires  entered  the  works  near  "  E  " 
on  the  sketch,*  the  bluejackets  and  marines  at  "  G,"  where 
tiiere  was  a  second  gun  embrasure.  The  actual  assault  and 
occupation  of  the  hostile  works  did  not  last  long,  but  small 
parties  of  Dervishes  held  the  two  stone  forts  obstinately  and 
caused  several  casualties  before  they  were  overpowered.  The 
maxims  were  brought  to  bear  on  the  flying  Dervishes,  who 
were  seen  running  down  their  communicating  walla  and 
passages,  and  many  were  killed  and  wounded ;    58  coipses 

^^^2   '  *  See  iiiate  10. 


beiug  iifterwards  lound  aud  several  wouuded  received  medical 
attention.  The  British  and  Italian  flags  were  then  hoisted 
on  the  wall  of  the  zariba. 

Such  close  fighting,  and  the  subsequent  fighting  in  the 
village  and  the  caves,  caused  the  troops  to  Buffer  some 
casualties,  which  amounted  to  3  seamen  killed,  and  10 
seamen  and  1  marine  wounded.  When  at  9.45  a.m.  the 
enemy  broke  and  fled,  many  of  them  took  shelter  in  the 
caves,  on  the  cliti  sides  and  in  the  huts  in  the  village 
from  whence  they  fired  on  our  wounded  who  were  being 
embarked.  The  cavea  were  cleared  and  the  huts  set  on  fire 
by  the  seamen  and  marines  of  the  "  Hyacinth  "  under  the 
direction  of  Hood,  who,  taking  a  south-westerly  direc- 
tion, followed  the  fugitives  up  for  about  1^  miles,  the 
shipa  filing  upon  the  enemy  seen  near  the  cliSs.  This 
work  was  not  completed  till  11.30  a.m.  During  this 
operation  Hood,  with  Mr.  A.  G.  Onslow,  midshipman,  and 
No.  PO-yi46  John  Edward  Flowers,  Corporal,  Royal  Marine 
Light  Infantry,  of  the  "  Fox  "  entered  the  cave  from  which 
they  were  fired  at  and  cleared  it  in  a  hand-to-hand  encounter. 
Major  C.  H.  Kennedy,  R.M.L.I.,  who  was  an  eye-witnesa  of 
this  incident,  gave  the  following  account : — 

A  marine  and  a  lilueiaukot  pu-ssiiig  a  burning  liiit  were  fired  at. 
Mr.  A.  G.  OdsIow,  Slidflhipman,  with  the  two  men  at  one*  opened  fire,  and, 
after  several  abots,  firing  ceased,  but.  after  a  pouse,  firing  wna  again  opened 
by  tbe  o<^cl1paIlts  of  the  hut.  Captain  Hood,  who  was  on  the  lieach  at  the 
time,  then  went  up  with  aeveral  men  who  opened  fire.  After  scveial  volleys 
had  been  fired  into  tlie  hut,  the  firing  still  continuing,  Captain  Hood  gava 
the  order  to  charge,  and  called  on  nioro  men  to  follow.  He  hiznself  dashed 
in,  aoeompBnied  by  Mr.  Onslow,  through  the  burning  hut,  and  with'  hiB 
aword  attacked  the  men  in  the  cove,  the  whole  time  being  practically  nnder 
fire.  He  fiist  used  his  sword  and  then  his  revolver,  and  Mr.  Onslow  bayonetted 
the  thu?d  inan.  During  theadvnnce  tbefour  matins  were  carried  by  theii 
urewB  who  kept  up  with  the  advauoing  line  during  the  attaclc. 

Tbe  village  of  lUig  as  a  fortified  place  was  entirely 
demolished,  together  with  the  adjacent  cavea,  as  it  was  con- 
sidered too  formidable  a  stronghold  to  be  held  by  any  natives. 
The  natural  strength  of  the  enemy's  works  was  surprising, 


and  snbBcquent  inapection  showed  that  an  attack  from 
the  beach  oppoaite  Ulig  village  would  probably  have  proved 
disastrous  owing  to  the  natural  advantages  possessed  by  the 
defence. 

Captain  Hood,  R.N.,  in  hia  report  to  the  Admiral  on  his 
own  movements  during  the  capture  of  Illig  said  : — 

It  wa?  too  dark  to  make  out  clearly  the  beach,  but  the  whito  siirf 
breaking  on  the  sand  abowcd  up  in  contract  to  the  black  rocks  in  time  for 
the  boats  to  be  turned  and  anchored ;  and  the  advanee  party  disembarkod 
expeditiously  and  lined  the  beach  under  cover  till  sufBcient  were  ashore 
to  advance.  The  place  chosen  was  the  actual  mouth  of  the  river.  Men 
were  wet  np  to  their  waist,  and  in  some  casea  up  to  the  neck. 

The  advance  party  moved  off  up  the  river,  clambering  up  on  the  left 
bank,  then  crossing  on  the  left  bank,  and  up  to  the  level  of  the  cliffs,  by 
which  time  they  were  alnut  a  mile  inland.  No  enemy  wore  sighted,  though 
the  bed  of  the  river  had  been  recently  visited. 

A  poutiim  was  taken  up  which  was  in  view  of  the  ship  of  the  landing 
beaeh  and  of  moat  of  the  pathway  up. 

When  all  were  assembled,  the  force  moved  over  towards  you  (the 
Admiral)  then  on  top  of  the  cliffs  overlooking  the  sea. 

In  accordance  with  your  orders  tlie  Naval  Brigade  were 
detached  to  make  a.  detour  to  the  right,  bo  as  to  envelop  the  defeneea  of 
Illig.  They  moved  off  in  fours,  imder  my  orders,  and,  when  well  round, 
advanced  towards  the  sea  (and  Ulig),  and  halted  when  the  left  fiank  of  the 
Marines  was  abreast  of  the  Hampshires.  No  men  had  faUen  out,  and  the 
carriage  of  the  maxim  guns  and  ammunition  boxes  was  a  marveUous  per- 
formance of  dogged  courage. 

The  advance  was  directed  by  the  left,  and,  on  fire  being  opened  by  the 
enemy,  the  advance  continurd  steadily,  until  the  HampehircB  opened  fire, 
when  fire  commenced  all  along  the  line  of  the  Naval  Brigade,  who  advanced 
by  rushes  and  graditaUy  swung  round  the  right  flank.  The  two  comapnieB 
of  the  "  FoK  "  (in  rMervo)  were  moved  right  away  to  the  right  flank,  so  as 
to  intercept  the  fugitives  in  that  direction.  The  advance  was  ooatinued 
by  short  rushes  until  it  appeared  that  the  fire  of  the  seamen  was  endangering 
the  left  of  the  line,  when  I  ordered  the  charge,  and  in  an  instant  the  whole 
Ime  of  the  Naval  Brigade  surged  like  a  sea  over  the  walls. 

Finding  that  many  Dervishes  were  escaping  along  the  cliffs  to  the 
right,  I  directed  all  aeamea  and  marines  to  follow  along  the  top  of  the  cliffs  j 
many  Dervishes  were  shot  and  several  were  killed. 

In  accordance  with  your  orders  a  company  of  seamen  were  detached 
away  to  the  southward  and  occupied  an  adjacent  ridge.  The  fleeing 
Dervishes  could  he  seen  and  were  engaged  at  long  range,  but  with  little 
resnlt ;  Lieutenant  James  rem^ed  in  charge  on  the  ridge  until  all  signs  of 
le  enemy  had  ceased. 

(8927)  I 


290 

Aa  tliK  enemy's  riflemen  in  tbe  village  prevented  tho  embarkation  of 
tbe  wounded,  oU  the  avfulable  Beamen  of  tlie  "  Ejacintti  "  with  Lieutenant 
BockhouBe  and  Boine  mariiie>s  of  all  ships  advanced  down  the  hill,  firing 
was  going  on  from  the  village,  ao  the  force  approached  to  within  100  yards, 
and,  aft«r  tiring  a  few  volleys,  luahed  the  nearest  huts  and  Bet  them  alight 
Firing  atill  continued  and  t\ro  men  were  wounded,  ao,  when  possible,  voUeyti 
were  fired  before  approaching  the  huts,  which  wero  finally  all  set  alight 
after  OBcert^ning  that  no  one  remained  inside. 

The  men  rested  on  the  beach,  but,  aa  sniping  still  continued  from  the 
village,  I  collected  a  few  men,  with  Mr.  Onslow,  Midshipman  [speoiat 
report),  and  cleared  a  cave,  the  entrance  of  which  was  covered  by  s  wicker 
hot.     It  contained  three  men,  all  riflemen,  who  were  then  killed. 

A  party  oE  seamen  and  marinea  were  then  token  up  the  cUffs  to  the 
northward ;  riHe  piti,  facing  the  sea,  were  Found  in  all  the  caves  and  openings 
on  the  side  of  the  cliff,  and  were  demoliahed,  tbe  stones  being  rolled  down 
into  the  sea. 

It  being  then  nearly  2  r.ti.,  end  tbe  men  having  been  on  tbe  march 
since  5  AM.,  T  conferred  with  Major  Jackson,  and,  having  ascertained  that 
bis  camp  was  seom'p,  gave  orders  for  tbe  embarkation  of  the  Naval  Brigade 
leaving"  50  marines  nnd  tour  maxims,  imd 
the  defence. 


Captain  F.  S.  Pelham,  H.M.S.  "  Fox  "  to  whom  the  com- 
mand of  the  squadron  had  been  transferred  after  Admiral 
Atkinson- Willea  had  landed,  reported  to  the  Admiral  : — 

After  the  landing  of  the  brigade  this  morning  I  hoisted  your  flog  on 
board  this  ship  in  accordMice  with  your  orders,  and  the  squadron  proceeded 
to  take  up  their  assigned  positions  off  Illig,  "  Fos"  being  shght  !y  delayed  by 
the  swamping  of  her  cutter  on  shore. 

Owing  to  tbe  height  of  the  elilfs  but  little  could  be  seen  of  thn  general 
advance  of  the  brigade,  except  for  the  left  flank,  which  waa  almost  con- 
stantly in  view,  and  the  movements  of  the  Mullah's  people  as  they  retired 
into  and  through  the  north-west  comer  of  the  zariba.  When  tlio  loft 
flank  halted  at  about  300  yards  from  tbe  zariba,  theie  was  a  regular  exodua 
of  women,  who  mostly  fled  to  the  southward. 

At  »  A.M.,  when  fire  was  opened,  the  advance  of  tbo  left  flank  was  in 
full  view ;  and  the  advance  of  four  imits  of  the  Hampshire  Regiment  was 
very  bold,  and  they  eventually  took  cover  actually  against  the  outer  wall 
of  the  zariba  itself,  under  what  appeared  to  be  a  very  heavy  fire.  At  this 
time  there  was  a  riisb  of  a  large  number  of  the  enemy  down  to  the  cave 
just]  below  but,  owing  to  the  proximity  of  the  Hampshire  Regi- 
ment, I  was  unable  to  0[>pn  Sre  on  Ibese  men  from  the  ship ;  and  also  the 
cave  being  only  just  bebw  the  ridge  as  seen  from  the  ship,  I  was  afraid  of 
hitting  our  own  men,  who  on.  the  right  and  centre  must  have  been  in  the 
line  of  fire  of  the  cave  and  outer  wall  of  the  zariba,     A  very  hot  fire  now 


391 

(tppparrd  to  be  raging  in  ivhich  ve  eontd  distinctly  henr  the  maxima  tnUog 
part,  mill  this  continiiml  up  to  9,30,  whn)  there  wu  a  general  oessation  of  fire- 
As  the  enemy  retired  to  the  soiithward  they  dlBpcrscd  all  over  the 
elifia,  through  oavea  and  beliind  rocks,  and  aoine  down  on  the  bwtch.  I 
therefore  opened  firo  with  a  4'7iooh  aim,  ruid  oh  the  enemy  attempted  to 
assemlile  they  w?re  at  once  diBpcrxed  iinil  liarricd,  but,  oviog  to  tlie  nature 
of  the  groiind,  it  is  iiupo^ible  l^i  vslimatfl  the  numbers  ai^poiiiit^  (or. 

Deaultory  firing  now  cnntinued  from  the  brigade  as  the;  searched 
cliSa  and  oaves,  brealiing  into  a  sharp  brii«h  close  to  the  village,  which  wai 
then  set  on  fire  and  biirned.  Ilonte  were  then  sent  in  for  the  wounded,  in 
accordance  with  yotir  signal. 


Lieut. -Colonel  S.  C,  F.  Jackson,  lat  Battalion  Hampshire 
Regiment,  furnished  the  following  account  of  the  capture  of 
niig:- 

From  obBcrvationa  taken  on  boruil  ship  it  wan  known  that  a  larjie  stone 
zariba  had  been  cons  true  led  on  the  top  of  the  cliffs  at  Illig,  and  that  a 
steep  path  led  to  the  beach  where  a  strong  elone  barricade  had  been  con- 
strncted.  The  landing  was  said  to  be  bad,  owing  to  the  Biirf,  and  the 
strong  defences,  if  held,  would  have  materially  added  to  the  difficulties  of 
effecting  a  landing  on  the  beach  of  Dlig  itself.  The  Admiral  therefore 
decided  to  disembark  the  force  at  the  month  of  the  Gollule  Birer,utuated 
soma  3i  miles  north  of  Illig.  The  '  Moliawk'  hod  arrived  oS  the  village 
ftbout  S.30  P.M.  on  the  '20th  April,  and  the  '  Hyacinth '  and  '  Fox,'  steaming 
without  lights,  stealthily  reached  the  anchorage  at  the  mouth  of  the  Gallule 
Bivcr  at  10  f.h.  At  4  o'clock  the  next  morning  the  work  of  disembarking 
the  landing  party  began  in  the  dark.  Captain  the  Hon.  H.  Hood,  B.N., 
landed  first,  with  a  covering  parly  of  bluejackets  who  ocaupied  the  plateau, 
160  fe«t  above  the  landing  place.  Thus  protected,  the  whole  force,  ninn- 
bering  some  540  rillcs  with  four  maiims,  was  quietly  conveyed  ashore  in 
the  ship's  boats.  The  boats  were  lowed  by  the  steam  pinnaces  as  near  to 
tho  shore  as  the  surf  would  permit,  each  boat  was  then  an  chore  I  imd  Bwung 
stem  on,  and  soliliers,  sailors  and  marines,  all  fully  accoutred,  waded  ashore 
through  the  surf.  By  7.40  a.m.,  the  whole  force  was  concentrated  on  the 
top  of  the  plnteau,  the  ground  of  which  is  formed  of  solid  rock  and  is  destitute 
of  vegetation, 

The  sailors  with  three  maxims  were  on  the  right,  the  R.M.1,.1.  in  the 
centre,  and  tlie  Hampshire  detachment  with  one  maxim  gim  woa  on  the  left, 
keeping  toiiuh  with  the  edge  of  the  oliffs  and  directing  tho  adyflnco.  A 
few  of  the  enemy's  scouts  were  seen  retiring  towards  Illig,  but  it  was  not 
known  whether  the  position  was  hold  or  whether  any  resistance  would  be 
ofiered  to  the  advance.  Our  progress  wof  somewhat  delayed  by  the  maxims, 
which  had  to  be  carried  by  their  crews,  but  after  an  hour's  marching  wo 
IMched  a  ridge  from  which  the  enemy's  position  could  bo  plainly  seen, 
B  yards  off.     Two  small  forts  or  blockhouses  and  soyoral  stone 

il)  T  2 


wallfl  Doiild  he  made  out,  atid  it  now  tetanie  evident  that  we  were  to  be 
opposed.  A  conch  shell  wbs  aniinded  from  behind  the  fort  walli,  and  baimciB 
were  waved  nboTe  the  parapets,  but  the  detcndets  kept  well  imder  cover 
and  not  a  shot  waa  fired  aa  we  moved  over  the  ridge  into  a  loiig  sjid  shallow 
hollow.  The  Admiral  decided  to  turn  the  position,  and,  while  the  blue- 
jackets BwuQg  round  to  the  right,  the  Morinea  and  Hampshiroa  upproaohed 
to  within  80  yards  of  the  position  absolutely  under  cover,  though  their 
scouts  were  fired  upon  as  they  reached  the  crest  line,  A  nnmber  of  the 
enemy  were  in  a  small  loopboled  onctoKure,  in  the  centre  of  which  stood  a. 
■mall  tower  with  three  tiers  of  loopholes,  and  the  rest  of  the  Ulig  garrison 
fired  upon  the  advancing  troops  from  the  safe  cover  of  a  double  row  of  stoce 
walls.  About  100  yards  further  on  another  blockhouse  protected,  the 
south-west  comer  of  the  enemy's  works.  The  first  of  these  two  hloothouses 
was  evidently  the  key  of  the  position,  and  from  this  little  fort  the  dervishes 
kept  up  a  heavy  fire  on  the  naval  and  military  contingent.  They  had  an 
ancient  oarronade  with  which  they  fired  canister  with  considerable  noise 
but  without  any  serious  efteot.  Tliis  position  was  soon  carried,  aa  the 
troops  charged  over  the  outer  wall  and  put  the  defenders  to  flight.  The  Bailors 
lost  three  of  their  number  during  the  advance  across  the  open,  the  rest  of 
the  attacking  force  being  bettor  protected  by  the  folds  in  the  ground,  did 
not  lose  a  man.  There  were  still  a  few  deterniined  men  in  the  little  tower, 
who  had  barricaded  themselves  in  and  were  firing  at  random  through  the 
loopholes  at  the  soldiers  and  sailors  below,  who  could  not  at  jirst  find  an 
entrance  into  the  building.  Lance -Sergeant  Hawn,  of  the  lat  Battahon 
Hauipshlro  Regiment,  seized  a  hand  axe,  staved  in  the  small  door,  crept 
through  the  nnrrow  opening,  awarmed  up  the  inside  of  the  building  and 
disarmed  three  desperate  Dervishes,  one  of  whom  bad  just  fatally  wounded 
a  sulor  below.  The  Hampshire  detaelunent  was  left  to  hold  this  part  of 
the  position,  while  the  sailors  pursued  the  Somalis  who  had  evacuated  the 
second  blockhouse  and  were  bolting  over  the  edge  of  the  cliffs  down  to  tho 
village.  Muay  o£  the  enemy  crept  into  oaves  Mid  huts,  and  ns  Captain  Hood 
with  his  seaman  battalion  followed  them  up.  they  were  received  with  a  warm 
llro,  and  several  instances  of  gallant  conduct  were  recorded,  for  those 
among  tho  Dervishes  who  hod  failed  to  escape  were  detRTmined  to  sell 
their  lives  dearly.  Mr.  Onslow,  a  Midshipman  of  tho  '  Hyacinth,'  after 
two  JIatinea  had  been  shot  down  at  the  entrance  to  a  cave,  ran  along  a 
narrow  ledge  under  fire  and  cut  down  the  two  occupants.  About  dO  of  the 
enemy's  dead  were  counted  about  the  defences,  and  in  the  village,  and  a 
considerable  number  of  prisoners  and  rifles  were  captured,  as  well  as  several 
stacks  of  skins  which  the  Mullah  was  in  the  habit  of  sending  down  to  Illig 
from  '  up  country,'  to  serve  as  current  coin  for  the  purchase  of  food  and 
munitions  of  war  regularly  brought  to  him  by  friendly  dhows. 

The  works  proved  to  be  of  considerable  strength,  and  consisted  of 
two  rows  of  slone  walls  from  7  to  10  feet  high  and  varying  from  4  to  6  feet  in 
thickness.  They  were  very  cleverly  designed  to  cover  the  blockhouses  from 
the  fire  of  ships  at  tho  anchorage  ofF  the  village,  as  well  an  to  oppose  a  landing 
on  the  beach.     Two  batteries  had  been  erected  on  the  face  of  the  cliffB 


993 

allow  tha  vUkgiki  and  in  tbeao  two  old  guns  were  found  loaded  up  to  tiie 
mulElc.     There  were  bIiio  wveral  rillu  pita  luid  Hhelter  treuchps  od  the  stevp 

bIo]>c  ;  and  tlicre  is  no  doubt  tliat  had  the  tarn  landed  on  the  beach  at  Illig 
it  would  have  mot  with  a  very  warm  reeujition,  iind  it  would  have  been 
no  easy  job  to  soalo  the  heights  and  take  the  jwaition  by  afrontal  attack. 
The  barricade  on  the  beach  was  of  considerahte  atrengtb,  about  200  yardv 
long,  and  luopholed  and  |irovid«l  with  a  small  passage  in  the  centre.  The 
Adntiral's  deciaion  to  laud  at  the  mouth  of  (Jallulc  River  was  sound,  and 
ao;^oimt«d  for  the  small  numbers  of  t'asualtiex  among  our  force,  viz.,  3  Eeamett 
killed,  2  Marines  and  10  seamen  wounded.  Somewhat  luckily  for  db  the 
det^loea  were  not  completed,  for  a  long  line  of  wall  had  been  traced  out 
wbii^h  would  have  completely  surrounded  the  works  and  made  the  task 
of  turning  the  position  a  ditHcuIt  one  to  accompllBh  without  guns. 

We  heard  from  the  prisoners  that  a  party  of  <10  rillcmeu  bod  gone  out 
on  s  raiding  expedition  the  day  before,  and  though  messengers  bad  boeS 
despatched  on  the  arrival  of  the  cruiaora  over  night  to  recall  these  warriors, 
they  bad  evidently  deemed  it  prudent  not  to  return.  We  were  considerably 
handieappcd  in  not  having  any  mounted  troo|»  to  follow  up  the  enemy 
in  his  flight,  but  the  difliculty  of  lauding  ooiuials  through  the  surf  at  Ulig 
was  known  to  be  bo  great  that  none  were  sent  with  the  force, 

Now-a-days,  combined  action  by  the  army  and  navy  is  of  somewhat 
rare  occurrence,  Mid  it  is  probably  some  time  since  the  men  of  a  British 
infantry  battalion  have  been  shipmates,  have  landed  and  have  fought  ride 
by  side  with  sailors.  It  is  pleasant  to  be  able  to  record  that  the  best  feelings 
of  Domradeship  existed  between  the  representatives  of  both  <iervices  during  the 
fortnight  they  worked  together. 

After  the  capture  of  the  village,  the  Naval  Brigade 
returned  to  the  ships  during  the  afternoon,  the  surf 
being  sufficient  to  make  the  men  get  wet  up  to  the 
neck.  The  embarkation,  however,  was  completed  by 
D  P.M.  The  Admiral  decided  to  leave  ashore  50  men  under 
Lieutenant  P.  H.  Colley,  R. M.L.I. ;  four  maxima  with  their 
crews,  under  Lieutenant  F.  O'B.  Wilson,  R.N.,  of  the 
"  Hyacinth,"  and  the  Hampahires  to  garrison  Illig,  the  whole 
under  the  command  of  Major  S.  C.  F.  Jackson,  who  erected  a 
small  atone  zariba  for  hia  force,  food  and  water  being  landed 
from  the  ahips.  During  the  night  searchlights  were  trained 
on  the  shore  from  the  ships.  While  the  embarkation  was 
proceeding  small  parties  of  Dervishes  were  seen  on  the  clifia, 
and  were  dispersed  by  shell  fire  from  th6  ships. 

On  the  following  day  a  large  working  party  was  landed  to 
demolish    the     enemy's     fortifications.     The     "  Hyacinth's 


k 


294 

boats,  manned  and  armed,  searched  the  cliffs  during  the  fore- 
noon, while  a  £orce  of  Hampshires  and  marines  and  a  maxim 
worked  in  conjunction  along  the  cliffs.  Boats,  manned  and 
armed,  were  also  sent  from  the  "  Fox,"  under  Lieutenant 
S.  H,  Radcliffe,  to  clear  the  caves  on  Middle  Beach,  and  to 
destroy  the  defensive  works  found  there. 

In  the  afternoon  the  "  Fox  "  was  sent  with  an  Intelligence 
officer  on  board  to  Obbia,  taking  a  letter  from  the  Adnural  to 
Sultan  Ali  Yusuf,  asking  him  to  persuade  the  Isa  Mahmoud 
tribe,  to  whom  Illig  formerly  belonged,  and  who  are  friendly 
to  the  Italian  Govenmaent,  to  reoccupy  the  place.  The  Sultan 
sent  a  letter  to  the  tribe  accordingly,  a  copy  of  wluch  he  trans- 
mitted to  the  Admiral. 

During  the  morning  the  "  Mohawk  "  proceeded  10  miles  to 
sea  and  buried  the  men  who  unhappily  lost  their  lives  during 
the  assault. 

On  the  23rd  April  the  Italian  sloop  "  Volturno  "  sent  a 
party  of  bluejackets  under  a  lieutenant  to  help  in  the  work  of 
demolition.'  This  party  worked  very  well  with  our  men, 
and  the  loyal  co-operation  of  Commander  Lorrecchio,  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  "  Volturno  "  was  much  appreciated. 

On  the  24th  the  "Fox"  returned  from  Obbia,  and  the 
"Volturno  "  sailed  for  Bosaso,  taking  17  refugees. 

By  the  25th  the  enemy's  defences  were  demolished,  and 
all  fugitives  found  were  collected. 

The  swell  which  presages  the  south-west  monsoon  having 
increased  daily,  the  Admiral  considered  it  prudent  to  with- 
draw the  garrison,  as  it  would  have  been  in^iossible  to  continue 
to  feed  and  water  the  force  ashore  from  the  ships,  and 
embarkation  was  becoming  very  difficult  and  dangerous. 
Provisions  for  the  refugees  who  wished  to  remain  at  Blig 
having  been  landed,  the  embarkation  oE  the  force  ashore  was 
begun  at  10  a.m.,  the  working  party  being  first  dealt  with, 
then  the  garrison,  and,  lastly,  the  rear-guard  with  the  ensigiL 
Before  this  operation  was  completed  four  lines  of  breakers 
had  risen,  of  which  the  second  one  from  the  shore  was  some- 
times over  a  man's  head.    To  add  to  the  difficulties  the  current 


■  WftB  nmning  so  etrongly  to  the  northward  that  a  considerable 
Biiaiii  had  to  be  kept  on  the  stem  lines  from  the  lieack  to 
keep  the  boats  head  to  sea.  The  boats,  however,  got  away 
i^iularly  and  well,  armed  cutters  with  maxim  gmiB  and 
picked  rifle  shots  covering  tbem  to  put  down  any  attempte 
at  sniping.  When  everything  was  finished,  the  last  boat 
to  leave  the  shore,  a  pinnace,  filled  with  men,  was  swamped, 
owing  to  the  stemfast  being  eased  prematurely.  The 
"  Hyacinth's  "  steam  cutter,  backing  in  to  help,  got  a  rope 
foul  of  her  screw  and  went  on  the  rocks,  where  she  was  beaten 
to  pieces  by  the  surf.  Captain  Hood  therefore  gave  orders  to 
reoccupy  the  heights  temporarily,  and  for  three  boms  the 
officers  and  men  struggled  with  the  surf  in  their  efforts  to  refloat 
the  pinnace.  It  was  eventually  decided  to  leave  the  two 
boats  for  the  night,  and  all  the  party  were  re-embarked  before 
dark. 

At  6  A.M.  the  next  morning  the  surf  having  abated,  the 
Admiral  sent  a  party,  covered  by  two  cutters  with  maxims, 
to  recover  the  pinnace,  which  was  done  by  a  party  under 
Commander  8.  R.  Drury-Lowe,  of  the  "  Hyacinth."  The 
steam-boat,  however,  was  a  complete  wreck,  except  the 
boiler,  which,  being  under  water  and  in  the  surf,  had  to  be 
abandoned,  for  the  rollers  set  in  again  at  8  a.m. 

At  9.30  a.m.  the  "  Hyacinth,"  accompanied  by  the  "Fox," 
sailed  for  Berbera. 

The  enemy's  killed  and  wounded,  counting  only  bo^es 
actually  found,  was  58  killed,  12  wounded.  Of  the  latter 
six  being  villagers,  were  left  at  Illig  with  food,  after  receiving 
medical  treatment.  The  other  six — four  of  them  Dervishes 
— were  placed  under  the  doctor's  care  on  board  the 
"Hyacinth,"  and  removed  to  the  Military  Hospital  at  Berbera 
Of  the  refugees,  in  accordance  with  their  own  requests, 
li  were  sent  to  Berbera  in  the  "Mohawk,"  17  to  Bosasoin  the 
Italian  sloop  "  Voltumo,"  50  went  inland  to  join  their  relatives, 
being  provided  with  three  days'  rations,  and  50  refused  to 
leave  Illig.     The  latter  were  left  there  with  a  week's  rations. 


296 

and  the  huts  which  had  sheltered  one  garriaoii  were  left 
standing  for  them.  A  young  woman,  two  little  boys,  and 
a  little  girl,  were  received  for  passage  in  the  "  Hyacinth  " 
and  transferred  to  the  charge  of  the  authorities  at 
Berbera, 

The  arms  and  material  captured  included  : — 
26  French  Gras  rifles,  bearing  date  1874. 
6  muzzle -loading  Arab  rifles. 

1  Martini -Metford,    with    "B.C.A."    marked    on    it — 

evidently  one  of  those  captured  by  the  Mullah  at 
Gumburu  or  Erigo. 

2  muzele-Ioadii^  carronadea ; 
2  banners ; 

11  surf  boata  (subsequently  destroyed),  and  about  3,000 
skins  belonging  to  the  Mullah. 


i  Fiaijj  FoEcH,  , 


a  ALL  Con- 


Berbera,  Uth  April,  1B04. 

\.—Prefalory. 
1.  The  following  notes  hove  been  compiled  from  information  fumiahed 
by  Commaadoc  Jones,  B.N.,  and  Captain  Blair,  Intelligence  Officer,  in 
November,  1902;  by  Captain  Bethell,  B.N.,  in  Det'Omber,  1903;  by 
Lieutenant  Evans,  Intelligence  Offloer,  in  February,  1904 ;  by  CommodotB 
Bixio,  Italian  Senior  Navat  OlGcer,  and  from  other  aouroes. 


B, — General  Desfription  of  Ihe  Coast  n 


r  lUig. 


a.  TheviBageoflttig— 

(a)  Position. — Dlig  lies  in  north,  latitude  T°  49'  44*,  and  east,  longitude 
49°  Sfy.  (l^om  observationa  talcen  on  bkoie  by  lieutenant 
Bevan,  B.N.) 

(li)  Peacription. — The  village  itself  ia  of  tko  usual  type  of  Somali  Jisbing 
villBgE,  and  normally  consUts  of  some  40  huts,  but  the  Dervish 
garrison  has  probably  caused  an  increase  among  these.  It  is 
situated  at  the  base  of  limeetone  oliffs,  some  150  feet  high,  and 
is  sepiirated  from  the  sea  by  a  narrow  atrip  of  beach  50  yards  wide 
and  300  yards  long. 


At  ft 


297 


1 


^stance  of  two  miles  the  village  can  hardly  be  made  out 

withuut  the  Hid  of  glssaeB,  owing  lo  th«  prevaihug  tawny  hue  of 
both  forpgrouiid  and  bopkgrauDil. 
t^)  Country  behind  Qlig, — From  the  aumniit  of  the  cUHa  an  immense 
uoduUling  plain  strotcheB  westward  lo  the  hoiizon,  the  groond 
bring  mostly  aoliil  rock  covered  with  loose  stones. 
(((]  Water  supply. — Tlie  water  supply  of  Illig  apparently  consists  solely 
ot  a  nngle  small  well  at  the  foot  of  the  oliSs,  and  some  200  yards 
east  of  the  village.     The  water  in  the  well  is  only  3  inches  deep  and 
is  quite  insufficient  to  supply  even  a  small  force, 
(e)  Defence?. — Taptwo  Bcthell,  B.N.,  who  inspected  lUig  from  the  sea 
on  the  lOth  December.  1903,  atotes  :— 

A  Urge  atone  zariba  on  top  of  the  cliSe  at  lUig  is  plainly 
visihb  hom  the  sea.  The  sea  frontage  appears  to  be  over  200  yards 
in  length  ;  the  walb,  which  are  about  0  feet  in  height,  forming  the 
sky  line  as  seen  from  a  ship.  The  cliffs  here  are  obout  150  feet  high,* 
■o  that  even  from  the  masthead  it  is  not  poaaible  to  see  into  the 
Eoriba  or  beyond  the  front  wall;  but,  yiowed  from  some  distance 
at  sea  through  a  glass,  its  shape  appears  to  be  square,  and  its  front 
wall  about  100  yards  from  tho  edge  of  the  cliff.  A  steep  path 
down  the  face  of  the  chff  leads  to  the  beach  where  the  village  is 
situated." 

Lieutenant  Evans,  R.B.,  lutelligence  Ofliccr,  who  inspected 
lUig  from  the  "  Pomone,"  on  15th  February,  1004,  gives  the  some 
description  of  this  w^U,  in  which,  however,  he  remarked  two 
openings.  Ho  added  that  it  is  impossible  to  t«ll  from  the  sea 
whether  this  is  a  single  wall  giving  frontal  defence  only,  or  a 
completely  surrounded  st^me  zariba. 

It  is  obvious  that  Capttun  Bethell's  description  must  be  similarly 
limited. 

Both  officers  received  somewhat  vague  inlormation  to  the  effect 
that  there  was  another  stone  building  further  inland  and  invisibLe 
from  the  sbb.  This  is  corroborated  by  thu  reports  of  deserters  and 
spes  forwarded  from  other  directions,  who  state  that  there  ore  two 
stone  "houses."  The  use  of  the  word  "house"  would  imply 
that  the  wall  seen  from  the  sea  is,  as  Captain  Betbell  thinks, 
merely  the  front  of  a  completely  enclosed  building. 

Captain  Biiio  forwards  a  sketch  which,  in  addition  to  depicting 
the  above  wall,  also  shows  a  wall  with  two  openings  ia  it,  which 
directly  covers  the  village  on  the  beach. 

lieutenant  Evans  alludes  to  a  barricade  in  front  of  the  village, 

and  draws  a  thing  which  may  represent  a  wall  such  as  Captain  Blxio 

describes  and  which  uiay  not. 

(/)  Ecaoorcos. — Commander  Jones,   in   November,   1902,   found  aomo 

13  or  U.  surf  boats  in  Elig  or  its  yicinity.     lieutenant  Evans,  in 

'  See  Plate  16  as  to  height  of  cliffs  and  other  details. 


Keiii'uary,  I'Mi,  could  only  luake  out  uiie  tirawii  up  un  liie  IicsikIi 
behind  the  biuricade.  There  may,  however,  have  been  moru 
boats  which  lie  could  not  see,  but  he  does  not  state  whetUor  it  is 
Itoasiblo  to  Bee  behind  the  barricade  which  he  mcntiouB. 
(y)  (Jam ping  ground. — There  is  no  site  for  a  good  camping  ground  on  the 
beaoh, 

3.  Middle  beach. — About  b^lE  a  mile  to  thu  west  of  Illig  there  is  aootbEr 
sbip  of  hcach,  longer  than  that  at  Illig.  The  (.IUIb  preaent  the  samo  ap- 
pearance ;  the  beach  ia  apparently  uniiaed  and  there  in  no  water  supply. 

i.  GaUuU  River— 

{a)  General  deEcription.— The  river  runs  in  a  ravine  with  banks  100  ieet 
high  of  white  honeycoiabcd  roek.  The  bed  of  the  river  ia  of  sand 
or  gravel.  The  mouth  of  the  river  is  some  3J  miles  west  of  Illig. 
There  is  a  bar  at  the  mouth  which  prevents  boats  going  up  the 
river  at  all,  even  at  high  tide.  Near  the  mouth  there  arc  some 
very  deep  pools.  Beyond  halt  a  mile  from  the  mouth  the  river 
has  to  be  continually  croased,  for  it  spreads  itself  into  many  small 
itreams.  At  1,000  yards  from  the  mouth  there  is  a  natural  flat 
road  of  solid  rock  on  the  right  (south)  bank,  10  yards  broadi, 
leodiog  from  the  river  up  tfl  the  plateau  at  a  sloj*  of  1  in  10.  The 
upper  portion  of  this  road  would  have  to  be  slightly  improved. 

Ih)  Water  supply. — 800  yards  from  the  mouth  the  water  is  good  and 
drinkable.  It  ia  ample  for  any  force  and  the  quality  is  good, 
though  the  taste  is  slightly  brackish. 

(e)  Camping  ground. — There  is  a  very  good  camping  ground  above  the 
;  it  ia  200  yards  square,  fairly  level  and  smooth,  and  could  ho 


aft  place  for  a  oamel 
np  could  be  easily  defended.  It 
ample  stones  to  make  walls  in  a 


uicreascd  to  any  bIkc.  There 
lariba  near  the  camp.  The  en 
is  not  overlooked,  and  there  an 

,  NoTB. — The  report  (Bl^)  omits  to  state  whether  the  camping 
ground  is  on  the  right  or  left  bank,  but  £rom  internal  evidence 
it  appears  probable  that  it  is  situated  on  the  right,  or  south,  bank. 

[d)  Fuel  and  gra;cing. — There  is  not  a  good  supply  of  fuel  at  hand,  and 

it  would  have  to  bo  brought  in  from  about  G  miles  off. 

(e)  The  surrounding   country. — An  immense  and  imdulntjng  plateau 

extends  west  and  south-west  to  the  Guremaile  Desert.  This 
plateau  is  stony  for  tho  most  part.  To  the  north  the  country 
becomes  much  broken  and  intersected  by  many  deep  ravines, 

n.  The  Nogal  Siter— 

(i)  General  description. — The  mouth  of  the  Nogal  Eiver  is  about  10  miles 

from  Illig,  measured  along  the  coast,  and  9  miles  in  a  straight  line. 

In  November  the  river  just  flows  into  the  sea  at  low  tide.     Neai 


III. 


299 

the  mouth  there  are  many  quicksands,  and  scrub  and  thick  bush 
grow  in  the  bed  of  the  river. 

Hie  banks  are  precipitous,  and  there  are  a  few  deep  {)ooLs  in  the 
river  which  spreals  itself  well  over  the  bed. 

There  is  a  smcdl  village  called  Khil  on  the  right  (south)  bank,  and 
another  called  Karim  on  the  left  bank. 

(b)  Landing  places. — ^The  shore  is  steep,  and  although  landing  is  {jossible 

there  is  no  point  at  which  it  would  be  easy. 

(c)  Water  supply. — ^The  water  is  impregnated  with  salt,  strongly  ai>crient, 

and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Medical  Officer  of  the  "  Pomone,"  of  a 
quaUty  undesirable  for  drinking  use. 

Near  the  northern  village  there  is  a  stream  called  Harariey, ' 
which  contains  fresh  water  ;   quality  not  rei)ortcd  on. 

id)  Fuel  and  grazing. — ^Fuel  is  ample,  and  the  grazing  was  found  to  be 
good  in  November,  1902  (a  wet  year). 

(«)  Camping  ground. — Owing  to  the  broken  nature  of  the  country  it 
would  be  difficult  to  select  a  good  camping  ground. 

6.  Erindera — 

(a)  General  description. — Erindera  is  some  4  miles  north  of  the  Nogal 
Bivtf .  Hiere  is  a  small  breakwater  and  a  narrow  strip  of  sandy 
beach,  and  beyond  that  an  overhanging  precipice.  Dhows  bound 
for  mig  are  unloaded  here  duimg  the  north-east  monsoon,  the 
stuff  being  carried  to  Illig  in  surf  boats. 

There  are  some  half  dozen  small  huts  on  the  beach. 

(6)  Resources. — ^Lieutenant  Evans,  in  February,  1904,  saw  six  surf  boats 
drawn  up  on  the  beach,  and  piles  of  food  and  cloth,  which  were 
being  hastily  carried  up  the  cliff  by  women. 

0. — Notes  on  Disembarkation  (Commander  JoneSy  R,N,,  November,  1902). 

7.  Points  where  landings  might  be  effected. — ^There  are  three  points  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Illig  where  a  landing  might  be  effected — 

(a)  At  the  village  itself  where  there  is  a  beach  about  300  yards  ii;  length. 

{b)  About  half  a  mile  to  the  west  of  Illig  where  tbere  is  a  longer  beach 
(described  under  the  title  of  "  middle  beach "  in  paragraph  3  of 
these  notes). 

(c)  On  the  beach  at  the  entrance  of  the  Gallule  River. 

On  all  of  these  beaches  there  is  a  surf  constantly  beating 
(November),  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  land  in  ordinary  boats. 

8.  Native  boats  available. — ^There  were  some  13  or  14  native  boats  available 
in  November,  1902  {see  paragraph  2  (/) ).  These  boats  are  about  25  feet  in 
length,  float  very  high  in  the  water,  have  sharp  overhanging  bow  and  stern, 
and  are  built  in  a  sharp  V-shaped  section,  the  planks  being  fastened  to  the 
timber  and  to  each  other  by  cord  in  place  of  nails. 

The  boats  are  worked  by  seven  men  with  paddles.  The  men  jump  out 
and  haul  the  boat  up  as  she  takes  the  ground. 


TliB  boats  are  very  a'aJib  mid  iiuulJ  lie  tttsily  upoet,  and  uoL  more  than 
8  Of  10  soldiet's  could  bo  Wideil  at  a  time,  according  to  the  state  of  the  Burf . 

It  ifl  not  poBsible  to  beach  dhowa  anywhere  at  lliig,  and  they  miiEt  also 
anchor  outside  the  breakers. 

it.  Anciorage  and  weather  at  lUig. — There  is  excellent  shelter  from  the 
BOuth-west  mooBODn,  but  the  bay  ia  quite  open  to  the  north-eoat. 

Large  transporta  could  anchor  at  little  more  than,  a  mile  from  laoding 
placea ;  the  bay  ehoata  very  regulsJ'ly,  andl  have  had  it  carefully  aounded. 
There  would  be  no  danger  in  appruiu^hing  the  shore  until  a  depth  of 
7  fathoms  is  obtained,  and  then  to  anchor  (for  a  steamer  drawing  25  feet). 

All  accounts  agree  that  the  wind  is  less  during  November  and  December 
than  in  January  and  February,  after  which  it  again  improyes  until  the  burst 
of  the  south-west  monsoou.  Then,  I  am  infonned,  a  heavy  swell  sets  in, 
dming  which  the  beach  at  Dlig  provides  a  better  landing  place  than  the 
other  two  beaches. 

It  ia  probable  also  that,  with  a  strong  uorth-eaat  wind,  the  Blig  beach 
might  be  used  whotf  that  at  Gallulc  was  impracticable. 

10.  Proposed  method  oj  landing. — I  would  propose  to  prepare  two  rafts 
oE  casks  and  timber,  each  of  36  casks  (54  gallons),  laxbed  under  a  strong 
timber  frame.  Work  planked  over.  Lay  down  anchora  outside  the  s\irf 
and  warp  the  rafts  from  the  anchor  to  and  fro  to  the  ahote  throiagh  the  surL 
Ordinary  boats  or  a  steam  tug  to  convey  troops  and  stores  from  the  trans- 
ports to  the  rafts. 

The  early  morning  and  the  forenoon  are  the  best  times  tor  landing.  In 
tho  afternoon  the  wind  is  stronger  and  the  surf  greater. 

D. — Diecuesion  of  posaible  Landing  Places. 

11.  Teehnical, — From  Commander  Jones'  report  (paragraphs  7  to  10), 
it  would  appear  that  ia  November  disembarkation  at  any  one  of  the  three 
pionta  mentioned  by  him  would  be  difficult,  and  oould  only  be  accomplished 
by  means  of  surf  boata,  and  that  during  the  south-west  monsoon  the  beach 
at  Illig  itself  might  be  capable  of  being  used  wheu  that  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Gallnle  Biver  would  be  impracticable. 

It  is  believed  that  during  the  present  intermediate  soBflon  of  tho  "  tilal " 
landing  at  any  one  of  the  three  points  would  be  much  simpler  than  when 
Commander  Jones  reported  on  tho  place.  This  is,  however,  a  technical 
naval  question  into  which  I  am  not  qualified  to  go. 

12.  Military  eortsideratitine. — Apart  from  the  important  [raint  regarding 
the  opposition  which  might  be  ofEered  to  a  force  disembarking  at  Illig  itaolf, 
there  appear  to  be  two  great  objections  to  the  landing  being  efleuted  at  that 

(a)  There  is  no  soitable  campmg  ground,  and  tho  total  standing  room 

appears  to  be  very  limited. 
(6)  Mote  important  still  the  water  supply  appears  to  bo  altogatiia 

insufficient. 
Similar  reaaona  militate  against  the  selection  of  the  "  middle  bcaoh." 


301 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Gftllulo  Rivta-,  31  miles  to  the  wisat  of  lUig,  uECords 
a  good  camping  ground,  and  an  esoeUent  water  supply  eiiBta  within  half-a- 
mile  of  the  proponed  Eite. 

A  landing  there  could  not  be  ao  easily  opposed,  and  an  advance  from 
that  point  along  the  top  of  the  cliRs  would  turn  the  stone  wall  defences 
iibove  the  village  if  they  prove  to  be  merely  single  walls  providing  frontal 
defence  only.  If  tho  walls  turn  out  to  be  the  front  faces  of  stone  zaribas, 
the  attacMng  force  would  be  at  any  rate  in  a  far  better  position  to  a,asault 
them  than  if  it  disembarked  at  Ulig  and  climbed  the  clifFa  under  lire. 

It  would  be  necessary  to  carry  water  from  the  Gallule  River,  aa  there  is 
none  t^  be  foimd  en  roiiU. 

The  nature  of  the  country  between  the  Oallulo  River  and  the  clifia 
overlooking  Illig  is  unknowTi,  but  nullahs  must  be  expected,  and  the  actual 
difitanoe  to  be  marched  may  bo  very  considerably  more  than  the  3J  miles 
ot  coast-line  distance. 

The  reported  want  of  fuol  in  tho  immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  proposed 
landing  place  is  a  drawback  which  will  require  special  arrangements  to  bo 

I  Attention  should  bo  drawn  to  the  remark  (paragraph  4  (u) )  that  the 
wc  portion  of  tho  road  leading  up  to  tho  plateau  requires  to  tic  slightly 
Koved.     This  may,  however,  only  refer  to  camel  transport. 
E. — EthnographiaU  NoUf. 
13.  Prior  to  tho  Mullah's  raid,  Illig  and  the  surrounding  country  web 
ifly  inhabited  by  the  Musa  laa  section  of  the  laa  Jlahmud  (nicknamed 
Isi  Rioh  on  account  of  their  largo  holdings  in  sheep  and  goats).   The  left 
Mahmud   is   nnmerically  the  strongest  of  the  three  main  divisions  of  the 
I  Mijjarten,  the  Osman  (or  Isman)  Mahmud  and  the  Omar  Mahmud  coming 

next  in  order.  Practically,  however,  the  Osman  Mahmud  are  by  far  the 
strongest  division,  not  only  on  account  of  being  the  family  tribe  of  the 
paramount  Chief  Osman  Mahmud,  hut  by  reason  of  the  numbers  of  rifles 
which  they  possess,  and  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  important  trading 
ts  of  Bosaso,  Handa,  Baa  Eafun  and  others,  belong  to  tbem. 
The  principal  "  jilibs"  of  the  Musa  laa  living  normally  at  or  near  Illig 
Wliie— 

Mahmad.  Ba  WorsangU,  living  at  lUig- 
Mahmud,  Ba  WorsangU,  living  at  Illig. 
Ba  Aurtableh,  Ba  Idayun,  living  at  Gallule  and  Illig. 
Ba  Morohon,  Ba  Idayun,  living  at  Gallule  and  Dlig. 
Shirouan,  Bo  Idaynn,  living  at  Gallule  to  Nogal. 
Samattar,  Ba  Idayun,  living  at  Gallule  to  Nogal. 
Jaralto,  Ba  Ida.yun,  living  at  Gallule  to  Nogal. 
Musa  Adhi,  Ba  Idayun,  living  at  Gallule. 

Hosein  (or  Ba  Dolbahanta),  Ba  Idayun,  living  at  Garad  to  Ulig. 
^amarkab,  Ba  Idaynn,  Garad  to  lUlg. 
L  In  addition,  a  few  Omar  Malunud,  chiefly  traders,  used  to  live  at  DUg. 


The    Isa   Mubnoiud   DarmaJlf   euknonledge   a  ui 
llogianop  to  the  piiramoutit  Sultaa   OBiaan  Mahmiid. 


V.—Bteeni  Evtut 


•tlUig. 


14.  About  the  middle  nt  lant  August  the  Mnllfth,  who  h&d  been  ^tting 
donri  in  the  south -etisf«m  Nogal,  moved  with  a  forte  omountin;;,  aoeording 
to  report,  to  3,000  mounted  m^n,  on  Illig,  wid  absolutely  cleaned  out  the 
place.  Over  UOO  &0ijnrten  lue  said  to  have  been  killed,  100  rifles  captored 
(on  exaggernljon}.  and  the  whole  of  the  very  nuinecouH  flocks  and  herds  token 
ftway.  Tlio  loot  was  driven  away  to  the  Nogal,  and  os  is  usual,  the  un- 
fortuoato  Muaa  Isa  had  to  follow,  and  became  nominally  Dervishes.  After 
the  fight  at  Jidbali,  and  tha  retreat  to  Jid  All  in  the  north,  most  of  these 
people  are  believed  to  have  broken  away  and  to  be  in  the  coast  comitry  to 
tliB  north  of  Ulig. 

IG,  .\fter  the  rud  the  Mullah  returned  to  the  Nogal,  leaving  at  Hiig  a 
garrison  which  has  been  mEuntained  until  now.  (For  estimate  of  strength, 
Kt  paragraph  22. )  Before  his  departure  he  gave  orders  for  the  construction 
of  the  two  stone  hoEiaes,  forts  or  eDclosures,  which  have  been  already  reported 
on.  When  the  MuUah  retreated  north,  as  the  result  of  our  operatiiHis  in 
the  Nogal,  the  garrison  found  itself  cut  off,  and,  as  a  conaequeuoe  of  the 
waterless  state  of  the  Northern  Hand  and  the  presence  of  the  Ut  Brigade 
at  Halin  guarding  the  Nogal  water  supply,  it  has  hitherto  been  unable  in 
rejoin  the  MuUah. 

16.  Chiefly  in  coneequcnce  of  this  raid,  and  partially  because  of  the 
ootiiig  of  some  of  his  caravans,  Osman  Malimud,  the  paiamount  cbieE 

who  had  always  hitherto  been  on  the  most  friendly  terms  with  the  Mulluh, 
changed  his  attitude,  and  has  nvaae  then,  nominally  at  least,  professed 
bitter  enmity  to  him. 

17.  On  the  14th  Ootobur,  lfl03,  tho  Italian  warship  "I^mbardia" 
visited  Illig  and  sent  two  boats  to  the  shore ;  when  ncariug  the  Iwaoh  (bo 
interpreter  swam  on  ahoie.  Almost  direetly  afterwards  fire  was  opened 
on  the  boats  from  thu  rooks  close  to  the  village,  and  the  ship  recalled  the 
boats.  The  ship  at  once  opened  fire  on  the  village  and  on  the  stone  wall 
crowning  the  cliff,  and  contJnued  tho  bombardment  until  sunset  The 
interpreter,  who  had  just  landed  when  Are  was  opened,  swam  cut  to  and 
regained  the  ship.  The  "  Lombardia  "  continued  the  bombardment  on  the 
following  day,  hut  was  unable  to  ascertain  what  results  had  been  achieved. 

Oo  the  rutiim  journey  from  Obbia  the  "Iiombardia"  slowed  down 
opposite  Illig  and  was  able  to  observe  that  the  garri-ion,  or  at  any  rate  the 
party  told  off  to  resist  disembarkalion,  had  he«n  largely  inoreased  anoe  her 
previous  visit. 

18.  At  the  end  of  October  the  Captain  of  the  Italian  naiship  "  Coatit 
reported  that  he  hod  arranged  with  Osnian  Mohmud  for  a  combined  attack 
on  Blig,  to  take  place  during  the  first  10  days  of  November,  the  Mijjsrten 
to  advance  by  land  and  tho  ships  to  bombard  the  place. 


.%3 

Owing  to  our  own  movements  at  this  juncture,  wo  asked  that  this  attack 
shonld  be  deferred  for  a  few  days,  and  eventually  nothing  came  of  it. 

19.  A  few  days  ago  the  Italian  authorities  reported  that  Osman  Mahmud 
had  lately  sent  a  small  force  down  to  attack  Illig  and  gain  possession  of  it, 
and  that  the  expedition  had  been  apparently  unsuccessful. 

20.  Our  latest  news  from  Ilalin,  dated  the  9th  or  10th  April,  and  requiring 
confirmation,  is  that  refugees  rci)ort  that  the  Dervish  Karias  are  trekking 
across  the  Northern  Haud  towards  Kallis,  and  that  the  Mullah  and 
Haroun  had  left  the  Darror  Valley  and  had  gone  towards  Illig.  Even  if  this 
be  true  (and  it  is  most  probable)  it  must  not  be  taken  that  the  Mullah 
will,  of  necessity,  actually  sit  down  at  Illig.  He  may  content  himself  with 
some  position  such  as  Unkud,  said  to  bo  20  miles  up  the  Nogal  River, 
where  there  is  a  water  supply ;  or,  if  sufficient  rain  has  fallen,  ho  may 
merely  sit  down  at  the  most  convenient  ball  (rain  pool)  out  of  immediate 
striking  distance  of  Blig. 

It  may,  however,  bo  taken  as  probable,  almost  as  certain,  that,  after 
his  movement  across  the  Northern  Haud,  he  must  sit  down  somewhere  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Lower  Nogal  before  moving  on  to  his  ultimate 
objective,  which  is  believed  to  be  the  Hawiya  country  and  the  middle  and 
lower  Webi  Shebeli.  He  is  uudoubtedly  in  a  very  bad  way,  he  has  had 
considerable  (though  possibly  much  exaggerated)  defections  from  his 
standard,  his  ponies  and  burden  camels  have  suffered  severely,  and  he 
realises  that  he  will  have  to  brush  through  whatever  opposition  Ali  Yusuf 
ia  capable  of  offering.  Personally,  I  do  not  believe  that  this  opposition 
would  amount  to  very  much,  but  the  Mullah  is  rei)orted  to  fear  it,  and  he 
18  bound  to  take  it  into  serious  consideration. 

G. — Mullah's  Property  at  lUig. 

21.  Various  accoimts  have  been  received  from  different  soiurcos,  all 
disagreeing  as  to  details,  but  all  agreeing  that  some  time  ago  the  Mullah 
sent  the  bulk  of  his  skins  to  Illig,  and  that  they  are  still  there.  There  may  be 
something  in  this,  and  it  must  not  bo  forgotten  that  skins  represent  the 
Mullah* s  chief  source  of  revenue,  and  are  converted  into  arms,  ammimition, 
food  and  clothing.  Inasmuch  as  they  are  very  bulky,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  rapidly  remove  these  skins,  and  they  should  become  a  certsdn  spoil, 
unless  they  have  already  been  taken  away  by  dhow.  They  would  probably 
be  hidden  in  nullahs  or  in  caves  and  clefts  in  the  cliffs. 

H. — Estimate  of  the  Dervish  Force  at  Illig, 

22.  The  garrison. — ^When  the  Mullah  returned  to  the  Nogal  after  the  raid 
on  Ulig,  he  left  there,  as  a  permanent  garrison,  100  mounted  riflemen.  He 
subsequently  reinforced  this  garrison  by  a  fiurther  100  men.  The  garrison 
was  again  increased  in  October  last,  owing  to  the  proceedings  of  the  "  Lom- 
bardia,"  and  in  November  it  was  reported  to  consist  of  400  men  with  about 
150  rifles. 

Recent  events  have  here,  as  elsewhere,  had  the  effect  of  causing  a  wastage 


smoDg  tlie  Dorvishes,  and  last  month  the  garriaon  was  reported  to  have 
dwindled  by  deeerlion  to  aomfi  '200  men  with  under  lOO  rifics. 

Some  fishermen  put  off  to  Commodore  Bixio  tlie  other  day  ofF  Illig,  and 
stated  that  the  Dervish  garrisoa  was  now  very  Bmal). 

23.  The  Mnllah's  main  farce.— Oar  latest  (unoonfirmed)  news  is  to 
the  effeet  that  the  Mullah  moved  from  the  Darrar  on  the  3rd  April, 
maMng  {or  Illig.  U  that  ia  so,  aud  if  he  has  not  aat  down  on  the  way,  hp 
should  now  be  at  ITlig  or  in  its  vicinity.  I  therefore  give  the  following 
notes  on  tha  strength  of  his  following : — 

Aft<!r  the  fight  at  Jidhali  it  was  estimated  that  the  Mullah  still  had 
1,400  rifles  and  Bome  5,000  good  fighting  men.  Many  of  these  men,  witii  a 
proportion  of  rifles,  drew  away  ot  were  left  with  the  Kariaa  in  the  Soiithern 
Haud,  and  it  is  believed  that,  when  turned  out  oE  the  Jid  Ali  di&lriot  last 
month  by  General  Fasken,  he  did  not  muster  more  than  3,000  or  3,fi00 
lighting  men  and  1,000  rifles. 

Since  then  all  reports  agree  as  to  a  large  number  oE  desertioue  having 
taken  place,  and  the  latest  Bosaso  news  puts  hia  flghting  strength  at  not  more 
than  800  men,  200  to  GOO  rifles,  ajid  200  ponies.  This  is  an  nnderestimate, 
I  think,  and  I  should  be  inclined  to  reckon  on  a  possible  2,000  men  witii 
800  rifles.  But  it  is  really  all  guess  work,  as  we  have  had  Uttle  or  no  reliable 
neWB  of  him  since  the  Mullah  entered  Mijjarten  territory. 
Fosl»rrip(. 

24.  ReeaU  tvonts  at  Illig. — News  roooivod  at  Bosaso  from  two  nephews 
of  Sultan  Nor,  who  deserted  from  tho  Haroun  at  Maddl,  near  the  Darror 
on  1st  April,  WBS  to  the  ofiect  that  the  Musa  lEa  Mahmud  Mijjarten 
had  had  a  big  Gght  with  the  Dervish  garrison  at  Illig,  and  that  many  had 
been  killed  on  either  side ;  actual  results  not  known. 

AU  Yusuf  ia  reported  to  have  built  a  fort  at  Oape  Garad  and  another  a 
Galkayu,  and  ia  prepared  to  fight  the  Mnllah  should  he  go  south.  There  has 
been  a  good  deal  of  rain  lately  at  Illig. 

25.  Mvllah'a  movements  (extra  special  edition). — The  sante  infonnonta 
state  (and  are  corroborated  by  two  other  deserters)  that  the  Haroun  was 
preparing  to  leave  Madda  on  the  1st,  but  was  only  going  to  Ishbo  Sbuban, 
10  miles  E.S.E.,  and  that  tho  Mullah  did  not  mean  to  go  to  Dlig,  not  only  on 
account  o£  the  waterless  journey,  but  because  he  had  been  frightened  by 
the  news  of  the  fighting  there. 

As  these  men  left  the  Uaroim  on  1st  April,  their  news  as  to  actual  events 
does  not  contradict  that  given  in  paragraphs  20  and  23,  as  to  Us  having  left 
the  Darror  Valley  on  the  3rd  April. 


CHAPTER    Vlir. 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS. 

Strategy. 

t  Each  of  the  "  small "  wars  in  which  BritiBb  troops  find 
>  often  engaged  against  semi -civilised  or  savage 
has  its  own  characteristics,  and  the  operations  in 
Soma Ul and  formed  no  departure  from  the  general  rule. 
The  special  feature  which  characterised  the  four  expedi- 
tions against  the  Mullah  was  that  they  involved  the 
double  task  of  suppressing  a  collection  of  lawless  and  hostile 
tribes  living  within  and  outside  the  limits  of  British  territory, 
and  of  overthrowing  a  dangerous  alien  foe,  who,  from  an  in- 
determinate position  and  with  a  still  more  indeterminate  force, 
threatened  the  peace  and  integrity  of  the  British  and  foreign 
protectorates  in  Somali  land. 

Owing  to  this  pecuUar  nature  and  position  of  the  enemy 
and  to  the  geographical  position  of  British  Somaliland, 
surrotmded  as  it  is  on  its  land  frontier  by  foreign  protectorates, 
the  campaign  resolved  itself  into  one  of  expediency,  com- 
plicated by  poUtical  considerations  which  placed  no  small 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  commanders  by  neutralising 
their  plans  and  preventing  the  campaign  from  being  brought 
to  a  speedy  and  satisfactory  conclusion. 

Having  briefly  dealt  with  the  cause  of  the  war  as  affecting 
its  general  conditions,  and,  as  the  principal  political,  strategical 
and  tactical  considerations  which  influenced  the  mihtary 
problem  in  the  several  expeditions  have  been  fully  presented 
in  the  preceding  chapters,  it  is  only  necessary  here  to  re- 
"^      (89271  u 


306 

capitulate  and  give  prominence  to  some  of  the  more  important 
points  from  which  lessons  may  be  leamt  in  a  struggle  con- 
ducted against  such  an  enemy  as  the  Mullah,  and  in  a  country 
which  possessed  such  exceptional  features  as  Somaliland. 

In  considering  the  strategy  to  be  adopted  in  Somaliland 
warfare  a  distinction  should  be  drawn  between  expeditions  of 
the  nature  of  those  despatched  against  the  Mullah,  and  petty 
punitive  or  coercive  measures  undertaken  against  single  tribes, 
such  as  the  expedition  in  1893  against  the  Aidagalla,  and  in 
1895  against  the  Rer  Hared  (Habr  Awal  Jibril  Abukir). 

The  operations  against  the  Mullah,  though  commenced 
on  a  comparatively  small  scale  against  what  was  apparently 
regarded  at  the  outset  as  an  insignificant  foe,  were,  in  their 
later  stages,  carried  out  against  a  strong  force  of  well  armed 
fanatics,  combined  and  controlled  by  a  single  individual 
whose  prestige,  foUowing  and  resources  bad  increased  with 
his  success  to  such  an  extent  that  in  the  final  phase  of  the 
operations  we  were  obliged  to  place  in  the  field  a  force  of 
some  6,000  regulars  and  1,000  to  1,500  irregulars.  Here  the 
object  was  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  fighting  force, 
and  the  strategy  was  aimed  at  bringing  it  to  battle.  Owing, 
however,  to  the  disinclination  of  Somalis  to  come  to  close 
quarters — unless  they  can  attack  by  surprise — and  to  their 
great  mobility  (70  miles  being  covered  in  a  day  by  mounted 
and  40  to  50  occasionally  by  dismounted  parties),  it  was 
found  to  be  difficult  even  with  mounted  troops,  to  infliot 
heavy  losses  on  them  in  men.  Small  formed  bodies  were 
sometimes  surprised  by  our  patrols  and  advanced  parties, 
but  such  surprises  were  exceptional  owing  to  the  enemy's 
system  of  spies  and  scouts,  the  latter  being  often  50  to  70 
miles  ahead  of  the  main  body. 

I  For  petty  punitive  and  coercive  operations  against  single 
tribes,  or  against  a  number  of  disconnected  sub-tribes,  com- 
paratively  small  forces  were  found  to  suffice,  and  the  strate^ 
adopted  had  for  its  object  the  capture  of  the  enemy's  material 
;3— his  Hocks  and  henk,  on  which  Somalis  are  almost 


m 


entirely  dependent  for  their  food,  uie&t  and  milk  aa 
the  occupation  of  their  permanent  weUs,  on  which  during  the 
dry  season  the  esdstence  of  their  camels,  cattle  and  sheep, 
aa  well  as  of  their  ponies  depends.  The  usual  mode  of  action  in 
such  cases  was  to  send  ahead  the  mounted  troops,  who  might 
be  required  to  march  some  90  te  120  miles  in  48  hours,  in  order 
to  efiect  the  capture.  The  transport  in  the  meantime  was 
left  with  the  dismounted  portion  of  the  force,  which,  protected 
with  a  strong  zariba,  occupied  some  important  source  of  water 
supply.  As  there  is  little  union  between  the  various  sub- 
tribes  and  clans  the  measures  indicated  above  were  generally 
followed  by  the  submission  of  the  sub-tribe  concerned,  and, 
if  continued  from  one  sub-tribe  to  another  resulted  in  the 
Bubjugation  of  a  wide  area. 

In  addition  to  the  exceptional  characteristics  of  the 
T,  the  question  of  water  supply  was  a  dominating 
throughout  the  four  expeditions.  It  confined,  in 
Ijie  dry  season,  the  movements  of  our  troops  to  certain 
lite  and  known  lines  of  wells,  unless  sufficient  trana- 
t  could  be  collected  to  carry  water.  Even  then  permanent 
pBter  could  not  be  left  for  more  than  a  few  days  at 
'^irae.  At  the  same  time  the  water  question  hmited  the 
Mullah's  movements,  though  not  to  such  a  degree  as  those 
of  our  troops,  for  an  irregular  body  of  men  like  his,  possessing 
an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  coimtry  and  its  water  resources, 
could  be  scattered  over  a  large  area  and  told  to  concentrate 
at  some  given  point,  while  many  considerations  of  supply  and 
transport  render  such  a  proceeding  impossible  with  regular 
troops  or  with  troops  under  any  definite  organization.  Again, 
in  most  parts  of  SomaUland  "living  on  the  country"  was 
impossible  with  any  considerable  body  of  troops.  This  diffi- 
culty more  or  less  tied  a  commander  to  his  lines  of  communica- 
tion, whilst  the  Mullah,  whose  followers  subsisted  chiefly 
I  camels'  milk  or  camels,  was  practically  free  to  move  an 
WjOB  pleased.  It  must  be  realised  therefore  that  many  of  the 
iinary  rules  of  strategy  do  not  apply  to  these  expeditions. 
(8927)  "  u  :! 


well  as  ■ 


First  and 

expeditions. 


308 

On  the  other  hand,  the  general  principleB  of  tactics  as  used 
in  savage  warfare  apply  to  those  as  to  other  expeditions 
against  an  undisciplined  enemy. 

After  water  supply,  and  closely  linked  with  it,  another 
factor  in  the  operations  was  that  of  tranbport.  In  a  country 
which  is  not  practicable  for  wheeled  transport  the  pack  animal 
was  the  only  possible  means  of  transport  with  a  field  force, 
for  no  carriers  were  available. 

The  success  or  failure  of  an  expedition  depended,  therefore, 
largely  on  a  thoroughly  well  organized  system  of  transport, 
the  selection  of  a  suitable  pack  animal,  and  on  hia  treatment 
when  obtained  and  the  amount  of  water  and  food  which  he 
requires  to  keep  him  in  working  condition.  To  equip  a  force 
with  hastily  improvised  transport  was  incurring  grave  risks, 
besides  being  an  economically  wasteful  proceeding. 

Many  other  points  call  for  attention,  such  as  the  organiza- 
tion of  an  efficient  system  of  intelligence  and  of  efficient  means 
of  communication,  the  necessity  of  careful  and  tactful  dealings 
with  the  surrounding  tribes  and  the  importance  of  a  well 
organized  base  and  hues  of  communication,  and  the  fact  that 
mounted  troops,  or,  at  any  rate,  troops  which  can  be  rapidly 
transported  from  place  to  place,  are  above  all  others  necessary 
in  a  country  like  Somahland. 

It  is  instructive  to  see  to  what  extent  the  above  con- 
siderations affected  the  conduct  of  the  several  campaigns. 

With  regard  to  the  first  and  second  expeditions,  it  is 
pleasing  to  record  the  courage,  endurance  and  untiring  energy 
which  prompted  a  handful  of  officers  in  command  of  small 
body  of  hastily  raised  local  levies  to  penetrate  into  a  practically 
unknown  country  and  seek  out  an  imknown  but  determined 
enemy.  But  it  is  difficult  to  beheve  that  the  nature  and 
conditions  of  the  undertaking  were  adequately  realised 
and  appreciated  at  the  time.  The  theatre  of  operations 
and  the  resources  of  the  district  for  mihtary  operations  were 
practically  a  sealed  book,  the  preparations  for  the  campaign 
were    incomplete,   the    organization    of   the   force   was   im- 


set,  the  line  of  communication  was  (iangerously  weak, 
while  the  adminiatrative  services  were  more  apparent  than 
real.  It  is  not  unfair  to  say  that  the  success  of  the  operation 
so  far  as  it  went,  was  due  more  to  good  fortune  than  to  suitable 
and  scientific  preparation,  and  Colonel  Swayne  may  be  con- 
gratulated on  having  managed  to  extricate  himself  so  success- 
fully as  he  did  from  a  difficult  and  hazardous  undertaking. 

The  reasons  for  such  ill-prepared  enterprises  are  not  far  to 
seek.  Small  wars  of  the  kind  in  question  generally  break  out 
unexpectedly  and  in  unexpected  places,  and  the  local  system 
of  military  or  police  organization  is  often  unsuitable  or  in- 
adequate to  meet  satisfactorily  such  a  contingency.  It  is, 
however,  due  to  the  commander  of  the  force  to  note  that,  owing 
to  the  political  exigencies  of  the  situation,  his  instructions 
prohibited  him  from  dealing  effectively  with  any  reasonable 
chance  of  success  with  an  enemy  who  was  free  to  operate 
from  almost  any  quarter  of  the  compass. 

The  third  and  fourth  campaigns  against  the  Mullah  afford  Tliinl  anj 
an  interesting  study  in  strategy  and  of  the  great  difficulties  expudition*. 
which  beset  a  genera!  who  has  to  conduct  operations  in  a  va^t 
country  devoid  of  almost  all  the  resources  of  civilisation, 
where  every  pound  of  food  for  the  men  or  forage  for  the 
horses  and  pack  animals  has  to  be  laboriously  brought  up 
from  a  sea  base  to  the  furthest  limit  of  operations  (a  distanco 
of  some  hundreds  of  miles)  on  pack  transport,  and  where,  as 
happened  more  than  once,  as  much  as  five  or  six  days'  water 
for  men  and  animals  had  to  be  carried,  as  well  as  the  rations, 
ammunition,  ordnance  and  engineering  stores,  which  form  the 
indispensable  impedimenta  of  an  army  in  the  field. 

These  difficulties  were  increased  by  the  heterogeneous  com- 
position of  the  force,  consisting  as  it  did  of  British  and 
Indian  troops,  of  South  Africans  and  Somalia,  for  each  and 
all  of  which  classes  a  separate  scale  of  rations  had  to  be 
carried. 

The  strategy  of  the  third  campaign  was  mainlv  based  on  Third 
two  considerations :-  "peditioa. 


ft 


J 


310 


To  prevent  the  Mullah's  retreat  to  the  Webi  Shebeli,  where 

it  would  have  been  difficult  to  follow  him,  and  to  drive 

him  north  into  or  towards  British  territory  and  to  deal 

with  him  thece. 

To  hem  in  the  Mullah's  forces  by  a  simultaneous  advance 

from  the  south-east   and  north   by  the  British,  and 

from  the  south-west  and  west  by  the  Abysainians. 

In  order  to  attain  the  first  of  these  objects  it  was  deemed 

necessary  to  land  a  force  on  the  east  coast  of  Italian  Somaliiand 

at  a  point  sufficiently  far  south  to  threaten  any  attempt  of 

the  Mullah's  forces  to  retire  from  the  Mudug  district  to  the 

Webi  Shebeli.     It  was  also  necessary  to  direct  the  Abyssinian 

movement  in  the  first  instance  south  towards  the  Webi  Shebeli, 

and  thence  north  towards  the  line  of  wells  from  Mudug  to 

Galadi,  and  Walwal  and  Wardair. 

The  selection  of  a  spot  at  which  troops  could  be  landed  on 
the  east  coast  of  Italian  Somaliiand  sufficiently  far  south  to 
satisfy  the  first  object  was  limited  practically  to  Obbia.  as 
it  was  considered  politic  and  desirable  to  support  the  Sultan 
of  Obbia  {Tusuf  Ali)  who  was  professedly  hostile  to  the  Mullah, 
and  who  had  a  considerable  following  among  the  Mijjarten 
and  Hawiya  tribes  which  dwelt  in  a  country  which  might  be  a 
possible  line  of  retreat  for  the  Mullah  towards  the  Webi 
Shebeli.  Moreover,  it  was  also  reported  that  the  Sultan  of 
Obbia  coiUd  supply  the  British  force  with  the  necessary 
transport  and  other  articles  of  supply  for  its  move  to  Mudug, 
in  both  of  which  services  he  eventually  failed. 

The  plan  of  campaign  was  to  advance  to  and  occupy 
Mudug,  open  communication  across  the  Hand  with  Bohotle, 
close  the  lines  of  commimication  from  Obbia  to  Mudug,  and 
depend  upon  the  Berber  a -Bohotle  line  for  further  supplies 
il  necessary. 

The  country  from  Obbia  to  Mudng  was  absolutely  imlmowu. 
The  route  from  Obbia  to  Mudug  had  to  be  discovered,  and  the 
watering  places  on  the  proposed  line  of  advance,  when  dis- 
covered, had  to  be  developed  and  made  possible  for  the 


the 

It. 

of  ( 
even 
^^^flace 

^K    Tl 


of  the  whole  loroe  to  Mudug.  Preliminary  recon' 
icea  in  several  directions  were,  therefore,  necessary 
mainly  to  teat  the  accuracy  of  native  information  as  to  the 
watering  places  on  the  several  routes.  There  was  also  the 
question  of  the  rainy  season.  Tlio  period  during  which 
operations  against  the  Mullah  could  be  effected  was  limited 
to  five  Diontha— January  to  May,  1303.  During  these  months 
the  Mullah  was  confined  to  distinct  watering  places,  which 
;ra  known.  After  May  the  rainy  season  began  and  the 
uUah  was  free  to  move  over  areas  which,  though  impassable 

want  of  water  in  the  dry  season,  were  rendered  easy  by 
the  filling  up  of  the  ballis  or  waterholes, 

Much,  therefore,  had  to  be  compressed  into  five  months. 
It  was  imperative  to  close  the  base  at  Obbia  before  the  burst 
of  the  south-west  monsoon  early  in  May;  since  that  place, 
even  in  the  best  months,  was  by  no  means  an  ideal  landing 
,^lace  and  would  become  in  the  south-west  monsoon  ira- 
ble  of  approach. 

The  landing  at  Obbia  during  the  north-east  monsoon  was 
laborious  and  tedious  undertaking,  and  much  time  was 

laumed  in  that  operation.  Yusui  Ali  signally  failed  in  his 
►bligatioiis  to  provide  transport,  thereby  necessitating  the 
"bringing  round  of  camels  from  Berbera,  hastily  collected  on 
the  Berbera-Bohotle  lines  of  communication  and  temporarily 
disabling  the  transport  on  that  line.  Although  this  dif&culty 
did  not  greatly  delay  the  advance  at  the  time,  it  necessitated 
a  modification  in  the  original  plan  of  moving  to  Mudug,  for, 
in  place  of  the  6,000  transport  camels  which  it  was  anticipated 
would  be  available  from  all  sources  at  Obbia,  the  total  transport 
fell  far  short  of  actual  requirements. 

The  route  to  Mudug,  when  finally  reconnoitred  and  fixed 
upon,  was  gradually  occupied  with  posts,  and  supplies  and 
stores  were  pushed  on  ahead.  The  water  supply  on  this  route, 
however,  was  very  precarious,  and  only  with  most  careful 
organization  was  made  to  equal  the  strain  put  upon  it. 

Camel  transport  from  India  was  offered  for  the  Obbia 


312 


force,  but  was  not  accspted  as  it  was  then  believed  that 
Indian  camels  could  not  move  unless  watered  daily  or  at  least 
every  other  day.  Such  a  procedure  on  the  Obbia-Mudag  line 
was  impracticable,  and  left  no  alternative  but  the  employ- 
ment of  Somali  camels,  which  could  travel  for  many  days 
without  water.  The  transport  service  in  Somaliland,  as  well 
as  the  water  supply,  was  a  governing  factor  in  the  operations. 
Had  it  been  possible  to  obtain  locally  transport  sufficient  to 
replace  casualties  in  a  large  force,  one  of  the  problems  of 
campaigning  in  Somaliland  would  have  been  solved.  It  was, 
however,  the  fact  that  though  the  country  .contained  immense 
herds  of  camels,  the  proportion  of  burden  animals  to  milch 
and  eating  camels  was  small. 

The  occupation  of  the  Mudug  district  compelled  the 
Mullah  to  fall  back  from  Galadi  to  Walwa!  and  Wardair, 
where  he  was,  as  regards  the  British  forces,  separated  from 
the  latter  from  the  east  by  nearly  one  hundred  miles  of  waterless 
country,  covered  by  dense  bush  ;  and  by  a  similar  stretch  of 
country  from  Bohotle  in  the  north.  As  regards  the  Abys- 
sinian forces,  the  enemy  was  less  well  placed,  as  his  anxiety 
was  to  escape  from  the  Abyssinian  advance  from  the  south- 
west. 

The  occupation  of  the  Mudug  was  not,  however,  sufficient 
to  render  the  crossing  of  the  Hand  from  Bohotle  to  Mudug 
a  safe  proceeding.  There  existed  several  large  watering 
places  between  Damot  and  Walwal  and  Wardair,  where  the 
Mullah's  forces  could  water  and  launch  attacks  agiinst  convoys 
crossing  the  hundred  miles  of  desert.  It  was,  therefore, 
necessary  to  occupy  Damot  in  the  nijrthern  part  of  the  Haud, 
Badwein  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Haud,  as  well  as  Galadi 
and  the  intervening  wells  to  the  west  of  Mudug. 

Thus,  by  the  middle  of  April.  1903,  the  Muhah  found  him- 
self hemmed  into  the  Walwa! -Wardair  district,  but  it  was 
difficult  to  approach  him  from  the  east  or  north,  while  to  the 
west  and  south-west  he  was  open  to  attack  from  the  Abys- 
iB,  who,  however,  were  further  away  than  our  forces. 


313 

The  two  actions  at  Gumburu  and  Daratoleb,  however,  cleared 
the  situation,  and  showed  that  the  MuiUh  had  reached  the 
limit  of  his  strategic  retirement,  and  was  compelled  to  stand 
at  Walwal  and  Wardair  and  to  fight  in  that  neighbourhood, 

The  unfortunate  action  at  Gumburu  prevented  for  the  time 
a  further  advance  from  Qaladi,  and  the  immense  strain  tlirown 
on  the  slender  transport  service,  due  to  the  long  lines  of  com- 
munication, made  it  shortly  afterwards  apparent  that  the  limit 
of  the  British  advance  from  the  east  had  been  reached.  It 
was  necessary  to  set  free  as  much  transport  as  possible  to 
close  up  the  Obbia-Mudug  lines  of  communication  before  the 
burst  of  the  south-west  monsoon.  The  Abyssinians  were 
urged  to  press  the  Mullah  from  the  south-west  and  west  and 
were  making  their  way  towards  him.  If  they  could  reach  hJm 
before  the  break  of  the  rains  he  must  give  them  battle  with 
his  avenue  of  retreat  closed  in  eVery  direction. 

The  Abyssinians,  however,  were  unable  to  come  up  in  time  ; 
the  rains  broke  and  filled  the  waterholes,  thus  giving  the  Mullah 
his  one  loophole  of  escape  to  the  north,  which  he  promptly 
seized  and  eJrtricated  himself  from  a  difficult  position. 

Strategically,  the  operations  of  the  third  expedition  were 
successful.  The  Mullah  was  driven  north  into  British  territory, 
where,  in  January,  1904,  he  was  brought  to  battle  and  severely 
defeated.  The  maintenance  of  our  hold  of  the  line  from  the 
Mudug  to  Galadi,  from  Bohotle  vid  Damot  to  Badwein  to 
the  very  last  moment  achieved  the  intended  result,  except 
that  the  Mullah  was  allowed  to  take  refuge  without  inter- 
ference in  the  Nogal.  This  may  have  been  unavoidable,  but 
it  is  open  to  question  whether  the  significance  of  the  retreat 
of  the  enemy  across  the  Berbera-Bohotle  lines  of  communica- 
tion was  adequately  appreciated  and  taken  advantage  of  by 
the  commander  at  Bohotle. 

As  regards  the  Abyssinians,  they  carried  out  their  part 
of  the  operations  in  so  far  that  they  blocked  the  way  to  the 
Webi  Shebeii.  Their  inability  to  co-operate  at  the  final  stage 
when  the  Mullah  was  inunqhile  at  Walwal  and  Wardair  by 


3U 


actually  attacking  him  is  explained  by  the  distance  which 
divided  them  from  those  places.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  the 
pressure  of  their  second  advance  compelled  the  Mullah  to 
extricate  himself  by  the  daring  expedient  of  breaking  through 
our  lines  of  communication ;  whilst  the  advent  of  the  rains 
permitted  him  to  move  independently  of  welb. 

To  come  to  the  fourth  expedition,  by  the  end  of  July, 
jn03,  tlie  situation  was  as  follows  : — The  Mullah  was  believed 
to  be  in  the  eastern  Nogal,  and  it  was  reported  that  he  and 
liis  followers  were  greatly  dispirited  by  the  losses  sustained  at 
(luraburu  and  Daratoleh,  while  his  camels  and  floclcs  and 
herds  were  in  a  state  of  exhaustion,  so  much  so  that  it  waa 
beheved  in  England  and  urged  upon  the  commander  of  the 
British  forces  that  a  sudden  dash  with  mounted  troops  only 
would  terminate  the  campaign. 

Even  had  the  Mullah's  plight  been  as  bad  as  was  reported, 
the  commander  was  in  no  position  to  make  a  sudden  dash  in 
any  direction,  having  neither  the  troops  nor  the  transport 
nor  the  supplies  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  such  an  operation. 

Strategically  the  Mullah  had  all  the  advantages.  Separated 
from  our  nearest  outpost  by  about  150  miles  of  country  lie 
could  calmly  await  the  advance  of  our  troops  and  either  fight 
or  decline  to  fight  as  seemed  best ;  for  there  was  no  con- 
taining force  to  keep  him  where  he  was,  while  the  whole  of 
Somaliland  to  the  south  from  the  Nogal  to  the  Equator  was 
open  to  him. 

Our  force,  on  the  other  hand,  was  in  the  worst  strategic 
position  possible.  Our  front  was  to  a  flank,  with  our  base  of 
supply  at  the  extremity  furthest  from  our  line  of  advance. 
There  was  then  no  advanced  base  of  operations  from  which 
even  a  small  force  could  operate,  while  for  convenience  of 
supply  all  troops  that  could  possibly  be  spared  had  been 
brought  down  the  line  towards  the  advanced  base,  leaving  om- 
outposts  completely  en  fair,  and  tmtil  the  transport  waa 
increased  and  equipped  there  was  no  hope  of  an  advanced 
base  being  established.     The  situation  was  not  a  hopeful  one. 


^-^  *'!^ 


315 


^^^Bteantime  reinlorcementfi,  Euppliea,  remomito,  &c.,  &c., 
^^Hned  in  the  country,  and  also  a  welcome  addition  in  tho 
^lotm  of  tho  Indian  Camel  Transport,  which  eventually  became 
'  the  backbone  of  the  transport  service.  The  whole  force  was 
reorganised  into  brigades,  staffed  on  the  Indian  system,  and 
as  soon  as  the  supply  and  Transport  Department  declared 
themselves  ready  to  begin  Kirrit  was  selected  as  an  advanced 
base  and  the  work  of  afbcking  it  began.  Tliis  advanced  base 
was  subsequently  moved  to  Eil  Dab,  which  was  found  to  be  not 
only  a  better  source  of  water  supply  but  better  situated 
in  every  way  for  a  base  of  operations  in  the  Nogal  which 
it  was  evident  must  form  the  theatre  of  war  if  by  any  possi- 
bility the  Muliah  could  be  forced  to  give  battle. 

The  problem  that  daily  confronted  the  General  was,  "  How 
is  the  Midlah  to  be  prevented  from  going  south  in  which  case 
it  would  be  impossible  for  our  troops  to  follow  him  ?  " 

One  obvious  suggestion  was  the  landing  of  a  containing 
force  at  ObbJa,  but  this  did  not  suit  the  poUtical  situation, 
and  the  General  was  notified  that  whatever  was  to  be  done 
must  be  carried  out  by  the  troops  on  the  spot ;  and  it  was  also 
added  that  such  operations  must  be  confined  to  British  territory. 
It  was  pointed  out  that  the  Mullah's  position  even  then 
was  on  the  borders  of  British  territory  and  so  long  os  be 
remained  there  it  was  impossible  to  strike  a  blow  at  him  imder 
these  conditions. 

After  considerable  parley  with  the  Italian  Government 
it  was  conceded  that  such  places  as  it  was  found  necessary  to 
occupy  in  the  Eastern  Nogal  or  to  the  south  of  the  Protec- 
torate within  the  Italian  sphere  of  influence  might  be  occupied 
for  the  temporary  purposes  of  the  operations.  With  this 
concession  the  General  had  to  be  content. 

In  August,  1903,  negotiations  were  entered  into  with  the 
Abyssinian  Government  for  a  force  to  co-operate  with  ours 
by  occupying  the  southern  line  of  wells,  which  stretch,  roughly 
speaking,  along  the  seventh  parallel  of  latitude  from  the 
Abyssiniiin   border  to  the  Mudugs  at  Walwal,   Galadi.  and 


318 


^ 


Galkayu,  the  possession  of  one  or  more  of  which  would  be 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  Mullah  should  he  elect  to  move 
south.  The  denial  of  these  wells  to  him,  combined  with  the 
hostile  attitude  of  the  Sultan  of  Obbia,  whom  we  had  subeidiBed 
and  supplied  with  a  certain  amount  of  arma  and  ammunition, 
would  no  doubt  have  decided  the  MuUah  not  to  attempt 
such  a  risky  move  and  to  trust  rather  to  hia  preaent  distant  and 
inacceasible  position  to  deter  our  foftea,  of  the  number  of 
which  he  seemed  ignorant,  from  moving  against  him,  or  should 
they  have  the  temerity  to  do  so  they  would  assuredly  be 
crushed,  as  they  had  been  before. 

There  waa  thia  advantage  in  the  situation,  that  it  would 
give  the  Abysainians  more  time  to  get  round,  but  there  was 
also  this  disadvantage,  that  a  good  autumn  fall  of  rain  in  the 
southern  Hand  before  these  wells  were  occupied  in  our  interests 
would  almost  certainly  induce  the  Mullah  to  move  to  tho 
south.  It  was  evident  therefore  that  aorae  means  must  be 
devised  to  induce  the  Mullah  to  believe  that  the  southern  line 
of  wells  were  being  held  against  him. 

To  thia  end  every  endeavour  was  made  to  give  publicity 
to  the  fact  of  the  Abyaainiana  being  on  the  move  (though  as 
a  matter  of  fact  they  did  not  move  till  considerably  later), 
while,  with  the  conaent  of  the  Home  and  Italian  Governments, 
a  naval  demonatcation  was  made  at  Obbia  by  all  the  available 
warships  on  the  station,  when  a  great  show  of  landing  men  and 
atorea  (the  latter  being  bags  of  rice  and  dates  for  the  Sultan 
of  Obbia)  waa  gone  through,  with  a  view  to  impressing  the 
Mullah's  spies  with  the  idea  that  a  force  had  actually  landed. 

At  the  same  time  a  further  subsidy  and  supply  of  arms 
was  promised  to  the  Sultan  on  condition  of  his  occupying 
the  Galkayu  wells. 

No  doubt  all  these  reports,  probably  in  a  much  exaggerated 
form,  eventually  reached  the  Mullah,  and  in  conjunction 
with  what  followed  made  him  believe  the  southern  line  of  wella 
to  be  effectually  barred  to  him. 

As  time  went  on,  the  reports  received  from  our  r^resenta- 


I      tiv«  1 


live  with  the  Abyssinians  made  it  quite  clear  that  there  was 
no  hope  of  their  being  able  to  reach  even  the  western-most 
wells  (at  Walwa!  and  Wardair)  before  the  end  of  the  year. 

The  General  therefore  decided  to  occupy  Galadi  with  our 
own  troopB,  and  to  this  oiid  a  scheme  was  worked  out  in 
secret  under  which  General  Manning's  brigade  shoold  concen- 
trate at  Bohotle  by  the  beginning  of  November,  march  across 
the  Haud  to  Galadi  (112  miles),  and  having  estabUshed  a 
strong  post  there,  consisting  of  infantry,  mounted  troops 
and  maxims,  should  retrace  his  steps  to  Bohotle. 

All  this  was  successfully  carried  out  with  the  result  that  the 
Mullah  was  completely  deceived  and  so  deprived,  at  least  in 
his  opinion,  of  the  strategical  advantages  he  at  one  time 


Another  factor  now  appeared  upon  the  scene  which,  for 
the  time  being,  aSected  the  strategical  situation  considerably 
in  our  favour.  This  was  a  quarrel  between  the  Mullah  and 
the  powerful  Mijjarten  Chief,  Osman  Mahmud,  who  under- 
took, on  certain  conditions,  to  keep  the  Mullah  out  of  Mijjarten 
territory.  If,  therefore,  we  could  succeed  in  driving  him  up 
north  there  was  every  likelihood  of  his  ultimately  falling  into 
our  lianda. 

On  his  rettirn  journey  from  Galadi,  Manning  had  fallen  in 
with  a  strong  raiding  party  of  the  Mullah's,  which  he  attacked 
and  dispersed,  killing  several  of  them  and  capturing  all  the 
booty  which  they  had  carried  of!  from  the  Ogaden  country. 
Many  of  the  enemy  fled  to  Galadi  where  several  more  were  killed 
though  others  escaped,  and  it  is  probable  that  it  was  from  these 
men  that  the  Muilah  obtained  his  first  authentic  news  of  our 
occupation  of  Galadi. 

Owing  to  the  bull;  of  our  troops  being  still  kept  as  fwr  back 
as  possible  on  the  lines  of  communication  for  convenience  of 
supply,  the  Mullah  seems  to  have  had  little  knowledge  of  the 
real  strength  of  the  forces  arrayed  against  him..  Believing 
Manning's  force  to  be  at  Bohotle,  and  Galadi  to  be  our  main 
army,  he  conceived  the  idea  of  cuttinc  our  lines  of  communioa- 


318 


a  attack  in  the  direction  of  Eil  Dab.  and  to  this  end 
began  to  concentrate  Jiis  fighting  men  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Jidbali. 

General  Egerton's  next  care  was  to  anticipate  the  Mullah  at 
the  southern  passes  of  the  Nogal  and  press  him  northwards.  It 
was  hoped  that  with  the  waterless  Northern  Hand  behind  him, 
the  possible  hostility  of  the  Mijjarten  tribe,  and  the  certainty 
that  large  portions  of  his  stock  were  still  in  the  southern  Nogal 
he  would  try  and  make  one  more  desperate  effort  to  defeat  us  ; 
but,  whatever  the  Mullah's  own  intentions  may  have  been,  his 
panic-stricken  followers  had  no  taste  for  further  fighting,  and, 
by  the  time  the  columns  had  joined  hands  on  the  line  Gaolo- 
Halin,  the  Muliah  had  already  commenced  his  disastrous 
flight  across  the  Northern  Hand 

The  strategical  situation  was  now  as  follows  :  The  Mullah 
had  been  forced  from  the  line  of  the  Nogal,  now  held  hj 
Manning's  brigade,  which  watched  the  whole  country  between 
Hudin  and  KalMs.  The  Mullah's  following  was  occupying 
the  various  wells  and  ballis*  along  the  edge  of  the  Northern 
Haud,  chiefly  in  the  Warsangli  country  and  west  of  th« 
Mijjarten  country,  which  the  Mullah  avoided  until  he  should 
succeed,  as  he  hoped  to  do,  in  making  terms  with  Sultan 
Osman  Mahmud. 

A  force  under  General  Fasken  was  being  concentrated  at 
Las  Bureh  to  operate  directly  against  the  Mullah,  while  s 
small  movable  column  was  moving  from  Eil  Dab  on  El 
Afweina  to  watch  the  western  edge  of  the  Northern  Haud. 

It  seemeilj  therefore,  that  if  Osman  Mahmud  adhered 
to  his  engagements  to  prevent  the  Mullah  entering  Mijjarteii 
territory,  that  is  to  say,  crossing  the  Italian  border  line,  that 
he  must  of  necessity  faU  into  otir  hands,  as  ivith  Manning  holding 
the  Nogal  he  would  hardly  venture  to  attempt  a  second  flight 
across  the  Northern  Haud.  It  appeared,  therefore,  that  he 
niust  either  fight  or  surrender,  unless  rain  fell,  which  would! 

*  DcpresBions  t^ontaLQing  nat.'r. 


319 


P        Enable  him  to  cross  the  Notthern  Hand  diagonally  in  a  eouth- 
caet  directiou  to  lllig,   where  he  had  established  a  strong 

I  fortified  post. 

I  In  the  meantime,  on  the  27th  February,  a  telegram  was 

despatched  requesting  permission  to  operate  in  Italian  terri- 

i  tory.     The  answer  to  this  was  not  received  until  the  7th  April, 

when  permission  was  accorded  by  the  Italian  Government, 
but  too  late  to  be  effectively  utilised. 

Directly  the  rains  set  in  the  opportunity  of  capturing  the 
Mullah  was  lost ;  but,  though  he  personally  was  not  captured, 
the  effectual  blow  dealt  him  at  Jidbali,  the  capture  of  the  greater 

I  ])art  of  bis  stock,  the  wholesale  desertions  of  his  adherents,  the 

destruction  of  Ulig,  and  the  relentless  manner  in  which  he  was 

'  followed  up  so  long  as  ho  remained  in  the  British  Protectorate, 

reduced  his  power  for  a  long  time  to  come.  Whether  it  was 
broken  finally  and  for  all  time  depended  on  the  future  pohcy 
of  the  Protectorate  Administration.  To  actually  capture 
a  man  whose  range  of  movements  extends  from  Cape  Gardafui 
to  the  Equator  and  from  the  sea  to  the  Abyssinian  border, 
waa  almost  a  bopeleaa  task,  and  could  only  be  attained  by  an 
extraordinary  piece  of  good  fortune  ;  but  the  Haroun,  which 
was  his  emblem  of  power  and  seat  of  government,  offered 
a  fairly  large  though  movable  objective.  Though  the  Mullah 
himself  might  escape,  the  capture  of  the  Haroun  meant  the 
destruction  of  his  prestige,  and,  in  all  probability,  his  own 
final  surrender.  It  was  this  objective  which  was  so  narrowly 
missed  owing  to  the  want  of  the  Mijjarten  "  stop  "  at  the  end 
of  March. 

As  a  matter  of  history,  it  is  evident  that  the  Mijjarten 
Sultan  not  only  did  nothing  to  oppose  the  Mollah,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  aided  him  in  effecting  his  escape.  How  far  the 
attitude  assumed  by  the  Sultan  was  influenced  by  local  political 
considerations,  it  is  difficult  to  say,  but,  from  information 
gathered  at  the  time,  it  appears  that  the  Mullah  only  decided 
upon  entering  the  Mijjarten  country  after  being  assured  that 
he  would  not  be  molested. 


320 

About  the  month  of  August,  1903,  the  Mullah  had  seized 
Illig,  then  a  small  fishing  village  situated  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Nogal  River,  and,  aa  reported  by  an  ItaUan  warship,  had 
commenced  to  construct  a  formidable  fortified  camp  there, 
only  partially  visible  from  the  sea,  the  main  defence  being 
directed  inland. 

It  was  known  that  when  the  Mullah  advanced  into  the  Nogal 
he  had  left  a  considerable  garrison  in  lUig  and  there  could  be 
Httle  doubt  that  should  he  succeed  in  getting  away  to  the  south 
from  General  Fasken's  force,  Ilhg  would  be  his  first  objective. 
It  was,  therefore,  deemed  necessary  to  destroy  it. 

Had  further  operations  against  the  Mullah  been  under- 
taken and  IlUg  left  undestroyed,  it  might  have  played  an 
important  part,  aSording  the  Mullah  a  sea  base  by  which  be 
could  import  arms  and  ammunition,  for  the  supply  of  which 
he  had  hitherto  been  dependent  on  Osman  Mahmud. 


Tactics. 

During  the  past  twelve  or  fifteen  years  a  very  large  illicit 
importation  of  fire-anna  took  place  into  almost  every  part  of 
Somaliland,  the  absence  of  administrative  control  over  the 
interior  of  their  protectorates  by  the  Powers  concerned 
rendering  it  practically  impossible  to  enforce  the  Arms  Regu- 
lations. The  arms  imported  were  principally  rifles  of  the 
Gras,  Lebel  and  Martini-Henry  patterns,  and  all  tribes  possessed 
rifles  in  greater  or  less  numbers,  and  made  use  of  them  in 
inter-tribal  warfare  where  formerly  they  only  employed  native 
weapons. 

The  native  weapons  are  three ;  the  sword  (bilawa),  the 
shield  (gashan)  and  spears  (waran). 

The  sword  has  a  double-edged  pointed  blade  of  soft  iron, 
2  feet  long  and  2  inches  in  maximum  breadth,  made  for  hacking, 
with  a  small  horn  hilt  ornamented  with  zinc  or  pewter  and  a 
_white  leather  scabbard  attached  to  the  waist  by  a  long  white 
thong. 


A 


321 


The  shield — of  rhinoceroa,  bullock  or  preferably  oryx  hide 
cut  from  the  skin  over  the  antelope's  withers — la  a  round 
disc,  15  to  16  inches  in  diameter,  with  a  boss  in  the  centre  and 
handle  at  back.     It  Is  proof  against  spears  and  arrows  only. 

The  spears  are  of  a  dozen  different  shapes,  of  which,  how- 
ever, two  are  most  commonly  used. 

One  is  a  small  spear,  plain,  or  barbed  like  ft  fish-hook,  and 
used  for  throwing  at  a  distance  of  25  to  30  yards  on  foot,  and 
at  a  dozen  more  on  horseback. 

The  other,  a  ponderous,  laurel-leaf  shaped  spear  is  used 
for  close  quarters,  especially  against  horses.  The  Ishak 
tribes,  who  are  mounted,  generally  carry  one  of  each  of  these 
two  kinds  of  spears ;  but  the  Isa,  who  fight  only  on  foot, 
use  the  long  stabbing  spear  alone.  The  Mljjarten  also  use 
a  club  (weger),  18  inches  long. 

The  Midgans  carry,  instead  of  shield  and  spears,  a  bow 
and  a  quiver  of  wood  bound  with  geranook  hide ;  a  knife 
in  sheath,  a  stone  for  sharpening  arrow  barbs,  and  a  pointed 
tool  for  mending  sandals  are  attached  to  the  quiver,  which 
contains  poisoned  arrows,  iron  shod  or  hardened  at  the  point. 
The  poison,  resembling  pitch  or  black  glue,  is  extracted  from 
the  roote  of  the  wnba.  Sometimes,  eg.,  in  the  Mijjarten  country, 
the  Midgans  also  carry  shngs. 

Light  skirmishing  raids   and   surprises  are   the  charac-  Somali 
teristics  of  Somah  tribal  warfare.     The  Isa,  who  have  no  horses  "^  "'*' 
and  fight  on  foot,  are  distinguished  from  the  other  tribes  by 
their  fondness  for  night  attacks  and  ambuscades,  and  by  the 
determination  which  they  show  in  pushing  their  attacks. 

Baids  are  generally  effected  at  dawn  or  in  the  afternoon, 
when  the  adult  males  of  the  raided  tribe  are  themselves  away 
raiding  or  are  asleep  and  have  thus  left  the  care  of  the  herds 
to  boys  and  women.  Some  days  before  the  raid,  scouts  are 
sent  forward  to  watch  for  a  favourable  opportunity,  and  when 
that  presents  itself,  the  raiders  move  in  bodies  of  20  to  IWO  men, 
often  by  night,  and  over  distances  of  70  miles  or  more  to  the 
grazing  ground.    Nothing  is  carried  by  the  riders  on  tlicir 

(8927)  X 


ponies,  whicli  are  invariably  uaed  on  raids,  beyond  a  small 
water  bottle  and  some  sun-dried  meat.  The  return  march 
is  made  in  scattered  parties  as  rapidly  as  the  raided  camels, 
sheep,  kc,  can  travel,  and  is  protected  by  a  strong  rear 
gnard. 

When  a  collision  does  take  place  the  order  of  battle  is 
generally  as  follows : — The  spearmen  form  the  first  line  in 
single  rank  at  one  pace  interval ;  on  the  flanks  are  the  horse- 
men who  are,  as  a  rule,  tribal  elders,  and  the  slingera  and 
riflemen,  if  any ;  in  the  second  line  follow  the  Midgan  archers 
or  additional  spearmen.  Aa  the  hostile  forces  approach  one 
another,  the  horsemen,  slingers  and  riflemen  first  come  into 
action ;  then  the  smaD  spears  are  thrown  backwards  and 
forwards  until  the  combatants  are  within  a  few  yards,  when 
a  rush  is  made,  and  the  long  spear,  and  then  the  sword  (and 
club)  are  used.  In  attacking  a  zaribaed  convoy  an  effort  is 
frequently  made  to  stampede  the  animals  or  to  utihse  them  as 
cover  for  pressing  the  attack  home,  more  particularly  at  night. 

But,  as  has  already  been  noted,  night  attacks  are  not 
favoured  by  the  Ishak  and  Darud  SomaUs,  except  in  small 
raiding  parties,  mutual  distrust  probably  preventing  sub- 
tribes  combining  for  night  attacks  on  a  large  scale, 

Against  our  troops  the  chief  characteristics  of  Somali 
fighting  were  usually  light  skirmishing,  wide  fronts  and  a 
dissolution  into  small  bodies  when  pursued ;  but  the  actions 
of  Samala,  Erigo,  Gumburu,  Daratoleh  and  Jidbah  afiord 
instances  of  determined  charges  in  the  face  of  rifle  fire  at  close 
and  medium  ranges. 

The  Somah  has  many  quaUties  which  fit  him  to  be  a  soldier. 
He  possesses  considerable  personal  bravery  and  dash.  As  a 
scout  he  is  full  of  resource  and  unsurpassed  in  his  own  country ; 
his  marching  powers  are  above  the  ordinary.  He  is  able  to 
subsist  for  comparatively  long  periods  on  short  rations  of  food 
and  water,  cheerfulness  under  such  privations  on  active 
service  being  one  of  his  best  characteristics.  He  is  a  fair 
horseman,  and  soon  makes  a  good  shot ;  he  is  quick  to  leam 


323 

and  rapidly  picks  up  elementary  drill.  He  has  few  vices, 
and  serious  crimes  are  rare ;  he  is,  on  the  whole,  easy  to 
manage,  though,  as  is  the  case  with  all  natives,  much  depends 
on  personal  inHuence  and  handling.  Though  naturally  im- 
patieut  of  restraint,  he  can  leam  to  recognise  the  necessity  of 
military  discipline  and  to  appreciate  its  value. 

On  the  other  hand,  he  has  several  serious  defects.  He 
is  vain  and  sensitive  and  does  not  willingly  adopt  methods 
which  are  foreign  to  him.  He  is  by  nature  lazy,  is  unaccus- 
tomed to  prolonged  hard  work,  and  finds  difficulty  in  making 
a  sustained  effort.  He  suffers  froui  a  highly  nervous  tem- 
perament, which  resultfl,  at  times,  in  such  excitement  as  to 
make  the  control  of  considerable  bodies  almost  impossible. 

During  the  operations  against  the  Mullah,  a  succession  of 
levies  and  irregular  corps  were  raised  from  time  to  time  and 
disbanded  again  after  comparatively  short  periods  of  service, 
mi»t  of  which  was  spent  in  the  field.  Their  training  was  of 
the  moat  rudimentary  description,  and  the  conditions  under 
which  they  were  enlisted  did  not  admit  of  their  being  subjected 
to  any  but  the  loosest  description  of  military  discipline. 

Nevertheless,  at  the  actions  of  Erigo,  Daratoleh  and  Jidbali 
they  behaved  with  credit,  though  at  the  first  and  last-named 
actions  their  fault  of  excitability  was  also  conspicuous.  If 
they  have  failed  on  occasions  to  display  steadiness  and 
staunchness  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  it  is  rather  because  they 
failed  to  grasp  the  idea  of  co-ordinate  and  combined  action 
than  from  any  lack  of  personal  courage. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Somalis  amongst  themselves 
have  practically  no  organization  or  inter-dependence.  Com- 
bined action  is  unknown  and  every  man  acts  independently 
as  he  thinks  fit.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  when  combined — 
to  them  artificially — into  units,  imder  British  or  native  officers, 
they  find  a  difficulty  in  learning  that  confidence  in  their 
leader  or  in  co-ordinate  action,  which  is  essential  to  success 
in  the  field, 

During  the  period  which  has  elapsed  since  the  close  of  the 
(8927^  X  2 


r    laEornii 


Maroh 
and  flghliiig 
formstionB. 


324 

operations  against  the  Mullah,  an  efiort  has  been  made  to 
train  and  discipline  a  Somali  Battalion  on  regular  lines ;  and 
the  degree  of  success  which  lias  been  attained  afiords  good 
hope  tliat  under  strict  discipline,  applied  gradually  and  with 
tact,  and  with  progressive  and  systematic  military  training, 
the  Somali  may  become  as  reliable  a  soldier  as  any  other 
African  native. 

British  Tactics. 

Spies  and  scouts  were  easily  found,  for  the  Somali  is 
■   avaricious   and   enterprising.     The   native   system   of   spies 
and  scouts  was  admirable. 

Camps  were  always  surrounded  by  zaribas,  especially 
when  there  was  a  quantity  of  transport  animals,  the  capture 
of  which  was  made  the  main  object  of  a  night  attack.  Ab  a 
rule,  material  for  zaribaa  was  plentiful,  cither  mimosa  or 
other  bush,  or,  in  the  open  country,  stones.  Zaribas  were 
generally  surrounded  by  barbed  wire,  and  were  built  about 
4  feet  high  and  as  wide  as  possible.  Even  in  the  dense  bush  a 
clear  field  of  fire  of  at  least  200  yards  could  generally  be 
obtained  in  the  open  belts  and  patches  which  occur  at  intervals. 

For  security  at  night,  sentries  were  usually  posted  about 
ten  or  fifteen  yards  outside  a  zariba,  and  not  along  its  peri- 
meter where,  owing  to  the  noise  in  camp,  they  were  unable 
to  hear  distinctly.  When  Illalos  were  available,  they  were 
employed  as  advanced  or  outlying  sentries,  being  posted 
some  distance  from  a  zariba  with  instructions  to  give  early 
warning  of  any  hostile  advance. 

The  usual  march  and  fighting  formations  were  that  of  an 
elastic  square  with  the  transport  in  the  centre  ;  the  mounted 
troops,  preceded  by  spies  and  scouts,  being  pushed  ahead,  as 
much  as  half  a  day's  march  and  more,  and  kept  well  out  to 
the  flanks  and  rear.  The  transport  men  being  usually  armed 
with  spears,  afforded  a  certain  amount  o£  protection  to  the 
transport  animals,  but,  when  action  was  imminent,  the  bulk 
of  the  transport  was  usually  zaribaed  and  left  in  rear  under 


325 

a  small  guard,  the  fighting  column  moving  forward  accom- 
panied on]y  by  such  animals  as  were  necessary  to  carry  reserve 
ammuniti(>  1,  maxim  gims  and  other  essential  loads. 

Br'g.-General  Manning  gives  the  following  information 
regarding  the  formations  usually  adopted  in  the  third 
expedition  : — 

In  marching  through  thick  bii.»h,  where  attack  was  probable  or  even 
when  there  was  no  immediate  probability  of  attack,  the  formation  was  as 
follows  : — The  infantry  formed  a  front  and  rear  face  of  a  square,  the  mounted 
troops  forming  the  defence  of  the  flanks.  The  companies  of  the  front 
face  of  the  squrje  moved  off  in  lines  of  sections,  or  half  companies  or  com- 
panies in  file. 

Eight  to  ten  Somalis  mounted  on  riding  camels  were  aligned  in  the  bush 
to  mark  the  front  face  of  the  square,  each  Somali  carrying  a  flag  fixed 
to  a  pole,  which  could  be  seen  from  time  to  time  above  the  bush.  I  rode 
immediately  behind  the  centre  Somali,  who  carried  my  flag ;  this  Somali 
rode  on  the  path  whence  the  dressing  of  the  Somalis  on  each  side  of  the 
centre  Somali  was  constantly  corrected.  By  watching  these  flags,  which 
the  men  from  time  to  time  could  see,  the  front  face  of  the  square  managed 
to  keep  a  very  fair  line,  even  in  the  densest  bush.  The  maxims  accompanied 
their  units. 

The  direction  of  the  advance  was  thus  kept,  although  the  men  were  making 
their  wiy  through  pathless  bush.  The  moimted  Somali  camel  men  learnt 
after  a  lime  to  keep  their  intervals  very  fairly,  and  to  align  themselves  on 
the  centre  Somali,  who  was  travelling  on  the  one  bush  path. 

The  rear  face  of  the  square  moved  off  in  the  same  formation,  but  without 
any  flagmen,  as  the  advance  guard  (front  face)  had  marked  the  road  in 
passing  along.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  troops  thus  employed  were  African 
troops  who  were  at  home  in  the  bush. 

The  camels  of  the  transport  moved  in  as  many  lines  as  possible  in  rear 
of,  and  covered  by,  the  front  face,  water  tins  being  m  front.  No  attempt 
was  made  to  use  infantry  on  the  flanks  of  the  square  while  marching,  the 
flanks  being  covered  by  mounted  troops  well  out  on  each  flank. 

In  case  of  alarm  the  square  closed  up,  and  infantry,  previously  detailed 
from  the  front  and  rear  faces,  formed  a  portion  of  the  side  faces  of  the 
square  together  with  the  moimted  troops. 

Crossing  the  very  dense  bush  of  the  Haud  in  this  formation  as  much  as 
25  miles  per  diem  was  accomplished,  and  it  was  often  the  case  that  until 
the  midday  or  evening  halt  the  troops  forming  the  front  face  were  hardly 
ever  visible  to  me  except  those  marching  behind  the  centre  flagman. 

Before  the  infantry  loft  the  zariba  in  the  morning  the  Somali  mounted 
infantry,  who  formed  the  advance  scout?,  moved  out  from  the  rear  face 
of  the  square  and  proceeded  first  well  to  the  rear ;  then,  after  dividing  into 
two  bodies,  they  returned  round  both  flanks  and  rejoined  in  front  of  the 


squrtre  aud  saouted  out  some  miles  ahead.  Tho  Burroitndmg  biul)  wa? 
thua  CBrotully  recornioitied,  and  when  reportfld  oleac  the  Bquare  advanced. 

Native  spiPB  or  aconts  were  pushed  out  daily  20  lo  30  miles  aheid  of  the 
force,  and  to  the  same  distance  from  a  threatened  Bank. 

The  Hqimre  formation  was,  of  course,  very  loose,  hut  since  ample  nolife 
of  any  hostile  force  could  be  given  the  square  could  close  np  before  an  attack 
could  be  delivered. 

At  night  each  face  made  ita  own  anriba  and  was  tcsponsible  for  the 
defejico  of  its  own  face.  A  start  wm  never  made  hetCFre  daylight,  and  the 
square  was  aluaya  halted  a  full  hour  before  dark. 

The  fiame  system  was  carried  out  by  me  when  marching  in  open  country, 
na  the  length  and  Tulncr-ability  of  the  tranHport  column  waa  thereby  mnch 
reduced,  Mid  troopa  and  transport  drivers  got  to  know  their  places  whether 
in  bui>h  or  in  open  country. 

The  subjoined  notes  and  sketches  furnished  by  an  officer 
who  commanded  a  column  illustrate  further  some  of  the 
formations  adopted. 

Daratolch. 
The  ground  was  dend  flat  but  covered  with  thorn  bush  some  15  to  SO  feet 
high,  with  high  grnss  (about  3(  feet  high)  between  the  thorn  trees. 


W' 


Thick'^  Bush 


As  in  most  fights  of  this  kind,  our  troopa  suffered  most  from  the  enemy's 
fire  going  over  the  bends  of  one  face  of  the  square  and  hitting  the  men  of 
the  opposite  face  in  the  back,  so  mnch  so  that  ooniplainta  were  received 
"  that  out  own  people  were  shooting  from  the  centre  of  the  squuie,"'  which 
as,  naturoily,  apt  lo  npaet  the  al«adinesa  of  the  men. 


The  order  of  march  and  the  manner  in  which  we  formod  Miaaro  w 

followa:— 

Ordtr  of  March. 


a  of  the 


a  to  the 


A  rfpttsrnbFkmKi&Rtdiaff  Camels 
Xnee'hi^llcrad inside  Square 

In  the  event  of  it  being  necewary  to  form  square — 

Tht  Bikanirs  were  to  halt  and  close  up  their  camels,  the  n 

Bikanirs  forming  up  at  right  angles  to  the  path. 
The  2nd  K.A.B.  (Yaoa)  were  to  form  the  left  face. 
The  Somali  Camd  Corps  were  to  oloae  up  their  animalB  tight  o 

Bikanir  camela  and  the  men  to  form  the  right  face. 
The  12  Sikhi  were  to  fcUo  close  up  and  to  form  a  reserve. 
The  Somali  MoaiUfd  Inlantry  were  to  form  the  rear  face,  the  advanced 
guard  makiiig  their  own  way  round  to  the  rear,  as  soon  as  the 
Bikanira  bad  formed  the  front  face.     The  object  of  doing  thia  was  to 
ensure  that  there  was  no  unnecessary  confusion  in  the  front  face, 
which  was  almost  certain  to  be  attacked  first. 
If  I  had  to  command  a  column  of  thia  kind  again  and  had  mounted 
troopa,  I  would  always  make  the  original  advanced  guard  form  the  rear  face 
in  case  of  attack. 

The  advanced  guard  clearing  the  front  as  they  fall  back  the  enemy  would, 
in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  I  think,  receive  an  unpleesiint  surprise  when  they 
ran  their  noses  on  to  the  proper  front  face,  which  should  he  by  that  time 
quite  ready  to  receive  them. 

If  one  had  only  infantry,  then  the  above  would  not  probably  apply,  as 
the  advanced  guard  would  not  be  able  to  clear  away  quick  enough. 

When  moving  with  a  column  of,  say,  600  infantry  (five  companies) 
100  aoimted  troops  and  500  baggage  camels,  onr  ordinary  order  of  march 
would  be  as  follows : — 


The  transiiort  bIiouIiI  move  od  as  broad  q  front  as  tin?  nilure  of  the 
ooiintry  will  admit  of;  the  mounted  advanced  gimrd  being  well  to  the  front, 
probably  3  to  8  milee  according  to  the  country  and  the  information.  The 
aide  faoes,  in  a  case  of  this  kind,  would  oitend  alongaide  the  transport,  but 
sections  always  koEping  intact. 

The  great  difficulty  in  Somalilnnd  was  tbo  want  of  water  and  the  long 
distances  between  wella,  in  m^iny  caaea  at  least  50  miles  and  sometimeii 
100  miles  without  water.  This  meant  that  a,  column  muHt  coTer  at  least 
16  to  20  miles  a  day,  otherwise  you  could  not  csiry  sufficient  water  for  the 
trip.  Now  to  march  SO  miles  a  day  one  cannct  afford  to  be  always  halting 
and  closing  up,  for  if  you  did  this  then  you  move  so  slowly  that  your  march 
would  probably  bts  only  S  miles  instead  of  20.  Consequently,  a  oolunm  as 
above  would  probably  stretch  2  to  3  miles  in  bush  country.  The  only  way, 
in  my  opiuian,  to  obviate  the  danger  of  such  a  straggling  maas  of  transport, 
is  to  scout  boldly  at  hast  3  to  4  miles  ahead. 

A  column  actually  attacked  while  on  the  march  would  have  s,  very  poor 
chance,  as  the  transport  camels  would  almost  certainly  stampede  and  your 
water  tins  would  bo  carried  off  in  all  direclioas.  The  oidy  thing  to  do  would 
be  to  fight  it  out  and  let  your  transport  go,  trusting  to  coUectiog  it  again 
after  you  had  defeated  the  attack  ;    but  the  rifk  of  such  a  fight  would  be 

Assuming,  however,  that  your  scouts  are  well  out  and  you  hnve  ample 
warning,  then  you  can  keep  the  enemy  book  with  your  mounted  troops  and 
allow  time  for  your  transport  to  close  up. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Somalis  invariably  fought  close  to  water,  so  that 
if  you  knew  the  wells  were  held  by  the  enemy,  then  yon  could  safely  depend 
on  their  waiting  until  you  got  within  1  to  3  miles  of  the  wells  before  they 
attacked  you. 

This  peculiarity  of  the  Somalis  was  probably  caused  by  f3ieir  anxiety 
to  be  able  to  get  bock  to  water  themselves,  and  also  by  a  desire  on  their 
port  to  make  us  Eght  ivitb  a  long  waterless  stretch  of  country  behind  us. 

My  own  Intention,  if  1  had  ever  been  put  in  such  a  situation,  was  to 
advanm  with  the  baggage  animals  to  within,  say,  10  to  12  miles  of  the 


329 

w^IIk,  zaribi)  up  the  transport  strongly  and  IwtTe  il  guard  ovor  Iho  coavoy 
and  with  tho  remainder  of  tho  force,  consisting  only  of  fighting  men,  reBerve 
nmmunition  and  hospital,  to  go  out  and  capture  the  wati^r.  After  the  fight 
to  return  with  some  of  the  troops  and  bring  the  baggage  into  the  wells. 

There  isone  other  point  about  lighting  in  bushoountry  against  a^iwemy 
BUch  as  the  Somalia,  who  are  armed  with  modem  rifles  and,  at  the  same 
time,  are  formidable  spearmen. 

There  ore  always  clearings  in  a  busb  aountry.  In  Somoliland  one  oft«n 
oame  across  clearings  varying  from  90  yards  across  to  l.OiX)  yards  in  diameter. 
It  is,  I  think,  a  very  dangerous  thing  to  fnrm  tip  one's  forre  in  the  middle  of 
sach  a  olearing.  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  many  of  us  were  inclined  to  do  so. 
Say  the  olearing  was  1,000  yards  across,  it  lookiid  big  aud  one  felt  safe  (rom 
a  rush  when  aae  was  in  the  GeQtri> ;  but  tho  danger  of  such  action  was  really 
very  great.  For.  if  one  formed  up  in  the  middle,  the  troops  presented  an 
excellent  mark  for  the  pneiny  who  would  all  be  out  of  sight  in  the  edge  of 
the  bush,  concentrating  their  fire  on  us  in  the  open.  Our  fire,  on  tho  other 
hand,  would  be  diverging,  and  the  probability  is  that  we  would  inflict  very 
trifling  loss  ou  the  enemy.  In  a  case  of  this  kind,  it  would  be  better  to 
taki  up  the  following  position,  in  which  at  any  rate  one  fai-e  would  be 
safe,  while  with  tho  other  three  you  would  be  as  Well  off  as  the  enemy: — 

a.  «*•..,(» 


*9" 


path 


^ 

cUarm^ 

y 

££ 

«_ 

As  considerable  use  was  made  of  troops  mounted  on  camels,  Cumclrj, 
the  following  observations  of  Brig.-General  Manning  on  the 
employment  of  camelry  in  Somaliland  are  instructive  : — 

After  conaidorablc  eipericnce  of  the  valuo  of  camelry,  I  am  of  th?  opinion 
that  except  such  a  corps  is  accompanied  by  a  proportion  of  mounted 
infantry  it  cannot  take  cote  of  itself,  and.  therefore,  thongh  the  theory  is 
advanced  that  a  camel  corps  is  a  force  which  should  be  able  to  move  in- 
dependently and  to  defend  itself,  the  practice  is  to  use  moonted  infantry  as 
iconts  with  a  camel  corps  in  order  to  prevent  a  few  determined  horsemoa  from 
harassingafotcemauntedoncameU,  and  then  tiding  off  when  they  please. 


330 


The  gencrnl  idea  is  that  the  man  on  the  camel  dismounts  before  firing, 
and  in  order  lo  dismouDt  the  camel  mnHt  Urst  bs  made  to  knecL  Thia 
takes  some  lime,  especially  ae  camela  are  likely  to  become  restive  with  the 
noiao  of  liriug  nod  are  apt  to  get  up.  When  the  man  wishes  to  mount 
again  he  umtntlj  hni  to  get  the  camel  to  kneel  again.  Thia  also  takes  time. 
(Though  it  ia  uaunl  to  tic  the  camalfl  down  by  the  knee,  it  is  not  very  efflca- 
cioua),  Mon  can,  be  trained,  howerer,  to  dismount  and  mount  with  tlie 
uamel  standing,  but  the  process  of  mounting  in  difficult. 

Tho  valiio  of  camelry  ia  considerable  in  that  they  are  ablo  to  move 
long  diatanpus  carrying  their  own  food  tor  several  diys,  their  camel's  food, 
their  reeorve  ammunition  and  also  a  ooiisiderablo  supply  of  water  tor  the 

Camplry  can  be  utilised  as  a  support  to  mounted  troops  to  cany  reserve 
ammunition  aod  grain  rations  for  horses,  but  when  mounted  troopa  aro 
used  a.1  a  reconnoitring  party  camelry  would  hamper  their  action  in  cise  of 
rapid  retirement.  It  ia  only,  therefore,  in  euch  cases  a^  a  pursuit,  or  for  the 
rapid  occupation  of  a  particular  position  to  be  held  for  a  few  days,  that 
camelry  can  be  said  to  be  a  HHeEul  acce9.sory  to  mount^id  troopa  in  n 
country  iiuch  aa  Som.ililand,  where  the  enemj-'s  horaemen  were  un  occasion 
very  daring. 

The  following  Operation  Standing  Orders  issued  by  Sit 
Charles  Egerton  governed  the  general  tactical  and  adminis- 
trative arrangements  of  the  field  troops  during  the  fourth 
expedition  : — 

Seneral. 

1.  In  the  vioinity  of  the  enemy,  al!  ranks  will  stand  to  arms  half  an  hour 
before  dawn,  and  special  defensive  precautions  will  be  taken  during  the 
occupation  and  evacuation  of  a  campmg  ground. 

2.  During  an  action,  or  when  an  action  is  known  to  be  imminent,  all 
non-combatants  and  baggage  will  be  packed,  camels  made  to  kneel  and  be 
knee -haltered. 

3.  Single  orderlies  are  not  to  be  sent  on  messages  beyond  the  vicinity  of 
camps  [or  posts  on  the  lines  of  communication). 


Armi. 

4.  Arms  will  never  be  piled  ;  at  nigbt  men  will  sleep  with  their  arms 
and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy  maga^inea  will  tie  charged, 
cut-offa  closed  aod  no  round  in  the  barrel. 

B.  The  bayonet  only  may  bo  used  agaonst  an  enemy  who  raay.haTe 
penetrated  a  camp  lit  night. 


331 


ft. 


How  carried. 

Infantry  and 

Mounted 

Men. 

Pioneers. 

Sappers 

and 
Minets; 

Mn-xini- 

Rifle.   Pistol. 

Rifle. 

Pistol. 

Rifle.  •  Pistol 

1 

Tn  regimental  charge — 
On  the  soldier 

On  mules     . . 

On  Somali  camels     — 
In  Ordnance  or  poet 
charge     . . 

120         24 

80         — 
200         26 

200  '      60 

1 

60 
140 
200 

200 

24 

26 
60 

60        24 

160        26 

1 
180        60 

r6,ooo» 
L  Moot 

2,200 
17,600 

i 

600  !     100 

1 

600  ,     100 

400 

100 

30,200 

« 

'  In  belts. 

t  In  boxei 

). 

Encampments. 

7.  All  encampments  will  be  zaribaed,  alarm  posts  told  off,  and  officers, 
soldiers  and  followers  made  acquainted  with  their  duties  in  case  of  attack 
by  day  or  night. 

8.  Officers  commanding  units  are  responsible  for  the  defence  of  the 
perimeter  of  their  unit,  for  local  camp  reserves,  and  also  for  connecting 
defence  arrangements  of  their  camjis  with  neighbouring  imits  on  both  flanks. 

9.  Night  latrines  will  be  arranged  for,  and  no  one  (Somalis  included) 
permitted  to  leave  camp  for  purposes  of  nature  before  broad  daylight. 

10.  When  a  force  is  halted  or  encamped,  the  ground  to  the  front  or  rear 
is  not  to  bo  used  for  latrine  purposes. 

Water, 

11.  The  water  supply  at  an  encampment  will  be  guarded  by  the  officer 
commanding  the  advanced  guard,  until  relieved  under  the  orders  of  the  officer 
commanding  the  camp.    No  animals  will  bo  watered  until  all  troops  and 

ollowers  have  been  provided  for. 

12.  Water  storage. — ^A  Royal  Engineer  officer,  or,  in  his  absence,  the  post 
or  camp  commandant,  will  be  in  charge  of  the  main  water  storage  tanks, 
pumps,  hose  and  syphoning  arrangements.  He  will  regulate  the  supply  of 
water  to  the  expense  tanks  according  to  the  quantity  available.  The 
Provost  Establishment  will  furnish  the  officer  in  charge  with  a  statement 
giving  the  water  rations  required  to  be  delivered  into  the  expense  tanks 
and  will  be  responsible  for  discipline  at  the  watering  places,  and  for  the  issue 
of  water  from  the  expense  tanks  and  from  water  tins  on  the  line  of  march. 

13.  Strict  discipline  will  be  maintained  at  all  water  supplies,  and  special 
precautions  will  be  taken  to  guard  against  any  form  of  pollution. 


332 

14.  Officers  in  obarge  of  water  iBBaes  will  supply  themBelves  with  boot 
blackmg  (obtainable  fiom  the  Ordnance  Departmont}  and  will  mark  with  it 
all  tins  wbiob  oa\j  contain  wat«r  Gt  for  Somalia  and  animals. 

15.  A  speoial  transport  officer  will  be  detailed  by  the  officer  commandbg 
a.  oolomQ  for  charge  of  water  transport.  He  will  be  responsible  for  the 
quantity  of  watec  issued  and  remaining  in  each  tin. 

On  the  march  a,  bugle  will  be  sounded  for  the  daily  issue  of  water  at  the 
mid-day  halt. 

IB.  To  facilitate  the  duties  of  the  suporrising  staff,  empty  tins  on  the 
ground  will  be  stood  upright  and  not  on  their  sidea. 

17.  In  order  to  avoid  the  loss  of  water  tin  hds,  those  concerned  will  be 
held  responsible  that  the  lid  is  properly  screwed  on  again  after  a  tin  is 
opened. 

IS.  Reservoirs  oonBtructed  with  sail  cloths  will  he  lined  with  brushwood 
to  protect  the  cloth  from  stones. 

19.  Officers  commanding  units  will  obtain  from  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment water  tin  keys  in  the  proportion  of  two  large  and  one  small  per  100  men 
and  they  will  see  that  improper  means  are  not  used  for  opening  tins. 

20.  Foul  air  may  be  exhausted  from  a  well  by  raising  and  lowering  aevera 
timea  a  bush  weighted  with  stones,  which  acts  as  a  piston. 

M arches . 

21.  The  normal  order  of  march  on  a  plam  will  be : — 
Non-comhatantB  and  animals  on  as  brood  a  front  as  possible,  covered 

in  front,  rear  and  on  the  flanks  by  combatants. 

22.  On  the  line  of  march,  followers  of  each  unit  will  be  assigned  their 
places  with  the  first  or  second  line  of  transport,  and  will  not  be  allowed  to 
leave  them. 

21).  The  hours  of  marching  will,  as  far  as  military  necessities  permit, 
he  regulated  by  the  requiremenlfl  of  camel  transport. 

34.  Some  water  tins  and  carriage  for  sick  must  always  accompany  real 

iHtMigsiic:. 

£,'>.  At  all  posts  and  with  all  forcou  and  detachnients  where  there  is  no 
regular  intelligence  officer,  the  officer  in  immediate  command  will  appoint 
an  officer  for  intelligence  duties,  in  addition  to  hie  own,  and  report  bis 
name  to  the  Assistant  Quartermaater-General  (nr  Intelligence. 

2(j.  When  a  force  traverses  a  route  the  Intelligence  officer  will  iavariabiy 
either  execute  a  route  report  and  sketch  or  check  exiatlng  rontc  reporW. 
The  offioer  in  immediate  command  will  forward  the  work  to  the  Assistant- 
Quartermaster- Genera  I  for  Intelligence  as  soon  as  completed,  reporting 
important  details  by  telegraph  if  necessary. 


27.  For  meat  ratl(>ns  m^O  animals  will  be  allotted  to  Indian  troops  a 


333 


28.  All  troops  and  followers  will  carry  on  the  person*  besides  filled  water 
botUe,  one  day's  ration  for  themselves.  Animals  will  carry  one  day's 
grain.  In  addition,  camels  will  carry  four  and  Army  Transport  mules 
two  days'  grain.    All  issues  to  be  made  the  day  previous  to  marching. 

29.  Transport  of  Fighting  Units, 


1.  Machine  guns     ., 

2.  „      ammuni- 
tion 

3.  Small  arms  am- 

munition 

4.  Pioneer     equip- 

ment 

5.  Signalling  equip- 

ment 

6.  Medical     equip- 

ment 

7.  Water 

8.  Entrenching  tools 

9.  Great  coats 

10.  Cooking  pots 

11.  Rations   . . 

12.  Baggage  . . 


First  line  Transport,      i  Second  line  Transport. 


On  mules  or  Arab  camels 
10,400  rounds   per  gun 

on     mules     or    Arab 

camels 
80  rounds   per   rifle   on 

mules 
On  mules 

On  mules. 

Panniers,  1  mule  ;  water 
for  surgical  purposes, 
1  mule 

For  consumption  on  the 
march  on  camels 


2,200    rounds  per  gun 
on  camels. 

200  rounds  per  rifle  on 
camels. 


On  camels. 


On  camels. 


it 


»» 


»* 


>> 


30.  Unless  special  orders  are  issued  by  the  officer  commanding  a  column, 
the  second  line  transport  will  be  marshalled  by  units,  in  the  order  of  march 
of  the  column,  headed  by  staff  baggage  and  followed  by  the  supply  column. 
1'he  whole  in  charge  of  the  senior  transport  officer  present. 

31., Not  more  than  three  camels  or  mules  may  be  on  one  string,  except 
for  special  reasons  approved  by  the  officer  in  charge. 

32.  Spare  transport  animals  are  not  to  be  used  for  any  other  purpose 
than  to  relieve  distressed  or  broken  down  animals. 


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